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Jonathan Edwards

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A Word from Editor

Volume 7 marks the second time that a volume of *Theologica Wratislaviensia* is dedicated to the legacy of a single individual. Volume 5 was a no-brainer; Dietrich Bonhoeffer's works have been the subject of popular interest and scholarly research in Poland since a translation of his selected texts (*Wybór pism*, SIW Znak, ed. Anna Morawska) first appeared in 1970. The choice of Jonathan Edwards for this volume is not so obvious. Although Jonathan Edwards is widely regarded as America's leading theologian and philosopher, to date little scholarly research on Edwards has been done in Poland, due in part to the lack of Polish translations of his major works, along with the scarcity of secondary source material available in the holdings of Polish university libraries.

Yet despite the lack of resources and resulting research, Polish interest in Edwards is surprisingly high. When Kenneth Minkema, Director of the Jonathan Edwards Center at Yale University (JEC-Yale), first contacted the Evangelical School of Theology in Wrocław (EWST) about opening a center in Poland to promote research into Edwards' life and work, we learned from him and his colleague Adriaan Neele that Poland regularly ranks second in the world in monthly hits on the JEC-Yale website.

Since the establishment at EWST of the Jonathan Edwards Center-Poland (JEC-Poland) in 2009, our goal has been to promote interdisciplinary research and discussion of Edwards' legacy. In addition to the acquisition of primary and secondary materials placed in the Jonathan Edwards' collection in the EWST library, JEC-Poland undertook the translation into Polish of the *Jonathan Edwards Reader* (Yale University Press, 1995, Smith, Stout and Minkema, eds.), scheduled for publication by EWST in Spring, 2014. The International Jonathan Edwards Conference, organized by EWST in June 2011, gathered scholars from four continents

and eight countries, representing 15 universities and 6 international Jonathan Edwards Centers. We feel confident that Volume 7 of *Theologica*, which grew in part out of the papers presented at the 2011 conference, will help stimulate new and increased interest in Edwards by scholars, church leaders and laypersons alike, both in Poland and abroad.

The articles we offer here to our readers are organized into three groups, reflecting the highly interdisciplinary nature of Edwardsian research. The first section, "Edwards, History and Theology in Context", contains five texts, beginning with Gerald McDermott's keynote address from the 2011 conference. McDermott argues that Edwards provides a unique basis for dialogue between Catholics and Protestants, between Eastern and Western Christianity, between charismatics and non-charismatics, as well as between liberals and conservatives. Rather than speaking of Jonathan Edwards as "America's theologian", McDermott concludes that, "it may be appropriate [...] to begin thinking of him as a global theologian for twenty-first-century Christianity." The remaining articles in this group reflect this forward-looking trajectory. Philip Fisk and Adriaan Neele first show how Edwards, living in 18th century Colonial America, creatively drew on and adapted the views of major European 17th century theologians from the Reformed and Puritan traditions. Next, Jan Stievermann brings us closer to the 21st century by illustrating the possibilities of using Edwards' thought, or more specifically its changing national and international reception, as an interpretive lens for studying the "diverse traditions and trajectories" of American Protestantism. Stievermann's perspective as a historian will be of particular interest to students and scholars working in the area of American studies. Finally, Willem van Vlastuin truly goes "where no Edwards' scholar has gone before", drawing on theology, philosophy and neuroscience in an interdisciplinary exploration of determinism and free will.

Section two, "Edwards and the Word", is headed by another McDermott paper, presented in 2011 at Jagiellonian University in Kraków (Institute of English Studies, Department of the History of English and American Literature). "Theology in the Hand of a Literary Artist: Jonathan Edwards as Preacher", which discusses the setting of Edwards' sermons, the stages of his preaching career, his goals as a preacher and his "incomparable use of imagery", is followed by three papers by young Central European scholars, all of which explore in more depth various aspects of Edwards' use of the spoken and written word. Wojciech Kowalewski's article, written primarily for Polish readers who are new to Edwards' work, analyzes selected sermons by Edwards, with a focus on his impact as a revivalist

and missionary preacher. In "Rhetorical Hermeneutics of Edwards' Sermonic Imagery", Michal Choiński employs cognitive poetics for the analysis of Jonathan Edwards' sermons. Anna Svetlikova closes this section with "Jonathan Edwards' Typology of Language", suggesting that the promise and the pitfalls of Edwards' understanding and use of typology "highlight issues which resonate with certain concerns of postmodern critical theory."

The final group of five papers appears under the theme of "Edwards and Religious Experience", a topic that is introduced by another McDermott article, "Affections and the Human Person". Ken Minkema picks the theme up from there, discussing Edwards' critique of members of his own congregation as well as the larger revival movement of his day, "who dwelt on 'talk of experiences' rather than on practice or behavior." The final McDermott paper, delivered as a public lecture during the interdenominational service organized by EWST at the Pentecostal Church (Antioch Fellowship), which closed the 2011 Conference in Wrocław, presents the reliable and unreliable signs of true spirituality, as described by Edwards in Religious Affections. The final two papers share an element of critique. Rhys Bezzant reexamines the oft-repeated stereotype that Edwards the pastor was more adept as a preacher than a mentor, arguing that while that may indeed be the case, nevertheless his sermons and letters show he was genuinely committed to mentoring the next generation. Joel Burnell concludes this volume by comparing Edwards' view of "true religion" and Dietrich Bonhoeffer's proposal for "non-religious Christianity", suggesting that a more in-depth study of their respective approaches will discover more similarities than differences.

It is with pleasure then that we present Volume 7 of *Theologica Wratislavien-sia* to our readers. It contains articles of interest to those familiar with Edwards and to those who are new to his work, to scholars and pastors, to teachers and students—regardless of whether their chosen discipline or area of expertise is English philology or philosophy, rhetoric or religion, literature or history, American studies or theology. As the participants in the 2011 International Conference in Wrocław experienced firsthand, Jonathan Edwards offers much to interest, attract and enrich us all.

Dr. Joel Burnell Chair of Theology Department Evangelical School of Theology (Wrocław, Poland) Director of the Jonathan Edwards Center-Poland (JEC-Poland) j.burnell@ewst.edu.pl Editor's note: Three of Gerald McDermott's papers are adaptations of parts of three chapters in Michael J. McClymond and Gerald R. McDermott, *The Theology of Jonathan Edwards* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). Used by permission.

EDWARDS, HISTORY AND THEOLOGY IN CONTEXT

GERALD McDermott

Roanoke College

JONATHAN EDWARDS AND THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL CHRISTIANITY

Christianity today is the world's largest religion. According to the Center for the Study of Global Christianity, 2.3 billion people in 2011 say they are followers of Jesus Christ.¹ That means approximately one in every three people on the planet.

It is well-known that in the last century Christianity's center of gravity has been moving from Europe and America to the Global South. While one century ago the average Christian was male and white and better-off materially than most of the rest of the world, today the average Christian is brown, female and poor. At the famous 1910 world missionary conference in Edinburgh, observers might have predicted a future church that would be dominated by mainline Protestants, especially those who took what was then considered a more liberal approach to the gospel, today things look very different. Mainline Protestantism has suffered a drastic decline in numbers and influence in the last half-century, and the two most vital blocs in world Christianity today are Catholics and evangelicals. In the latter group the fastest-growing are the Pentecostals and charismatics, who number today 600 million—more than just about any other community in the world that can be defined by a shared theology.

What is the future of global Christianity? No one knows for sure, of course, but it will probably be dominated by Catholics and evangelicals in Africa, Latin Amer-

¹ Todd Johnson, David Barrett, and Peter Crossing, "Christianity 2011: Martyrs and the Resurgence of Religion," *International Bulletin of Missionary Research* 35:1 (Jan. 2011), 28-29.

ica, and Asia. Asian Christianity will be dominated by the burgeoning churches in China and India, both of which are growing by leaps and bounds. Scholarly observers estimate that Christians in China number between 50 and 100 million, and in India between 24 and 30 million.

Nearly all of these Global South churches wrestle with the challenge of non-Christian religions that have dominated their lands, and today face them often with hostility and sometimes with violence. Therefore any theology that will be able to help global Christianity in this new century needs to be able to negotiate the boundaries between Protestantism and Catholicism, and experience and doctrine. It also needs to be able to speak to the questions of other religions—Why be a disciple of Jesus and not Muhammad or the Buddha? Is there a way to be distinctively Christian while also talking about levels of truth Christians share with other religionists?

I want to propose that Jonathan Edwards provides a theology that is ideally situated for this new world of global Christianity in the $21^{\rm st}$ century. Edwards' theology is profoundly biblical and orthodox. By the latter term I mean that it is part of the Great Tradition shared by Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, and Protestants over the last two thousand years. This is what C.S. Lewis called "mere Christianity," which he defined as "the belief that has been common to nearly all Christians at all times."

Edwards was of course a Reformed theologian with his own Reformed particularities. But with a difference. He was remarkably open to truth wherever he found it, and so often burst the bounds of the Reformed tradition that he inherited. Because of his fresh approach to the Trinitarian God, his theology is a unique bridge-builder, in four ways: 1) between Catholics and Protestants, 2) between East and West, 3) between Pentecostals/charismatics and non-charismatics, and 4) between liberals and conservatives.

But first, a bit more about Edwards. He was a world-class theologian, one of the five or six most distinctive and penetrating theologians in the history of Christian thought. In other words, he was up there with Athanasius, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Martin Luther, John Calvin, and Karl Barth.

He certainly wrote as much. Yale University Press has just finished the critical edition of his works, which in print version numbers 27 volumes, 400-800 pages each. Another 46 volumes are in electronic form, for a total of 73 volumes.

But he was also distinctive. More than anyone else in the history of Christian theology, Edwards made beauty central to his vision of God. Augustine and

² C.S. Lewis, *Mere Christianity* (New York: HarperOne, n.d.), viii.

Balthasar depicted God in terms of beauty, but for Edwards the beauty of God was far more integral to his thinking.

Now let me share what I consider to be Edwards' unique contribution to global Christianity. His theology can build bridges between:

1. Catholics and Protestants. At a number of critical points, Edwards' theology shows both Protestant and Catholic characteristics. In his embrace of metaphysics as foundational for theology, Edwards' theological approach was closer to that of Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, and Bonaventure than that of Luther, Calvin, or Barth. In his reading of scripture and his view of the natural world, Edwards showed a thoroughgoing commitment to typological interpretation—hugely important in the Catholic tradition. This was based on a concept of analogia entis affirming that all created things show an analogy to the Creator. With regard to salvation, Edwards' thought exhibited what Anri Morimoto called a "Protestant principle"—the notion that grace always comes from God, and that it is never properly a human possession or under human control. Yet it also revealed a "Catholic substance"—the sense that divine grace is truly present, becomes incarnate in the world, and indwells the saints and the church in an abiding way. In Edwards' teaching, salvation comes by grace alone and yet there is nonetheless a "fitness" that makes it suitable for God to save human beings who come to him in faith. Edwards' teaching on "fitness" in respect to salvation showed analogies to traditional Catholic notions of "merit".

Unlike Reformational thinkers such as Luther and Calvin, Edwards had as much to say about love as faith. Like Augustine, his thought highlighted love sometimes even more than faith. Also striking is Edwards' statement that faith is not the only "condition" of justification. As Thomas Schafer often noted, Edwards came down again and again on the side of Augustine—the fountainhead of both medieval Catholicism and modern Protestantism. In his ecclesiology, Edwards did not hold the subjectivist or individualistic views of the church that have sometimes been attributed to him. Rejecting a strict Congregationalism throughout his life, he gravitated toward a Presbyterian system that affirmed the importance of trans-local authority. His stress on the church's visible unity was in some respects an anticipation of later ecumenism. With regard to the sacraments, Edwards affirmed the Eucharist as a means of grace and a held to a robust view of Christ's presence. Edwards was perhaps *least catholic* in the rather minimal role he assigned to church tradition in his theological method.

2. East and West. One of the surprising ways that Edwards bridges between traditions lies in the "Eastern" flavor and ethos of his theologizing. For Ortho-

doxy, the term "theologian" is traditionally used for someone who may have little or no technical academic training, but who instead is rich in direct, experiential knowledge of God. Beginning in the High Middle Ages, the teachers and students associated with the emerging universities in Europe began to embrace scholastic methods for expounding Christian theology. The locus for theological reflection shifted from the monastic community to the lecture hall. Within Orthodoxy, however, there has always been a strong countervailing thrust toward an understanding of "theology" and "theologian" in their earlier sense. Edwards' *Diary* and *Personal Narrative* often referred to his own practice of "meditation" or "contemplation." The practices of prolonged, solitary reflection that he first developed during his youth seem to have continued throughout his lifetime. Prayer, reflection, and attentive reading of scripture and other books created the atmosphere in which Edwards composed his *Miscellanies*. Biographers have commented on the solitary, meditative, and almost monastic appearance of Edwards' lifestyle and spirituality.

Another link between Edwards and the Eastern Christian tradition lies in his core notion of salvation as "participation" in God's being, love, knowledge, and happiness. To be sure, the divinization doctrine was not unknown in the West but was far more common in the Christian East. There was no salvation without participation. Edwards' trinitarianism asserted the ontological priority of the Father vis-à-vis the Son and the Spirit, and affirmed both a single procession of the Spirit (from the Father) and a double procession as well (from Father and Son). In this way, Edwards mediated between traditional Western and traditional Eastern Christian views of the Trinity. Moreover, Edwards' ontology of divine Fatherhood was not a mere metaphysical nicety. Instead it carried soteriological ramifications. It implied that all being derived ultimately from God the Father, and that God the Son shared his sonship with others. Salvation meant that human beings—as members of Christ—shared in the Son's joy and delight in the Father. Salvation also meant that human beings—as members of Christ—were recipients and sharers of the Father's love for Christ. Edwards' trinitarianism and his teaching on divinization were thus intertwined—in ways that are familiar to Eastern Orthodox Christians.

3. Charismatics and non-Charismatics. Edwards may be the only major theologian of the modern era who is widely known and influential in the burgeoning Pentecostal-Charismatic movement, which today numbers more than 600 million adherents around the world. No other author has great influence in the discussion of religious revivals. During the spiritual awakening in Toronto during the mid-1990s, there were vigorous online debates as to whether the events taking place

there were signs of true revival or some kind of spiritual counterfeit. During this debate—much of it online—both sides appealed to Edwards in support of their views. Pentecostals have appreciated Edwards' notion that the Holy Spirit may be not only a conserver of traditions but also an innovator and a disturber of the status quo. Philip Jenkins has documented the massive growth of Christianity in the southern hemisphere during the last several decades and has noted the predominantly "experiential" rather than intellectualistic character of Christianity's growing edge.³ Against this backdrop, Edwards' theology of spiritual experience takes on new importance. His stature as the single most important Christian author on the topic of religious revival suggests that he is going to be read, cited, and debated in the coming generation.⁴

Not only is Edwards still cited as an authority on revival but his writings can be cited in favor of more than one position. On the one hand, he displayed openness. He insisted that no one could define in advance what the Holy Spirit might do. This was known only after the fact, as one observed and then tested the "fruit" that came out of a revival. On the other hand, Edwards insisted on the need for caution. Phenomena that were impressive to observers and that seemed spiritual might be spurious. Edwards even spoke of a "bastard religion" that Satan might counterfeit in order to turn people away from true religion. So even as today's Charismatics might learn from Edwards' spiritual caution, the non-Charismatic church could benefit from Edwards' call for openness to new and even unprecedented works of the Holy Spirit. In his eschatological teaching on the church's coming "glorious times," Edwards opened a door to spiritual novelty. What God might do in the future will transcend anything witnessed in history thus far.

Edwards did not affirm—as do today's Pentecostal-Charismatics—the present-day exercise of the charismatic gifts of the Holy Spirit. In this sense, Edwards was on the side of the cessationists. Nonetheless, Edwards took an empiricist's approach to revivals, judging them by their observable fruits rather than by *a priori* reasoning. It is possible that he might have taken a different stance on charismatic gifts in the modern era if he had witnessed at first-hand the growth, impact, and dynamism of the twentieth-century Pentecostal-Charismatic movement. He would likely have found something to affirm in this global movement, as well as much to criticize.

4. Liberals and conservatives. Given Edwards' overt Calvinism, and his asser-

³ Philip Jenkins, *The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity*, rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

⁴ See the innumerable references to Edwards in Michael J. McClymond, ed, *Encyclopedia of Religious Revivals in America*, 2 vols. (Wesport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2007).

tions on such topics as original sin, human depravity, the unfree will, divine judgment, and hell, it is surprising that Edwards would have any appeal at all among liberal, modernist, or revisionist theologians. Yet Edwards has long had admirers at such seemingly unlikely places as Harvard Divinity School and universitybased departments of religious studies. Though his theology might be classified as conservative in content, its style and ethos is closer in some respects to what one might consider a liberal or revisionist approach. Edwards assigned a significant role to experience in theology. Like Schleiermacher, Edwards affirmed the apologetic significance of experiencing God. He was also in no sense a creedalist. Never did he appeal to a creedal statement as a basis for affirming any doctrine. In this sense a formal appeal to tradition in Edwards' thought is virtually nonexistent. Believing that the Reformation and earlier Calvinist tradition was capable of being improved, we have classified Edwards as a "developmentalist" rather than as an "originalist" or a "creedalist." He was akin to later revisionists—if not in terms of his specific teachings, then in the sense of being unconstrained by what has been believed and confessed in the past. Edwards identified with the Calvinist tradition, but denied that he believed certain things because Calvin believed or taught them.

What is more, Edwards used innovative arguments to support his positions. The very method he used to develop his theological positions—i.e., the method of discovery by writing—pressed Edwards to come up with new ways of approaching old issues. His theology thus showed a freshness and originality that has often been pleasing to moderately liberal Christians and troubling to the strictly conservative. Conservative Calvinists have long had a love-hate relationship with Edwards. In response to Edwards' *Original Sin*, Charles Hodge went so far as to call the work "pantheistic" in its consequences. In the experiential dimension of his revival theology, Edwards has often been troubling to theological conservatives.

Edwards showed a surprising degree of reliance on human reasoning in theology. This is probably not what one might have expected, given his views on human depravity. He displayed what Soren Kierkegaard once termed "dialectical fearlessness"—that is, a willingness to follow each argument through to its conclusion. Calvinist critics often blamed the vagaries and errors of the New Divinity on Edwards himself. They argued that he was the fountainhead of a theological school that was excessively "metaphysical," unduly attached to human reasoning about God, and not sufficiently respectful of the role of mystery in theological inquiry. Moderately liberal theologians have generally

appreciated the style and ethos of Edwards' theology, and regretted only that Edwards did not follow his logic to different conclusions. Liberals and conservatives have both read Edwards selectively—picking the parts that they liked, and ignoring everything else. Yet Edwards remains one of the very few theologians of the modern era who appeals both to liberal and conservative thinkers.

In conclusion, it may be appropriate to cease speaking of Jonathan Edwards as "America's theologian" and to begin thinking of him as a global theologian for twenty-first-century Christianity. His thought may have more linkages and more points of reference to various constituencies within world Christianity than any other modern Christian theologian. The outstanding modern Catholic thinkers—John Henry Newman, Karl Rahner, Yves Congar, Hans Urs von Balthasar, Pope John Paul II, and Pope Benedict XVI—are crucial for understanding post-Vatican II Catholicism. Yet most of them lack the vocabulary and conceptuality that might link them to the Protestant and Pentecostal worlds. The same is true of such eminent Orthodox thinkers such as George Florovsky and Sergei Bulgakov. Yet Edwards' thought—while conceived within the context of the Reformed tradition—offers many surprising avenues of approach to other schools of thought.

Imagine a Christian dialogue today that included adherents of ancient churches—Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Coptic, etc.—with various modern church bodies—Lutheran, Anglican, Methodist, Disciples of Christ, etc.—as well as a fair representation from the newer evangelical and Pentecostal-Charismatic congregations from around the world. If one had to choose one modern thinker—and only one—to function as a point of reference for theological interchange and dialogue, then who might one choose?

My answer should be clear enough from this conclusion.

Abstract

Because of his fresh approach to the Trinitarian God, Edwards' theology is a unique bridge-builder, in four ways: 1) between Catholics and Protestants, 2) between East and West, 3) between Pentecostals/charismatics and non-charismatics, and 4) between liberals and conservatives.

⁵ Miklos Vetö—the outstanding European scholar of Edwards—suggested in his generally positive review of Robert Jenson that "America's theologian" might be a limiting phrase that shortchanges Edwards' global significance (Review of Robert W. Jenson, *America's Theologian* in *Church History* 58 [1989], 520-2).

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DIVINE KNOWLEDGE AT HARVARD AND YALE: FROM WILLIAM AMES TO JONATHAN EDWARDS

Introduction

William Ames (1576-1633), whose portrait hung in Old Harvard Hall, and whose *Marrow of Theology* served several generations of ministers at both Harvard and Yale, exercised substantial influence upon the New England curriculum, and arguably ought to occupy an important place in any examination of the scholastic background to Jonathan Edwards' theses on divine knowledge and freedom. During his two years as tutor at Yale (May 1724-September 1726), and while cataloguing the Dummer collection of books, no doubt Edwards would have come across a number of Ames's books, including Ames's *Rescriptio Scholastica*, (1615), which serves a key role in this essay's illustration of the use of scholastic terms by post-Reformation authors. Students at Harvard, and at Yale in Edwards' time as a student, recited Ames's *Medulla* and Heereboord's *Meletemata* in order to learn

¹. Papers in Honor of Andrew Keogh: Librarian of Yale University by Staff of the Library 30 June 1938, ed. Mary C. Withington (New Haven: Privately Printed, 1938), 458. Of the eight books donated by Mr. Mount, seven were by William Ames. It was the Lugduni Batavorum [Leiden], 1634 edition. The original dates to Leiden, 1617. In this same volume, the "historical notes on the catalogues and classifications of the Yale University library," written by Anna Marie Monrad, say that the senior tutor was charged with the responsibility of cataloguing the library books and that in 1725, the first catalogue appeared. Edwards was the senior tutor at this time and charged with this duty, p. 251. See also the similar remarks by George Levesque, in Kenneth P. Minkema and George G. Levesque, *Jonathan Edwards Tercentennial Exhibition: Selected Objects from the Yale Collections* 1703-2003, collection housed at Yale (New Haven, CT: Jonathan Edwards College, Yale University, 2003), 33, 38.

how to dispute theses. Both authors figure prominently in this essay's understanding of the backdrop to Edwards' view of divine knowledge and freedom.²

This essay takes its cue from recent references to "Amesian Calvinism taught at Harvard and Yale" and a putative synthesis of aspects of "the early Enlightenment thinking with post-Reformation scholastic metaphysics," and seeks to identify and establish the influence of Ames, the Reformed scholastic Puritan, upon the Harvard and Yale curricula.³ In particular, the aim is to set a benchmark by which to assess the correspondence between Ames's theses and those of commencement broadsides from 1687-1759 at Harvard, and from 1718-1760 at Yale, and those of Edwards, on issues related to divine knowledge and freedom. The evidence and analysis which follows will make the case that a shift occurred in the way Reformed scholastics used technical terms in the line from William Ames, Peter Van Mastricht, Adriaan Heereboord, Charles Morton, to Jonathan Edwards, especially noticable in the latter's Enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, published in 1754 (FOW). Though much had changed since Ames's day, it is striking that even as late as 1754 Edwards chose to write his FOW in the scholastic style and method, naming the same opponents as his forebears did, the Pelagians, semi-Pelagians, Jesuits, Socinians, and Arminians.⁵ Edwards selfconsciously makes his a "modern" inquiry, and for this reason only engages recent and contemporary authors, ⁶ with the one exception to this rule being his use of the standard thesis of Boethius (480-524) on the unchanging ever-presentness of God. Nevertheless, although Edwards calls his inquiry "modern," the method he in fact follows is the classic scholastic method of explaining terms and concepts, propositional analysis, stating opponents' positions, setting forth questions (quaestiones), and giving extensive commentary, making arguments which rely on, in Edwards' words, "the strictest and justest reason."⁷

To make the case that a shift occurred between Ames and Edwards—largely due to a neglect of the late-medieval and post-Reformation use of technical scholas-

². See, John Noble, "An Old Harvard Commencement Programme, 1730," in *Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts*, vol. 6, Transactions 1899, 1900 (Boston: Published by the society, 1904), 277.

³ Mark Garrett Longaker, "Idealism and Early-American Rhetoric," *Rhetoric Society Journal* (Summer 2006), 5; Oliver D. Crisp, "Jonathan Edwards's Ontology: A Critique of Sang Hyun Lee's Dispositional Account of Edwardsian Metaphysics," *Religious Studies* 46, no. 1 (March 2010), 14-15.

⁴. The Works of Jonathan Edwards, vol. 1, Freedom of the Will, ed. Paul Ramsey (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), 266. Henceforth, WJE 1, and in the body of the essay, FOW.

⁵. WJE 1:203.

⁶ Such as, the English philosopher John Locke (1632-1704), the Church of England scholar Daniel Whitby (1638-1726), the English non-conformist Isaac Watts (1674-1748), the English philosophical theologian Samuel Clarke (1675-1729), and the Scottish moral philosopher Henry Home, Lord Kames (1696-1782).

⁷ WJE 1:423.

tic terms—the next section looks to Ames as the early standard-bearer for the Puritan Reformed position on issues related to Reformed freedom. It examines the contribution of Ames to our understanding of Reformed freedom in relation to God's knowledge of indeterminate possibles, on the one hand, and of future contingents, on the other, by setting forth the complaint of Nicolaus Grevinchovius (1578-1632)⁸ followed by the response of Ames in his *Rescriptio scholastica*. The next step is to examine a manuscript copy of Charles Morton's "Pneumatics," which came into the possession of Elisha Williams, the tutor of Edwards. In particular, it examines what Edwards would have learned from Morton's chapter on "God's knowledge" about conceptual planes of divine knowledge, and the lack of "diverse moments" in the divine mind. Moreover, the evidence will show that this chapter, and others as well, are not original to Morton, but is largely abstracted from Adriaan Heereboord's Pneumatics (Leiden, 1659). We then describe and analyze the use and development by Van Mastricht and Edwards of the formula of Boethius, on the unchangeable ever-presentness of God. The next section displays specific Harvard and Yale commencement broadside theses and quaestiones, which show the influence of Ames upon the school's curricula, and the school's understanding and use of technical scholastic terms concerning freedom, necessity, and contingency. In addition, we examine a handwritten transcription of quaestiones by Isaac Mansfield (Harvard AB, 1742; AM, 1745), as concerns two planes of divine knowledge. Finally, we will assess the disparity between the theses discussed from Ames to Edwards by briefly comparing a principal argument used in Edwards' published work Freedom of Will (1754) with arguments in his unpublished "Controversies" Notebook (1743).9

William Ames as the Puritan Standard-Bearer on Reformed Freedom

Ames on Divine Knowledge and Will

Ames's *Marrow* makes the classic distinction between two conceptual planes of divine knowledge, the one plane structurally preceding the divine will, and the

⁸ Fueled by the opportunities and challenges of what began as a University of Leiden dispute on predestination in 1602, between Jacobus Arminius and Franciscus Gomarus, which grew into the theologico-politico controversy between "the Remonstrants" and "the contra-Remonstrants," as Grevinchovius called the parties in his preface, theologians like Grevinchovius flourished in this context, writing a treatise designed to persuade public opinion by drawing on a long tradition and broad spectrum of authors. Nicolaus Grevinchoven was born in Rotterdam in 1578 and died in Hamburg 1632. He partook of the Hague Conference (1611) and Delft (1613). The South Holland Synod removed him from ministry in 1618. He was not cited as a delegate to the Synod of Dordt (1618-9). See, *Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek* (NNBW), II:505-6. He was a signer of the *Remonstrance* of 1610, recognized by Wtenbogaert and Episcopius and the States of Holland.

⁹ The digital edition of *WJE* (*WJE* Online) 27, hereafter cited as WJEO 27, "Controversies" Notebook, Pt. V, "Predestination."

other structurally following the divine will. The relevant portion of the table of contents in the *Medulla* reads:

Ch. 7. "The Decree and Counsel of God"

25. "The knowledge of simple understanding refers to all possible things, i.e., all things universal and particular which may be brought into being through the most perfect knowledge in God."

26. "The knowledge of vision is the knowledge of all future things, whether they are necessary in their own nature, or free, or contingent." 10

Ames builds on the Reformed tradition at Leiden as is evident in the similar terminology of Gomarus's definition of the first kind of knowledge. The *Auction Catalogue of the Library of William Ames* shows that he owned Gomarus's *Approval of the orthodox doctrine of the providence of God*, which has identical terminology. Ames's "simple knowledge of understanding" (thesis 25) is called by Gomarus "indefinite" knowledge, which according to both authors is "the most perfect knowledge in God of universal and individual states of affairs which can obtain." The term "simple" means that there is a conceptual plane of divine knowledge that may logically be considered as absolutely free from any composition with other divine attributes, and thus apart from or "before" the intuitive (visionary) knowledge of states of affairs, which he sees by the divine will. 14

After Ames, later Reformed theologians, such as Francis Turretin (1623-1687) and Petrus van Mastricht (1630-1706), give the same standard definitions as Ames.

¹⁰ William Ames, *Theologiae Medullae*, reprinted from 1648 edition, ed. James S. Candlish (London: James Nisbet & CO., 1874), 31-2; William Ames, *The Marrow of Theology*, based on 3rd Latin edition, 1629, ed. and trans. John D. Eusden (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1968), 96. Ames's definition in Latin is given in order to compare to Gomarus, Van Mastricht, and Turretin. [25] "Scientia simplicis intelligentiae est omnium possibilum, id est, rerum universarum et singularum, quae fieri possunt, perfectissima in Deo scientia . . . [26] Scientia visionis est scientia omnium futurorum sive sint in sua natura necessaria, sive libera, sive contingentia."

¹¹ Fransicus Gomarus (1563-1641). After pastorates in Frankfort an der Main and Hanau, he became professor of theology at Leiden University (1594-1611). Thereafter, he lectured in Saumur (1615-1618) and Groningen (1618-1641). On his conflict with Arminius, see n. 8.

¹² K.L. Sprunger, *The Auction Catalogue of the Library of William Ames*, Catalogi Redivivi: A Reprint Series of Dutch Auction and Stock Catalogues from the 17th and 18th Centuries (Utrecht: H&S HES Publishers, 1988), 12.

¹³ F. Gomarus, *Conciliatio Doctrinae Orthodoxae de Providentia Dei.*, Opera Theologica Omnia, Maximam Partem Posthuma: Suprema Autoris Voluntate f Discipulis Edita. Cum Indicibus Necessariis. (Leiden: 1597; Amsterdam: Joannis Janssonii, 1644), C.3, 4, p. 159 (pagination from 1644 edition). "Praescientia autem Dei indefinita est rerum universarum & singularum, quae fieri possunt, perfectissima in Deo scientia." (Now the indefinite foreknowledge of God is the most perfect knowledge in God of universal and individual states of affairs which can obtain).

¹⁴ See "Simplicitas" in Richard A. Muller, *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology* (Grand Rapids: Baker books, 1985), 283.

Turretin's definition of the first kind of divine knowledge refers to it as both "simple understanding" or "indefinite," or "natural." And his definition of the second kind of divine knowledge refers to it as "free," or "intuitive (of vision)" or "definite." The first kind concerns "a mere possible state of affairs"; the second kind concerns "future states of affairs, which are called definite, whose future certainty are due to the certain council of God."

Van Mastricht has consulted Ames on the decrees and counsel of God, as is evident in his in-text reference to Ames's *Medulla (Marrow)*, Book I, ch. 7. He also gives a twofold definition of *scientia Dei* in his *Pars dogmatica*, 14. And he, too, refers to the first kind of divine knowledge as "natural," or "simple understanding," which concerns things God knows purely as possibles (*pure possibilia*)." And, likewise, the second kind is "free," or "intuitive (visionary)." ¹⁸

After his theses about two kinds of divine knowledge, Ames explains in the very next thesis in the *Marrow* that the decree of the divine will structurally precedes the knowledge of vision, thereby privileging the divine will.

7. 27. The things which God knows through the knowledge of simple understanding he knows by his all-sufficiency, but those things he knows through the knowledge of vision he knows by his efficiency or by the decree of his own will. Ps. 33:15 and Isa. 44:7.¹⁹

The distinction by Ames between these two conceptual planes of divine knowledge, with Ames's privileging of the divine will, means that there is a non-necessitated, formal plane of divine freedom. "There is no necessary connection between the divine nature and such acts," that is, outward acts of God, writes Ames. ²⁰ The formal plane of divine freedom applies to both divine knowledge and divine will.

¹⁵ Francis Turretin, *Institutio Theologiae Elencticae, in Qua Status Controversiae Perspicue Exponitur, Praecipua Orthodoxorum Argumenta Proponuntur & Vindicantur, & Fontes Solutionum Aperiuntur.* (Geneva: Samuelem De Tournes, 1688), Q. 13, 234. "Solet vero distingui vulgo a Theologis in Scientiam simplicis intelligentiae seu naturalem, & indefinitam" ("It is commonly distinguished by theologians into the knowledge of simple understanding, or natural and indefinite").

¹⁶ Ibid., "Et Scientiam liberam, seu visionis & definitam."

 $^{^{17}}$ Ibid., "Illa [the former] est rerum mere possibilium . . . Ista [the latter] est rerum futurarum, quae definit, dicitur, quia res futurae definitae sunt certo Dei consilio."

¹⁸ Petrus van Mastricht, *Theoretico-Practica Theologia*, *Qua*, *Per Singula Capita Theologica*, *Pars Exegetica*, *Dogmatica*, *Elenchtica & Practica*, *Perpetuâ Successione Coniugantur* (Utrecht: Thomae Appels, 1699), 146, 148. (Henceforth, *ThPrTh*). "Duplex nomen obtinet: scientiae *naturalis*, seu simplicis intelligentiae, qua, circa *pure possibilia* . . . scientia *libera* seu visionis" ("There is a twofold nomenclature: natural knowledge or simple understanding, which concerns pure possibles . . . free or intuitive, visionary knowledge").

¹⁹ Ames, *Medullae*, 32. "Quae novit Deus per scientiam simplicis intellegentiae, novit ex sua omnisufficentia: quae vero novit per scientiam visionis, novit per suam efficientiam, vel ex decreto suae propriae voluntatis." Ames, *Marrow*, 96.

²⁰ Ames, *Marrow*, 97 (th. 36).

There are the two planes of divine knowledge and the one plane of divine willing. God's outward acts are not knowledge-based, but will-based. God wills "by preceding choice." Moreover, "the will of God does not imply a necessity in all future things." The significance of a distinct formal plane of divine freedom—and human freedom as well—is that, by definition, an agent has simultaneous powers to elicit an alternative act, that is, one of a number of possible alternatives (Ames, ch. 7, thesis 25, 47). Although, of course, the number of possible alternatives for God is infinitely greater than for humans. Whichever act an agent elicits, he or she has at that instant the power to will that it not occur, or to not will that it occur.

Moreover, keeping these two conceptual planes of divine knowledge distinctly apart helps one better understand divine freedom of will, that God is not omnivolent, and that he wills by counsel, the choices of which are not necessitated, and that a contingent status of future states of affairs can rhyme, or consist, with necessity, in the sense of the necessity of consequence of the divine decree.

The next section will turn to the more sophisticated scholastic exchange between Grevinchovius and Ames, which will provide more support to verify the significance of holding distinct planes of divine knowledge, and in Ames's terms, "antecedent to" and "following" the divine will. First, we present the complaint by Grevinchovius, followed by the reply from Ames. The section will reconstruct, as it were, the two author's comments to each other in the form of a dialogue, as if they were face-to-face, which is the format the two authors used in their in-print dialogue. We then give a brief analysis of the dialogue.

Grevinchovius (1578-1632)

The authors address each other in the second person singular and refer to each other's page numbers in the original in-print dialogue. Ames had written his *De Arminii sententia Disceptatio scholastica* in 1613 to which Grevinchovius responded in his *Dissertatio theologica* in 1615, which invited a counter reply by Ames in his *Rescriptio scholastica* in 1615. We begin with the voice of Grevinchovius, enhanced for sake of the dialogue, who sets forth his complaint about what Ames had written. The question the following dialogue addresses is: If a proposition such as, "It is the case that Peter will believe," is neither true nor false, how then can God have any certain knowledge of it?

²¹ Ibid., (th. 36).

²² Ibid., 99 (th. 49).

Grevinchovius's complaint: Dissertatio theologica (1615)

You deny that future contingents can in any way be known with certainty and infallibility, unless in the divine will as the cause.²³ If that were the case, then the will is so great that it would be the cause of divine knowledge.²⁴ Moreover, you imply that God's volition posits an objective event before the divine mind, which would not be future, unless the will of God determines or permits it to occur.²⁵ Likewise, your view would entail that God would not know the event as future, because it is not future, and that God cannot foreknow the future, which is nothing short of error. I deny that foreknowledge, properly speaking, is caused by the will.²⁶

The will only produces or permits the effect, which must be known by God, according to the infinity of divine knowledge. The knowledge of God, concerning what is willed, cannot be contingent. It is not a result of a cause or by volition. When God produces or permits an objective effect, the object is known and cognized. You should be more precise and not say that future events are not known, but only that they do not exist, except by the divine will. In other words, I am willing to accept that there is a sense in which future objects do not yet exist, but you must agree that God knows them. And, instead of asking you if God knows what will come about, let me ask you if God knows what will not come about. I believe, that your notion of divine freedom of will is caught on the horns of a dilemma 130:

²³ Nicolaus Grevinchovius, Dissertatio Theologica de Duabus Quaestionibus Hoc Tempore Controversis, [1] de Reconciliatione Per Mortem Christi Impetrata Omnibus Ac Singulis Hominibus, [2] de Electione Ex Fide Praevisa (Rotterdam: Batavorum, 1615), 350. "2. Negas futura contingentia cognosci posse ullo modo certo atque infallibili, nisi in voluntate divina."

²⁴ Ibid., "Quid? Ergo ne voluntas seu volitio potius erit causa scientiae divinae?"

²⁵ Ibid., "Dato, quod volitione Dei ponatur objectum, quod non esset futurum, nisi voluntas Dei id fieri decerneret aut permitteret."

²⁶ Ibid., "Nego tamen praescientiam istam a voluntate proprie loquendo causari."

²⁷ Ibid., "[Q]uia voluntas tantum producit aut statuit producere vel permittere effectum, quod non potest non a Deo cognosci, propter infinitatem scientiae divinae."

²⁸ Ibid., "[Q]uod est objectum, scientiae et cognitionis."

 $^{^{29}}$ lbid., "[N]eque dixisse, futura contingentia non cognosci, sed tantum, non existere, nisi ex voluntate divina."

³⁰ Ibid., 353. I extrapolate in the body of the text from what Grevinchovius says about Ames's view, to wit, "Rather you understand the will of permitting such that future contingents are not known with certainty, for after God has posited a decree permitting an act, a created agent can nevertheless avoid the act. (Aut, denique, intelligis voluntatem permittendi: sed neque in hac certo sciuntur futura contingentia: posito enim decreto permittendi actum, potest tamen creatura actum evitare). "Further, he says that Ames's view implies that God cannot know what a human agent is going to do, due to

If such is the will of God concerning free acts, so will it be of future acts, such that he wills them to occur either contingently or necessarily. If necessarily, they will occur in a necessary manner, and they cease being contingent.³¹ However, if, on the other hand, he wills them contingently—this is without prejudice to freedom and its use—then surely, 1) the absolute decree ceases its activity and efficacy; 2) nor are your acts, as you yourself can judge, able to be foreseen in this decree. They are set forth, and yet cannot occur.³²

Ames's reply: Rescriptio scholastica (1615)³³

I disagree with you on whether God knows a proposition as either true or false *before* (in a structural sense) the decree (*ante decretum*). For future contingents such as, "Peter will believe, (*Petrus credet*)" do not have a determined truth-value antecedent to divine knowledge (*non habere veritatem determinatam antecedenter ad scientiam divinam*), such that they can be known or that they may be said to be, or that they may be said to be knowable, except by the will of God.³⁴

The truth-value of the proposition, "Peter will believe," has not been determined true before the decree of the divine will (non fuit determinate vera, ante decretum illud voluntatis divinae), by which the faith of Peter has been predetermined. Indeed the thing itself (res ipsa) has not been reckoned as a future being (entis futuri), neither therefore as true . . . it is not a determinate truth value out of the nature of the thing

how he constitutes human power either to act or not to act. (At in neutra voluntate cognosci potest certo hominen acturum, quia per utamque solum constituitur potens ad agendum, vel non agendum). Then Grevinchovius concludes: "Now you see, if I am not mistaken, that the decree of the divine will is not a sufficient reason for the existence and knowledge of future contingents (according to your argumentation)" ("Iam vides, ni fallor, decreto divinae voluntatis non inesse sufficientem rationem existentiae eoque nec [ex tua ipsius argumentatione] scientiae fututorum contingentium").

³¹ Ibid., 352-3. "Adde, si talis est Dei voluntas de actibus liberis, erit etiam de modo futuritionis actuum istorum, eoque vult eos fieri modo vel contingenti vel necessario: si necessario, fient ergo modo necessario, et desinunt esse contingentes: Sin contingenti modo, hoc est salva libertate atque usu eius, jam, 1) cessat decretum de istis actibus absolutum atque efficax."

³² Ibid., "[J]am 1) cessat decretum de istis actibus absolutum atque efficax; 2) neque actus isti, vel te judice, possunt in hoc decreto praevideri, quippe quo posito, possunt tamen non fieri."

³³ William Ames, Rescriptio Scholastica et Brevis Ad Nicolaus Grevinchovii Responsum Illud Prolixum, Quod Opposuit Dissertationi de Redemptione Generali, et Electione Ex Fide Praevisa, rev. ed. (Amsterdam: 1615; Harderwijk: Nicolai a Uvieringen, 1645).

³⁴ Ames, *Rescriptio*, 182. "[U]rgebam ego, futura haec non habere veritatem determinatam antecedenter ad scientiam divinam, vel ita ut sciri possint aut scibilia dicantur, nisi ex voluntate Dei." See discussion below under Pt. IV, B, where Van Mastricht uses the same expression: "Futura contingentia non habere determinatam veritatem . . . non habere quidem in se; habere tamen in decreto divino." ("Future contingents do not have a determinate truth value . . . not in themselves, they have, however, truth values in the decree of God").

or internal cause, for there is no necessary junction between these terminate ends (*quia nulla necessaria connexio est inter hos terminos Petrus et fides*), Peter and faith, nor from any external secondary causes; for they are indifferent, neither determined nor determining.³⁵

Moreover, Ames holds, a future contingent proposition, such as "Peter will believe," does not possess a truth value independent of the divine will. God's will is the first cause, and therefore the truth value is not assigned to the proposition by secondary causes, which would root the ultimate cause outside God. Let us suppose the proposition, "Peter will believe." Even though the relation between the subject and predicate may be necessary by a necessity of the consequence of the divine decree that Peter believe, Peter's belief is not a necessary consequent. The proposition is contingent upon and rooted in the divine will. The secondary cause, that is, Peter's believing, is contingently rooted in the first cause, God's divine willing. Message continues his reply:

The force of my argument, hinges, not upon the moment of time in which Peter believes, but upon the structure of the moment of time by which he believes. You insist on this proposition, "Peter will believe": That either it has been determined true or determined false, and that it is thus contradictory to be determined true, if Peter will not believe. But the law of contradiction refers to in the same way in the same moment of time in which an event takes place among us. I refer not to the moment of time *in which*, but I take my reference point from the structural moment (*momento rationis*) by which an event occurs.³⁷

Analysis of Grevinchovius and Ames

Grevinchovius has two concerns about Ames's view of election. In his opinion, it is either marked by an antecedent, causal necessity that destroys human freedom, or it denies absolute divine knowledge of contingent future events which

³⁵ Ibid., "Propositio ista Petrus credet, non fuit determinate vera, ante decretum illud voluntatis divinae, quo praedefinita fuit Petri fides. Res enim ipsa non habuit rationem entis futuri, nec igitur veri, verum enim et ens confunduntur, praeterea, non est determinate vera ex natura rei,vel causis internis; quia nulla necessaria connexio est inter hos terminos, Petrus et fides, neque ex causa aliqua externa secundaria; quia sunt indifferentes, nec determinatae nec determinantes."

³⁶ This paragraph extrapolates a bit from the preceding paragraph for the sake of his argument.

³⁷ Ibid., "Instat ille *propositio hac, Petrus credet, vel determinate vera fuit, vel determinate falsa, ita ut contradictoria sit determinata vera, Petrus non credet.* Respondeo, 1. Contradictionis lex est, ut ad idem temporis momentum referatur, ad idem, secundum idem, et eodem tempore: agitur autem inter nos, non de momento temporis *in quo*, sed de momento rationis *a quo*."

God wills contingently, reducing God's absolute knowledge to contingent knowledge.

The answer of Ames to the statement that a future contingent event is known to bear either a true or a false value, is that there is a third value which comes into play, namely, a neutral truth value of a neutral proposition.³⁸ What Ames objects to is the notion that God cannot know something unless it already has one of two assigned truth values; that it is either true or false.

Grevinchovius does not accept the semantical distinction of a "neutral proposition," which functions on a formal plane of freedom. For him, there is no plane of unactualized possibilities. His semantic field operates on the one plane of this world's factual reality. He denies Ames's distinction of conceptual planes of knowledge, that is, *scientia naturalia* or *scientia simplicis intellegentiae* on the one hand, and *scientia visionis* on the other.

Rather, in his opinion, states of affairs are already assigned truth values. But this begs the question, who assigns truth values, God or humans? His answer is that this happens concurrently, which in effect conflates God's will into both God's knowledge of possibles and knowledge of foreseen states of affairs. And this is what Ames objects to and the reason why a supposed "foreseen faith" forms part of the title of his scholastic reply to Grevinchovius.

That God is omniscient and omnipotent, but not omnivolent, testifies to a conceptual distinction between divine will and divine knowledge.³⁹ For it is God's will that specifies which possible states of affairs God will actualize and thereby assign a truth value.⁴⁰ Moreover, this implies that God contingently wills the state

³⁸ On the semantic distinction of "neutral propositions," considered at the level of pure possibilities, see Andreas J. Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589-1676): Sein Theologieverständnis und Seine Gotteslehre, Forschungen Zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte, 92 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007). In his summary on "God's knowledge" (8.5), Beck writes that Voetius makes the classic distinction between "indefinite" (unbestimmten) and "definite" (bestimmten) divine knowledge, with, however, the divine will, located structurally between the two, playing the decisive role. Voetius's theory of "the neutral proposition," which Beck (pp. 271-2) attributes to Duns Scotus, is "where God's will determines the truth value of a proposition which in itself is neutral" ("Theorie der neutralen Proposition, an, wobei Gottes Wille den Wahrheitswert einer aus sich selbst neutralen Proposition bestimmt"),. Also, see Beck's chapter, "God weet wat Hij wil: Duns Scotus' theorie van de neutrale propositie" ("God knows what He wills: Duns Scotus's theory of the neutral proposition"): "But at a pure level of possibility, contingent propositions are semantically undetermined, for at that level it is not seen when and where they actually are true or not true" ("Maar op het pure mogelijkheidsniveau zijn contingente proposities semantisch onbepaald, want daar is niet zichtbaar wanneer en waar ze actueel waar of onwaar zijn"). Geloof Geeft Te Denken: Opstellen Over de Theologie Van Johannes Duns Scotus, ed. A. J. Beck and H. Veldhuis, Scripta Franciscana, 8 (Assen, Netherlands: Koninklijke van Gorcum, 2005), 142-46.

³⁹ "By his will, however, he does not will all things which he can . . . God is omniscient and omnipotent but it cannot be said that he is omnivolent," in Ames, *Marrow*, 99 (th. 47).

⁴⁰ This conceptual distinction on God willing contingently, which flows from a *theologia contingens*, belongs to the Reformed theological heritage, and is explained by Andreas J. Beck in "Gisbertus Voetius (1589-1676): basic features of his doctrine of God," in W. J. van Asselt and E. Dekker, *Refor*-

of affairs, "Peter will believe," such that God specifies between the possibles (simultaneous alternatives) "Peter believes," or "Peter can not believe." 41

Ames appeals to the "canons of logic" to disprove the notion that freedom and contingency are somehow removed by the necessity of the consequence of a divine decree. According to the canons of logic, he argues, it is not the case that "the connection always be necessary if it be true." In fact, says Ames, scholars should know that the sense of the words of a conditional conjunction are not "absolute" or "positive," but express "a hypothetical necessity." And a hypothetical necessity, or necessity of the consequence of a decree, can consist with contingency. The struggle between the two positions of Ames and Grevinchovius can be illustrated by Ames's proposition, which Grevinchovius contests. Grevinchovius cites Ames as saying, (1) "Unless the world be created *ex nihilo*, nothing will exist."

Ames focuses on the decree, saying that this proposition rests on the divine decree.

Grevinchovius returns to this proposition of Ames and changes it to illustrate the conditionality of God's knowledge of future contingents. He writes, (2) "If the world will exist, it is necessary that it be created from nothing." He argues that Ames's statement (1) is "altogether incongruous (*omnino incongruum est*)." It assumes the antecedent; therefore, by inference, what follows, follows necessarily. Ames argues that statement (2) transfers the status of a conditional future to that of an absolute by "conjectural" (*mere conjecturalem*) knowledge of what will occur, independent of the divine will (*independenter a divina voluntate*). But this is inconsistent with God's "natural knowledge or knowledge of simple understanding." In statement (1), Ames does not conjecture or assume the truth value or existence of any state of affairs. His example is meant precisely to illustrate the point that

mation and Scholasticism: An Ecumenical Enterprise, gen. ed. Richard A. Muller, Texts and Studies in Reformation and Post-Reformation Thought (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001), 205-26.

⁴¹ Conceptually, that Peter believes and can not believe, at the same moment, is not a contradiction. The concept here is not that of "the power of simultaneity" but rather that of "simultaneous powers."

 $^{^{42}}$ Ames, *Rescriptio*, 195. "Negatur hic (ibid.) imprimis canon ille logicus axioma scilicet connexum necessarium semper esse si verum sit."

⁴³ Ames, *Rescriptio*, 195. Ames refers in the text to Julius Caesar Scaliger (1484-1558), "Vide Scaligerum *de causis linguae Latinae* [Lyon, 1540], I.II.c.168." Scaliger's book is listed in Sprunger, *The Auction Catalogue of Ames*, 15.

⁴⁴ Grevinchovius, *Dissertatio*, "Nisi mundus ex nihilo fiat, nunquam existet," 349.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 410. "si mundus existet, necesse est eum ex nihilio creari."

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 349. This section of Grevinchovius's *Dissertatio* cites Ames's arguments: "Sed eandem in Deo vel naturalem esse dico et simplicis intelligentiae." Grevinchovius then responds to Ames's language on this kind of "natural" knowledge in God: "scientiam quondam in Deo naturalem esse et simplicis intelligentiae, puta, Nisi mundus ex nihilo fiat, nunquam existet," 410. On "conjectural knowledge," see also, Ames, *Marrow*, c. VII, "The decree and counsel of God," 97 (th. 31).

God knows possibles by his natural knowledge (*scientia naturalis*) or knowledge of simple understanding; these possibles God can bring into being by fiat. It remains a neutral proposition in God's "natural knowledge" until and unless God decides to actualize it.

Charles Morton's (Heereboord's) "Pneumatics," Copied by Ebenezer Williams

Ebenezer Williams (Harvard AB 1709, AM 1712) finished his own transcription of Morton's "Ethicks and Pneumatics" on 07 February 1707-8. The flyleaf of the notebook suggests that his copy was passed on to a fellow student, Elisha Williams (Harvard AB 1711, AM 1714). ⁴⁸ It is well known that Elisha was Edwards' tutor at Wethersfield (1716-1719), and it is reasonable to suppose that Elisha used these texts in instructing Edwards. A close analysis of the Morton text, which follows, shows that it is not original to Morton, but rather that he largely extracted and translated Heereboord's Latin text on *Pneumatics*. ⁴⁹ Edwards then was at least indirectly exposed to Heereboord and his Reformed definitions on "science in God," "divine will," "divine power"—among other chapters—at the earliest time of his training in Wethersfield. ⁵⁰

What would Edwards have learned? Specifically, he learned that divine freedom was confirmed by two kinds of divine knowledge and their structural relation to the divine will, as mediated to him through Morton's (Heereboord's) *Pneumatics* chapter "Of science in God."

In Chapter 8, "Of Science in God," Morton begins his translated extraction with the definition of Heereboord of the knowledge of God. "The science of God is

⁴⁸ Ebenezer Williams, "A System of Ethicks and Pneumaticks P.D. Carolum Morton. M.A," Harvard University Archives, HUC 8707.394 VT (transcribed 1707-08). The commencing dates for Elisha Williams are taken from the Harvard commencement broadsides, where his name appears. Harvard University, Commencement Theses, Quaestiones, and Orders of Exercises, 1642-1818. HUC 6642, Harvard University Archives. The Bachelor 1711 broadside is in the collection. However, the Master's 1714 *Quaestiones* was procured through *Early American Imprints, Series I: Evans, 1639-1800*.

⁴⁹ Adriaan Heereboord, *Pneumatica* (Leiden, 1659).

⁵⁰ William Sparkes Morris has argued for Edwards' early familiarity with Heereboord's *Meletemata*, whose work also serves as a benchmark for examining the use of scholastic distinctions in Edwards' thought. Morris demonstrated the influence of both Franciscus Burgersdijck (1590-1635) and Adriaan Heereboord (1614-1661), in *The Young Jonathan Edwards: a Reconstruction*, Chicago Studies in the History of American Religion (New York: Carlson Publishing, 1991; republished in The Jonathan Edwards Classic Studies Series, Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2005), 3, 79-80.

⁵¹ Ebenezer Williams, "Pneumaticks." The following footnotes will show that the text of *Pneumatics* is not original with Morton, but for the most part extracted and translated from Heereboord's *Pneumatica* (Leiden, 1659), cap. X, "De Scientia Dei." One piece of evidence, in addition to the obvious translation of the Latin text, is the fact that the English text does not read so smoothly, which is due, not so much to a student's transcription errors, but rather to a wooden translation from Latin into English. The quotes in the body of our text are from Morton's student textbook; the footnotes show the Latin original in Heereboord's *Pneumatics* text.

whereby he does understand most perfectly all singular together and at once truly and infallibly by one eternal and most simple act."⁵² Morton explains that though "possibles" in the "past, present, and future" are "real," God's knowledge of them is technically considered "one pure simple act."⁵³ But to accommodate to human understanding, the following distinctions are made about divine knowledge. The first is that of "possible."

What is possible is "not as opposed to impossible, but future."⁵⁴ This is a significant additional statement since these are real possible states of affairs; they are "opposites" present to the divine mind, as it were, which can be assigned a truth value, be actualized, and obtain in this world, if decreed by the divine will. This first plane of knowledge he calls by the classic name, knowledge of simple understanding: "1. Possibles are "known of God by knowing his own power, Tis called Science of simple intelligence and conceived as going before all decrees of his will."⁵⁵

This conceptual plane of knowledge also bears the names "necessary," "natural," and "indefinite." The indefiniteness of a state of affairs corresponds to the lack of an assigned truth value. And this divine knowledge of the opposite state of affairs corresponds to whether it will be "future," that is, the same state of affairs has no truth value, but can have a truth value. As Morton describes this "indefinite" characteristic of divine, it concerns "the thing without the circumstance of time." This status of possibility is subject to the divine will which, as Heereboord describes, "transfers a state of affairs from the state of possibility to a state

⁵² Heereboord, *Pneumatica*, 188. His stated thesis under the title of ch. 10 is: "Scientia Dei est, qua omnia et singula vere atque infallibiliter uno, aeterno, ac simplicissimo actu, simul et semel, intelligit perfectissime ac distintissime" ("The knowledge of God is that by which he truly knows most perfectly and distinctly all, and all individual, states of affairs, at once and simultaneously, and in one most simple, eternal, and infallible act").

⁵³ Ibid., 190, 192. "III. Ex entibus realibus cognoscit Deus tum possibilia, tum futura, uno simpliq; actu intelligendi" ("God knows from among real entities, both what is possible and what is future, in one simple act of understanding").

⁵⁴ Ibid., 193. "[D]icimus circa possibilia, non excludimus impossibilia, scientia enim est oppositorum, sed possibilia hic opponuntur futuris" ("When we speak concerning possibles, we do not exclude impossibles—for knowledge is of opposites—but these possibles are opposed to futures").

⁵⁵ Ibid., 192. "[A]c scientiam in Deo possibilium vocamus simplicis intelligentiae" ("We call knowledge in God of possibles simple understanding"). P. 191: "Praeterea, cum entia realia dicuntur possibilia, in ordine ad potentiam Dei, uti futura in ordine ad voluntatem ejus, Deus cognoscendo suam potentiam et voluntatem, eo ipso cognoscit entia realia, que ut possibilia potentiae, et ut futura, voluntati ejus objiciuntur" ("Besides, when we speak of possible real entities, it is in order to the power of God, as futures are in order to his will, God knowing his power and will, by which he knows real entities; they are as possibles of his power, and as futures, they are subject to his will").

⁵⁶ As has been seen above, these are the terms also assigned by William Ames. The Latin text of Heereboord, which Morton follows and translates (p. 193), is: "Prior vocatur quoque necessaria, naturalis et indefinita; posterior libera, voluntaria ac definite."

of futurition."⁵⁷ The second distinction about divine knowledge that Heereboord, and Morton, make concerns the "future." Here, then, is Morton's translation of the second conceptual plane of divine knowledge:

2. [The] future known of God by knowing his own will 'tis called science of vision in the order of our intellect conceiving is apprehended to follow his decrees though indeed science and decrees are together eternal tis also called free and voluntary and definite by the circumstance of time past present and future.⁵⁸

The frequent reference which is made to two conceptual planes of divine knowledge, that is, that there is a structural ordering of these planes, before and after, the divine will, is borne out from the text of Heereboord (and Morton). The definition (2) seeks to clarify that this language is an accommodation to human thinking, and that in the divine life of God, "knowledge and decrees are together eternal." The very next paragraph of Morton makes this clear that there is a "twofold estate" conceived, of possibility on the one hand, and fruition on the other.

Hence the schoolmen conceive all things as in a twofold estate viz. possibility & fruition, between those two they place the act of Gods will to transfer thing from the act of possibility to a state of futurition, God knows both say they, the one antecedently to the will and the other consequently. 60

Morton, following Heereboord, holds this "twofold estate" (*duplex rerum status*) in tension with the will and clarifies what one means by attributing "foreknowledge" to God. "Prescience is properly speaking science of vision" and not "knowledge of simple understanding." The latter "precedes" futures, structurally speaking, but is not nevertheless called "foreknowledge." This is because the "objects" of simple understanding are "non-entities." They are "indefinite," unde-

⁵⁷ Ibid., 193. "[R]em ex statu possibilitatis transferre in statum futuritionis."

⁵⁸ Ibid., 192.

 $^{^{59}}$ Heereboord, 192-3. "[Q]uamvis utraque et ipsum Dei decretum ab aeterno simul sint" ("It follows, however, that both [knowledge, given the context] and decree be simultaneously eternal in God himself").

⁶⁰ Ibid., 193. "Hinc duplex rerum status ortus est Scholasticis; unus possibilitas, alter futuritionis, inter quem voluntas divina concipitur intercedere media, et rem ex statu possibilitatis transferre in statum futuritionis: Deus res cognoscit in utroque statu, in priori antecedenter ad illum voluntatis suae actum, in posteriori consequenter ad illum."

fined, that is, without an assigned truth value. They are "possibles." There is therefore nothing to "fore-know." The end of Morton's (and Heereboord's) chapter "On the science of God" and his exposition can be summarized in the following points:

- (1) The prophet Isaiah alludes to "diverse conceptual planes of divine knowledge," and makes the point that there is no third conceptual plane, commonly called, "middle knowledge." Morton understands the Heereboord text to mean "several movements of human thought," whereas the Latin text speaks of "diverse moments," pointing to conceptual planes of divine thought, or structural moments, since all agree that there are no succesive temporal moments or steps in divine thought. By not conceiving what Heereboord was talking about, Morton unwittingly mistranslates and masks from the student the important conceptual distinction at hand.
- (2) The objects of divine knowledge are either in a state of possibility or a state of futurition.
- (3) The divine will is conceived to be located between the two, the function of which is to transfer a state of affairs (*rem*) from a state of possibility to a state of futurition.⁶³
- (4) It is God's will that imposes necessity of the consequence upon future states of affairs; but it is a "derived" necessity, from God's side, not from humans.⁶⁴
- (5) The following syllogism by Heereboord proves, he says, that there are but two conceptual planes of divine knowledge, for the inference of the major can be denied. The syllogism is:
 - a. Every habit presupposes an object. 65
- b. Those things which are mutually opposed to one another do not allow a third to come between them. (Possible and futures are mutually set in opposition to one another, if viewed in their formal sense (*in ratione sua formali*).⁶⁶
 - c. But the objects of (1) simple knowledge of understanding and (2) knowledge

⁶¹ Ibid., 194. The text of Morton is: "Prescience is properly science of vision respecting futures possible (the object of simple intelligence) are as such proper non entities hence God is said to know non entities and impossibles, non entities as possible, and impossibles as opposite to possibles for opposites are together in knowledge simple intelligence."

⁶² Ibid., 198-9. "[Q]uare illa scientiae divinae distinctio tantum notat diversa momenta . . . quod non autem non detur tertium momentum" ("Therefore the distinction only marks diverse [structural] moments of the divine knowledge").

⁶³ Ibid., 193.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 195.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 199. "Omnis enim habitus objectum presupponit."

 $^{^{66}}$ Ibid., "Possibile et futurum immeditate opponuntur, si scilicet spectentur utrimque in ratione sua formali."

of vision are set in mutual opposition to one another in God's mind.⁶⁷

- d. Therefore, what is possible is set in mutual opposition to what is future.
- (6) There are, therefore, but two conceptual planes of divine knowledge, such that, in the divine mind, states of affairs are mutually opposed to one another. This state of opposition, $(p \text{ or } \sim p)$ lies as a foundational stone in the syllogism of Heereboord and is reflected in claim (5b), that a possible and a future are mutually opposed to one another.

The Use of Boethius on Foreknowledge and Contingency by Van Mastricht and Edwards

The Formula of Boethius Boethius's definition of eternity reads:

Eternity is the simultaneous and complete possession of infinite life \dots . That which grasps and possesses wholly and simultaneously the fullness of unending life." 68

The Boethian thesis was meant to answer the vexing parallel questions of (1) how to rhyme God's foreknowledge with human freedom of will and (2) necessity and contingency. He answers (1) by saying that foreknowledge no more causes the necessity of future results than does the light of vision render things necessary, because it shines on them, to use the Boethian metaphor. "God sees all things in His eternal present. Wherefore this divine foreknowledge does not change the nature or individual qualities of things." He identifies two kinds of necessity, a simple necessity, "All men are mortal," and a conditional necessity, "if you know that a man is walking, he must be walking." The former is akin to a necessity of the consequent, or, a necessity of nature, "The sun rises." The latter is akin to the necessity of the consequence of knowing that a man is walking at a certain moment.

He answers (2) by pointing to the modalities of possibility, necessity, and contingency. The definition that God "grasps simultaneously the whole of unending life in the present," holds to a single unchangeable plane of reality such that past, present, and future states of affairs are present to God's mind and therefore necessary. This view of modalities has been called "statistical," which means that

 ⁶⁷ Ibid., "Sed objecta scientiae simplicis intelligentiae et visionis in Deo immeditate opponuntur."
 ⁶⁸ Andrew B. Schoedinger, Readings in Medieval Philosophy (Oxford: OUP, 1996), 199. PL 63:348, Prosa VI, 858.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 201.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 199.

it reduces possible and necessity to a "temporal frequency."⁷¹ For example, to say that a person *can* be blind and *can* see at the same instant of time is not possible. There would have to be a successive moment of time at which she sees. This poses a problem to the Boethian view of one single plane of reality, where past, present and future, are present to God. Is she blind, or not? For in this view, there is no alternative conceptual plane of reality upon which the blind person possibly can see at that same instant of time. Only another future time index is possible in this view. Nevertheless, the Boethian formula stresses that though these states of affairs are present to God's mind, and are therefore necessary, "the necessity of the present is an unconstraining necessity."

But another way is to move beyond the "statistical" understanding of modalities and posit a simultaneous, alternative conceptual plane of reality. This would leave room for a "synchronic alternative possibility."⁷³ In that case, someone who is sitting can be standing at the same instant; and a blind person *can* see at the same moment, on a simultaneously alternative conceptual plane.

We now turn to Van Mastricht's development of the Boethian formula. He follows in the line of Ames and Voetius, as one who does go beyond the statistical understanding of modalities, and speaks of two conceptually distinct but synchronically simultaneous planes of divine knowledge.

Van Mastricht's Use and Development of Boethius's Formula

It is known from a letter of Edwards to Bellamy on 09 January 1748/9 that he wished to consult both Turretin and Van Mastricht in the course of his writing *Freedom of Will.*⁷⁴ We now turn to Van Mastricht and his use and development of the formula of Boethius.⁷⁵ In his chapters "On the eternity of God" and "On the life and immortality of God," Van Mastricht takes several of his "dogmatic parts" to confirm that there is no "before" and "after" in terms of successive temporal moments in God's unlimited life. He does this by explaining each distinct term of

⁷¹ John Marenbon, *Medieval Philosophy: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction* (2007; repr., London: Routledge, 2009), 45.

⁷² Ibid., 46.

⁷³ Ibid., 45, 307, 371. The formal plane of freedom is described as "simultaneous alternatives," in Simo Knuuttila, "Medieval thories of Modality," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2011 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/modality-medieval, 1 [accessed 7 October 2011]. See,also Antoon Vos, who dubbed this theory "synchronic contingency," in Vos, *The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 225, 243. Also, Vos, et al., *John Duns Scotus: Contingency and Freedom, Lectura I 39. Introduction, Translation, and Commentary*, The New Synthese Historical Library 42 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1994), 6.

⁷⁴ WJE 16:217, 266.

⁷⁵ For the development by Van Mastricht of the exegetical tradition of the Boethian formula, see Adriaan Cornelis Neele, *The Art of Living to God: A Study of Method and Piety in the Theoretico-Practica Theologia of Petrus Van Mastricht*, Perspectives on Christanity, 1 (Pretoria: University of Pretoria, 2005), 164.

the Boethian definition, which he cites from his *Consolation of philosophy*: "Boethius has accurately said [that God has] a perfect possession, together and at once, of unlimited life."⁷⁶

He then goes beyond Boethius, introducing two planes of divine knowledge, citing Ames in his text and expressing the Reformed view, which both Voetius and Ames held, that there is a non-successive, structured order in divine knowledge, antecedent to and following, by implication, the divine will. (1) God's simple knowledge of understanding, which is of possibles, is grounded, "not in the divine will, but in God's all-sufficiency," which also is what Ames had said in his *Marrow*. On this point, Van Mastricht says that there is an "antecedent structure" (antecedens natura) of his all-sufficiency to his will.⁷⁷

Van Mastricht follows Ames by confirming the (2) conceptual plane of divine knowledge of vision (of intuition) where future contingents are known *due* to the divine will. And given this structuring, one can hold that "Future contingents do not have a determinate truth value . . . not in themselves; they have, however, truth values in the decree of God."⁷⁸

Briefly, four points can be made at this point: (1) Structurally speaking, before the divine decree, future contingents do not have an assigned truth value (*non habere determinatam veritatem*); a truth value is assigned (determined) by the divine decree. (2) "God cannot know any event, nor the futurity of any event, except by the decree made from eternity, which is most perfectly known by God." (3) "He knows" what he has decreed "by his most certain and perfect intuition" (knowledge of vision).⁷⁹ (4) Van Mastricht improves on the Boethian modalities view, under (A2) above, by drawing on previous author's (Ames and Voetius) notion of an alternative conceptual plane.

Edwards' Use of Boethius' Formula

Edwards engages his Arminian⁸⁰ interlocutors using the Boethian definition—

 $^{^{76}}$ "Boëthio, satis accurate dicitur: interminabilis vitae, tota simul & perfecta possessio. De Consol. Philos. Lib. v. Pros. 6," in Van Mastricht, *ThPrTh*, Cap. 11, sect. VI, 129.

⁷⁷ Ibid., Cap. 13, "De intellectu, scientia, et sapientia Dei," sect. XXIII, 149. "in signo rationis, ut loquuntur, antecedens natura" (in a structural moment . . . that naturally goes before). On this technical term in Voetius, see Beck, *Gisbertus Voetius*, 268 (footnote 18).

 $^{^{78}}$ Ibid., Cap. 11, "On the eternity of God," sec. VI, 129; Cap. 12, "On the life of God," sec. VIII, 136; "On the immortality of God," sec. XIX, XX, 140. "Futura contingentia non habere determinatam veritatem . . . non habere quidem in se; habere tamen in decreto divino" (148).

⁷⁹ Ibid., 148. Points (1), (2) "Eventus nullus, futuritionem ullam, habere non potest, nisi, per decretum ab aeterno factum, Deoque perfectissimè cognitum," and (3) "suique certâ & perfectâ intuitione, intelligit."

⁸⁰ Brooks Mather Kelley writes of the term Arminian that it was "usually used in an imprecise sense by New Englanders to mean any leaning toward Anglicanism (which, it is true, leaned in turn toward Arminianism)," in, *Yale: A History*, The Yale Scene, University Series, 3 (New Haven: Yale University

without building on his forebears' developments—as a foil upon which to make the point that the prescience of God is consistent with the necessity of the consequence of the divine decree. He brings elements of this standard definition into the discussion by quoting some unnamed Arminian source. The Arminian quote that Edwards gives is placed alongside his own source of the Boethian formula. First, the Arminian source:

Although it be true, that there is in God the most perfect knowledge of all events from eternity to eternity, yet there is no such thing as before and after in God, but he sees all things by one perfect unchangeable view, without any succession.81

Edwards' source (likely mediated to him either by Andrew Baxter or Van Mastricht) reads:

God comprehends all things, from eternity to eternity, in one, most perfect, and unalterable view; so that his whole eternal duration is vitae interminabilis, tota, simul, and perfecta possessio.82

In this chapter on "God's certain foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral agents," Edwards repeatedly makes the case that divine foreknowledge of an event implies the necessity of the event, where necessity is understood as the necessity of the consequence, the consequence either of being known, or of being decreed. A variety of technical terms are used in this chapter, such as, necessity "of connection," "of supposition," "of infallibility," and "indissoluble," all of which properly refer to the necessity of the consequence.⁸³ For Edwards, whether the connection is between an event and God's foreknowledge or between an event and God's decree, the connection is the same kind of necessity, a necessity of the

⁸¹ WJE 1: 266.

Press, 1974), 31. Kelley alerts us to the fact that much more was at stake in New England than theology and its conceptual distinctions, as helpful and needful as this paper claims they are.

 $^{^{82}}$ Ibid., 268. Edwards cites the Latin of the Boethian definition twice, also on 385-6, possibly mediated to him via Andrew Baxter, mentioned in Edwards' footnote, 385-6. However, the Boethian formula may also have been mediated to Edwards via Van Mastricht, ThPrTh, 129, cap. 11, sec. VI.

 $^{^{83}}$ "The necessity of the consequence" (necessitas consequentiae) can be understood, for example, as "Necessarily, if I marry Cindy, Cindy is my wife." "It is a necessity brought about or conditioned by a previous contingent act or event so that the necessity itself arises out of contingent circumstance," writes Muller. Cf. "the necessity of the consequent" (necessitas consequentis), which is what cannot be otherwise than it is, in Richard A. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker books, 1985), 200. See, these two necessities defined in Ames's theses logicae 290, 297, 298, and Yale 1737 broadside, Logic 9. See infra under Part V, A.

consequence, in the one case of the divine decree, in the other of divine knowledge. $^{84}\,$

Edwards' statement that "hence there never is in reality anything contingent in such a sense, as that possibly it may happen never to exist," 85 reveals his understanding of the use of the modal "possible," which in this statement is in line with the single Boethian plane of this present reality.

Edwards points out that the Arminian quote of Boethius refers to the notion that God sees states of affairs "as they are in truth," that is, with assigned truth values, which strengthens his argument that God's foreknowledge of human acts is necessary by a necessity of the consequence of God's seeing. That Edwards makes use of the Boethian thesis is, given its original aim, an understandable move. The answer of Boethius is the answer that Edwards gives, namely, "Necessarily, what God sees will happen, will happen." This is none other than the necessity of the consequence of, in the Boethian sense, "divine vision of all things co-present." The service of the notion of the service of the notion of the service of the notion of the necessity of the consequence of the Boethian sense, "divine vision of all things co-present."

The value of the Boethian definition for the Remonstrants (Arminians) is that (1) it seems to confirm one's convictions that there are no neutral propositions being presented to the mind of God. (2) Future acts are always seen by God, and thereby always have a truth value assigned to them. (3) The necessity of the consequence of human acts is concomitant (accompanies) with the divine decree and divine knowledge. (4) There is no possibility of an unconditioned necessity of the consequence "after" the divine decree, because there is no before or after.

Analysis

What is striking is that there is ostensible agreement between Edwards and all four above-mentioned points about what the Remonstrants value. What permits this agreement is the lack of either party to hold to distinct, structurally ordered "moments" in the "unchanging ever-presentness" of God,⁸⁸ whether antecedent to or following the decree, which would have set one party in opposition to the other. Both definitions operate on the single plane of this present reality, a view that has been mentioned before in association with the Remonstrant Grevinchovius. By adopting the Boethian thesis as a defensible thesis, both on the account of rhyming necessity with freedom, and on the "statistical" understanding

⁸⁴ WJE 1:261.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 267.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Mortimer J. Adler, *The Idea of Freedom: A Dialectical Examination of the Conceptions of Freedom,* The Institute for Philosophical Research (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1958), I:445.

⁸⁸ Marenbon, Medieval philosophy, 55.

of modalities, Edwards has ruled out discussion of divine knowledge in terms of a simultaneous, alternative plane of thought.

There are drawbacks in not appealing to the advances made by post-Reformation authors, such as Ames, Voetius, 89 and Van Mastricht, who distinguish two conceptual planes of divine knowledge. What is at stake for the Reformed notion of freedom is (1) the conceptual plane of formal freedom, both divine and human, as well as (2) the privileged and structurally key role of the will, which is the axis around which seventeenth-century Reformed authors understood divine knowledge. In neither the scheme of Edwards nor that of Arminians is there room for alternative possibles whose nature is known by God, but not necessarily actualized. There is no room for neutral states of affairs, proposed to the divine mind for election, for all states of affairs are seen in the divine vision as co-present, are time-indexed, and therefore possess a truth value. These are aspects of divine intuitive knowledge (of vision), but these planes of knowledge are not specified in Edwards' text. By way of contrast with these two schemes, as Ames put it in his Marrow, God's knowledge of all things that are to be known, and his power which can do all possible things, "together they are stretched forth beyond those things which actually have been, are, and shall be."90

Suppose the proposition, "Peter will believe," is more sharply formulated, as (1) "If God considers the possible statement, 'Peter will believe,' and assigns it a truth value, and decrees that it be so, then, 'Necessarily, Peter will believe'." This necessity remains a necessity of the consequence. The consequent, "Peter's belief, or assent," is not necessary regardless of the antecedent decree. Proposition (1) is contingent upon and rooted in the divine will.

Proposition (1) makes use of the distinction between two conceptual planes of divine knowledge. It reckons upon God's knowledge of simple understanding and its feature of knowing "possibles," which may be brought into being and fruition. This attribute of divine knowledge is not composed with another attribute, but is distinct from the divine decree. It is at the level of these conceptual planes that the argument takes place in Ames. Edwards' discussion, however, takes place entirely on the plane of God's intuitive knowledge (of vision).

Harvard and Yale Commencement Theses and Quaestiones

⁸⁹ Voetius, like Ames, understands that God knows future contingents through his will, but not in the Boethian sense of God seeing all states of affairs as present and actual. On this point, see Beck's exposition in ch. 8, sec. 2, on "necessary and contingent knowledge," which traces this notion back to Henry of Ghent (ca. 1217-1293) and Duns Scotus (1265/6-1308), in Beck, *Gisbertus Voetius*, 276.

⁹⁰ Ames, *Marrow*, 99.

The Commencement Program and Ames's Influence upon the Curriculum

The trustees of Yale ensured that the act for founding the collegiate school obliged the president "to ground the Students in the Principles of Religion by reading to them or making them Recite the Assembly's Confession of Faith which is turned into good Latin, as also the Cathechises; and Dr. Ame's *Medulla*." Friday afternoons were reserved for learning theology from Johannes Wollebius's *Compendium Theologiae Christianae*. ⁹¹ Traces of William Ames's influence upon the commencement theses, which reflect the broader scope of the undergraduate curriculum, are evident in the 1718 Yale Bachelor *theses* that the young initiates in the arts drew up together with moderator Samuel Andrew, the second rector of Yale (1707-1719). The theses of Ames are presented, followed by the similar theses on the Harvard and Yale commencement broadsides. ⁹²

Thesis three of Ames's *Technometry*—the measure or study of art— is:

Question 3: "In summary, What does technometry teach?"

Answer: "The general nature and use of universal and particular arts."

Question 5: "How therefore is art defined?"

Answer: "Art is the idea of Eupraxia [good action] delineated methodically from universal rules." 93

Yale's 1718 Theses Technologicae, presided over by Samuel Andrew, included the following: 94

1. "Technology is in general the summary of universal and particular arts."

⁹¹ Franklin Bowditch Dexter, ed., *Documentary History of Yale University: Under the Original Charter of the Collegiate School of Connecticut 1701-1745* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1916), 7-9.

⁹² For a description of the broadsides and commencement days, see, especially, the "Historical Note," in the online article: Harvard University, "Commencement Theses, Quaestiones, and Orders of Exercises, 1642-1818," HUC 6642, Harvard University Archives. Accessed on the online archival search information system: http://oasis.lib.harvard.edu/oasis/deliver/~hua03010 [accessed 2 January 2013]. See also Noble, "An Old Harvard Commencement Programme," 265-78; For a description of the commencement exercises at Yale, see Levesque's essay, "Jonathan Edwards at Yale," in Minkema and Levesque, *Jonathan Edwards Tercentennial Exhibition*, 33-4. For another account of Yale commencement days, see Kelley, *Yale, a History*, 13, 14, 20-1.

^{§3} William Ames, *Philosophemata* (Amsterdam: Joannem Janssonium, 1651), Bk. II "Alia technometriae delineatio per quaestiones & responsiones ad faciliorem captum instituta ac proposita," 45. "3. *Quid docet summatim technometria?* Omnium et singularum artium in genere naturam et usum; 5. *Quomodo ergo definis artem?* Ars est idea *eupracia* regulis catholicis methodice delineata." For an English translation of Bk. I, the *technometria theses*, see William Ames, *Technometry*, trans. and ed. Lee W. Gibbs (University of Pennsylvania, 1979); Originally published as *Technometria*, *Omnium et Singularum Artium fines adaequatč circumscribens*, (London: 1633).

⁹⁴ Early American Imprints, Series I: Evans, 1639-1800. 1. "Technologia est omnium & singularum Artium, universale Summarium." 2. "Ars est compendium, ex Regulis catholicis constitutum." 3. "Eupraxia est communis omnium Artium Finis."

- 2. "Art is a compendium constituted from universal rules."
- 3. "Eupraxia is the common end of all the arts."

And one of Harvard's 1687 *Theses Technologicae* argued: "Art is *Eupraxia*, 'good action,' methodically delineated from universal rules." The influence of Ames upon the New England schools is also evident in the close nexus between Ames's *theses logicae* and certain commencement broadside *theses*.

From Ames's Theses Logicae:

Thesis 290. "The antecedent is not always the cause of the consequent, but of the consequence." 96

Thesis 297. "Every propositional connection, which is absolutely true, is also necessary: This necessity is the necessity of consequence, not of the consequent."

Thesis 298. "This necessity can consist with contingency and antecedents and consequents, indeed with falsity and impossibility." ⁹⁷

Yale's 1737 Theses Logicae, presided over by Elisha Williams:

9. "The antecedent is not always the cause of the consequent, but of the consequence." 98

The following selection of *theses* and *quaestiones* confirms that future contingents are grounded in the divine will, and that there is a structural ordering of planes of divine knowledge prior to and following the divine will.

Harvard's 1704 *Quaestiones*, presided over by Samuel Willard:

"Whether the root of contingency in second causes be in God's will itself." Samuel Wiswall affirmed this *Quaestio*.

Harvard's 1717 Quaestiones, presided over by John Leverett:

⁹⁵ Harvard University, "Commencement Theses, Quaestiones, and Orders of Exercises, 1642-1818," HUC 6642, Harvard University Archives. Commencement broadside, 1687, *Theses technologicae*, no. 1, "Ars est *Eupraxia* regulis catholicis methodice delineata."

⁹⁶ Ames, *Philosophemata*, Bk. VI. "Theses logicae," 184. "Antecedens non semper est causa consequentis, sed consequentiae."

⁹⁷ Ibid., Thesis 297. "Omne axioma connexum, quod est absolute verum, est etiam necessarium: necessitas haec est *necessitas consequentiae* non consequentis." Thesis 298. "Necessitas haec consistere potest cum contingentia et antecedentis, et consequentis, imo cum falsitate et impossibilitate," 184-5.

⁹⁸. In *Early American Imprints, Series I: 1639-1800* (hereafter *Evans Bibliography*). "Antecedens non semper est causa consequentis, sed consequentiae."

⁹⁹ Samuel Eliot Morison , *Harvard College in the Seventeenth Century*, Pt. II (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1936), 634. *Quaestio: An Radix contingentiae in causis Secundi sit ipsa Dei Voluntas*?

"Whether a third kind of middle knowledge in God be mandated other than simple knowledge and visionary knowledge?" No, was the response of Nehemiah Hobart. 100

Yale's 1740 *Theses Ethicae*, presided over by Thomas Clap (Edwards was present at this commencement):

9. "The certainty of a contingency (or event) is not a cause in determining the will." 101

Yale's 1740 Theses metaphysicae:

6. "The knowledge of something non-existent whose existence is possible depends on omniscience." ¹⁰²

Yale's 1740 Quaestiones:

"Whether divine foreknowledge implies the certainty of the consequence" affirmed by Robert Silliman. 103

Harvard's 1759 Theses Metaphysicae, presided over by Ewards Holyoke:

3. "Necessarily, the infallibility of foreknowledge does not remove contingency and freedom of second causes." 104

Yale's 1760 *Quaestiones*, presided over by Thomas Clap:

"Whether the foreknowledge of God of future events would preexist his determination and decree?" Denied by Samuel Lynde. 105

The New England schools were making distinctions based on structured conceptual planes of divine knowledge in relation to the divine will. Without these

¹⁰⁰ Harvard University, "Commencement Theses, Quaestiones, and Orders of Exercises, 1642-1818," HUC 6642, Harvard University Archives. Harvard 1717, "An praeter simplicis intelligentiae et visionis, Statuatur in Deo Scientia quaedam Tertia et Media?" Negat Respondens Nehemias Hobart.

¹⁰¹ Evans Bibliography. "Eventus certitudo, voluntatem in determinando non efficit."

¹⁰² Evans Bibliography. "Cognitio alicujus non existentiae, cujus existentia possibilis est, ex omniscientia pendet." See Ames, *Marrow*, 96 (th. 27). Thesis 6 is clearly consistent with, perhaps appropriated from, Ames, *Marrow*, 96 (th. 25, 27.

 $^{^{103}}$ $\it Evans$ $\it Bibliography.$ "An Praescientia divina eventus certitudinem implicet?" Edwards was present at the commencement and demonstrates in WJE 1 that he fully agrees with this thesis.

 $^{^{104}}$ $\it Evans$ $\it Bibliography.$ "Infallibilitas Praescientiae Contingentiam et Libertatem Causarum Secundarum, necessario non tollit."

 $^{^{105}}$ Evans Bibliography. "An Dei Praescientia Eventus futuri, ejus Determinationem et Decretum praexisteret? Negat Respons Samuel Lynde."

distinctions, it would be difficult to understand the point of the theses. For example, the Yale 1740 Logic thesis 6 makes sense if the discussion at Yale assumed a simple knowledge of understanding of possible states of affairs that do not exist and do not yet have an assigned truth value. Edwards was present at this commencement and would have had a copy of the broadside. Thesis 6 would consist with what Edwards writes in his private "Controversies" Notebook (1743): That which is "in a state of possibility" is not "necessary in its own nature" and must be brought out of one state and into "futurition" and that by "God only," writes Edwards. But it would not consist with his published work, FOW. We will return to this at the end under Part VI assessment.

Isaac Manfield's Student Notebook

Mansfield's notebook contributes to our understanding of the theological content that was mediated to students as part of their program of study. The focus is the structural priority of the divine will and its relation to two planes of divine knowledge: "God's knowledge of simple understanding" and "God's intuitive knowledge (of vision)," necessity, and contingency.

As may be expected, student notebooks show preparation for these commencement day disputations and exercises. A bound student notebook, with handwritten transcriptions of selected commencement *quaestiones*, part of the Masters' degree exercises, copied by Isaac Mansfield (1720-1792), confirms that these two kinds of divine knowledge were part of the curriculum.

Isaac Mansfield entered Harvard college in 1742 and left behind a student notebook in which he listed commencement *Theses* and *Quaestiones*. He found commencement broadsides in the library of his grandfather-in-law's, Joseph Gerrish (AB 1669). Mansfield records the following *Quaestio* and supporting argument from Harvard's 1670 *Quaestiones*, presided over by Charles Chauncey:

1. "Whether the foreknowledge of God be the cause of states of affairs?" Johannes Harrimannus responded in the negative. 109

 $^{^{106}}$ WJEO 27, "Controversies" Notebook, Pt. V, "Predestination" [accessed 4 February 2013]. Quote from paragraph after section ending with n. 39.

 $^{^{107}}$ WJE 1:266-269. It does not seem to consist with his use and explanation of the definition of Boethius.

¹⁰⁸ John Langdon Sibley, *Biographical Sketches of Graduates of Harvard University, in Cambridge, Massachusetts*, 18 vols. (Cambridge: Charles William Sever, 1873-1999), 11:158-60.

¹⁰⁹ Isaac Mansfield (1720-1792), "Quaestiones in Comitiis Publicis Harvardini Collegi Quod Est Cantabrigiae Nov-Anglorum, Defensae & Pro Viribus Propugnatae & Juvenibus in Artibus Initiatis," HUM 6 (Harvard University Archives, 1660-1753), AD 1670. "An Praescientia Dei fit causa rerum? Negat Responsum Johannes Harrimannus." This *quaestio* is not listed in Appendix B of Morison, *Harvard College in the Seventeenth Century*.

The argument is built upon the scholastic distinctions, which we have seen, between "simple" or "indefinite" knowledge" and "knowledge of vision." The former neither "makes nor does," the latter God "does and effects."

"That which God has willed he does and effects. But the foreknowledge of God is simple. Knowledge it is said that is 'indefinite' neither does nor will do. It follows that definite knowledge foreknows future sins, but it will not be called the cause of sin. Therefore, bare divine knowledge does not remove the nature of states of affairs, knowing both the good and the bad." ¹¹⁰

This view affirms that there are two conceptual planes of divine knowledge and that knowledge of vision (intuition), which follows the divine will, is in no way the cause of states of affairs.

Assessment and Conclusion

In assessing the disparity between the theses discussed above from Ames to Edwards, it is instructive to look into the "Controversies" Notebook to see what Edwards transcribes from Johann Friedrich Stapfer (1708-1775) and his *Institutiones* (1743-7), and what he does not, in his preparation for writing on the Arminian controversy. Edwards transcribes paragraph XCIII, "Objectio IV," and then skips over the first "responsio" paragraph marked "a" and begins again with paragraph "b," which ends with a thesis on mere possibles represented to the divine mind, antecedent to the decree. First, the thesis he does transcribe:

b And yet, no representation of a free and contingent state of affairs involves an absolute necessity. Therefore, neither of them are foreknown or foreseen."¹¹²

Paragraph *a*, however, he consciously rejects and skips over, presumably because it would not fit his scheme. The thesis he does not transcribe:

a Above all it must be held, what we have often observed, that neither divine foreknowledge of a state of affairs, nor predestination of a state

 $^{^{110}}$ lbid., "Sic quiquid voluit, fecit & effeciet. Sed praescire Dei. Simplexq: Scientia dicta, Indefinite nie facit aut faciet. Sic definite praescit peccata futura. Sed non peccati causa vocandus erit. Ergo, Naturam rerum Divina Scientia nuda non tollit, cogens quae bona, quae mala."

¹¹¹ WJEO 27, "Controversies" Notebook, Pt. V "Predestination" [accessed 4 February 2013].

¹¹² Ibid., paragraph ending with footnote 10. The Latin transcription is compared with the source: Johan Friedrich Stapfer, *Institutiones Theologicae Polemicae Universae*, *Ordine Scientifico dispositae*, 5 vols. (Tiguri [Zurich], 1743-47; 4th ed., Tiguri: Heideggerum et socios, 1756-7), 4:579. (The pagination follows the 4th edition.)

of affairs infers absolute necessity."113

In his FOW, Edwards adopts neither thesis a nor b, but arrives at a different conclusion, namely, that the divine decree does not increase or change the already absolute nature of the connection, nor God's knowledge of the event decreed. Stapfer, contrary to Edwards' view, makes clear in paragraph a that what God foreknows as contingent remains contingent, and what he foreknows as necessary, necessary. The predetermination by the divine will does not change a contingent status into a necessary status. 115

Moreover, in his "Controversies" notebook, Edwards shows that he is quite familiar with the structural distinctions, such as have been drawn from primary sources above, like the distinction between possible states of affairs, which are antecedent to the decree, and not necessary in their own nature, and the decree which brings them "out of a state of mere possibility, into a state of futurition." A brief sampling from the notebook will show his awareness and his own exposition of these conceptual planes of thought, including his emphasis of the key role of the divine will.

Edwards picked up the notion of "mere possibilities represented to the divine mind antecedent to the decree (*antecedenter ad decretum*)."¹¹⁷ He argued that it is not the case that the proposition, "such a thing will be," is necessary in its own nature, rather, "the reason of the futurition of the thing . . . can be no other than God's decree."¹¹⁸ God determines "the truth of the proposition" and decides "whether the proposition shall be true or not." Edwards contests with Arminians who hold that God knows that things are future, or not, "antecedent to God's decree, and independent of it." For, argues Edwards, if it were so, then "God has no power

 $^{^{113}}$ Stapfer, *Institutiones*, 4:578. "a. Tenendum hic ante omnia, quod saepius jam a nobis observatum fuit, nec divinam rerum Praescientiam nec praedeterminationem rebus absolutam inferre necessitatem."

¹¹⁴ WJE 1;261.

 $^{^{115}}$ Stapfer, *Institutiones*, Paragraph a: "Siquidem Deus res liberas praesciat et decernat ceu res liberas, contingentes ut contingentes, necessarias vero ut necessarias; praescientia futuritionis rerum earundemque praedeterminatio in rebus ipsis nihil mutat." (If in fact God foreknows free states of affairs and determines them as if free states of affairs, contingent as contingent, but necessary as necessary, then the foreknowledge of future states of affairs and the predetermination of the same, changes nothing in the states themselves.)

 $^{^{116}}$ WJEO 27, "Controversies" Notebook, the paragraph following n. 39 [accessed 4 February 2013]. The notion of transferring a state of affairs "from a state of possibility to a state of futurition" is in Stapfer, *Institutiones*, I:108, CDXL. Edwards has transcribed whole sections, in Latin, from Stapfer, vols. IV (starting at p. 577) and V (p. 185) on the Arminian controversy.

 $^{^{117}}$ Ibid., from paragraphs ending with n. 10. Translation mine; the source is Stapfer's *Institutiones*, vol. 4, 578, cap. XVII, *De Arminianis*.

 $^{^{118}}$ Ibid., paragraph following n. 39. The argument is directed against the Molinist, Arminian, Remonstrant notion of divine "middle knowledge."

by his decree to make anything future or not future."¹¹⁹ A principal argument in FOW is Edwards' use of the necessity of the consequence of the divine decree, which he associates with the strength of an implicative proposition, whose subject and predicate have an indissoluble bond. The thesis he draws on in support of his argument is the formula of Boethius on the unchanging ever-presentness of God and what he sees. Of the two aspects of the formula outlined above, under (IV. A) "the formula of Boethius," (1) the necessity of the consequence of what God sees, and (2) the statistical approach to the modalities of a single unchangeable plane of reality, Edwards infers in his exposition both (1) and (2), but favors the use of the former and neglects to gain from the development of the latter, into synchronically contingent conceptual planes of reality, as seen in the development from Ames to Van Mastricht. The early medieval formula cannot, with only a single present plane of reality, bear the weight of Edwards' claim to defend Reformed divine knowledge and freedom against the scheme of Arminians, at least not with the present perspective on the greater strengths of the arguments in the beginning of the Ames to Edwards historical trajectory. 120

This essay has raised evidence from primary sources that highlights the problem of interpretation that a published work like Edwards' *FOW* creates, when compared with his use of sources in his private notebooks. He does not feel beholden to defending an historical line of Reformed arguments, but projects a modern trajectory, appropriating one and leaving aside another of an author's arguments, selecting what best fits his own scheme, all the while writing in the mode of classic scholastic-style and method. A related topic is his appeal to a late-classical, early-medieval authority such as Boethius in his writing strategy against the Arminians, rather than to other above-mentioned authors in the line back to Ames.

This study has raised these issues from primary sources and has hopefully pointed the way to the need for such research in order to better understand Edwards in his time and the shift away from use of the "more" sophisticated understanding of distinct conceptual planes of divine knowledge. Edwards, like Van Mastricht before him, first gave arguments from the Bible for necessity of consequence based on infallible divine prescience, in *FOW* Part II, section 11, followed in the next section by reasoned argumentation to arrive at a better understanding of the necessity of the consequence. And Edwards and Van Mastricht, like Ames

¹¹⁹ Ibid., ending with n. 40.

¹²⁰ It is conceivable that the definition of Boethius was mediated to Edwards through Stapfer, since it is stated in *Institutiones*, I:75 (CCCIV); divine knowledge of simple understanding and of vision are defined by Stapfer in I:87 (CCCLVIII-CCCLX). That Stapfer moves beyond the Boethian thesis and develops a robust view of contingency raises the question of why Edwards left these ideas out of his treatise against the Arminians.

in his *Marrow* before them, cite the locus classicus of Acts 15:18, "Known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world."¹²¹ On this text, Edwards customarily speaks of what God "foresees," whereas Ames and Van Mastricht distinguish between what God knows and what he foresees. The question is which line of reason most convincingly specifies how his works are known, without compromising the integrity of divine knowledge and freedom.

Abstract

This essay makes the case that a significant shift occurred in the conception of the doctrine of divine knowledge and freedom, in the line from William Ames (1576-1633), traced through Van Mastricht, Heereboord, and Morton, to Edwards, marked by a neglect, intentional or otherwise, of technical terms used by post-Reformation scholastic authors... The study begins with the exchange of arguments in Ames's Scholastic reply to the Remonstrant Nicolaus Grevinchovius (1615) and the latter's Theological treatise (1615). The essay also examines a manuscript copy of Charles Morton's "Pneumaticks," and claims that the evidence from the flyleaf shows that this student notebook came into the possession of Elisha Williams, Edwards' tutor at Wethersfield. Moreover, evidence shows that the text is a translation of Heereboord's "Pneumatics" and that a few crucial passages have been mistranslated, evidencing the shift that occurred in the understanding and use of technical terms. The essay will then examine the use and development by Van Mastricht and Edwards, in the latter's Freedom of Will, of the well-known formula of Boethius (480-524) regarding the unchanging ever-presentness of God, as well as Edwards' (1743) "Controversies" Notebook (WJE Online Vol. 27), on "Predestination." Finally, select Harvard and Yale commencement broadside theses and quaestiones show the influence of Ames and that technical distinctions on structured conceptual planes of divine knowledge were being made in the schools, which are necessary to understanding the Reformed doctrine of divine freedom. It appears that Edwards, however, rested his published arguments on Boethius's single conceptual plane of divine knowledge rather than appropriating a post-Reformation development of a twofold conceptual scheme.

 $^{^{121}}$ WJE 1:251. See, Ames, *Marrow*, 94. Thesis 7, "Every decree of God is eternal," with Acts 15:18 referenced. The Bible verse is v. 18, not v. 8, corrected from Latin version.

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THE CATHOLICITY OF POST-REFORMATION BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION

"See Poole's *Synopsis*, in loc., place marked..." Thus Jonathan Edwards (1703-58) noted in his *Blank Bible* on Genesis 6:2. Such annotation presents the modern reader not only with challenges but also provides a window into the world of biblical exegesis of the eighteenth-century preacher of New England. Both the absence of Edwards' copy of Matthew Poole's (1624-1679) *Synopsis Criticorum aliorumque Sacrae Scripturae Interpretum*, and consequently an inability to identify a more precise location, as found elsewhere in Edwards' writings, lead to questions about determining the extent of his interest and dependency of Poole's interpretative comments. This is further complicated by the nature of Poole's work—a massive

¹ WJE 24:145 [accessed between January 10 and March 30, 2011].

² WJE 24:134, (Gen. 2:17), 141 (Gen. 4:1, Gen. 4:4, and Gen. 4:7), 143 (Gen. 4:26), 144 (Gen. 5:21), 146 (Gen. 6:14, and Gen. 7:20), 149 (Gen. 8:7-8), 150 (Gen. 9:19), 884 (Matt.11:5), 955 (John 16:8-11), and 995 (Rom 4:19).

³ Matthew Poole, Synopsis Criticorum aliorumque Sacrae Scripturae Interpretum, 5 vols. (London: S. Flesher, 1669-76). On Edwards's copy of the Synopsis see WJE 24:61. On Poole's biographical details, see Gerald Bray, "Poole, Matthew (1624-1679)," Dictionary of Major Biblical Interpreters, ed. Donald K. McKim (Downers Grove: IVP Academic / Nottingham: Inter-Varsity Press, 2007), 840-42; Nicholas Keene, "Poole, Matthew (1624?-1679)," Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford University Press, 2004) [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/22518, accessed 21 Jan 2011]; Thomas Harley, Matthew Poole. His Life, His Times, His Contributions Along with His Argument against The Infallibility of the Roman Catholic Church (New York, Bloomington: Universe, 2009), 1-84; WJE 5:59-61; WJE 24:60.

 $^{^4}$ For example, WJE 24:1157: "See Poole's Synopsis , in loc., p. 1358, right column, d, place marked in margin."

⁵ Stein observes, WJE 24:61, "the precise location of his marks remains uncertain, though it is usually

synopsis and compilation of multiple sources of various faith traditions, offering an opportunity to appraise early modern biblical interpretation.

The importance of Edwards' exegetical engagement with Poole's *Synopsis* cannot be overlooked.⁶ He relied on this seventeenth-century Scripture commentary in writings such as *Original Sin*, "Types of the Messiah," "Notes on Scripture," the "Miscellanies," "Discourse on the Trinity," the sections on "Justification" in the "Controversies" notebook, "Defense of Pentateuch as a Work of Moses," and "Notes on Christianity." Moreover, the significance of the *Synopsis* is exceptionally shown in the *Blank Bible*, where Edwards refers 792 times to Poole's *magnus opus*, and particularly in Old Testament exegetical reflections—more than all other references to the *Synopsis* in his *corpus* combined. Furthermore, these references, taken together, show Edwards' life-long occupation with exegetical issues as well his continuous reliance on Poole's *Synopsis* from late 1730 to early 1757. The extensive use of the *Synopsis* by Edwards warrants further examination of this five-volume, 9,000 page marshalling of Post-reformation Scripture commentary that attests to deep acquaintance with non-Christian sources, such as rabbinical

not difficult to identify the passage he intended." However, Poole comments most times at a particular word, phrase, or clause of the biblical text, and provide various sources of exegetical interpretations leaving open the question of precise dependency of Edwards on Poole's *Synopsis*, if any.

⁶ Edwards' use of Poole's *Synopsis* is acknowledged in general. See for example, WJE 26:199: "This massive compilation of biblical exegesis . . . would later become a favorite source for Edwards"; WJE 3:83-84, WJE 5:59-61, WJE 11:24-27, WJE 13:127, n. 3; WJE 15:6-7, WJE 21:330, WJE 24:60-62, WJE 26:83, 146; Robert E. Brown, *Jonathan Edwards and the Bible* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 9.

Original Sin, WJE 3:266; "Types of the Messiah," WJE 11:201, 212, 323; "Notes on Scripture": WJE 15:160 (no. 222, on II Kgs. 24:8), 162 (no. 223, on Lev. 27:2), 169 (no. 223, on Judg. 11), 469 (no. 416, on Numb. 21:14), 483 (no. 419, on Ex. 2:3), 514 (no. 432, on Ex. 12:12), 583 (no. 486, on Cant. 4:3; no. 484, on Cant. 4:4), 585 (no. 490, on Cant. 7:1; no. 491, on Cant. 8:2), 587 (no. 493, on Cant. 7:4); the "Miscellanies": WJE 18:264 (Ex. 12:16, no. 691, "On the Sabbath"); WJE 20:231 (II Pet. 3:7, no. 956, "On Traditions among Heathen Concerning the Conflagration"), 364 (Deut. 12:8, no.1027, "Abolishing the Ceremonial Law by Christ"); WJE 23:112 (Ex. 7:12, no. 1190, "Christian Religion. Success of the Gospel in the Overthrow of Heathenism. Christ's Miracles"), 119 (Luke 18:22, no. 1198, "Christ's coming being spoken of as nigh at hand"), 176 (Deut. 4:7, no. 1243, "Trinity"), 387 (Gen. 49:27, no. 1347, "Prophecies of the Old Testament"), 417 (II Pet. 3:8, no. 1349, "The Divinity of Christ"), 482 (Lev. 1:4, 16:21, and 16:28, Is. 53, no. 1352, "Christ's Satisfaction or Atonement, etc."), 484 (Lev. 1:4, no. 1352), 615 (Ps.50:1, no.1358, "Divinity of Christ"), 637 (Ps. 45:6, entry "Concerning the Reasonableness of the Doctrine of Imputation of Merit"); WJEO 30 (Ps. 69, no. 1067 [pt. 2], "Prophecies of the Messiah," and Ps. 47:9, Deut. 10:16, no. 1068 [pt. 4], "The Fulfillment of the Prophecies of the Messiah"); "Discourse on the Trinity": WJE 21:127 (Lev. 1:14); "Controversies," On Justification: WJE 21:386 (Ps.17:15); "Defense of Pentateuch as a Work of Moses," WJEO 28, n. 31; "Notes on Christianity," WJEO 28 (the Epistle to the Hebrews).

⁸ WJE 24.1:60.

⁹ WJE 24, 1:60, Table 2 (Pentateuch 211x, Historical Books 299x, Wisdom Literature 263x, Prophets 5x, Gospel and Acts 6x, Epistles 8x, and Apocalypse 0x).

¹⁰ The *Blank Bible* entries commenced in October 1730 though this should not be an immediate basis for Edwards' use of Poole's *Synopis*, Cf. WJEO, "Chronology" (accessed January 18, 2011). The references to the *Synopsis* in the "Miscellanies" date from ca. late 1733 to 1743/44, and in the "Notes on Scripture" from ca. 1734 to 1754. The reference to the *Synopsis* in *Original Sin* dates from the summer of 1756 to early 1757. Cf. WJE 3:19, WJE 16:696.

interpretation, and non-Protestant sources, such as Roman Catholic exegesis.¹¹

Therefore, this paper will explore, first, the place and essence of Poole's *Synopsis* in the history of Post-reformation biblical exegesis. Secondly, I will assess interpretative trajectories in Edwards' use of the *Synopsis*, including, but not limited to, a review of the *Blank Bible* entry on Gen. 6:2.

Poole's Synopsis in the History of Exegesis: Context and Content

The *Synopsis*, and its derived work, the *Annotations upon the Holy Bible*, ¹² can be placed within the Post-reformation era (ca. 1565-1725), and specifically the high orthodoxy of the Post-reformation Reformed period (ca. 1640-1685). ¹³ Although an examination of the method and practice of Post-reformation biblical interpretation, as with such inquiries in the Edwards *corpus*, awaits a much-needed appraisal, ¹⁴ David C. Steinmetz, Richard A. Muller, and others demonstrate that the seventeenth century stands as

not only a continuation of the philological and interpretive development of the Renaissance and Reformation but also as the great era of Protestant linguistic study, whether in the biblical or in the cognate languages. ¹⁵

The *loci* of the theological system arose directly out of meditation on specific

¹¹ Poole, *Synopsis*, Vol. I, Complectens libros à Genesi ad Jobum divisum in duas partes, Vol. II, Complectens libros Jobi, Psalmorum, Proverbiorum, Ecclesiastis, & Cantici Canticorum, divisum in duas partes, Vol. III, Complectens Prophetas omnes, tum Majores, tum Minores, nobis dictos, divisum in duas partes, Vol. IV, Complectens omnes libros Novi Testamenti, divisum in duas partes, Vol. IV.2 (V) pars posterior. Complectens Epistolas universas & Apocalypsin. Hereafter called *Synopsis*. The work is cited hereafter as Poole, *Synopsis*, vol. no.: page no.line no. For a helpful and partial English translation of the *Synopsis*, see *The Exegetical Labors of the Reverend Matthew*, transl. Steven Dilday, ed. R. Andrew Myers (Culpeper, VA: Master Poole Publishing 2007-10): Vol.1 (Gen. 1-9), Vol. 2 (Gen. 10-22), Vol. 3 (Gen. 23-50), Vol. 4 (Exod. 1-18), Vol. 5 (Exod. 19-40), Vol.80 (Rev. 1-7), Vol. 81 (Rev. 8-14), Vol. 82 (Rev. 15-22).

¹² Matthew Poole, Annotations upon the Holy Bible: wherein the sacred text is inserted, and various readings annex'd, together with parallel scriptures, the more difficult terms in each verse are explained, seeming contradictions reconciled, questions and doubts resolved, and the whole text opened, 2 vols. (London: Printed by John Richardson, 1683-85). Poole completed the work to Is. 58:1-14 before his death. From Lives of Eminent and Illustrious Englishmen, from Alfred the Great to the Latest Times, on an Original Plan, ed. George Cunningham, 3:175, "The remainder [of the Annotations, after Poole's death] was supplied by several other persons, viz. Mr Jackson, Dr Collins, Mr Hurst, Mr Cooper, Mr Vinke, Mr Mayo, Mr Veal, Mr Adams, Mr Barker, Mr Ob. Hughes, and Mr Howe."

¹³ Muller distinguishes the Post-reformation Reformed era in (1) early orthodoxy (ca. 1565-1618-1640), (2) high orthodoxy (ca 1640-1685-1725), and (3) late orthodoxy (after 1725-), Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformed Reformed Dogmatics. The Rise and Developments of Reformed Orthodoxy, ca. 1520 to ca. 1725 (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003), I:30-32.

¹⁴ For Edwards studies, Stein and Kimnach excepted.

¹⁵ Richard A. Muller, "Biblical Interpretation in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," *Dictionary of Major Biblical Interpreters*, ed. McKim, 31.

texts,¹⁶ as is attested, for example, in the exegetical work of Johannes Piscator (1546-1625) on the Old Testament, which is typological and Christological in nature¹⁷—a commentary which was frequently used by Poole¹⁸ and not unknown to Edwards.¹⁹ Seventeenth-century exegetical works were by and large aimed at theological and practical ends, and resonated more with medieval and patristic exegesis than with the modern higher-critical interpretation of Scripture. As such, the hermeneutical, philological, and text-critical work of the post-Reformation period disagrees with so-called proof-text characterization—that is, biblical exegesis confined to confirm established doctrine.²⁰ Furthermore, this period can be characterized as an intensification of scholarly biblical exegesis and outgrowth of Renaissance ideals following the Reformation both by Roman Catholic and Protestant exegetes.²¹ Moreover, many Post-reformation exegetes, such Henry Ainsworth (1571-

¹⁶ On sixteenth-century Protestant exegesis, see *The Bible in the Sixteenth Century*, ed. David C. Steinmetz (Durham, London: Duke University Press, 1990); Calvin and the Bible, ed. Donald K. McKim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Biblical Interpretation in the Era of Reformation, Essays Presented to David C. Steinmetz in Honor of His Sixtieth Birthday, ed. Richard A. Muller and John L. Thompson (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1996); I. D. Backus and F. M Higman, Théorie et practique de l'exégèse: Actes du troisieme Colloqui international sur l'histoire de l'exégèse biblique au XVIe siècle (Geneve: Droz, 1990); Gerald Bray, Biblical Interpretation Past & Present (Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 1996). For Calvin studies in particular, see H. Henry Meeter Center, The John Calvin Bibliography, http://www.calvin.edu/meeter/publications/calvin-bibliography.htm (accessed January 18, 2011). On seventeenth-century Reformed Protestant biblical interpretation, see Muller, "Biblical Interpretation in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," 31-44; W. Perkins, A Commentary on Galatians, ed. G. T. Sheppard with introductory essays by B. S. Child, G. T. Sheppard, and J. H. Augustine, Pilgrim Classic Commentaries (New York: Pilgrim, 1989), vol. II; David C. Steinmetz, "The Superiority of Pre-Critical Exegesis," Theology Today 37 (1980): 27-38, reprinted in A Guide to Contemporary Hermeneutics, ed. Donald K. McKim (Grand Rapids: Wm. Eerdmans, 1986), 65-77; Henry M. Knapp, "Understanding the Mind of God: John Owen and Seventeenth-Century Exegetical Methodology," Ph.D. diss., Calvin Theological Seminary, 2002; Brian Lee, "J. Cocceius's Exegesis of the Epistle of the Hebrews" (Ph.D. diss., Calvin Theological Seminary, 2002); and Adriaan C. Neele, Petrus van Mastricht (1630-1706). Reformed Orthodoxy: Method and Piety (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2009), 141-70.

¹⁷ Muller, "Biblical Interpretation in he Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," 35.

¹⁸ Poole, Synopsis, I:2.61, 3:62, 4.43, 7.25, 14.3-5, 23.37, 26.38, 29.46, 30.72, 34.46.

¹⁹ WJE 26:1192.

²⁰ L. Berkhof, *Principles of Biblical Interpretation* (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1950), 29: "exegesis became the handmaid of dogmatics and degenerated into a mere search of proof-texts"; K. O'Dell Bullock, "Post-Reformation Protestant Hermeneutics," *Biblical Hermeneutics: A Comprehensive Introduction to Interpreting Scripture*, ed. Bruce Corley, Steve Lemke, Grant Lovejoy (2nd ed., Nashville: Broadman & Holman Publishers, 2002), 129: "the [post-reformation] Scholastics often superimposed their own sets of rationalistic guidelines upon its [the text of Holy Writ] pages, with the result that the simple message was often lost in the search for methodological and doctrinal correctness;" C. Graafland, "Schriftleer en Schriftverstaan in de Nadere Reformatie," *Theologische aspecten van de Nadere Reformatie*, ed. T. Brienen et al. (Zoetermeer: Boekencentrum, 1993), 35: "We krijgen niet zelden de indruk, dat de leer al lang vastaat, en dat ze alleen nog maar achteraf uit de Schrift moet worden bevestigd. Dat secundaire karakter van het Schrifbewijs is bij Voetius opvallend;" Greijdanus argued that the development of exegesis in the period 1600-1750 was further hindered by the strong adherence to the confessions; S. Greijdanus, *Schrifbeginselen ter Schrifverklaring en Historisch overzicht over theorieën en wijzen van Schriftuitleggingen* (Kampen: Kok, 1946), 193.

²¹ Augustin Calmet, Commentaire littéral sur tous les livres de l'Ancien et du Nouveau Testament (Paris: Emery, Saugrain, Pierre Martin, 1707).

1622),²² Johannes Cocceius (1603-1669),²³ Johannes Drusius (1550-1616),²⁴ and John Lightfoot (1602-1675) showed intimate knowledge of sixteenth-century Renaissance scholars of Biblical Hebrew such as Paul Fagius (1504-1549) and Johannes Buxtorf Jr. (1599-1664),²⁵ and demonstrated a profound acquaintance with the rabbinic exegetical tradition—including the Targum and Midrash. Moreover, their works digested not only the writings of medieval Hebraist Nicolas of Lyra (c. 1270-1349),²⁶ but also included commentators such as R. Aben Ezra (1092-1167), R. Solomon Jarchi (Rashi) (1040-1105), and R. David Kimchi (1160-1240), Jewish exegetes with a primary interest in the literal meaning of the biblical text. In fact, the renowned Post-reformation interest in rabbinic interpretations was an integral part of Poole's *Synopsis*—though he obtained much rabbinic material from the works of Fagius, Munster, Ainsworth, and Drusius. In other words, these Post-reformation exegetes, whose works Poole cited,²⁷ mediated the inclusion of rab-

²² See for bibliographical information, Michael E. Moody, "Ainsworth, Henry (1569-1622)" Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford University Press, 2004) [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/240, accessed January 21, 2011].

²³ G. Schrenk, *Gottesreich und Bund im Älteren Protestantismus vornehmlich bei Johannes Coccejus* (1923; rep. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1967). See also the following publications by W. J. van Asselt: *The Federal Theology of Johannes Cocceius* (Leiden-New York: Brill, 2001); *Coccejus*, [Serie Inleidingen met Kernteksten] (Kampen: De Groot Goudriaan, 2008); "Hoop op betere tijden. Spirituele dimensies in de theologie van Johannes Coccejus (1603-1669)," *Kerk rond het heilgeheim. Opstellen aangeboden aan prof. dr. A. de Reuver*, ed. H. J. Lam, P. J. Vergunst and L. Wüllschleger (Boekencentrum/Zoetermeer ,2007), 64-79; "Christus Sponsor. Een bijdrage tot de geschiedenis van het coccejanisme," *Kerk en Theologie 53* (2002); "Coccejus antischolasticus? Johannes Cocceius en de scholastieke traditie," *Theologia Reformata 44* (2001): 31-48; "Structural Elements in the Eschatology of Johannes Cocceius," *Calvin Theological Journal 35* (1999): 76-104; "*Amicitia Dei* as Ultimate Reality: An Outline of the Covenant Theology of Johannes Cocceius (1603-1669)," *Ultimate Reality and Meaning Interdisciplinary Studies in the Philosophy of Understanding 21* (1998): 35-47; "Ultimum tempus nobis imminet. Eschatologische structuren van de theologie van Johannes Coccejus," *Nederlands Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis/ Dutch Review of Church History 76* (1996): 189-226; *Amicitia Dei. Een onderzoek naar de structuur van de theologie van Johannes Coccejus* (1603-1669) (Ede, 1988).

²⁴ Peter Korteweg, *De Nieuwtestamentische commentaren van Johannes Drusius* (1550-1616) (Melissant, 2006).

²⁵ Robert M. M. Gerth, "The Interpretation of Genesis 6:6—And the Lord Repented—in Early Rabbinic and Patristic Tradition," Ph.D. diss., Hebrew Union College, 2002; W. J. van Asselt, "Hebraica Veritas: zeventiende-eeuwse motieven voor de bestudering van het Hebreeuws door predikanten," Kerk en Theologie 46 (1995): 309-24; P. T. van Rooden, Theology, Biblical Scholarship and Rabbinical Studies in the Seventeenth Century: Constantijn L'Empereur (1591-1648) Professor of Hebrew and theology at Leiden (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1989).

²⁶ Plassmann, Thomas. "Nicholas of Lyra," *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. 11 (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1911), http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11063a.htm (accessed January 14, 2011); *Nicholas of Lyra: The Senses of Scripture*, ed. Philip D.W. Krey and Lesley Smith (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2000).

²⁷ The following is a review of Genesis 1-5, in Poole, *Synopsis*: I: 2.65, "K. & AE. in F.A."; 3.75, "K. in F."; 4.3, "Onk. in F."; 8.26, "R. S. in F."; 18.53, "K. in F., AE. in D."; 19.10, "AE. in F."; 19.48, "AE in F."; 26.12, "R. S. in F."; 26.53, "AE. in F."; 27.48, "K. in F."; 28.75, "R. S. in F."; 29.23, "K. & alii in F."; 30.28, "AE. in F.," 57, "R. S. in F. A.; 33.26, "K. aliiq. He in F.," 44, "K. in F."; 35.1, "He. in F."; 45.9, "AE. & K. in Helv"; 46.48, "F. ex. K."; 47.3, "F. ex. AE.," 53, "Di. ex. R.S.," 70, "AE. in F."; 50.24, "K. in F."; 52.35, "R. Juda in D."; 53.46, "RR. in A."; 57.23, "Onk. in F"; 58.39, "AE. in F. M."; 60.71, F ex. K.";

binical biblical commentary into the *Synopsis*.

A review of the preface of the *Synopsis* reveals the aim and essence of the work. Concerning his aim, Poole distinguishes two types of commentators of Scripture: those concerned with the meaning of the word(s), and commentators aiming for the matter of Scripture—the sense of the Word.²⁸ Meaning, Poole asserts, is the primary focus of the *Synopsis*²⁹—a compendium of selected, edited, and arranged collected material from multiple sources and diverse authors.³⁰ His aim, therefore, is twofold: a commentary of Scripture, "void of considerable amount of waste" he detected in other commentaries, and a source for effective use by "candidates of theology,"31 who had Poole's particular interest.32 The aim of the Synopsis was moreover delineated by Poole's account of the composition that included material of international and ecumenical allure: the London-published Critici Sacri of John Pearson (1660), 33 the Franciscan John de la Hay's (1593-1661) Scripture commentary; the Spanish Dominican commentary of Thomas Malvenda (1566-1628) on the Bible books from Genesis to Ezekiel; the Roman Catholic scholar Andrew Masius (1516-1563) on the book of Joshua, whom Poole regarded as "an interpreter to whom you will not easily find an equal with respect to skill in matters

^{65.67, &}quot;R. S. in D."; 66.26, "AE. in Mu." This observation differs with Clyde A. Holbrook, in WJE 3:84: "Poole delved into Rabbinic and Roman Catholic sources as well as relatively obscure commentators"; and Stephen J. Stein, in WJE 5:59-60: "[Poole] incorporated studies by English Protestants, continental scholars, Roman Catholic commentators, and Jewish rabbis."

²⁸ Poole, *Synopsis*, I, *præfatio* (I): "[...] si quis par negotio melioris notae Interpretes (cum Criticos, qui verba & phrases ac idiotismos sagaciùs indagant, tum alios, qui materias ac senses Scripturae enucleatiùs tractant)."

²⁹ Ibid., præfatio (III): "verba & phrases enucleant (in quibus præcipuè versatur Synopsis)."

³⁰ Ibid., *præfatio* (I):"in compendium redacta, congrua methodo digereret, additis insuper, ubi opus esset, ad supplendas ipsorum lacunas, doctis variorum Sacra Textú locorum Interpretationibus"; ibid., A3, "Commentaria in Sacrum Codicem apud Illustres multos Authores late dissusa cum delectu colligere, & modicis voluminibus concludre, institui."

³¹ Ibid., I, A4: "Porrò, cùm multi Theologiæ candidati destituantur vel notitiâ quâ optimos Interpretes dignoscant, vel judicio quo seligant, vel censu quo emant, vel tempore, sive animo, quo illos diligenter ac fructuosà legant."

 $^{^{32}}$ Matthew Poole, A model for the maintaining of students of choice abilities at the university, and principally in order to the ministry: together with a preface before it, and after it a recommendation from the university, and two serious exhortations recommended unto all the unfeigned lovers of piety and learning, and more particularly to those rich men who desire to honour the Lord with their substance (1658). Cf. Harley, 39.

³³ Critici sacri, sive, Doctissimorum vivorum in ss. Biblia annotationes, & tractatus: opus summâ curâ recognitum, & in novem tomos divisum, quid in hoc opere præstitum sit præfatio ad lectorem ostendit, ed. John Pearson, Anthony Scattergood and Francis Gouldman, 9 vols. (London: Jacobus Flesher, 1660), v. 1, Annotatores in pentateuchum; v. 2, Annotata ad libros historicos Veteris Testamenti, sive, Criticorum sacrorum; v. 3, Annotata ad libros hagiographos, sive, Criticorum sacrorum; v. 4, Annotata ad libros propheticos Veteris Testamenti, sive, Criticorum sacrorum; v. 5, Annotata ad libros apocryphos item Joannis Prici annotata ad nonnullos Novi Testamenti libros, & ad librum Psalmorum, sive, Criticorum sacrorum; v. 6, Annotata ad ss. Euangelia, sive, Criticorum sacrorum; v. 7, Annotata ad Actus Apostolicos, epistolas & apocalypsin, sive, Criticorum sacrorum; v. 8, Tractatuum Biblicorum volumen prius, sive, Criticorum sacrorum; v. 9, Tractatuum Biblicorum volumen posterius, sive, Criticorum sacrorum. See also WJE 5:60.

of substance and languages", 34 Roman Catholic Bible commentator Francis Vatablus (ca. 1485-1547); Jesuits Lucas Brugensis (1549-1619), Jacobus Tirinus (1580-1636), and Johan Stephen Menochius (1576-1656), and the Flemish Jesuit Hebraist Cornelis à Lapide (1567-1637). In addition, Poole makes use of the Annotations of the Remonstrant Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), and the Notes on Scripture of the Reformed scholars Franciscus Junius (1545-1602) and Piscator, as well as the expositions of the Lutheran theologians Lukas Osiander (1534-1604) and Abraham Calov (1612-1686).³⁵ To these commentaries Poole added works of grammarians, sacred historians, and Hebraists such as Buxtorf, Lightfoot, and Ainsworth, as well expositors of specific Bible books such as Andreas Rivetus (1572-1651) on Genesis and Exodus, 36 and Drusius' Historia Ruth, 37 alongside other renderings of Scripture as found in the *Polyglot Bible*. ³⁸ Most of these works Edwards well may have been familiar with at the Yale College library,³⁹ and some were part of his own library. 40 Besides the account of authors and works Poole included in the *Synopis*, he also gave specific reasons of exclusion or limited use of the Genevan Scripture commentator John Calvin (1509-1564).⁴¹ Calvin's work, Poole asserted, was

³⁴ Poole, Synopsis I, præfatio.

³⁵ Poole, Synopsis I, præfatio (II): "Hi autem sunt Libri & Authores ex quibus præcipuè hanc Synopsin composui. 1. Novem Criticorum in S. Scripturam Interpretim, nuper Londini excusorum . . . 2. Biblia Maxima novendecim voluminibus distincta, Parisiis An.D. 1660. Edita, concinnante Joanne de la Haye . . . 3. Commentaria in S. Scripturam à Genesi ad Ezechielem Thomæ Malvendæ . . . 4. Francisci Junii Scholalia . . . [præfatio (III)] 5. Joannis Piscatoris Scholia Critica...6. Joannis Marianæ Scholia . . . 7. Lucæ Osiandri Explicationes . . . 8. Corn. à Lapide . . . 9. Tostati ingentia volumina." The Advertisement concerning the Fourth and Last Part of Mr. Poole's Synopsis Poole mentions the sources used for the New Testament commentary, that include, besides those mentioned in the Catologus Auctorum, Valla, Revius, Erasmus, Zegurus, Camero. Cf. Matthew Poole, An advertisement concerning the fourth and last part of Mr. Poole's Synopsis criticorum aliorumque S. Scripturæ Interpretum (London: s.n., 1676]). See for the biographical information, Thomas Plassmann, "Jean de La Haye." The Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 8; Ewan Macpherson, "Thomas Malvenda," The Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 9; Michael Plathow, "Junius Franciscus" Biographisch-Bibliographische Kirchenlexikon (T. Bautz, Hamm, 1992), 3:885-86; Friedrich W. Cuno "Piscator, Johannes," Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie (Duncker, Humblot: Leipzig 1888), 26:180-81; Theodor Schott, "Osiander, Lucas (Professor der Theologie in Tübingen)," Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie (1886), 24:495-96; John P. van Kasteren, "Cornelius Cornelii à Lapide," The Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 4; Florentine Bechtel, "Alonso Tostado," The Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 14.

³⁶ Andras Rivetus, Commentarii in librum secundum Mosis, qui Exodus apud Graecos inscribitur: in quibus praeter scholia, analysim, explicationem et observationes doctrinarum... variae quaestiones theoreticae et practicae discutiuntur et solvuntur (Leiden: Franciscum Hegerum, 1634).

³⁷ Johannes Drusius, Historia Ruth. Ex Ebræo Latinè conversa, & commentario explicata. Ejusdem historiæ translatio Graeca ad exemplar Complutense, & notæ in eandem (Amsterdami: Joannem Janssonium, 1632).

³⁸ Poole could mean the London Polyglot Bible, *Biblia sacra polyglotta, complectentia textus originales, Hebraicum, cum Pentateucho Samaritano, Chaldaicum, Graecum, Arabicae, Aethiopicae, Persicae* (London: Thomas Roycroft, 1657), the Paris Polyglot Bible (1645) or Antwerp Polyglot. See also Edwards's copy of the Antwerp Polyglot, referred to in WJE 5:9, 24:598 and 26:95.

³⁹ A catalogue of the library of Yale-College in New-Haven (N[ew] London: T Green, 1743), 4 (Buxtorf, Biblia Polygotto), 23 (Ainsworth, Rivetus), and 25 (Lightfoot).

⁴⁰ For example, WJE 26:131 (Lightfoot), and 323-24, 424 (Buxtorf).

⁴¹ Poole, Synopsis, I:32.53; I:80.26, I:215.17, I:231.63, I:321.21 (Calv. in Riv.), I:227.24, I:389. (Riv[etus].

more theological and practical than a critically oriented commentary, in particular in regard to etymology. Furthermore, Poole continued, Calvin's commentary was widely used in other commentaries and consulted by many. 42 Here, Poole may have represented the thought of many of the Post-reformation era: Calvin was not unknown but not often mentioned in the works of such commentators as Cocceius and Campegius Vitringa (1659-1722), or theologians such as Petrus van Mastricht (1630-1706) and Francis Turretin (1623-1687). 43 This tendency also resonates strongly in the Edwards *corpus*, where reference to Calvin's commentary is absent. 44 Finally, Poole discussed the use of Jerome, the Septuagint (LXX), and Aramaic, Syriac, Arabic, and Samaritan versions of Scripture in order to supply deficiencies in translating the biblical text, 45 and in particular, according to Poole, where doubtful and ambiguous language required great discernment. 46

In summary, the *Synopsis* is a composition of a vast number and variety of authors of various faith traditions, though mediated and appropriated into the framework of the *Synopsis*: a delta of philological and etymological exposition of the texts of Scripture in the service of biblical exegesis—an observation that cannot be neglected when examining Edwards' use of Poole's *magnum opus*. Poole's *Synopsis*, then, is a distinct genre from another Post-reformation Scripture commentary, and also frequently used by Edwards, that of Matthew Henry (1662-1714).⁴⁷ This well-known work belonged to Poole's second group of commentary,⁴⁸ in which the sense of Scripture was given along with "practical remarks and

ex Calv.), I.385.68, I:490.64 (Calv. in Wil[let]), I:537.65 (Calv. in Wil[let]), I:709.12, I:764.26, I:806.60, I:862.38, I:889.28 (Calv. *Inst.*), I:929.56, I:950.67, I:958.19, I:1023.51; I (pars posterior): 32.42, I (pars posterior): 82.53, I (pars posterior): 68.20, I:208.23.

⁴² Poole, *Synopsis*, *præfatio* (III): "Mirentur forsan nonnulli, in Auctorum catalogo non comparere Joannem Calvinum, Interpretem...1. Ex eo nonnulla, ubi opus suerat, subindè delibavi...2. Calvini Commentaria non tam Critici sunt...quàm materias Theologicas solidè tractant, & ad praxin accommodant. 3. Ex Calvino pleraque decerpserunt qui post eum scripserunt...4.Calvinum sere omnes in minibus & bibliothecis habent...."

⁴³ On the use of Calvin's work by Mastricht, see Adriaan C. Neele, "The Reception of John Calvin's Work by Petrus van Mastricht (1630-1706)," in *The Reception of Calvin and his Theology in Reformed Orthodoxy*, ed. Andreas Beck, William de Boer (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2011).

⁴⁴ See WJE 26:57: "Conspicuously absent from the 'Catalogue' and the 'Account Book' is any mention of Calvin himself. This does not mean that Edwards never read Calvin: he cites the *Institutes* three times in *Religious Affections*, and we may assume that in many matters, Calvin's authority was simply taken for granted in New England."

⁴⁵ Poole, Synopsis, præfatio (IV).

⁴⁶ Ibid., *præfatio* (V): "in verbis tantùm & phrasibus vel dubiis, vel obscuris, vel quæ semel aut rarò occurrunt; vel ubi rei momentum curiosiorem indagninem postuler."

⁴⁷ On Henry's biographical information see H.O. Old, "Henry, Matthew (1622-1714)," *Dictionary of Major Biblical Interpreters*, ed. McKim, 520-24; David L. Wykes, "Henry, Matthew (1662-1714)" *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford University Press, 2004) [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/12975, accessed January 21, 2011]; WJE 5:61-63, 24:62-64.

⁴⁸ WJE 5:61-63, 24:62-64, 26:136; A catalogue of the library of Yale-College in New-Haven, 23.

observations."⁴⁹ Furthermore, the *Synopsis*, as a pivotal work of Post-reformation biblical exegesis, found its way throughout England,⁵⁰ the European continent from London⁵¹

50 Catalogus variorum & insignium librorum instructissimae bibliothecae clarissimi doctissimiq; Viri Thomae Manton, S.T.D. Quorum auctio habebitur Londini in in aedibus defuncti in vico regio prope Covent-Garden, Martis 25. Per Gulielmum Cooper, bibliopolam, [London: s.n.], Catalogi Gratis distribuentur ad insigne pelicani in Vico Vulgo dicto Little-Britain, 1678, 2, "Math. Poli Criticorum, Sacrorum Synopsis, 5 vol. Charta Regia Ibid. 1669"; The library of the late Reverend and learned Mr. Samuel Lee. Containing a choice variety of books upon all subjects; particularly, comentaries on the Bible; bodies of divinity. The works as well of the ancient, as of the modern divines; treatises on the mathematikcs, in all parts: history, antiquities; natural philosophy physick, and chymistry; with grammar and school-books. With many more choice books not mentioned in this catalogue. Exposed at the most easy rates, to sale (Duncan Cambell, bookseller at the dock-head overagainst the Conduit, 1693), 1, "Pools Synopsis Critic. 5 vol."; Bibliotheca selecta, sive, Catalogus variorum librorum tum in theologia tum & coeteris facultatibus miscellaneis insignium: ex variisq; nuperrime bibliothecis selectorum: quorum auctio habebitur Londini ad insigne cervi albi ex adverso ecclesiae D. Augustini, prope australem coemeterii Paulini plagam, 21 die mensis Maij, a.d. 1688 (Catalogues are distributed gratis at Mr. Nott's . . . [and 3 others] and at the place of sale, [London] 1688), 1.13.

⁵¹ Samuel Annesley, The morning exercises at Cripplegate, St. Giles in the Fields, and in Southwark: being divers sermons, preached A.D. MDCLIX-MDCLXXXIX. By several ministers of the Gospel in or near London (London: Thomas Cockerill, 1674), 616: "thus our learned Mr. Poole in his Synopsis. The same author observes, that 'some take the word *blessed* in the Hebrew to be an interjection, or adverb; and so make this to be a rhetorical, though abrupt, exclamation, or a joyful acclamation, at the happiness of such."; Richard Gilpin, Demonologia sacra, or, A treatise of Satan's temptations in three parts (London: Printed by J.D. for Richard Randal and Peter Maplasden, 1677), 10, 30, 49, 62, 75, 155; Sir Matthew Hale, The primitive origination of mankind, considered and examined according to the light of nature (London: Printed by William Godbid for William Shrowsbery, 1677), 189: "And if any shall doubt of the Capacity of the Ark of Noah for the Reception of Brutes, Birds, and the Family of Noah, with the necessary Provisions of Livelihood for them; let him but consult Mr. Poole's Synopsis, and he will find that which may reasonably satisfie him touching it;" John Williams, A vindication of the sermons of His Grace John Archbishop of Canterbury concerning the divinity and incarnation of our B. Saviour: and of the Lord Bishop of Worcester's sermon on the mysteries of the Christian faith, from the exceptions of a late book, entituled, Considerations on the explications of the doctrine of the Trinity: to which is annexed, a letter from the Lord Bishop of Sarum to the author of the said vindication, on the same subject (London: Printed for Ric. Chiswell, 1695), 35: "I hope he will admit those to be Criticks that are in the Critici Sacri, or those whom Mr. Pool has inserted into his Synopsis; but if we may pass a judgment upon the Learned Interpreters;" John Edwards, A preservative against Socinianism: Shewing the direct and plain opposition between it, and the religion revealed by God in the Holy Scriptures (Oxford: Printed at the Theater for Henry Clements, 1698), 60: "you may peruse what Mr. Poole in his Synopsis hath quoted out of Gerhard"; John Adamson, The duty of daily frequenting the publick service of the church recommended in a sermon preached in a chapel at Wragby in Lincoln-shire erected to that purpose by Sir Edmound Turnor, Kt., and consecrated by the Lord Bishop of Lincoln the 18th day of July, 1697 (London: Printed by Ben. Griffin for Sam Keble, 1698), 2: "Godwyn's Jewish Antiq l. 6. c. 10. And Pool's Synopsis in loc."; ibid., 10: "Pool's Synopsis on Exod."; Thomas Edwards, The paraselene dismantled of her cloud, or, Baxterianism barefac'd drawn from a literal transcript of Mr. Baxter's, and the judgment of others, in the most radical doctrines of faith, compar'd with those of the Orthodox, both conformist and nonconformist, and transferr'd over by way of test, unto the Papist and Quaker (London: Printed, and sold by Will. Marshal, and John Marshal, 1699), 94: "There was nothing in him, Joh. 14. 13. and (as you read) he always did those things which pleased him: It remains therefore that that cause of his Displeasure, and of Christ's Death, was our Sin laid upon him, and our Peace to be procured by him. Rom. 4. 25. Who was delivered (viz. unto Death) for our Offences; not only upon occasion of our Sins (as the Socinians

⁴⁹ Matthew Henry, *An exposition of all the books of the Old and New Testament: wherein the chapters are summ'd up in contents; the sacred text inserted at large, in Paragraphs, or Verses; and each Paragraph, or Verse, reduc'd to its proper Heads; the Sense given, and largely illustrated with Practical Remarks and Observations,* 6 vols. (London: Printed for J. Clark et. al, 3rd edition, 1721-25). Thus, the use of both Poole's *Synopsis* and Henry's *Exposition* by Edwards may be understood as a complementary use—and parallels Poole's identification of two categories of interpreters.

to Leipzig,⁵² and the New World. In America, it was found in the private libraries of many New England ministers,⁵³ as well as the college libraries of Harvard, Yale and New Jersey.⁵⁴ In contrast, Cotton Mather's (1663-1728) *Biblia Americana*, written between 1693-1728—America's first Bible commentary—remained in manuscript form for nearly three hundred years.⁵⁵ Increase Mather (1639-1723) asserted that the *Synopsis* made Poole "famous in the World,"⁵⁶ and the favorable reception of the *Synopsis* continued through the Connecticut River Valley and the Middle Colonies far into the eighteenth century.⁵⁷ Edwards' use of the *Synopsis*, then, was

[and the Baxterians] gloss it) but for the Merit of our Sins—Gal. 3. 13. he underwent that Curse due to us, that Curse from which we are freed, that Curse which others who receive not Jesus Christ, shall undergo. Ibid. Mr. Pool, p. 203, 322, 323, 326."

⁵² Johann Olearius, *De stylo Novi Testamenti dissertatio phylologico-theologica, d. 17. Sept. anno 1668. pro licentia consequendi supremum in theologia gradum habita* (Schwabach: Christoph. E. Buchtae, 1690), 54: "Consulantur interea *Philologi* ac *Critici* Sacri in Synopsi f *Matthaeo Polo* edita Londini anno 1674"; August Pfeiffer, *Thesaurus hermeneuticus sive de legitima scripturae sacrae interpretatione tractatio luculenta, pridem editam hermeneuticam sacram, quae & integra hic repetitur, notis, quaestionibus & canonibus, adiiectisque praxeos exemplis illustrans* (Leipzig: Godofredi Leschii, 1726), 435: "ex *Corn. a Lapide* atque *Polo*, enodationem dubiorum textualium petere e *Synopsi Poli* (cui *Biblia Critica Anglorum* iungere consultum erit."

53 The library of the late Reverend and learned Mr. Samuel Lee. Containing a choice variety of books upon all subjects; particularly, comentaries on the Bible; bodies of divinity. The works as well of the ancient, as of the modern divines; treatises on the mathemeticks, in all parts: history, antiquities; natural philosophy physick, and chymistry; with grammar and school-books. With many more choice books not mentioned in this catalogue. Exposed at the most easy rates, to sale (Duncan Cambell, bookseller at the dock-head over-against the Conduit, 1693), 1: "Pools Synopsis Critic. 5 vol."; A catalogue of curious and valuable books, belonging to the late reverend & learned, Mr. Ebenezer Pemberton, consisting of divinity, philosophy, history, poetry, &c. Generally well bound, to be sold by auction, at the Crown Coffee-House in Boston, the second day of July 1717. Beginning at three a clock afternoon, and so, de die in diem, until the whole be sold. Also a valuable collection of pamphlets will then be exposed to sale. The books may be viewed from the 25th day of June, until the day of sale, at the house of the late Reverend Mr. Pemberton, where attendance will be give (Boston: B. Green, 1717), [1]: "Poli Synopsis 5 vol." Timothy Edwards's library included Ebenezer Pemberton, A funeral sermon on the death of that learned & excellent divine the Reverend Mr. Samuel Willard (Boston, 1707). See further on Pemberton, WJE 7:39-42, 16:113-15.

⁵⁴ Catalogus librorum Bibliothecae Collegij Harvardini quod est Cantabrigiae in Nova Anglia (Boston: B. Green, 1723), 25: "Poli (Matth) Synopsis Criticorum Tom 1-5"; A catalogue of the library of Yale-College in New-Haven, 23: "V. Annotations on the Bible, Poli Synopsis 5. Vol."; Catalogue of books in the library of the College of New-Jersey, January 29, 1760. Published by order of the trustees (Woodbridge: James Parker, 1760), 25: "540. Poole, Synopsis Criticorum 5 vols."

⁵⁵ Cotton Mather, *Biblia Americana*, vol. *I: Genesis*, ed. Reiner Smolinski (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck / Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010).

⁵⁶ Mather Increase, *An essay for the recording of illustrious providences wherein an account is given of many remarkable and very memorable events which have hapned this last age, especially in New-England* (Boston: Samuel Green, 1684), preface: "About six and twenty years ago, Design for the Recording of illustrious Providences, was under serious consideration among some eminent Ministers in England and in Ireland. That motion was principally set on foot by the Learned Mr. Matthew Pool, whose *Synopsis Criticorum*, and other Books by him emitted, have made him famous in the World."

⁵⁷ Joseph Fish, Angels ministering to the people of God, for their safety and comfort in times of danger and distress. A sermon preached at Westerly, in the colony of Rhode-Island, Aug. 27. 1755 (Newport: J. Franklin, n.d), 18; Timothy Stone, The nature and evil of selfishness, considered and illustrated, in a sermon, preached in the Second Society of Norwich, September 21, 1777 (Norwich: J. Trumbull, 1778), 5; Thomas-Wells Bray, A dissertation on the sixth vial; in five parts. With an introduction upon the design of prophecy in general, and the book of Revelation in particular. Pastor of a church in Guilford (Hartford: Hudson & Goodwin, 1780), 55;

not an exception—though the degree to which he used it surpassed many before and after him.

Edwards and Poole's Synopsis: Trajectories of Interpretation

One aspect of Poole's work concerns its broad incorporation of various faith traditions, and raises the question of how the use of Poole's work by Edwards reflected his understanding of himself as standing in a Protestant reformed tradition.⁵⁸ One way to get at this question is by looking at Edwards' annotations on the book of Genesis in the *Blank Bible* referring to Poole—30% of the entries

Charles Inglis, An essay on infant baptism: in which the right of infants to the sacrament of baptism, is proved from Scripture, vindicated from the usual objections, and confirmed by the practice of the four first centuries (New York: H. Gaine, 1768), 153 (Gen. 17:14); James Blake, Six sermons on divers subjects, preach'd at Weymouth (Boston: J. Kneeland, for J. Edwards in Corn-Hill, 1772), 40 (Eph. 2:8); Divine glory, brought to view, in the condemnation of the ungodly: or The doctrine of future punishment, illustrated and vindicated, as rational and true. In reply to a late pamphlet, entitled, Salvation for all men. By a friend to truth (Boston: Robert Hodge, 1782), Appendix, 5: "But after all this proposed cause, it happen that the book is much nearer to what many Divines is called Calvinism than is suggested. Among the authors of this class, which the writer of it has at present by him, he can produce Poole, Burkitt, Henry and Edwards, the last of whom is a well known American, and New England defender of the Calvinistic doctrines, who in the very article in which this pamphlet is declared by the letter writer to have departed from Calvinism, are each of the same opinion, and professedly believed that the atonement of Christ Jesus was compleately answerable to the universal offer of mercy which has been made from heaven, and yet that some men would perish for ever." In addition, Poole's Annotations were also widely used by revivalist Gilbert Tennent (1703-1764). See the following works by Tennent: Twenty three sermons upon the chief end of man. The divine authority of the sacred Scriptures, the being and attributes of God, and the doctrine of the Trinity, preach'd at Philadelphia Anno Dom. 1743 (Philadelphia: William Bradford, 1744), sermon XI (Gen. 17:1), 213; Discourses, on several important subjects (Philadelphia: William Bradford, 1745), 100; The danger of spiritual pride represented. A sermon preach'd at Philadelphia, December the 30th, 1744. On Romans XII. 3. With some enlargements (Philadelphia: William Bradford, n.d.), 7; The late association for defence farther encouraged: or, Defensive war defended; and its consistency with true Christianity represented. In a reply to some exceptions against war, in a late composure, intituled, The doctrine of Christianity, as held by the people called Quakers, vindicated (Philadelphia: Benjamin Franklin, David Hall, 1748), 4. See also John Smith, The doctrine of Christianity, as held by the people called Quakers, vindicated: in answer to Gilbert Tennent's sermon on the lawfulness of war (Philadelphia: Benjamin Franklin, David Hall, 1748), 27 (it is not clear whether the reference is to the *Annotations* or *Synopsis*); Sophia Hume, *An exhortation to the inhabitants* of the province of South-Carolina, to bring their deeds to the light of Christ, in their own consciences. In which is inserted, some account of the author's experience in the important business of religion (Philadelphia: Benjamin Franklin, David Hall, 1748), 10, 54; Abel Morgan, Anti-Paedo-Rantism defended: a reply to Mr. Samuel Finley's Vindication of the Charitable plea for the speechless. Wherein his repeated objections against the baptism of believers only, and the mode of it by immersion, are again examined and refuted, at Middletown, in East-Jersey (Philadelphia: Benjamin Franklin, David Hall, 1748), 105; A catalogue of a very large assortment of the most esteemed books in every branch of polite literature, arts and sciences . . . N.B. All new books of merit, magazines and reviews, imported by every opportunity from London (Cox & Berry at their store in King-Street, Boston), 22; Edward Young, The complaint; or Night-thoughts on life, death, and immortality (Philadelphia: Robert Bell, 1777), back page advertisement of William Young's catalogue for 1787 (Philadelphia: Young and McCulloch, 1786) 4: "Annotations on the Bible by Poole folio." This poem is noted in the "Account Book" of Jonathan Edwards; see WJE 26:356. The Annotations of Poole were also part of the inventory of Timothy Edwards' estate; see WJE 26:382 [B1].

⁵⁸ WJE 1:131: "I should not take it at all amiss, to be called a Calvinist, for distinction's sake: though I utterly disclaim a dependence on Calvin, or believing the doctrines which I hold, because he believed and taught them."

on Genesis in the *Blank Bible* reveal a use of the *Synopsis*.⁵⁹ Some of Edwards' references to the *Synopsis* simply concern the meaning of words, underscoring Poole's aim for the work, rendering the biblical text as offered by Poole and not as found in the King James Version.⁶⁰ In other cases, where Poole offers various interpretations on a specific text, Edwards usually chooses one interpretative option. On Gen. 11:1, for example, Edwards notes, "the first language was the Hebrew language; see Poole, *Synopsis*, in *locum*, and on Gen. 11:5, places marked." There, Poole offers reasons from Augustine, R. Salomon, R. Ibn Ezra, Junius, Piscator, and Ainsworth that Hebrew was the primeval language, but also presents his own alternative interpretation that the Hebrew language is closer to the Canaanite language, "whereby Moses rendered names in the Hebrew language for the sake of the Jews." Edwards, then, follows the interpretation that is shared in the Jewish, Protestant reformed, and Puritan separatist tradition—an interpretation that also may have been enforced by Edwards' reading of Andrew Wilson's *The Creation the Ground-work of Revelation*, and Revelation the Language of Nature.⁶¹

Another way of seeing Edwards' interpretive choices can be observed in a concurrent reading of the "Blank Bible" and his "Notes on Scripture." Consider, for example, Poole's commentary on Gen. 4:7. Here, the author of the *Criticorum* breaks down the text into various grammatical parts, but Edwards chooses to con-

⁵⁹ In his 156 entries on Genesis, Edwards refers to Poole in fifty-two of them.

 $^{^{60}}$ WJE 24:142, on Gen. 4:23: "But this man he had slain 'in' or 'for' his wounding (as the words are interpreted by some learned men)"; cf. Poole, Synopsis, I:65.28-66.3. Here, the "learned men" mentioned are Rivet, Piscator, Fagius, R. Salomon in Dieu, and Lightfoot. WJE 24:150, on Gen. 9:25 (Canaan is Mercury); cf. Poole, Synopsis, I:112.26, on Gen 9:11, "Canaan idem qui Mercurius." See also WJE 24:152, on Gen. 10:6; 153, on Gen. 10:15; 154, on Gen. 11:31, and cf. Poole, Synopsis, I:145.38, "qui & Chasdim dicti, à Chesed, Gen. 22:22." WJE 23:387: "Jacob's prophecy concerning Dan, his being as an adder in the path, etc., Gen. 49:17, was fulfilled in Samson and in the Danites that took Laish (Judg. 18:27)"; cf. Poole, Synopsis, I:306 61-63, "Sensus loci est, Danites potius astu quam aperto Mare rem gesturos. Exemplum habemus Jud. 18:27." WJE 24:178, on Gen. 30:39. See also WJE 24:61n: "In the margin adjacent to verse 39 is 'v 39 SSS.' This notation signals an intention to consult Poole on Genesis 30:39." Cf. Poole, Synopsis, I:221.56-222.37. WJE 24:195, on Gen. 44:5: "He divineth," and on 44:15. cf. Poole, Synopsis, I:272.43. Poole offers various options (and refers to Zaphnath-paaneah I:273.55), but these are not further found in Edwards' corpus. See also WJE 24:197, on Gen. 47:21, cf. Poole, Synopsis, I:282.32-33; on Gen. 47:22, cf. Poole, Synopsis, I:282.58-76; on Gen. 48:7, cf. Poole, Synopsis, I:284.56-74, on world created in September (24:124); on Gen. 46:26, cf. Poole, Synopsis, I:278-79. WJE 15:596: "They are often used for proceeding from a father by generation . . . I Kgs. 8:19, 'Thy son that cometh forth out of thy loins'; so II Chron. 6:9, the same words; Gen. 46:26, 'that came out of his loins.' . . . The generation of mankind, their proceeding from their fathers, or ancestor, or of a particular stock and family, is often compared in the Old Testament" (597). The latter may resonate with Poole, Synopsis, I:278.21-34, citing Rivet "ex more castissemć Scripturarum locutionis."

⁶¹ Andrew Wilson, The Creation the Ground-work of Revelation, and Revelation the Language of Nature. Or, a brief attempt to demonstrate that the Hebrew Language is founded upon Natural Ideas, and that the Hebrew Writings transfer them to Spiritual Objects (Edinburgh: n.p., 1750). Cf. WJE 11:152; 24:110, 797.

 $^{^{62}}$ See on this issue WJE 24:81-99, for example, p. 92: "The 'Blank Bible' is patently complementary to the 'Notes on Scripture.' See also WJE 24:137, where Gen. 3:14-15 is cross referenced to "Notes on Scripture" (WJE 15:537).

centrates just on the words "be accepted" (*recipies*).⁶³ On the meaning of these words, however, Poole offers no less than six exegetical options: receiving a gift (Menochius, Piscator), remission of sin (Targum Jerusalem, Kimchi, Junius and Tremellius), lifting up (Grotius), acceptance (Vatablus, Pagninus), being superior (Fagius), and exaltation (Malvenda).⁶⁴ These interpretive comments attest to an ecumenical exegetical enterprise, i.e. a blended rabbinic, Roman Catholic, Protestant Reformed and Remonstrant understanding of Scripture.

In the entry of the *Blank Bible* on this text Edwards refers to the "Notes on Scripture," no. 344, where he writes:

Cain was not accepted in his offering, because he did not well...But Abel brought a sacrifice of atonement, the blood whereof was shed in order to remission, thereby owning himself a sinner.

Edwards, then, includes the second and fourth exegetical interpretation offered by Poole, "remission of sin" and "acceptance," originating from Jewish and Roman Catholic and Protestant Christian exegetical sources, respectively.⁶⁵ In

 $^{^{63}}$ Poole, *Synopsis*, I:56.11-58.35: "Nonne . . . Si bene egeris . . . Recipies . . . In foribus peccatum aderit . . . Ad fores . . . Sub te appetitus"

⁶⁴ Ibid., I:56.32-55: "1. Nónne recipies, scil. præmium . . . 2. Nónne remissio erit peccati? . . . 3. Nónne elevatio erit? . . . 4. Nónne acceptatio erit? . . . 5. Nónne superior eris . . . 6. Exaltatio erit, vel gloria . . . " Edwards pays attention to three parts of this biblical text in "Notes on Scripture" (WJE 15:326-27).

⁶⁵ A joined reading of the "Blank Bible" and "Notes on Scripture" concerning the use of the *Synopsis* is also helpful for Edwards' understanding of Gen. 43:11, on nuts and almonds. Poole offers various interpretations but leans toward the rendering of "pistachios nut," following the rabbinic interpretations of D. Kimchi, R. Macci, R. Salomon, and Maimonides as found in the Talmudic treatise. Cf. Poole, Synopsis, I:270.22-68: "Varič reddunt, Nuces . . . avellanas . . . pineas . . . juglandes . . . nuces terebinthinus . . . pistacia." Edwards makes use of this interpretation in "Notes on Scripture" (WJE 15:495): "pistachios, a sort of nut that grew in the country," which reading may also be enforced by Poole's Annotations, where the interpretation is restricted to pistachios only. Cf. Poole, Annotations, on Gen. 43:11, b: "That kind of nuts which we call pistachios, as some Hebrew and other expositors render the word." WJE 24:166, on Gen.24:2, and Poole, Synopsis, I:194.18-36. Poole offers the following interpretations: an accepted custom of swearing at the time (Josephus); a sign of homage to place one's hand under one sitting (Ibn Ezra); "to master" is derived from sedendo, "sitting" (Grotius); power of the superior (Ibn Ezra in Munster, Fagius, Vatablus); a reference to future posterity (Munster, Fagius); a sign of covenant (R. Salomon in Munster); place of the sword (Grotius); applying to Christ coming from Abraham (Ainsworth, Jerome, Augustine, Bernard); and an acknowledgment of the Messiah (Tirinus, Targum Jonathan rendering of the text). Edwards follows Grotius in the "Blank Bible," WJE 24:166, "Abraham might sit on his hand," which exegetical understanding is also seen in "Notes on Scripture" (WJE 15:352): "The servants of the householder can be interpreted of nothing better than ministers, who were represented by Abraham's servant."See also WIE 24:149, on Gen.8:7-8. Cf. WIE 15:328: "346. Genesis 8:7-11. Concerning the raven and the dove that Noah sent forth. The dove is an emblem of a gracious soul that, finding no rest for its foot, no solid peace or satisfaction in this world, this deluged defiling world, returns to Christ, as to its ark, as to its Noah. The carnal heart, like the raven, takes up with the world, and feeds on the carrions it finds there . . . The olive branch, which was an emblem of peace." Cf. Poole, Synopsis, I:103.54: "Olivć folium pacis . . . symbolum." See, for another example, WJE 24:157, on Gen.15:10; cf. Poole, *Synopsis*, I:159.78-160.47: "Divisi per medium] . . . Divisit] . . . Et utrasque partes contra se altrinsecus posuit]... Aves non divisit]." Where Poole comments on "He

summary, Edwards carefully delineated and discerned Poole's commentary on the text. His understanding of the text—sometimes fully revealed by reading the "Blank Bible" and the "Notes of Scripture" side by side—resonates with long-standing Christian and non-Christian exegetical trajectories.

Edwards' use of the *Synopsis* can be seen in other of his writings. Let us look, for instance, at his reflection on Gen. 49:18. In the "Blank Bible" annotation Edwards points to the immediate context of the biblical text, its promise, and appropriation to Christ, as he writes:

["I have waited for thy salvation, O Lord."] Jacob says this here because the event foretold in the immediately preceding words, viz., Sampson's slaying the Philistines, and destroying the temple of Dagon at his death, was a remarkable type of that great salvation by Christ so often promised in the blessing God gave to Abraham, Isaac, and to him, and that he had been so supported by through the many troubles of his wearisome pilgrimage.

However, in the other writings, such as *An Humble Attempt* and "Types of the Messiah," and the notebooks on "History of Redemption," "Controversies," and "Faith," he provides an eschatological understanding of this biblical passage, in the sense of trusting and waiting for the fulfillment of divine promises to the "church of God." This exegetical understanding in multiple ways—contextual and eschatological— is grounded in Poole. He offers various interpretations of

divided them in the midst \dots This custom was preserved," Edwards refers to Gen. 15:10 in "Notes on Scripture," commenting on Job 8:8 concerning the preservation of primeval knowledge through traditions of the fathers.

⁶⁶ WJE 5:344-347: "The 'whole creation' is, as it were, earnestly waiting for that day, and constantly groaning and travailing in pain to bring forth the felicity and glory of it . . . 'Tis the language of the church of God, and the breathing of the soul of every true saint . . . Gen. 49:18, 'I have waited for thy salvation, O Lord'"; WJE 11:279: "So the church is often represented as waiting for the fulfillment of God's promises with respect to the benefits of the Messiah's kingdom (Gen. 49:18...)"; WJE 21:400-401: "It is not credible that there should be so much revealed to the church of God from the beginning of the world about the Messiah for the comfort of the church, so that he seems to have been all along the main subject of divine promises and promises given to his people . . . It was earnestly desired and waited for by Jacob. Gen. 49:18, 'I have waited for thy salvation, O Lord.' The same was the language of the hearts of God's church in all times of the old testament." Cf. WJEO 27, "Controversies Notebook," pt. 2a. WJE 21:449: "They that seek God are spoken of as those that LOVE GOD'S SALVATION . . . and hoping in God's salvation . . . and waiting for God's salvation. Gen. 49:18, 'I have waited for thy salvation, O God'"; WJE 21:451: "[113.] WAITING on the Lord, waiting for his salvation, and the like are terms used as being equivalent to trusting in God in the Scripture . . . Gen. 49:18, 'I have waited for thy salvation, O God.'" WJEO 31, "History of Redemption, Book I," pt. I, n.p: "[I]f he reflected upon it, [it] must needs be a Confirmation of the promise made that in his seed all nations should be blessed, which Jacob bore much in his mind and set his Heart upon, as appears by those words, 'I have waited for thy salvation, O Lord.' [A] more particular Revelation was made to Jacob concerning this seed, that it should come from Judah."

the text by placing in its immediate context, and asserts that the text may permit a spectrum of meanings: an imploring of divine help (Rivet); or a reference to Samson (Grotius), who defends and vindicates his people (Castalio); or a reference to Dan, for whom Jacob asked God salvation of his posterity (Rivet); or that Jacob foresaw calamities, and so entrusted himself to the Lord who promised to be his protector through the Messiah (Vatablus, Rivet); or that this tribe would be preserved by divine salvation when they would encounter oppression (Ainsworth, Junius, Piscator); or that it concerns Christ, so that all may be fulfilled through the Messiah (Oleaster),⁶⁷ the true and eternal Savior of the world (Lapide), as Christ is called the salvation of God (Ainsworth), far more than Samson (Fagius).⁶⁸ Edwards, then, used the various understandings of the text offered by Poole discriminately: the literal sense of the text in its immediate context—shared by Protestant Reformed and Remonstrant commentaries—and a Christological and promisefulfillment motive, propounded by Roman Catholic and Protestant exegetes.

Finally, Edwards' annotations in the "Blank Bible," referring to Poole's *Synopsis*, have to be considered in relationship to his sermons. For this we turn our attention to Gen. 6:2, where Edwards commented, "See Poole's *Synopsis*, loc., place marked," in which Poole presents four interpretations of "the sons of God." Following a patristic reading (Lanctantius, ca. 240-ca. 320) and a Franciscan medieval understanding (Nicolas of Lyra) these words may refer, respectively, to good or bad "angels." The Targum Jerusalem and other Jewish sources, as well as the Chaldean, Syrian, and Arabic readings, render the text as the "sons of judges or powerful," and Fagius takes it to be "giants." But these text words can also be understood as "sons of the pious, professing true religion" —an interpretation shared, according to Poole, by Rivet, Junius and Tremmelius, as well as Menochius, Lapide, and Vatablus.

In the 1731 sermon series *Christians a Chosen Generation*, on I Pet. 2:9, Edwards explicitly refers to the words of Gen. 6:2, proclaiming to the congregation of Northampton:

⁶⁷ Hieronymus Oleastro, Commentaria in Pentatevchvm Mosi: hoc est, in qvinqve primos Bibliorvm libros: quibus iuxta M. Sanctis Pagnini Lucensis . . . interpretationem, Hebraica veritas cum ad genuinum literae sensum, tum ad mores informandos, ad vnguem enucleatur (Lyon: Petrum Landry, 1588).

⁶⁸ Poole, *Synopsis*, I:306.64-307.27: "anhelans auxilium Divinium implorat . . . Alii referunt ad Samsonem . . . servaturus populum i.e. defensurus & vindicarus . . . Alii dicta volunt ad Dan . . . Indicat se non fidere his artibus, u tab iis exspectaret posterum suorum salutem; sed ema à Deo expetere . . . etc."

 $^{^{69}}$ Poole also incorporates the dissenting view of Drusius and others, that evil angels are not called the sons of God.

 $^{^{70}}$ Poole, *Synopsis*, I:77.26-73: "1. *Angeli* . . . 2. *Filii judicum vel potentum* . . . 3. *Gigantes* . . . 4. *Filii poirum*, sive profitentes veram religionem."

The church is a distinct race that originally came from God . . . the church is the posterity of God. Thus 'tis said, in *Genesis 6:2* . . . The sons of God were the children of the church, of the posterity of Seth . . . Those that were the first founders of the church, they were of God and were called by way of specialty, the sons of God.

In his sermon, Edwards employed the fourth interpretation offered by Poole, which found its origin in Roman Catholic and Reformed interpreters of Scripture. 71

In conclusion, Edwards' selective use of the Synopsis shows that Poole's exegetical materials of Jewish and Christian origin (Roman Catholic, Reformed and Remonstrant) found its way in the various writings of the preacher of Northampton, in particular the "Blank Bible." Poole channeled the many streams of seventeenth-century exegesis, including patristic, medieval and Post-reformation sources, and his labors provided a valuable influential treasury for Edwards' understanding of Scripture. In fact, the Christian and Jewish sources gathered by Poole offered an ecumenical character for Post-reformation biblical interpretation, as the Protestant and Roman Catholic interpreters demonstrated a catholicity of exegetical trajectories. This observation may be pleasing to the post-modern reader though such must be tempered by two final considerations. First, the sources of biblical exegesis used by Poole shaped the nature of the Synopsis: his philologically and etymologically oriented commentary refrained from theological and practical comments. A preliminary foray by scholars such as Doug Sweeney, David Barshinger, and Mark Noll suggests that Edwards seems to have used the Synopsis for this particular way, looking for practical content elsewhere. 72 Secondly, the overwhelming number of sources of Protestant-reformed origin in the Synopsis, many of which were familiar to Edwards, provided him with acceptable exegetical choices, even when other faith traditions shared the same interpretation.

⁷¹ WJE 24:141, on Gen. 4:4. Edwards notes in a 1729 sermon, *The Sacrifice of Christ Acceptable*, WJE 14:446: "So we read (Gen. 4:4) that God had respect to Abel and his offering. Therefore I answer: *First Ans*. The sacrifices of the Old Testament were acceptable to God as they were done in obedience." Cf. Poole, *Synopsis*, I:55.57-59: "Nota quod persona prius respicitur deinde sacrificium. Opportet ergo nos per fidem ante justificatos, quam opera Deo gratia sint."

⁷² Mark Noll, "Jonathan Edwards's Use of the Bible: A Case Study with Comparisons," Lecture at the Jonathan Edwards Center, Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, Nov. 11, 2011; David P. Barshinger, "Making the Psalter One's 'Own Language': Jonathan Edwards Engages the Psalms," *Jonathan Edwards Studies*, no. 1 (2012):3-29.

Abstract

The examination of the method and practice of biblical interpretation of the Post-reformation era (ca. 1565-1725) awaits a much-needed appraisal. Protestant exegetical works, in particular, aimed not only at theological and practical ends, but also continued philological and etymological aspects of biblical interpretation. Furthermore, these works attest to deep acquaintance with non-Christian sources, such as rabbinical interpretation, and non-Protestant sources, such as Roman Catholic exegesis. The paper explores the text and trajectories of the *Synopsis Criticorum* of Matthew Poole (1624-1679). This massive Post-reformation running Scripture commentary (five volumes in folio of approx. 9,000 pages) was deeply influential in the early modern history of exegesis, and formative to the biblical interpretation of Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758).

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STUDYING THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM THROUGH JONATHAN EDWARDS: VERSIONS OF "AMERICA'S THEOLOGIAN" AT MID-CENTURY

In Germany, and presumably in other areas of Continental Europe as well, interest in Jonathan Edwards has been largely confined to academia. Although considerably smaller, Germany also has its subculture of evangelical Protestantism (often still associated with the traditional term Pietism) with its own ministries, seminaries, and publishing industry. So far, however, few have shared American evangelicals' fascination with Edwards as a theological and devotional author. At

 $^{^{1}}$ This essay is a modified and annotated version of a 2011 lecture held in Heidelberg, Germany, and Wrocław, Poland.

² Edwards did receive more attention from German-speaking Pietists in the eighteenth and nine-teenth century than has been hitherto assumed. For new insights, see my "Halle Pietism and its Perception of the American Great Awakening: The Example of Johann Adam Steinmetz," in *Awakened Christians in the Atlantic World: Proceedings of an International Symposium on the Occasion of Henry Melchior Mühlenberg's* 300th *Birthday in 1711 at the Franckesche Stiftungen, Halle*, eds. A. Gregg Roeber, Thomas Müller-Bahlke, and Hermann Wellenreuther (Halle: Verlag der Franckeschen Stiftungen), 213-46. However, neither the "Edwards Renaissance" after World War II in the U.S. nor the current wave of enthusiasm for the colonial theologian among American evangelicals have carried over into Germany, although some new interest in Edwards as a devotional author is detectable. For instance, Edwards' biography of David Brainerd, repeatedly printed in German translations during the eighteenth and nine-teenth centuries, has just come out in a new edition, along with new German translations of *Religious Affections* as well as a selection of Edwards' evangelical writings. Also, Iain H. Murray's pious biography was recently translated into German. See Jonathan Edwards, *Das Leben des David Brainerd: Tagebuch*

the same time, the German academic interest in Edwards is highly compartmentalized. For the most part Edwards is studied in the context of American literature programs for his contributions to various intellectual and rhetorical traditions.³ German theologians and church historians who are at all familiar with Edwards know him only as a revivalist and author of A Faithful Narrative of the Surprising Work of God and Sinners in the Hand of an Angry God. In other words, they primarily perceive Edwards as an early eighteenth-century Calvinist preacher of the new birth, whose significance lies in the role he played in the awakenings that swept the British colonies in America during the 1730s and 1740s. 4 Edwards hardly figures at all in the fields of systematic or historical theology. Only recently some attention has been given to his theologia experimentalis for its unique blend of Enlightenment ideas and Pietist tendencies and for the lines of continuity connecting it with later affection-centered approaches to religion by figures such as Friedrich Schleiermacher.⁵ But this is where the appreciation of Edwards in German departments of theology usually ends. Most German theologians would be much surprised to learn that on the other side of the Atlantic Edwards is widely regarded as one of the country's greatest philosophers and almost universally acknowledged as "America's theologian."

eines Indianermissionars (Waldelms: 3l Verlag, 2011); Jonathan Edwards, Sind religiöse Gefühle zuverlässige Anzeichen für wahren Glauben? (Waldelms: 3l Verlag, 2012); Jonathan Edwards, Aus Edwards Schatzkammer (Hamburg: C.M. Fliss Verlag, 2008); Iain H. Murray, Jonathan Edwards: Ein Lehrer der Gnade und die große Erweckung (Bielefeld: CIV, 2011).

³ See, for example, the interpretations of Edwards in Ursula Brumm, *Die religiöse Typologie im amerikanischen Denken: Ihre Bedeutung für die amerikanische Literatur- und Geistesgeschichte* (Leiden: Brill, 1963); Winfried Herget, "A Culture of the Word: Puritanism and the Construction of Identity in Colonial New England," (*Trans-)Formations of Cultural Identity in Colonial New England*" eds. Jochen Achilles and Carmen Birkle (Heidelberg: Winter, 1998), 15-25; Frank Kelleter, *Amerikanische Aufklärung: Sprachen der Rationalität im Zeitalter der Revolution* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2002).

⁴ Edwards the revivalist is briefly mentioned in many German textbook accounts or encyclopedia articles dealing with the age of revivalism or American church history. He has received somewhat more substantial, if still tangential, treatments in, among others, Peter Kawerau, Amerika und die orientalischen Kirchen (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1958); Peter Kawerau, Martin Begrich, Manfred Jacobs, Amerika (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1963); Erich Beyreuther, Die Erweckungsbewegung (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1977); Ulrich Gäbler, Auferstehungszeit: Erweckungsprediger des 19. Jahrhunderts (München: Beck, 1991) and "Die Anfänge der Erweckungsbewegung in Neu-England und Jonathan Edwards 1734/1735, "Theologische Zeitschrift 34 (1978), 95-104; Michael Hochgeschwender, Amerikanische Religion: Evangelikalismus, Pfingstlertum und Fundamentalismus (Frankfurt a.M.: Verlag der Weltreligionen, 2007); Andreas Urs Sommer, "Weltgeschichte und Heilslogik: Jonathan Edwards' History of the Work of Redemption," Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte 53 (2001), 115-144. The best recent summary accounts in German are offered in A. Gregg Roeber's chapter "Der Pietismus in Nordamerika im 18. Jahrhundert," in Geschichte des Pietismus: Der Pietismus im 18. Jahrhundert, eds. Martin Brecht and Klaus Deppermann (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995), 668-699, and in Mark Noll's History of Christianity in North America, translated into German as Das Christentum in Nordamerika (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2000).

⁵ See, for instance, Caroline Schröder, *Glaubenswahrnehmung und Selbsterkenntnis: Jonathan Edwards theologia experimentalis* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1997); and Thorsten Dietz's current book project, *Religiöse Gefühle: Religion und Emotion bei Jonathan Edwards und Friedrich Schleiermacher*.

Advocating for Edwards as a source for systematic or historical theology in Germany is a task I will leave to others more qualified in this regard. This essay seeks to make a case for Edwards' great potential as an interpretative lens for studying the diverse traditions and trajectories of American Protestantism in their larger cultural contexts. While the interest in American religious history and especially evangelicalism is growing, German scholars working in this area have mostly overlooked this potential of Edwards both for research and for the classroom. To students of the colonial period, Edwards' life and work offer a fascinating window into a crucial moment in the evolution of American Reformed Protestantism when Puritanism transitioned into modern evangelicalism.⁶ It provides unique opportunities to examine, among many other things, the transatlantic dynamics of colonial revivalism and the birth of the modern missionary movement in America. However, the national and international reception histories of Edwards arguably offer even richer possibilities.⁷ Already shortly after his death, Edwards' influence became such that the development of American Reformed theology into the second half of the nineteenth century, as it branched out into new competing schools (such as the New Divinity school, the Old Calvinists, or the New Haven Theology), can be fruitfully examined as struggles over

⁶ The literature on colonial revivalism and the development of American evangelicalism is vast. Good recent treatments of Edwards in this context (with further literature) include Patricia Tracy, *Jonathan Edwards, Pastor: Religion and Society in Eighteenth-Century Northampton* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1980); Michael Crawford, *Seasons of Grace: Colonial New England's Revival Tradition in its British Context* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Frank Lambert, *Inventing the Great Awakening* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Thomas Kidd, *The Great Awakening: The Roots of Evangelical Christianity in Colonial America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); as well as the relevant chapters in two new excellent biographies: Philip Gura, *Jonathan Edwards: A Life* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003). For the transatlantic context, see the two studies by W. R. Ward, *The Protestant Evangelical Awakening* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) and *Early Evangelicalism: A Global Intellectual History, 1670-1789* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and Mark A. Noll, *The Rise of Evangelicalism: The Age of Edwards, Whitefield and the Wesleys* (Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 2003).

⁷ Michael J. McClymond and Gerald R. McDermott's recent *The Theology of Jonathan Edwards* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) has an extensive chapter on "Legacies and Affinities: Edwards's Disciples and Interpreters" that offers an in-depth examination of the appropriations of Edwards in the history of American theology. The most comprehensive survey of Edwards's American reception between 1750 and 1900 is provided by Joseph A. Conforti, *Jonathan Edwards*, *Religious Tradition*, *and American Culture* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995). A very helpful short overview from the colonial period to the present is M.X. Lesser, "Edwards in 'American Culture'," in *The Cambridge Companion to Jonathan Edwards*, ed. Stephen J. Stein (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 280-299. D.W. Bebbington offers an introductory sketch to his international reception history in "The Reputation of Edwards Abroad," in the same volume, 239-261. See also the collection by Barbara B. Oberg and Harry S. Stout, eds., *Benjamin Franklin and Jonathan Edwards, and the Representations of American Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), and the volume by David William Kling and Douglas A. Sweeney, eds., *Jonathan Edwards At Home and Abroad: Historical Memories, Cultural Movements, Global Horizons* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2003), in particular the essays in Part Two, "Edwards and American Culture," and Part Three, "Edwards Around the World."

the Edwardsean legacy, its authority, and appropriate interpretation.⁸ Likewise, to follow the changing views on Edwards after the Civil War presents rich insights into the rise of theological liberalism and secular modernism in the United States.

While the ascendancy of liberalism and modernism made Edwards' theology more contested than ever and temporarily diminished his standing, by no means did it bring to an end his influence. As today's widespread usage of the honorary title "America's theologian" suggests, he is now indeed a very powerful presence in the religious and theological landscape of the United States. Edwards' voice resonates strongly in American history and literature departments, but even more so in theology departments and Protestant seminaries across the country. For decades the numbers of dissertations, books, and articles on Edwards have been steadily increasing, especially in the various areas of theology. The enthusiasm for Edwards, however, is by no means a purely academic phenomenon in America. Especially in evangelical circles, he is widely promoted and read as a devotional author, and serves a cultural and religious hero for many pastors and laypeople. ¹⁰ The cover of the September 2006 issue of *Christianity Today*, the most important organ of American mainstream evangelicalism, featured a T-shirt emblazoned with the words: "Jonathan Edwards Is My Homeboy." As Mark Noll remarks, "In the breadth of his learning, piety, and intellectual rigor, Edwards is more comprehensively alive today than ever in his own lifetime or since." 11

⁸ Joseph A. Conforti, Samuel Hopkins and the New Divinity Movement: Calvinism, the Congregational Ministry, and Reform in New England between the Great Awakenings (Grand Rapids: Christian University Press, 1981); Douglas A. Sweeney, Nathaniel Taylor, New Haven Theology and the Legacy of Jonathan Edwards (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); D.G. Hart, Sean Michael Lucas, and Stephen J. Nichols, eds., The Legacy of Jonathan Edwards: American Religion and the Evangelical Tradition (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003); Douglas S. Sweeney and Allen C. Guelzo, eds., The New England Theology, 1734-1852: America's First Indigenous Theological Tradition, From Jonathan Edwards and the New Divinity to Edwards Amasa Parks (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2006); Oliver D. Crisp and Douglas A. Sweeney, eds., After Jonathan Edwards: The Courses of New England Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

⁹ On the developments in Edwards scholarship, see Kenneth P. Minkema, "Jonathan Edwards in the Twentieth Century," *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society* 47 (2004), 659-87 and Kenneth P. Minkema and Harry S. Stout, "Jonathan Edwards Studies: The State of the Field," in *Jonathan Edwards as Contemporary: Essays in Honor of Sang Huyn Lee*, ed. Don Schweitzer (New York: Peter Lang, 2010), 239-59; Sean Michael Lucas, "Jonathan Edwards Between Church and Academy: A Bibliographical Essay," in *The Legacy of Jonathan Edwards: American Religion and the Evangelical Tradition*, eds. D.G. Hart, Sean Michael Lucas, and Stephen J. Nichols (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003), 228-48. To cite just one numerical indicator from these studies, since World War II the number of dissertations on Edwards completed during each decade has grown rapidly from 20 in the 1950s to 76 in the years 2001-2010. For approximately the last 20 years, the largest growth in numbers has been in constructive theology and the study of church growth. The most comprehensive bibliography of Edwards scholarship is M.X. Lesser, *Reading Jonathan Edwards: An Annotated Bibliography in Three Parts*, 1729-2005 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008).

¹⁰ Douglas A. Sweeney, "Evangelical Tradition in America," in *The Cambridge Companion*, 217-38.

¹¹ Mark Noll, "Edwards's Theology after Edwards," in Sang Hyun Lee, ed., The Princeton Companion

The now truly gigantic stature of this eighteenth-century clergyman, particularly in conservative areas of Protestant theology, must be understood as the result of what is called the "Edwards Renaissance." This ongoing recovery and reinvigoration of the Edwardsean legacy in different strands of American Protestantism had its tentative beginnings in the 1930s and took off after World War II with the launching of the Yale Edition of The Works of Jonathan Edwards in 1957. It reached new heights at the turn of the millennium with the tercentenary of Edwards' birth in 2003. ¹² In this essay I wish to revisit the beginnings of the Edwards Renaissance between the 1930s and 1950s and demonstrate how much we can learn about these important decades in the religious and cultural history of the U.S. by scrutinizing the birth of today's iconic Edwards and the different facets of this icon. By offering such an exemplary case study, I hope to contribute to a new awareness among German and European scholars of how fruitful Edwards Studies can be also for those who are neither colonialists nor wish to revive Edwardsean theology for the present but rather to study and teach the religious dimension of the American story from the national period to the present.

Focusing on the formative years of the Edwards Renaissance shortly before and after World War II, when the basic patterns of Edwards' current reception were established, I will pursue the following questions: Why did Edwards rise to such popularity? What were the developments in American religious and cultural history that, first of all, created the need to construct an iconic American theologian and that made Edwards such an attractive figure for many? Secondly, I want to take a closer look at the contested religious reception and often conflicting theological interpretations of Edwards. In elevating Edwards to the status of America's theologian, what normative conceptions both of "true Christianity" and of Americanness were ascribed to Edwards by the different interpretative communities involved in the Edwards Renaissance? For reasons of space, I will have to restrict myself to explicitly religious or theological interpretations of Edwards during the period and will not be able to cover the equally fascinating trends that emerged in the fields of historical or literary scholarship on Edwards at the same time. 13 In the world of mid-century Protestantism, I will distinguish three major interpretative communities that were essential in the theological recovery of Edwards: First, I will discuss neoorthodoxy, as the most prominent intellectual school in

to Jonathan Edwards (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 292-308, 306.

¹² See Donald Weber, "The Figure of Jonathan Edwards," American Quarterly 35 (1983), 556-64, and "The Recovery of Jonathan Edwards," in *Jonathan Edwards and the American Experience*, eds. Nathan O. Hatch and Harry S. Stout (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 50-70.

¹³ On Edwards and the American Studies movement from Perry Miller to Emory Elliott, see Philip F. Gura, "Edwards and American Literature," in *The Cambridge Companion*, 262-279.

American mainline Protestantism at the time. The essay will then turn to the popular mainstream of the modern evangelical movement (sometimes referred to as neoevangelicalism) that emerged in the postwar era, as epitomized by the great revivalist Billy Graham. Finally, I will look at a branch of modern evangelicalism that, in contrast to the mainstream, is deeply invested in preserving the confessional heritage of the Reformed churches in America and can therefore maybe best described as "neoconfessional."

What, in brief, was the historical and theological context in which the Edwards Renaissance took place? Until the Civil War, American Protestantism had been overwhelmingly evangelical in orientation, and virtually all of the most influential American schools of Reformed theology during the antebellum period, in one way or the other, drew on the legacy of Edwards' teachings. But in the last third of the nineteenth century the movement of theological liberalism and modernism, which had first found programmatic expression and organizational shape in Boston-centered Unitarianism, was growing increasingly powerful and popular, not just in colleges and seminaries but also in the ecclesiastical institutions and pulpits of major Protestant denominations across the country. 14 It has been estimated that around the time the fundamentalist-modernist controversies tore through many Protestant churches in the 1920s, a liberal outlook "had become accepted and respectable in more than a third of the pulpits of American Protestantism and in at least half the educational, journalistic, and literary or theological expressions of Protestant church life." ¹⁵ Among the cultural and academic elite and in academic discourse in particular, there was widespread endorsement of the cluster of liberal ideas and ideals that William R. Hutchinson has defined as the heart of theological modernism: Central among these was the belief in a benevolent God, approachable through humanity's rational and moral faculties. This God was not radically transcendent but immanent in man's nature, and progressively revealed himself through the development of human culture toward ever-higher stages of enlightenment and moral self-perfection. Out of immanentism grew the notions of cultural evolutionism and accommodationism, according to which Christianity, like all religions, was inevitably tied into the larger historical evolution of human culture. To keep Christianity relevant for a new age, its theological legacy had to be consciously adjusted to modernity, embrace modern expansions in scientific and historical knowledge, and be made compatible

¹⁴ The best overview of the rise and development of liberal Protestant theology in the U.S. is offered by Gary Dorrien, *The Making of American Liberal Theology: Imagining Progressive Religion, 1805-1900* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001).

¹⁵ William R. Hutchinson, *The Modernist Impulse in American Protestantism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992), 3.

with enlightened views of a loving God and of man as a moral, self-determined being. American Puritanism seemed to contain little that could or should be incorporated into such a self-consciously modern, progressive Christianity. And thus Edwards' star, along with that of most other representatives of early American religious history, sunk dramatically between the end of the nineteenth century and the 1930s.

It was not that Edwards would have been forgotten or neglected. 16 His status as a figure of great historical significance seemed largely secure even at this point. However, most liberal theologians who wrote on Edwards during this period argued that in terms of religious orientation America needed to leave him and his outmoded form of Calvinism behind because it was denigrating to both God's and man's true characters. Even more aggressive attacks came from progressive historians such as Vernon Louis Parrington and Henry Bamford Parkes, who denounced Edwards as a hopeless and embarrassing anachronism in modern American thought. Other liberal theologians were inclined to think that Edwards had his merits as an unwitting originator of later developments. If one only stripped away the time-bound dogmatic superstructure from his writings, the underlying essential beauty of Edwards' mystical vision of God was exposed, which in many ways anticipated the Romantic panentheism of a Schleiermacher or Emerson. These gracious acknowledgments notwithstanding, even sympathetic liberal theologians had little real use for Edwards and, for the most part, gladly handed him over to the church history and literature departments, where the American Studies movement was beginning to form.

This was the situation when a countermovement to liberalism arose in academic theology that generated a very different interpretation of Edwards. In many ways akin to, and strongly influenced by "crisis theology" or "dialectical theology" in Continental Europe, this movement came to be known by the (somewhat misleading) term "neoorthodoxy." Among the main representatives of this diverse and far-flung movement were the brothers Reinhold (1892-1971) and Helmut Richard Niebuhr (1894-1962), second-generation immigrants from Germany who grew up in Missouri, and the German *émigré* from Nazi Germany Paul Tillich (1886-1965). Although deeply disillusioned with theological modernism, neo-

¹⁶ This section is strongly indebted to Stephen D. Crocco, "Edwards's Intellectual Legacy," in *The Cambridge Companion*, 300-24. Crocco offers the best account so far of the intellectual contexts in which the Edwards Renaissance occurred and the reader is referred to this study for more bibliographic details.

¹⁷ On neoorthodoxy and the Niebuhr brothers in particular, see Jon Diefenthaler , *H. Richard Niebuhr: A Lifetime of Reflections on the Church and the World* (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1986); James W. Fowler, *To See the Kingdom: The Theological Vision of H. Richard Niebuhr* (Lanham: University Press of

orthodoxy did not reject the Enlightenment heritage, or deny the findings of modern science and historical-critical method, but rather sought to recover for modernity the existential truths of the biblical revelation and the Protestant tradition. For this project, neoorthodox theologians drew on many Old World sources: the Fathers, the great leaders of the Reformation, Søren Kierkegaard and, of course, Karl Barth. But several of them also rediscovered Edwards as an—or *the*—American theologian, who deserved to be heard not because he in some oblique way was as an unwitting predecessor of Romantic idealism, but because he offered a powerful alternative vision of what neoorthodoxy liked to call "Christian Realism." Besides serving as an inspiration, Edwards was also of great importance to these thinkers in the sense that he provided them with a native genealogy for their own theology in a cultural situation where European, especially German theology, was seen as obscurantist and dangerously "foreign" by the wider American public.

The pioneering figure in the recovery of Edwards for the purposes of "Christian Realism" was in fact Joseph Haroutunian (1904-1968), an American Presbyterian clergyman and theologian with Armenian roots. In his dissertation, published as Piety vs. Moralism: The Passing of the New England Theology (1932), Haroutunian made a passionate plea for a new appreciation of Edwards and Puritanism as a profound alternative to the immanentism and accommodationism of modernist theology. The most profound and influential neoorthodox reading of Edwards, however, was undertaken a few years later by H. Richard Niebuhr in his The Kingdom of God in America (1937). Using Edwards as a central reference point and normative touchstone, in this early work Niebuhr outlined the main themes of a theology that he would later develop more fully in his other major books, The Meaning of Revelation (1941), Christ and Culture (1951), and Radical Monotheism and Western Culture (1960). 18 The Kingdom of God in America was basically intended as an exploration of "the meaning and spirit of American Christianity" from an explicitly theological perspective that was concerned with normative reorientation rather than sociohistorical explanations. For Niebuhr, the essence of American culture had been molded by Protestantism and American Protestantism, understood as a broad-based movement rather than a specific denomination and had its center in "the prophetic idea of the kingdom of God." But over the course of America's

America, 1985); Richard Fox, *Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biography* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1995); Douglas John Hall, *Remembered Voices: Reclaiming the Legacy of "Neoorthodoxy* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1998); Robin Lovin, *Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Donald B. Meyer, *The Protestant Search for Political Realism*, 1919-1941 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960).

¹⁸ See Leo Sandon, Jr., "Jonathan Edwards and H. Richard Niebuhr," *Religious Studies* 12.1 (1976), 101-115.

¹⁹ H. Richard Niebuhr, The Kingdom of God in America, with a New Introduction by Martin E. Marty

history, different aspects of that central idea of God's kingdom had been emphasized as American Protestantism moved through various "hot" stages of revolutionary fervor and "cold" stages of institutional petrification and accommodation to the larger culture. In colonial New England Puritanism, Niebuhr argued, the "kingdom of God" had primarily meant the "sovereignty of God." For the revivalists of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the kingdom first and foremost had been the advancing "reign of Christ" to be joined by those who opened their hearts to Him, while for the kind of liberalism that became prevalent after the Civil War it primarily had come to signify a "kingdom on earth." To Niebuhr's mind, however, Christianity was originally based on a dialectical understanding of God's relation to man and human culture through Christ in which all three aspects of the kingdom vitally belonged together. When they were separated or seen in isolation, as had happened in the various historical phases of American Protestantism, different distortions, errors and malformations resulted. From these insights Niebuhr would later develop in Christ and Culture his famous typology of different ways in which Christianity related to culture over the course of its history. At the time, he was most concerned with pointing out the faults and dangers inherent in the view of God's kingdom as a progressive earthly utopia which had become so widely accepted under the reigning liberal establishment in America.

With its mistaken understanding of God's progressive self-realization in history, Niebuhr claimed, American liberalism had lost sight of humanity's sinfulness or alienation from God, and thus of man's need for reconciliation. As a consequence, liberalism had falsely detached the central idea of gospel Christianity and Protestantism, the prophetic vision of God's kingdom, "from the ideas of sovereignty and redemption." "Since no reconciliation to the divine sovereign was necessary the reign of Christ," the liberal interpretation thus

involved no revolutionary events in history or the life of individuals. Christ the Redeemer became Jesus the teacher or the spiritual genius in whom the religious capacities of mankind were fully developed. . . . Evolution, growth, development, the culture of the religious life, the nurture of the kindly sentiments, the extension of humanitarian ideals and the progress of civilization took the place of the Christian revolution.

In essence, as Niebuhr put it in a now-famous aphoristic phrase, liberalism

⁽Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1988), ix, 17.

preached about how "[a] God without wrath brought men without sin into a kingdom without judgment through the ministrations of a Christ without a cross."²⁰ In the context of this scathing critique of liberalism's naïve anthropocentric optimism, for Niebuhr Jonathan Edwards served both as a historical source of polemical criticism and as a positive countermodel of a truly theocentric thinker, yet one who had simultaneously emphasized the dynamic and culture-transforming power of Christianity.

In what was surely a gesture of calculated provocation, Niebuhr even paid tribute to Sinners in the Hand of Angry God, Edwards infamous sermon that was so "often pointed to as the example of the offensive character of his [Calvinist] theology, or as something to be apologized for or 'gotten over' before he could be appreciated."21 By contrast, Niebuhr wanted Edwards' hellfire preaching to be taken as an expression of his anthropological realism, his "intense awareness of the precariousness of life's poise, of the utter insecurity of men and of mankind which are at every moment as ready to plunge into the abyss of disintegration, barbarism, crime and the war of all against all, as to advance toward harmony and integration." Edwards, in Niebuhr's view, "recognized what Kierkegaard meant when he described life as treading water with ten thousand fathoms beneath us."22 The colonial minister thus anticipated the tragic vision of life and disillusionment with Enlightenment dreams of progress that the neoorthodox theologians saw as the essential characteristics of the conditio moderna. In Niebuhr's existentialist reading the deeper truth behind Edwards' Calvinist diatribe about man's totally depravity and his literalist vision of hell, was a profound sense of humanity's need for redemption and its inability to save itself from itself.

In opposition to the modernists, who naïvely maintained that evil was the product of error or ignorance, Edwards knew that human nature was fundamentally flawed or sinful in a way that could never be wholly overcome by education, reflection, or human action. Because of his profound understanding of man's sinful nature in terms of a binding of the will by its concerns for the self and the temporal world to which the self is related through its desires, hopes, and fears, he recognized "that the problem of human life was not the discovery of an adequate ideal nor the generation of will power whereby ideals might be realized, but rather the redirection of the will to live and the liberation of the drive in human

²⁰ Niebuhr, The Kingdom of God in America, 152, 192, 193.

²¹ Crocco, "Edwards's Intellectual Legacy," 302. On the reception history of *Sinners*, see *Jonathan Edwards's Sinners in the Hand of an Angry God: A Casebook*, ed. Wilson H. Kimnach, Caleb J.D. Maskell, and Kenneth P. Minkema (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).

²² Niebuhr, The Kingdom of God in America, 137-38.

life from the inhibition of fear, conflict and the sense of futility."²³ More importantly, Edwards vigorously insisted on the fundamental Christian truth to which, in Niebuhr's view, liberal theology had become oblivious: that this redirection of the will cannot be achieved by man's own strength. Especially in Edwards' theological masterwork *Freedom of the Will*, Niebuhr found a reinterpretation of the Reformed teachings on the bondage of the will through sin that he praised for its philosophical depth and psychological sophistication. Whereas liberalism dreamed of man's progressive deification through self-culture, Edwards understood that the turning of the will to the good, the shift from our natural self-centeredness to a life centered in the "Being of beings," the shift from the practical polytheism in which men worship the transitory gods of self and world, to a genuine monotheism, could only occur by an existential revolution set into motion by the grace of a transcendent God alone.²⁴

According to Niebuhr, by demonstrating the necessity of divine initiative in bringing about the Christian revolution in the life of an individual human, and also in the historical world at large, Edwards had preserved the original Protestant idea of the kingdom of God as sovereignty. He had done so even as he developed an increasingly dynamic vision of how this kingdom expanded through religious revivals in which great numbers of people would open to Christ's redeeming love. Ultimately, however, "[o]nly the action of God himself is sufficient to effect the transfer, and so the divine sovereignty stands at the gate of the kingdom of Christ. Unless it opens the portals they remain closed and closed the tighter because man presses against them in the wrong direction." For Niebuhr, Edwards and some of the other early evangelicals embodied an almost perfect theological equilibrium between an acute sense of God's absolute transcendence, on the one hand, and a hopeful belief in his gracious presence in history on the other; between a humble recognition of man's flawed nature and an experiential faith in the regenerative love of Christ. In Niebuhr's words, they

²³ Ibid., 103.

²⁴ Anticipating some of the basic ideas that he would later pursue in *Radical Monotheism*, Niebuhr continues his exegesis of *Freedom of the Will*: "The human will is always committed to something and that so long as it is not committed to the universal good it is attached to the relative. The will, said Edwards, is as its strongest motive is. 'In all such offerings, something is virtually worshipped, and whatever it is, be it self, or our fellow men, or the world, that is allowed to usurp the place that should be given to God, and to receive the offerings that should be made to him.' Life never begins in a vacuum of freedom, but awakes to its tacit commitments. It is always loyal to something and its problem is how to transfer its loyalty from the ephemeral, the partial, and the relative, which by assuming absoluteness becomes devilish, to the eternal, universal and truly absolute." Niebuhr, *The Kingdom of God in America*, 103.

²⁵ Niebuhr, *The Kingdom of God in America*, 103.

presupposed or reaffirmed the rule of God as the basis of all they believed about the kingdom of Christ. [And] Jonathan Edwards, the greatest theologian of the movement, comes to mind at once as one in whom faith in regeneration was solidly founded upon a supreme conviction of the reality of divine sovereignty. It would be difficult to find in all religious literature a more moving confession of loyalty to the kingdom of God than the one in his *Personal Narrative*, or to discover more illuminating statements of the principle than those which abound in his writings.²⁶

Of course, the implicit message of Niebuhr's argument was that this balance needed to be restored in American Protestantism and that the Edwardsean legacy could be instrumental in achieving this. But he was not at all interested in reestablishing Edwards' theology as a historical system. As we saw, he rather engaged in a fairly free-wheeling existential appropriation of Edwards' teachings. He was not only unconcerned with the particulars of his Calvinist scholasticism; Niebuhr also did not share Edwards' orthodox scripturalism. Accordingly, Niebuhr spoke of the enduring theological truths embedded in "the mythology of Edwards" when he gave a celebratory address on the occasion of the two hundredth anniversary of Edwards' death in 1958.²⁷

Niebuhr's approach to Edwards illustrates some of the basic tensions that characterize the neoorthodox project more generally. While Niebuhr and his fellow travelers wished to preserve and revitalize the core insights of Reformation and post-Reformation theology, they did not believe that it was desirable or even possible to maintain as a whole the dogmatic systems of Luther, Calvin, or Edwards for that matter, under the conditions of modernity. Indeed, Niebuhr, as much as Tillich, distanced himself from "an atavistic Protestantism [that] shuns the ardors of adventure with the social gospel, flees the problems which historical and psychological criticism have posed for faith and out of dream stuff reconstructs a lost Atlantis of early Protestant thought." But it turned out that most Americans were not ready to, or found little sustenance, in embracing such a stance; rather, they felt increasingly attracted by the certainties promised to them by the new varieties of evangelicalism that made their appearance after World War II. While neoorthodoxy continued to be a significant presence in some circles of American academia,

²⁶ Ibid., 101.

²⁷ H. Richard Niebuhr, "The Anachronism of Jonathan Edwards," in *Theology, History, and Culture: Major Unpublished Writings*, ed. William Stacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 123-34, 131.

²⁸ H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Meaning of Revelation*, intr. Douglas F. Ottati (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006), 3.

its popular influence, which had always been rather limited, dramatically waned after the mid-1960s. What had happened? 29

During the heyday of liberalism in the early twentieth century the community of conservative evangelicals had, in large parts, withdrawn into itself, and formed an increasingly closed-off, religious subculture often referred to as Fundamentalism. Deeply suspicious of liberal theology, the natural sciences, and the culture of modernity as a whole, this community kept its distance, as much as possible, from the perceived corruptions of "outside" society and its churches. But in the 1930s there emerged a group of evangelical theologians and church leaders, including figures such as Harold John Ockenga (1905-1985), Edward John Carnell (1919-1967), and Carl F.H. Henry (1913-2003), who sought to overcome the rigid sectarianism and anti-intellectualism of their community, and who wanted to reengage American society and politics in a constructive fashion. Through the efforts of these men, American evangelicalism during the 1940s and 1950s redefined itself as a faith for the American mainstream, and quickly gained new strength, not least through the founding of the National Association of Evangelicals (1942) and the Evangelical Theological Society (1949).

Although bound together by a desire to leave the Fundamentalist ghetto, this rejuvenated evangelicalism, which increasingly challenged and then overturned the liberal ascendancy in the postwar period, was theologically quite diverse. Nevertheless, an enthusiasm for Jonathan Edwards as the founding father of American evangelicalism was shared almost across-the-board. As they had done in the first half of the nineteenth century, evangelicals since World War II have "championed Edwards more wholeheartedly—less hesitantly, and often much less critically—than has any other group." Indeed, while neoorthodoxy set the Edwards Renaissance into motion, it was only with the triumphant return of evangelicalism to the mainstream of American culture that the Edwards Renaissance gathered the broad momentum that carries into the present. The evangelical constructions of Edwards, of course, differed widely from the neoorthodox vision of America's theologian. For many evangelical theologians and preachers, Edwards, in the words of Niebuhr, constituted such "dream stuff" out of which they hoped to reconstruct

²⁹ The study of modern American evangelicalism has produced a veritable scholarly industry. Important general works include Randall H. Balmer, *Blessed Assurance: A History of Evangelicalism in America* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001); *The Variety of American Evangelicalism*, ed. Donald W. Dayton and Robert K. Johnston (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1991); Barry Hankins, *American Evangelicals: A Contemporary History of a Mainstream Religious Movement* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009); George M. Marsden, *Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001); Mark. A Noll, *American Evangelical Christianity: An Introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001).

³⁰ Douglas A. Sweeney, "Evangelical Tradition in America," in *The Cambridge Companion*, 217-38, 217.

"a lost Atlantis of early Protestant thought," even as they inevitably adopted his thought to fit the need of the present and their own agendas. 31

For all the consensual passion for Edwards as the iconic embodiment of good and pure "old-time religion," twentieth-century evangelicals were quite divided from the beginning over how much loyalty was due to the fine points of Edwards' Calvinist theology, especially when it came to such contested doctrines as double predestination. The main force behind the spectacular comeback of evangelicalism was a popular urban revivalism that deemphasized dogma in the service of mass conversionism, and in many ways was deeply at odds with Edwardsean sensibilities. This popular revivalism, more than anything, is today associated with the term neoevangelicalism, and its most important representative is, of course, Billy Graham (b. 1918).³² No one was more successful in evangelizing America's growing white-collar middle-class and in making evangelicalism culturally respectable in large segments of the population than this Southern Baptist preacher. Graham fully committed himself to his evangelistic work immediately after the war, and 1949 in many ways was the annus mirabilis of his career that marked his breakthrough to popular success. In the summer and fall of that year, he conducted the first of his great urban crusades in Los Angeles, in which he spoke to an estimated total audience of 350,000 people, and according to the Los Angeles Times made 3,000 new converts, bringing another 3,000 more "back to Christ." Towards the end of the L.A. Crusade, Graham did something quite remarkable and without precedent in his career: he preached another man's sermon, and significantly he chose Jonathan Edwards' famous homily Sinners in the Hand of an Angry God. A closer look at this unusual performance will not only reveal Graham's own rather equivocal use of Edwards' theological authority but will call attention to what I regard as a deep-seated ambiguity in the neoevangelical relation to its great Puritan forebear.33

³¹ Neoorthodox intellectuals were generally highly skeptical of the new evangelicalism, which to them was basically an atavistic Protestantism that had accommodated itself to consumer capitalism, and the new lifestyle and psychological demands of a growing suburban, white-collar middle class, from which it recruited the majority of its converts. Conversely, evangelicals saw in neo-orthodoxy "but a confusing form of modernism," especially dangerous because it claimed to defend the Protestant tradition, but had cut itself loose from literalism and "a propositional view of biblical revelation." Sidney E. Ahlstrom, *A Religious History of the American People* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1972). 944.

³² On Graham, see William C. Martin, *A Prophet with Honor: The Billy Graham Story* (New York: William Morrow, 1991); William C. McLoughlin, Jr., *Billy Graham: Revivalist in a Secular Age* (New York: Ronald Press, 1960); John Charles Pollock, *Billy Graham, Evangelist to the World: An Authorized Biography of the Decisive Years* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979) and *To All Nations: The Billy Graham Story* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1985).

³³ This section of the essay owes much to Andrew Finstuen's online essay "'Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God' Reprised: Billy Graham and the Los Angeles Crusade of 1949," featured on The Jonathan Edwards Center at Yale University Web site. http://edwards.yale.edu/education/billy-gra-

Graham's preaching of Edwards should be read as a highly symbolic gesture, even if Graham, at the time, was only partly conscious of this symbolism.³⁴ It is a gesture that reveals as much about Graham's theology and aspirations as a revivalist as it does about Jonathan Edwards' status in evangelical culture. It is also a gesture that at the very beginning of the postwar revivals anticipates how this movement would embrace Edwards as its founding father and spiritus rector. In the neoorthodox reading of a Richard Niebuhr, Edwards was a prophetic figure from the past without any legitimate heirs amongst modern revivalists. In performing Edwards to more than 6,000 people in his overcrowded "Canvas Cathedral," Billy Graham, in defiance of such views, assumed for himself the mantle of the American Elijah. At the same time, Graham's actual approach to Edwards' text was informed by a spirit of pragmatism rather than a spirit of reverent faithfulness to the original. For one thing, he only preached about half of Edwards' sermon, which he obviously thought too long for modern attention spans. Moreover, he substantially edited the text and revised the diction in order to make it more accessible. Finally, he added a lengthy, contextualizing introduction and several impromptu asides (for instance, on the sinful pleasures of the Sunset Strip and the gambling dens) that related Edward's strictures to modern life in urban Los Angeles.³⁵

In the extemporaneous introduction to the actual sermon Graham created a general sense of historical continuity between the Great Awakening of Edwards' time and his current evangelical mission: He evoked the year 1740 when "revival fires were spreading very much as they are at present time in America." Then he beseeched God that the "Holy Ghost" would "move again tonight in 1949 and shake us out of our lethargy as Christians and convict sinners that we might come to repentance." More specifically, Graham constructed for himself and the new evangelical movement a genealogy, and through it, an image of intellectual respectability: "Jonathan Edwards," he (mistakenly) told his audience, "had his Ph.D. from Yale University. He was later to become the eminent President of Princeton University. Jonathan Edwards was one of the greatest scholars that America ever produced, one of the greatest preachers . . . , a man we look back on

ham. See also Andrew Finstuen, *Original Sin and Everyday Protestants: The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, Billy Graham, and Paul Tillich in an Age of Anxiety* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 127-28.

³⁴ Finstuen, has pointed out that there were pragmatic reasons for Graham's decision as well: after 72 days of crusading, in which he had preached 65 sermons, he had exhausted himself. But there is certainly more to it, for if pragmatism had been the key factor there would have been easier choices than a two-hundred-year-old sermon written in an antiquated language.

³⁵ A full transcript of Graham's rendition of Edwards' sermon is available at: http://edwards.yale.edu/education/billy-graham. It is based on an audio file at the Billy Graham archives, Wheaton, Ill. ©1949 Billy Graham Evangelistic Association. Used with permission. All rights reserved.

today and revere, and pray God might raise up again such men on the American scene, that will not compromise, but will preach the word of God seriously, like Jonathan Edwards . . ." Implicitly, of course, Graham here expressed the hope that he might be one of these new American prophets.

Throughout the sermon Graham repeatedly interspersed comments such as "this [is] the past President of Princeton University speaking," especially when he reached the parts where Edwards speaks about the factual reality of hell and eternal damnation:

Unconverted Men walk over the Pit of Hell on a rotten Covering, and there are innumerable Places in this Covering so weak that they won't bear the Weight, and these places are not seen. Walking in this tent, down that sidewalk, out on the street, every step you take, on every rock and cover, and underneath, is so weak that any step you might fall through and be into eternity, so says Jonathan Edwards, the President of Princeton University.

While this insistence on Edwards' intellectual credentials constituted in part a way to assert the credibility of his message to modern ears, it was also a strategy of self-authorization in a situation in which Yale and Princeton were in the hands of mainline Protestant intellectuals who tended to reject literalist interpretations of hell and damnation and looked down on the atavism of the evangelical community that still upheld them.³⁶

Theologically speaking, the Edwards to which Graham laid claim was not only quite different from the neoorthodox Edwards, but he was also quite different from the orthodox Edwards, that is to say from Edwards' own understanding of himself as an orthodox Reformed theologian. Especially in some of his later writings Graham would claim that he wholeheartedly supported the traditional Reformed emphases on God's free and sovereign grace. But his actual evangelizing techniques and his preaching style, all aiming to produce mass conversion through a spontaneous decision for Christ, at least stand in tension with these emphases. This is also evinced by his rendition of *Sinners*, which becomes apparent if one looks carefully at the many revisions which Graham made to the original

³⁶ The invocation of the authority of Edwards in the context of the L.A. crusade also had other political overtones, of course. Significantly, the motto of the revival crusade was "Christ for the Crisis," by which Graham not only meant the crisis in the nation's moral life, but also the "Red" crisis, i.e., the standoff with atheist communism at the beginning of the Cold War. Through the iconic historical figure of Edwards, evangelical religion and American nationalism were thus brought together. Graham's preaching of Edwards suggested that evangelicalism had been America's religion from the nation's very beginnings in the colonial period, and that the revitalization of this religious and intellectual legacy was the remedy for the Communist threat now.

text, changes which frequently go well beyond mere rhetorical modernizations. Andrew Finstuen has argued that "Graham softened Edwards' strict Calvinism," to make "it more palatable to [his] mid-twentieth century audience" but sees "no radical departure."³⁷ In my opinion, Graham modified the substance of Edwards' original Calvinist teachings and he did so in ways that reflect the general theological development of American evangelicalism since the nineteenth century. This is not to deny that in many areas the continuities and affinities between Graham and Edwards are strong. Like most neoevangelicals, Graham goes along with Edwards' scripturalism. In contrast to Niebuhr, he is very comfortable with the literalist vision of hell that Edwards' sermon creates in lurid detail, and with the understanding of the devil as a personal entity. As a revivalist, Graham also shares the sense of urgency with which Edwards warned the unconverted of their precarious situation before God who is rightfully angry with them on account of their many sins that might bring them into everlasting damnation at any moment.

Yet with regard to several central tenets of post-Dortian Calvinism, Graham swerves away from Edwards, thereby overriding the latter's radical emphasis on divine sovereignty and human passivity in the salvation process. Edwards vehemently defended the view that the imputation of the original fall made the corruption of natural or unregenerate man so complete that he was morally unable to really direct his will towards God and embrace a saving faith in Christ. In accordance with this understanding of total depravity, supernatural regeneration must precede even the gracious acts of genuine repentance and believing as the first steps in the conversion process. Because man's will was bound by sin, there was nothing that he could do to earn forgiveness. Atonement was the unmerited gift that a sovereign God unconditionally bestowed upon His elect. However, in his revisions of and extemporaneous additions to Edwards' sermon, Graham repeatedly shifted the accent to each person's ability to decide his or her own fate, to either continue in wickedness or turn to Christ. In repeated asides, for instance, he would warn his L.A. audience not to "reject Jesus Christ and turn down God's way of salvation" lest their decision would bring eternal perdition upon them. This, of course, implied that humans have the freedom to make such a decision.

Graham's assertion of human freedom contra Edwards becomes most obvious in the formulaic altar call with which Graham concluded the performance of the sermon. In this addition to the original, he reminded the audience of its sin, and how "every one of us are hanging over the pit of hell" and then held out the unabashedly universalistic promise that in giving themselves over to Christ everyone's sins could be taken away:

³⁷ Finstuen, "'Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God' Reprised," 5.

... I'm glad to tell you this, that the Lord Jesus Christ died on the cross of Calvary, and that God loves you with an everlasting love, and the mercy of God is everlasting. And I don't care who you are tonight, man, woman, boy, or girl, it makes no difference who you are tonight, the Lord Jesus Christ can cleanse you from sin, and you can be assured you're going to heaven, and every man, woman, boy, and girl in this place to know they're saved before they leave this place. Wouldn't it be wonderful to walk out with peace in your heart, and that [as] you walk alone not be afraid of the next step, not be afraid that some place along the way tomorrow you are going to drop? Wouldn't it be wonderful to have the glorious peace and joy in your heart, knowing that your sins are cleansed, and that you're ready to meet God? Well you can know it right now. Right this minute, You say, how long does it take? Only an instant. You say, what do I have to do? All you have to do is let Jesus in, right now where you sit. You make certain that you are ready to meet Lord God.

To say, "All you have to do is let Christ in your heart," of course implies that the bondage of the will is not total, and that atonement is not quite unconditional. By foregrounding human agency in the redemption process, Graham also effectively undercut Edwards' understanding of double predestination. For Edwards, Graham's revisions would, in short, have been guilty of the Arminian heresy which he fought against so hard throughout his career. Moreover, Graham in effect promised instantaneous assurance to his audience; something that very much contradicted Edwards' scrupulousness about detecting the marks of genuine grace or signs of salvation that could usually be found only after a prolonged process of conversion.

What Graham was doing here, was reinterpreting Edwards along the lines of a popular, free-will evangelicalism that had first risen to prominence in America during the mass revivals of the Second Great Awakening in the early nineteenth century and reached its apex in the mass revivalism of a Dwight L. Moody or Billy Sunday, who had called upon large anonymous urban audiences to abandon their wicked ways, instantly turn to God and seek holiness. This developmental line of American evangelicalism, which is often claimed to be more consistent with American culture and its emphasis on self-reliance, reform and perfectionism, had also shaped Graham's religious background, and he carried it very successfully into the modern era. While Graham certainly admired Edwards and found it useful to invoke his authority, Graham's performance of *Sinners* shows that he expe-

rienced much difficulty with actually using Edwardsean theology in evangelical practice and in fact had to read it against the grain in certain core areas to make it serve his purposes.

Although Graham is undoubtedly the most popular American evangelical of the twentieth century, not everyone in the broader evangelical movement was happy about his tremendous influence. Reformed theologians in the more confessionally-oriented seminaries criticized Graham and his followers for their too-easy peace with the larger culture and for their lack of Calvinist commitments. Significantly, already in the postwar era, prominent theological representatives of this neoconfessional evangelicalism also turned to Edwards as an authoritative resource for how to reconcile evangelical activism and the Reformed dogmatic tradition without compromising the purity of the latter.

My example here for this third pattern of interpreting America's theologian which emerged after World War II is John H. Gerstner (1914-96), one of the trailblazers of the evangelical Edwards Renaissance, who over the course of his long career published a good number of theological studies on Edwards, beginning with Steps to Salvation: The Evangelical Message of Jonathan Edwards (first publ. 1959).³⁸ A conservative Presbyterian, who ended his career in the Presbyterian Church in America, Gerstner taught Church History at Presbyterian Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, Knox Theological Seminary, and Trinity Evangelical School. Here, he was a vociferous apologist of post-Reformation Calvinist orthodoxy, as defined by the Synod of Dort, which, to his mind, was the purest embodiment of the gospel truth. To Gerstner, Edwards was the most ingenious interpreter of the Reformed heritage for modern America. In Steps to Salvation, Gerstner called Edwards America's premier "intellectual evangelist" who engaged with modern philosophy and the sciences, while simultaneously arguing with great rigor "the fine points of salvation" and the "controversial issues of theology."³⁹ For Gerstner, and those who would follow after him, Edwards was simultaneously guardian of orthodoxy and an innovator, who, in their view, had successfully harmonized Calvinist teachings about total depravity, unconditional election and limited atonement with the evangelical priorities of practical piety and evangelizing as many people as possible.

Most importantly, Edwards seemed to offer a convincing answer to the great conundrum of evangelical Calvinism: how can you emphasize the responsibility

³⁸ Over the course of his long career Gerstner published a good number of further theological studies on Edwards, including *Jonathan Edwards on Heaven and Hell* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1980); *Jonathan Edwards: A Mini-Theology* (Wheaton: Tyndale House, 1987); *The Rational Biblical Theology of Jonathan Edwards* (3 vols; Orlando: Ligonier, 1991).

³⁹ Steps to Salvation was later reissued under the title Jonathan Edwards, Evangelist. Here I am quoting from a recent reprint (Morgan: Soli Deo Gloria Publications, 1995), 189.

of Christians to actively seek God in their lives and of working to spread God's word without falling into the Arminian trap? And how can a preacher engage in the practice of "indiscriminate gospelizing," i.e., in extending the gospel promise to everyone in the audience, without compromising, as Graham seemed to be doing, the belief that Christ died only for the elect? In his Freedom of the Will—the same work that Niebuhr admired so much—Edwards had worked out in great detail the distinction between the natural ability (constitutional capacity) to respond to the gospel offer and turn to God with contrition that everybody had, including the nonelect sinner, and his or her "moral inability" (or ineradicable unwillingness) to actually submit one's will to God and embrace a saving faith in Christ. As Gerstner puts it: "Men are unable to do any good thing, whether in the direction of salvation or in any other way. But they are able to hear the Word and they are able to do certain outward deeds that possess a nonmeritorious 'negative righteousness'." While always emphasizing God's complete sovereignty in the salvation process, Edwards, according to Gerstner, "never let up in insisting that they do what they could."40 With this distinction in place, Edwards could argue that it was the church's responsibility to make itself a willing instrument of Christ's redemptive work in history by indiscriminately spreading the gospel to the nations, through which saving faith was carried forth, while avoiding the erroneous presumption that revivalists could actually save anyone except those chosen by a sovereign God before the beginning of time. He could call on the responsibility of every man to repent, seek God, study the Word, while avoiding the false presumption that such human activities could have any saving power. So Gerstner praises Edwards for having never offered any false certainties (unlike the Arminians), and for restricting himself to holding out a hope to be amongst the elect on whom the gift of regeneration would be bestowed.

Neither did he ever cease to remind them that all they did was of no true value at all, could in no way recommend them to God, and did not in itself bring them one bit whit closer to the Kingdom than they were without it. In other words, he preached human ability and responsibility with as much insistence as any Arminian would do, but without a trace of Arminianism or the slightest compromise of his Calvinistic convictions.⁴¹

Gerstner and those who would follow after him thus held up Edwards as a historical corrective to counter the continuing tendency in post-war American evan-

⁴⁰ Gerstner, Jonathan Edwards, 190.

⁴¹ Ibid., 190-91.

gelicalism to undercut, if not in teaching then in practice, the Reformed teachings on divine sovereignty and human passivity in the salvation process.

It is worth noting in conclusion that over the past half-century the interest in Edwards as a constructive theologian for the modern age has been almost exclusively concentrated in the evangelical camp. As Douglas Sweeney has pointed out, evangelicals "now produce the bulk of scholarship on Edwards' theological activity." They "convene the largest conferences, dispense the most literature and audio-visual material matter, build the most popular websites, and raise the most interest related to Edwards' life and theological ministry."42 The world of American evangelicalism has of course, changed dramatically and become a good deal more complex since the post-war era. Yet I would argue that as far as current appropriations of Edwards are concerned, the basic bifurcation between a dogmatically less pronounced, more ecumenically-minded, and stylistically popular, "Grahamesque" revivalism on the one hand, and a self-consciously and programmatically confessional evangelicalism on the other remains visible. If one wanted to name a single successor to Graham, who would come close not only in style but also in status, it would probably have to be Rick Warren (b. 1954), pastor of the Saddleback megachurch in Lake Forest, California and author of the enormously successful The Purpose Driven Life (2002). Like Graham, Warren has drawn a lot of fire from Reformed evangelicals concerned with his perceived doctrinal laxity. At the same time, he too has expressed his great appreciation of Edwards. In an interview he said: "Edwards is, without a doubt, the most brilliant mind America ever produced... And he used his mind—I have read through the complete set of Jonathan Edwards . . .—He clearly was an influence on me."⁴³ As with Graham, however, Warren's enthusiasm for America's most brilliant mind has not translated into any strict commitment to the intricacies of Edwards' defense of Dortian orthodoxy.

While "influence" is admittedly always hard to quantify, it would seem that over the last three decades or so in which there was a general resurgence of traditional Reformed theology in the U.S., the neoconfessional advocacy of Edwards has gained the most ground. Gerstner alone created a veritable dynasty of Edwardseans. His most prominent disciple is R. C. Sproul (b. 1939), who has advocated Edwards in many of his writings and the influential *Ligonier Ministries*, which reaches a large following through seminaries, radio programs, a monthly

⁴² Douglas A. Sweeney, "Evangelical Tradition in America," 229. See also, D.G. Hart, "Before the Young, Restless, and Reformed: Edwards Appeal to Post-World War II Evangelicals," in *After Jonathan Edwards*, 237-53.

 $^{^{43}}$ "Script of Interview with Pastor Rick Warren and Pastor John Piper. May 1, 2011," available at http://pastors.com/piperinterview/. Link valid on 27 Feb 2013.

magazine, and the Internet. 44 Somewhere in-between Warren's more generic evangelicalism and the ardent confessionalism of Sproul we find several highly successful preachers who are often labeled "neo-Calvinists" but who operate in the world of megachurch evangelization and mass media outreach with the ease of Warren. Virtually all have extolled their love for and loyalty towards Edwards. Besides Tim Keller (b. 1950) and Mark Driscoll (b. 1970), 45 today John Piper (b. 1946) is arguably "America's most famous Edwardsean minister" who recently retired as senior pastor of a megachurch in Minneapolis (Bethlehem Baptist Church), and "publishes widely popular books on Edwards' thought and spirituality, and heads a national center, named Desiring God Ministries, devoted in part to sharing Edwardsean views with other evangelicals."46 If one looks at these recent evangelical publications of a "Classical Calvinist" orientation, they praise many aspects of Edwards' work: his Trinitarian metaphysics; his analysis of religious affections in the conversion process and revivals; his teachings on gender roles in the church, on family issues, and on Christian education; his missionary activities; his ministry, and his personal piety. Ultimately, however, he is probably most important to those invested in the Reformed heritage who see him as an intellectually respectable model for how to be what Gerstner called a "predestinarian evangelical."47

Abstract

Primarily geared toward a European audience, this essay seeks to create an awareness of the significant potential of Edwards' national and international reception histories as an interpretative lens for studying the diverse traditions and trajectories of American Protestantism. As an example, the essay revisits the beginnings of what is often called the "Edwards Renaissance" from the 1930s to the 1950s to demonstrate how much we can learn about these important decades in the religious and cultural history of the United States by examining closely the different appropriations of Edwards. The focus is on three major interpretative communities essential to the theological recovery of Edwards: the movement

⁴⁴ See, among others, *Chosen by God* (Wheaton: Tyndale, 1986); *Willing to Believe: The Controversy over Free Will* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1997); with Archie Parrish, *The Spirit of Revival: Discovering the Wisdom of Jonathan Edwards* (Wheaton: Crossway, 2000).

⁴⁵ Keller most explicitly acknowledges Edwards' influence in his bestseller *The Reason for God: Belief in an Age of Skepticism* (New York: Dutton, 2008). Driscoll has cited Edwards as America's greatest theologian and a major influence in the book he co-authored with Gerry Breshears, *Doctrine: What Christians Should Believe* (Wheaton: Crossway, 2010), as well as in other places.

⁴⁶ Sweeney, "Evangelical Tradition in America," 230-31. Among Piper's Edwardsean publications are Desiring God: Meditations of a Christian Hedonist (Sisters: Multnomah, 1986); The Supremacy of God in Preaching (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1990); The Pleasures of God (Sisters: Multnomah, 1991); God's Passion for His Glory: Living the Vision of Jonathan Edwards (Wheaton: Crossway, 1998); A God Entranced Vision of All Things: The Legacy of Jonathan Edwards, ed. with Justin Taylor (Wheaton, Crossway, 2004); Finally Alive (Minneapolis: Desiring God Foundation, 2009).

⁴⁷ Gerstner, Jonathan Edwards, 13.

of neoorthodoxy, represented by H. Richard Niebuhr, the popular mainstream of the neoevangelical movement as embodied by Billy Graham, and the kind of "neoconfessional" evangelicalism advocated by John H. Gerstner.

Kurzusammenfassung:

Dieses primär an ein europäisches Publikum gerichtete Essay will einen Beitrag dazu leisten, die vielfältigen Möglichkeiten ins Bewußtsein zu rücken, welche in der Erforschung von Edwards' nationaler und internationaler Rezeption als Zugang zur Geschichte des amerikanischen Protestantismus mit seinen vielfältigen Traditionen und Entwicklungslinien liegen. Als Beispiel werden die Anfänge der "Edwards Renaissance" zwischen den 1930er und 1950er Jahren in den Blick genommen, um zu zeigen, wie viele Einblicke man in diese so wichtige Epoche der U.S.-amerikanischen Religions- und Kulturgeschichte gewinnen kann, indem man die verschiedenen Anverwandlungen von Edwards in dieser Zeit untersucht. Der Fokus liegt dabei auf drei Deutungsgemeinschaften, die für die theologische Wiederentdeckung Edwards' maßgeblich waren: die theologische Bewegung der sogenannte Neoorthodoxie, als deren Vetreter H. Richard Niebuhr betrachtet wird, die populäre Hauptströmung des neuen Evangelikalismus nach dem Krieg, wie sie von Billy Graham verkörpert wurde, und schließlich ein neo-konfessionalistischer Evangelikalismus, wie ihn John H. Gerstner vertrat.

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A RETRIEVAL OF JONATHAN EDWARDS' CONCEPT OF FREE WILL: THE RELEVANCE FOR NEUROSCIENCE

Introduction

Despite the hundreds of years that society has dedicated to science and technology which has led to the development of airplanes, space travel, computers and nano-techniques, when we reflect on ourselves we are still embarrassed about how little we understand about our human identity. Neuroscience can help us to develop insight, to comprehend ourselves and our identity, especially in the complex and perplexing area of the freedom of will.

The tendency in neuroscience has been to deny an autonomous free will. The seriousness of this shocking academic view touches modern humanity and society² because it does not just raise academic and philosophical questions about how intentionality, human emotion and love can be accounted for, but the consequences of these neuroscientific discoveries also affect the understanding of

¹ From a cultural-historical perspective, World War I and II came as a shock to an optimistic humanistic self-understanding that showed the relevance of the 'doctrine of the unfree will', see G.C. den Hertog, *Bevrijdende kennis. De 'leer van de onvrije wil' in de theologie van Hans Joachim Iwand* ('s Gravenhage: Boekencentrum, 1989), 11-12.

² In the Netherlands, D.F. Swaab published, *Wij zijn ons brein: van baarmoeder tot Alzheimer* (Amsterdam: Contact, 2010). Swaab's book has continually been on www.debestseller60.nl from October 2010 until November 17 2012 (last accessed 7 December 2012). In 2011 it was number 4 in the top ten of the most sold books in the Netherlands, http://web.cpnb.nl/cpnb/campagne.vm?c=51&template=campagnes.

morality³ and autonomy, and may also have a huge impact upon accountability and law, on the one hand,⁴ and the care of addicts, prisoners⁵ and psychiatric patients on the other.

Modern neuroscientists are not the first people to reflect on human will. In the Christian tradition theologians and philosophers have contemplated this issue too. In the first century, Origin (185-254) examined the relationship between necessity, human freedom, and responsibility⁶ and since then Augustine theologians have often meditated upon free will and its related problems. Augustine himself wrote *De Libero Arbitrio*,⁷ while Anselm furthered this tradition in his *De libertate arbitrii*. During the Augustinian revival of the Reformation, Luther wrote *De Servo Arbitrio*⁸ defending a radical theological and soteriological understanding of this anthropological problem by denying free will. Initially, Calvin was not very sensitive to the problems raised by the concept of free will, but the writings of Albertus Pighius increased his awareness of this issue and convinced him of the necessity of making sound expressions and clear distinctions.⁹

The theme of free will remained an issue throughout the reformed tradition; confessions are a reflection of this attention given to the issue of free will. ¹⁰ The numerous theological studies on this issue, and the different emphases that these theologians stressed, is evidence of the great interest shown in this theme. ¹¹ While Luther denied free will, Calvin was much more careful in his speech/expressions; the early modern reformed tradition underlined the freedom of human will and the contingency of God's acts. That this insight was not definitive is made clear

³ See E.J. Sternberg, My Brain Made Me Do It: The Rise of Neuroscience and the Threat to Moral Responsibility (New York: Prometheus, 2010).

⁴ V.A.F. Lamme, 'Controle, vrije wil en andere kletskoek', *Justitiële Verkenningen* 34, 1, 2008, 76-88.

⁵ See B. Demyttenaere, *Levenslang*, *een blik achter de tralies van de Belgische gevangenissen* (Antwerpen: Manteau, 2002), 201.

⁶ See H.S. Benjamins, Eingeordnete Freiheit. Freiheit und Vorsehung bei Origenes (Leiden: Brill, 1994).

⁷ See also S. Harrison, *Augustine's Way into the Will. The Theological and Philosophical Significance of* De Libero Arbitrio (Oxford: OUP, 2006).

⁸ Weimarer Ausgabe 18, 600-787. Luther wrote to Erasmus in relation to the problem of the will: 'Unus tu et solus cardinem rerum vidisti, et ipsum iugulum petisti, pro quo ex animo tibi gratias ago' (You, and you alone, have seen the hinge on which all turns, and aimed for the vital spot. For that I heartily thank you), Weimarer Ausgabe 18,786. For an English translation, see *The Bondage of the Will* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1990). Iwand found in the doctrine of the unfree will the Archimedian point of theology, G.C. den Hertog, *Bevrijdende kennis*, 105.

⁹ Calvin's thoughts are laid down in *Institutes* 2.2. See P. Helm, *John Calvin's Ideas* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004), 157-183. Free will is also a theme in confessions, see *Canones of Dordt* III/IV, art 12, 16; *Westminster Confession of Faith*, Chapter IX.

¹⁰ See Canones of Dordt III/IV, art 12, 16; Westminster Confession of Faith, Chapter IX.

¹¹ The book which is edited by W.J. van Asselt, J.M. Bac and R.T. te Velde deals with the approaches of Girolamo Zanchi, Fransiscus Junius, Fransiscus Gomarus, Gisbertus Voetius, Fransesco Turrettini and Bernardinus de Moor, *Reformed Thought on Freedom. The Concept of Free Choice in Early Modern Reformed Theology* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2010).

by Jonathan Edwards who—in accordance with Luther—emphasized necessity, but—in opposition to Luther—defended human free will.¹²

Given the fact that during this century, there has been such an increase in the cooperation between theologians and neurobiologists in understanding the coherence of intelligence and religion that some people even speak about 'neurotheology'¹³ there are good reasons for investigating how the Christian tradition can contribute to the current debate. The concept of free will expounded by Jonathan Edwards a representative of the Christian tradition is used for this investigation, for the following reasons. Firstly, Edwards opposes the argument of self-determination, which is also recognizable in neuroscience. ¹⁴ Secondly, Edwards underlined the concept of necessity, in contrast to the spirit of his early modern age that was focused on human autonomy. ¹⁵ Thirdly, the fact that Edwards wrote about anthropological themes, including *Freedom of the Will, Original Sin* and *Religious Affections* indicates that he was a modernist which makes him a suitable partner for our age. ¹⁶ Fourthly, Edwards combines a deterministic worldview on the one hand, with morality and responsibility on the other, which makes it interesting to look at the structures of his thought processes.

In this essay¹⁷ I will first briefly describe the main points of the determinis-

 $^{^{12}}$ See Edwards on Freedom of Will, in WJE 1 (The Works of Jonathan Edwards, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957, vol. 1).

¹³ This expression is used in circles of the Institute for the Biocultural Study of Religion, www.ibcsr.org, an example of the cooperation of different disciplines. This institute issues a magazine, *Religion, Brain and Behavior.* See also: W.S. Brown, N. Murphy, H. Newton Mahony (eds.), *Whatever Happened to the Soul? Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human Nature* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1999); R.J. Russell, N. Murphy, T.C. Meyering, M.A. Arbib (eds.), *Neuroscience and the Person. Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action* (Berkeley: Vatican Observatory Foundation, 2002); U. Lüke, H. Meisinger, G. Souvignier (Hrsg.), *Der Mensch – nichts als Natur? Interdisziplinäre Annäherungen* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2007); A.W. Geertz, 'When cognitive scientists become religious, science is in trouble: on neurotheology from a philosophy of science perspective', in: *Religion* 39/4 (December 2009), 319-324; W. Achtner, *Willensfreiheit in Theologie und Neurowissenschaften. Ein historisch-systematische Wegweiser* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2010).

¹⁴ See WJE 3:375, WJE 16:722-723. Edwards understands the power of self-determination as the will that 'determines its own volitions; so as not to be dependent in its determinations, on any cause without (outside) itself, not determined by anything prior to its own acts', WJE 1:82, see also 164. D.A. Sweeney and A.C. Guelzo understand Edwards' opinions about freedom of will as 'the engine of the Edwardsean tradition', *The New England Theology: From Jonathan Edwards to Edwards Amasa Park* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academics, 2006), 57. This is an indication as to how important this topic was in Edwards' theology.

¹⁵ "And particularly that grand objection, in which the modern writers have so much gloried, and so long triumphed, with so great a degree of insult towards the most excellent divines and, in effect, against the gospel of Jesus Christ, viz. that the Calvinistic notions of God's moral government are contrary to the common sense of mankind", in his letter of July 7, 1752 to John Erskine, WJE 16: 491. See also G.M. Marsden, *Jonathan Edwards. A Life* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 437-438.

¹⁶ See also M.J. McClymond and G.R. McDermott, *The Theology of Jonathan Edwards* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012), 15.

¹⁷ Here I use parts taken from my 'Neurocalvinism: Calvinism as a paradigm for neuroscience', in P. Jonkers & M. Sarot (eds.), *Embodied Religion. Proceedings of the 2012 Conference of the European Society*

tic approach of neuroscience. I will then investigate Jonathan Edwards' concept of free will in relation to determinism, responsibility and morality, and reframe it in the context of contemporary neuroscience. This investigation concludes with some final considerations of the relevance of theology for science and neuroscience in general and of theological concepts of freedom in particular

Neuroscience on Free Will

Much of the contemporary case made for the denial of free will in neuroscience is based on the experimental work of Benjamin Libet. ¹⁹ His 1983 experiment became famous and had an enormous impact. In this experiment, Libet asked volunteers to press a button when they were happy with themselves. An EEC with an active electrode on the scalp detected a slow electrical current that preceded the actual movement of the fingers by up to a second or more. ²⁰ It is not striking that there is a time interval between the first brain change (RP = readiness potential) and the actual movement, because there is always a time interval between our conscious decision and the act itself, but Libet asked more. He wondered whether the RP was present before the consciousness to act. When he studied the relationship between RP and consciousness, he found that RP began 550 milliseconds before the actual conscious decision to act was made. This experiment has been repeated, refinements have been introduced, errors have been admitted, but by far the most

for Philosophy of Religion (Utrecht: Ars Disputandi 2013), 279-292, in which I made an assessment of Swaab's determinism in the paradigm of Jonathan Edwards' determinism.

¹⁸ For a discussion of the concept of retrieval, see J. Webster, 'Theologies of Retrieval', in Oxford Handbook of Systematic Theology (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007), 583-599. A striking example of a theology of retrieval is the fresh application of the older theological concept of unio mystica cum Christo, see J. Canlis, Calvin's Ladder. A Spiritual Theology of Ascent and Ascension (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010); M. Horton, Covenant and Salvation: Union with Christ (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2007); D.E. Tamburello, Union with Christ. John Calvin and the Mysticism of St. Bernard (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1994); J. Todd Billings, 'United to God through Christ: Assessing Calvin on the Question of Deification', in Harvard Theological Journal 98/3, 315-334; Calvin, Participation, and the Gift: The Activity of Believers in Union with Christ (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2008); Union with Christ. Reframing Theology and Ministry for the Church (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2011).

¹⁹ B. Libet, A. Freeman and K. Sutherland, 'Editor's Introduction: The Volitional Brain', *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 6/8-9 (1999), ix-xxiii, xvi. T. Bayne explains: 'Libet's studies concerning the neural basis of human agency [is] [...] the most influential rebutting objection (to free will, WvV) in the current literature', 'Libet and the Case for Free Will Scepticism', in: R. Swinburne (ed.), *Free Will and Modern Science* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011), 25-46, 26. Compare about Libet, M. Sarot, 'Christian Faith, Free Will and Neuroscience', in P. Jonkers & M. Sarot (eds.), *Embodied Religion. Proceedings of the 2012 Conference of the European Society for Philosophy of Religion* (Utrecht: Ars Disputandi, 2013), 105-119, 112-116.

²⁰ For a summary of his findings, see B. Libet, C.A. Gleason, E.W. Wright and D.K. Pearl, *Brain: A Journal of Neurology* 106, no. 3 (1983), 623-642; B. Libet, 'Do We Have Free Will?' *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 6/8/-9 (1999), 47-57, reprinted in R. Kane (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Free Will* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002), 551-564 and in Sinnot-Armstrong & Nadel (eds.), *Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin Libet* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011), 1-10.

important outcome of this sort of experiment was that conscious decisions clearly do take place after $\mbox{RP.}^{21}$

These sorts of experiments have had an enormous impact on the debate about free will. It seems clear that our volitions and our deeds are not voluntary, but are the product of brain processes. It appears as if our decisions, our emotions and our beliefs are products of a brain machine; contrary to any thoughts about a human free will.²² Remarkably, Libet himself did not draw this conclusion; instead he acknowledged that volitional processes are initiated unconsciously, but stressed that the conscious function is still in control because of its ability to veto the act.²³ In this way he states that free will does not initiate and generate decisions, but is in control of them.

Many neuroscientists, however interpreted the outcomes of Libet's experiments in a different way, and concluded that the real autonomy of free will appeared to be an illusion. ²⁴ They understood the complete personality as one which was controlled by billions of brain cells; every sickness, every disposition, every understanding, every choice and even religion could be related to the functioning of a part of the human brain. There is a strong coherence between the functioning of the human brain and the functioning of the human spirit. If the human brain dysfunctions, if the brain is removed or dies, the human spirit dysfunctions. In other words, if the brain does not function, the human spirit does not function. Because the functioning of the human spirit can be described and explained in physical terms, it is controlled by physical laws. This explains the understanding of the deterministic character of the human spirit and of human will in particular, because physical reality is determined by the order of cause and effect.

Accepting a deterministic worldview in relation to physical reality leads one to

²¹ Meanwhile more recent experiments suggest that the process leading to free acts already starts ten seconds before the act, C.S. Soon, M. Brass, H.J. Heinze & J.D. Haynes, 'Unconscious Determinants of Free Decisions in the Human Brain', *Nature Neuroscience* 11 (2008), 543-545.

²² C. Blakemore expresses: "The human brain is a machine which alone accounts for all our actions, our most private thoughts, our beliefs (...) All our actions are products of the activity of our brain", cited by R. Tallis, *Aping Mankind: Neuromonia, Darwinitis and the Misrepresentation of Humanity* (Durham: Acumen, 2011), 52. See also D.F. Swaab, *Wij zijn ons brein: van baarmoeder tot Alzheimer* (Amsterdam: Contact, 2010) 381. Swaab speaks about neurocalvinism to suggest that neuroscience implies a deterministic worldview.

²³ Libet, 'Do We Have Free Will?', 47. See also A.L. Roskies, 'Why Libet's Studies Don't Pose a Threat to Free Will', in W. Sinnot-Armstrong & L. Nadel (eds.), Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin Libet (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011), 11-22.

²⁴ D.F. Swaab speaks about neurocalvinism suggesting that neuroscience implies a deterministic worldview, *Wij zijn ons brein*, 381. Other free will sceptics who appeal to Libet include G. Roth, *Das Gehirn und seine Wirklichkeit: Kognitive Neurobiologie und ihre philosophischen Konsequenzen* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1994); S.A. Spence, 'Free Will in the Light of Neuropsychiatry', *Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology* 3/2 (1996), 75-90; D. Wegner, *The Illusion of Conscious Will* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).

conclude that any understanding of human will must be based on the recognition of the will's ability to make decisions or choices without any internal or external restraints. Because of heritage and socio-environmental factors which determine the functions of our brains, an important part our behaviour is determined from our birth on. This means that the freewill sceptics deny the libertarian concept of human free will which understands the ultimate decision about our existence, our willing and our acting as made by an isolated abstract human will. They acknowledge that human will has to be understood from and be determined by human personality, education and environment.

Because of the limited range of anthropological and philosophical distinctions the free will sceptics among neuroscientists are not compatibilists or soft determinists, who combine a deterministic worldview with human free will.²⁵ Their denial of compatibilism coheres in general with the Principle of Alternative Possibilities as an interpretative paradigm for free will; this leaves no room for understanding human will as free, but conscious willingness is taken to be a product of unconscious neural brain processes which are under the control of physical laws.²⁶

The fact that neuroscientists defend the coherence of free will and responsibility²⁷ and deny freedom of will, means that free will sceptic neurobiologians tend to deny that responsibility has any role in social life.²⁸ If free will does not exist, responsibility has to be redefined. The neuroscientist Swaab, who espouses this position, illustrates this issue with the example of a paedophile who according to Swaab, cannot be held responsible for his sexual orientation, because his orientation is caused by his genetic background and the irregular development of his brain; being a paedophile thus cannot be seen as the result of a free choice. Swaab proposes that the same reasoning be applied to kleptomania and other forms of delinquent behaviour, including the consequences for accountability and responsibility. This approach also has consequences for morality and religion, which Swaab understands as being determined by biological influences.²⁹

Although the existence of the soul is acknowledged in all cultures, Swaab denies it.³⁰ According to his understanding the human soul is nothing more than the functioning of billions of brain cells, which ends at death.³¹ This confirms the

²⁵ See also A. König, 'Providence, Sin and Human Freedom', in: A. van Egmond and D. van Keulen (eds.), *Freedom. Studies in Reformed Theology* (Baarn: Callenbach, 1996), 181-194, 181-184.

²⁶ See W. Achtner, Willensfreiheit, 223-232 for the common views of neuroscientists.

²⁷ See Swaab, Wij zijn ons brein, 385, 391.

²⁸ See Swaab, Wij zijn ons brein, 392.

²⁹ Swaab, Wij zijn ons brein, 290-293, 323-330.

³⁰ Swaab, Wij zijn ons brein, 357.

³¹ See B. Keizer, Waar blijft de ziel? (Rotterdam: Lemniscaat, 2012), 61-62.

physicalistic understanding of reality in which reality is understood as monistic, reductionistic and materialistic as if humans—according to the title of Swaab's bestseller—are nothing more than their brains.³²

Reframing Edwards's Concept of Free Will

Edwards developed his understanding of free will by debating with the Arminians, the libertarians of his time.³³ According to Edwards, the issue of a self-determining will was absolutely fundamental to their position in relation to morality and responsibility:

Here I would observe in general, that the aforementioned notion of freedom of will, as essential to moral agency, and necessary to the very existence of virtue and sin, seems to be a grand preferred point with Pelagians and Arminians, and all divines of such characters, in their controversies with the orthodox. There is no one thing more fundamental in their schemes of religion: the determination of this one leading point depends on the issue of almost all controversies we have with divines.³⁴

Edwards' opponents argued that determinism and necessity would destroy freedom, responsibility and morality, because determinists understood human beings to be acting out of necessity like impersonal machines and simply links in the chain of the cause and effect. Edwards, however, defended the necessity of human deeds, without denying human freedom, morality and responsibility. To achieve this compatibilism, on the one hand Edwards qualifies his understanding of necessity and freedom and on the other hand he developed a high level branch of anthropology which is characterized by its holistic approach to the relationship between human will and human intellect.

In the following section, Edwards' qualification of the concept of necessity and freedom is investigated and his holistic branch of anthropology is outlined. I then

³² In opposition to the materialism as the guarantee for unity, G.H. Labooy stress a duality, *Waar geest is, is vrijheid. Filosofie van de psychiatrie voorbij Descartes* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2007), 261.

³³ Edwards opposed a certain (extreme) version of Libertarianism. Libertarianism in general means that human will is ultimately decisive for choices, see R.H. Kane, 'Libertarianism', in: Fischer, Kane, Pereboom and Vargas, *Four Views on Free Will* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 5-43. Kane defends an undetermined free will, 'Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism', *Journal of Philosophy*, 96, 217-240. For philosophical distinctions, see current introductions to free will, J.K. Campbell, *Free Will* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011); T.J. Mawson, *Free Will: A Guide for the Perplexed* (London: Continuum, 2011); T. Honderich (ed.), The Determinism and Freedom Philosophy Website, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwIntroIndex.htm [accessed 13 December 2012].

³⁴ WJE 3:375.

³⁵ WJE 1:277, 295.

question how Edwards' response to the libertarians of his time can be made fruitful in the present debate.

1. Edwards's qualification of necessity and freedom

For Edwards' opponents the concept of a self-determining will was basic, as he explains:

The word, as used by Arminians, Pelagians and others, who oppose the Calvinists, has an entirely different signification. These several concepts belong to their notion of liberty: 1) That is, it consists of a self-determining power in the will, or a certain sovereignty which the will has over itself (...). 2) Indifference belongs to liberty in their notion of it, or that the mind, previous to the act of volition, is in equilibrio. 3) Contingence is another thing that belongs and is essential to it; not in the common acceptation of the word, as that has been already explained, but as opposed to all necessity, or any fixed and certain connection with some previous ground or reason of its existence.³⁶

Edwards' rejection of the Arminian concept of freedom is deeply theologically motivated. Edwards believed in the sovereignty of God and according to his understanding God has determined all of human history by his eternal decrees. This fact obliges Edwards to deny contingence and to acknowledge the necessity of history. Another implication was the understanding of human self-determination as something contradictory to God's determination.³⁷ In Edwards' Calvinistic context, this attack on God's determination meant, most importantly, the undermining of reformed soteriology. Edwards understood the Arminian concept of human self-determination as a complete undermining of the role of the irresistible agency of the Holy Spirit in the process of regeneration and faith. If changes in human lives ultimately depend on the human self-determining will, then the glory of the Holy Spirit vanishes.

Edwards' theological motivation for rejecting the libertarian understanding of free will is corroborated by his worldview. Edwards' opponents argue for a libertarian understanding of the will, because they could not accept the impact that the order of cause and effect has upon the exercise of the human will. According

³⁶ WJE 1:164-165. See WJE 3:375-376.

³⁷ WJE 16:722. See P. Ramsey, 'Editor's introduction', WJE 1:25-26. Edwards uses the distinction between God producing evil and permitting it, and between God's secret and revealed will, WJE 1:399-410. Edwards accepted the comparison with the Stoic world view; however, he rejects this concept because of the lack of any freedom, WJE 1:372-374. Edwards defends the position that God necessarily chooses what is wise and fits best, denying the arbitrariness of God's will, WJE 1:375-396, 418, 434. God's acts are necessarily moral.

to their understanding the order of cause and effect would make human will an impersonal machine. Edwards did, however accept the Newtonian worldview in which the order of cause and effect is essential for the basic structures of reality. Applying this mechanistic worldview to anthropology means that human will is not self-caused. Edwards regarded self-causation as absurd, like an animal which has begat itself and was hungry before it had being. Edwards rejects the notion of the uncaused and arbitrary free will, and instead proposes that human free will is determined by a combination of the object and the mind's view of the object.

Edwards acknowledges that the Arminian theologians are right to reject the cause-effect order as it applies to the relationship between external deeds and inner motivation. 41 Good behaviour can be caused by bad motives and behaviour under the pressure of circumstances has to be assessed differently than voluntary behaviour. In external deeds, therefore, we should distinguish between effect and cause. But this distinction cannot be applied to the internal habits of people in the same way; internal dispositions are a real indication of the quality of the human soul.

In one sense it could be said that Edwards honours the Arminian use of the external context. While maintaining the mechanic worldview, he appreciates the necessity of qualifying the character of the causes. This leads him to qualifying necessity and distinguishing between natural necessity and moral necessity:

By natural necessity as applied to men, we mean such necessity as men are under the force of natural causes, as distinguished from what are called moral causes, such as habits and dispositions of the heart, and moral motive and inducements (...). What has been said of natural and moral necessity may serve to explain what is intended by natural and moral inability. We are said to be naturally unable to do a thing, when we cannot do it even if we will, because what is most commonly called nature does not allow it, because of some impending defect of obstacle that is extrinsic to the will, either in the faculty of understanding, constitution of body, or external objects. Moral inability is seen not in any of these things, but in either the want of inclination or the strength of a contrary inclination, or the want of a sufficient motive in view to in-

³⁸ WJE 1:365. See also G.M. Marsden, Jonathan Edwards, 440-441.

 $^{^{39}}$ WJE 1:345-346. The notion that the human will determines its own volitions implies that each free volition arises from another antecedent volition, which is inconsistent WJE 1:169-195.

⁴⁰ 'The act of volition itself is always determined by that in or about the mind's view of the object, which causes it to appear most agreeable.' WJE 1:144. See G.M. Marsden, *Jonathan Edwards*, 445.

⁴¹ WJE 1:341, 348, 351-356.

duce and excite the act of the will, or the strength of apparent motives to the contrary [...]. A woman of great honour and chastity may have a moral inability to prostitute herself to her slave. A child of great love and duty to his parents may be unable to be willing to kill his father.⁴²

Edwards' distinction between natural and moral necessity qualifies necessity. Natural inabilities are not related to human responsibility because in general, they lie outside the range of human responsibility and moral intention, whilst moral inabilities do not. Human beings are responsible for their moral inability, but they are not responsible for their natural inability to do morally good things. However, if we behave in a bad way with the agreement of our own will, we are responsible for it. In this way, Edwards tries to retain moral responsibility, despite several determining factors, as a product of our behaviour.

It is clear from Edwards' approach that he discounts any and all mitigating circumstances when he speaks about things being 'extrinsic to the will, either in the faculty of understanding, constitution of the body, or external objects obstacles' indicating that not only external factors contribute to the upholding of moral responsibility or act as an excuse for bad behaviour, but that internal factors can also have the same effect. However, Edwards is not completely clear about the boundaries of the definition of human inabilities, although his concept has the potential for making a distinction between moral necessity and other necessities. In this way, Edwards qualifies the concept of necessity in order to maintain responsibility as a category on the one hand and to maintain freedom as a category on the other.

This qualified necessity means the qualification of freedom, or a redefinition of freedom:

But I would observe one more thing concerning what is vulgarly called liberty, which is the power and opportunity for one to do and conduct himself as he will. According to his choice, it is all that is meant by it without taking into account the meaning of the word, anything of the cause or origin of that choice, or without considering how the person came to have such a volition, that is, whether it was caused by some external motive or internal habitual bias (...). Let the person come to his volition or choice of how he will, yet, if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing and executing his will, the

⁴² WJE 1:156-160. P. Ramsey remarks that Edwards was among the first to formulate fully and adequately the distinction between 'determinism' and 'compulsion,' related to the distinction of 'natural necessity' and 'moral necessity', 'Editor's Introduction', WJE 1:37.

man is fully and perfectly free, according to the primary and common notion of freedom.⁴³

This definition of freedom clarifies that in Edwards' concept, freedom is not presented as the possibility of choosing from different alternatives.⁴⁴ This means that Edwards does not understand freedom in the formal framework of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, which does not treat the freedom of the agent with regard to its possible contents; rather, he describes freedom with regard to contents. 45 According to Edwards, the conscious voluntariness of human volition is a necessary and sufficient condition for freedom and responsibility. Everything that human beings do in accordance with their wills indicates their freedom and underlines their responsibility, while, at the same time, they are excused for committing deeds which are against their active will. Simply stated, freedom is the right to do what we like, even if there is no alternative possibility. For example: if a boy finds himself in a place where there is only one girl to bond with, and he loves this one girl, then he loves her freely. This makes clear that the difference between Edwards and the Arminians of his time is not the disjunction between freedom and responsibility as both the Arminians and Edwards unite freedom and responsibility, but Edwards distinguishes between moral and natural necessity in order to save free will and human responsibility, if not to say humanity. If speaking about free will in a qualified way wasn't possible, then it seems that Edwards would deny responsibility.

If two conditions are met: firstly, if humans have a natural inability, or a derivative of a natural inability and secondly, if humans behave voluntarily, then this concerns human responsibility. Behind this viewpoint is the conviction that moral inability is ultimately qualified as unwillingness and that humans are completely responsible for inexcusable unwillingness. ⁴⁶ The implied opposite is that nobody can excuse him or herself for morally bad behaviour with an appeal to their inclinations if the bad behaviour was voluntary.

Another way of characterizing Edwards' concept is to understand that it coheres with the prelapsarian and the postlapsarian human condition. Before the fall into sin, humans were free to choose good, but, after the fall, although the freedom of the will to choose remained much the same, the ability to make a good

⁴³ WJE 1:164.

⁴⁴ See G.M. Marsden, Jonathan Edwards, 442.

⁴⁵ K. Krause suggested that this approach makes Edwards' concept relevant for today. 'Jonathan Edwards' Beitrag zum Freiheitsdiskurs,' *Theologische Zeitschrift* 68/2 (2012), 139-162, 144-148.

⁴⁶ WJE 1:307-308. In the tradition after Edwards the 'Exercisers' concentrated evil only in the will, M.J. McClymond and G.R. Dermott, *The Theology of Jonathan Edwards*, 608.

choice changed. This means that it is not sin as such that destroyed the human will as a faculty and as the ability to choose; because of the depravity of human heart, human beings voluntarily choose sin and are bound by sin. The remaining part of human infrastructure also has consequences for the understanding of the soteriological work of the Spirit. The saving work of the Spirit does not create a new faculty which offers the possibility of choice, but the change effected by the Spirit provides the ability to choose good again. Thus, the work of the Spirit can be interpreted as the liberation of the bound will. This leads to the paradox that in the eschaton believers experience the greatest liberty whilst still requiring virtue. ⁴⁷

It can be concluded that in this life sinning is necessary because of moral inability, but this necessity of sin does not destroy the 'technical' freedom of the will and the responsibility for sin. While Arminians denied human responsibility for sin given the necessity of sin, Edwards took the opposite position that the necessity of sin is not inconsistent with the responsibility for sin. This conclusion can be taken one step further. The Arminians rejected the mechanic worldview and accepted libertarianism because they lacked the philosophical tools to qualify necessity and, according to their understanding the order of cause and effect would imply the denial of human freedom. Because Edwards was able to qualify necessity, on the one hand he could accept the mechanic worldview and on the other, he was able to interpret morality and responsibility within the framework of human freedom.

2. Edwards' holistic anthropology

In Edwards' understanding, the libertarian concept of free will implies that man is truly free when he is not under any necessity to act. To achieve this freedom, Arminians isolate the will from the totality of the human personality. This isolation of the will also means that the functioning of the will is reduced to the moment of choosing, implying that choosing and willing are accidental happenings. One implication of this approach is that only the pure act of the will values the act of the will; the act of will is praised or blamed not the habit or inclination that caused the act of the will or the deeds that are themselves in turn caused by the act of will. Another implication of this conviction is that the habit or disposition of the soul does not add to the value of virtue or vice. This means that,

⁴⁷ WJE 1:364. Edwards understands the Christian life as an eschatological life, WJE 4:236-237. Edwards also argues with the necessity of God's and Christ's holy nature, see P.J. Fisk, 'Jonathan Edwards' *Freedom of the Will* and his defense of the impeccability of Jesus Christ,' in *Scottish Journal of Theology* 60/3 (2007), 309-325.

⁴⁸ WJE 1:303-304.

⁴⁹ WJE 1:325.

⁵⁰ WJE 1:324, 329-330.

while a bad heart is an excuse for vice, having a heart with a good disposition does not imply virtue. Therefore, the characteristic of this libertarian concept of free will is indifference.⁵¹ Edwards' criticism is directed at this indifference, saying it is characteristic of the self-determining will:

'Those notions of liberty of contingence, indifference and self-determination, as essential to guilt or merit, tend to preclude all sense of any great guilt for past and present wickedness (...). All wickedness of heart is excused as what, in itself, brings no guilt.'⁵²

Edwards' criticism is directed at two aspects of this concept of freedom. In the first place, he criticizes the concept's ineffectiveness⁵³ which can be illustrated by the example of seeing a friend in need. The libertarian concept of freedom would, according to Edwards, imply being indifferent towards this friend and that preference is given to a cold heart above a compassionate one. In this way, instead of upholding responsibility and morality, the concept of libertarian freedom leads to the denial of responsibility and morality. This proves that this concept of freedom is not only ineffective, but that it would produce the opposite of the desired attitude.

Secondly, Edwards criticizes the Arminian concept of freedom because of its inconsistency. According to the Arminian understanding of freedom, people should not be influenced by exhortative language such as commandments, promises, warnings, invitations and exhortations, because this language undermines freedom by taking away the indifference of the will. But, according to Edwards, taking away this exhortative language would go against common sense. It should also be noted here that exhortative language appeals to the virtuous character of obedience, which would be annihilated by a will exhibiting total indifference. ⁵⁴ If one's action is not caused by reasons, then the action is random or arbitrary and is hardly an action at all.

This conclusion has a far reaching implication. While the Arminians of Edwards' time understood this libertarian version of the concept of freedom as being essential to responsibility and morality, Edwards interpreted it in the reverse. Instead of promoting morality and responsibility, the Arminian concept of liberty would actually undermine it, because of its conviction that the concept of contingent and indifferent self-determination is the only possible form of real freedom.

⁵¹ WJE 1:303-304.

⁵² WJE 16:722.

⁵³ WJE 1:320-323.

⁵⁴ WJE 1:331.

Edwards' alternative to the libertarian concept of freedom is the concept of the habitual dispositions of the heart. This concept offers the possibility of exploring moral causes, motives and inducements on the one hand and voluntariness as an expression of freedom on the other.⁵⁵ Edwards described the characteristics of his alternative concept as follows:

If strict propriety of speech is to be insisted on, it may more properly be said, that the voluntary action which is the immediate consequence and fruit of the mind's volition or choice, is determined by that which appears most agreeable, than the preference or choice itself, but that the act of volition itself is always determined by that in or about the mind's view of the object, which causes it to appear most agreeable. I say 'in or about the mind's view of the object', because what has influence to render an object in view agreeable is not only to what appears in the object viewed, but also the manner of the view, and the state and circumstances of the mind that views. Particularly, to enumerate all things pertaining to the mind's view of the objects of volition, which have influence in their appearance to the mind, would be a matter of no small difficulty, and might require a treatise by itself, and is not necessary to my present purpose. ⁵⁶

In Edwards' approach the human will is not understood as an independent faculty as a source of choices and desires, but as an instrumental function of human personality, namely the ability to make the inclination of the heart effective, for example, at times of choice or in our daily behaviour. Edwards' alternative makes it impossible for an independent indifferent human to make choices that go against the strongest inclinations of the human heart.

Edwards' approach did not only differ from the Arminian one, but also represented a redefining of the relationship of will and intellect in his own puritan tradition. In this tradition a hierarchical order of the faculties of the mind, the will and the affections was common. Edwards however, had arrived at a whole new understanding of anthropology, one in which the two faculties of mind and will were equally ordered.⁵⁷ Because the affections are included in the will, this concept leads to a less intellectualistic and more voluntaristic and intuitive anthropology, one which also implies that the intensity of the affections is an indication

⁵⁵ WJE 1:156-157.

⁵⁶ WJE 1:144-145. It is noteworthy that God acts also according his nature. In that sense, He is not free. O.D. Crisp, *Jonathan Edwards on God and Creation* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012), 69-73.

⁵⁷ WJE 1:217; 2:96. See also M.J. McClymond and G.R. McDermott, *The Theology of Jonathan Edwards*, 311-318. P. Ramsey shows the relationship with John Locke, WJE 1:49.

of the intensity of religion in the soul.⁵⁸ Furthermore Edwards is a holistic thinker who does not understand the human mind and the human will as isolated faculties, but understands the distinction between the modes of operation of the human soul more analytically than actually.⁵⁹

3. Towards a retrieval of Edwards's concept

In this section we investigate how a retrieval or revitalisation of Edwards' concept can be useful in the present debate. In the first place Edwards' concept shares a common framework with deterministic neuroscience. Both Edwards and neuroscience understand the libertarian concept of free will and its concomitant implication that the will is indifferent as too simple a concept for describing the complex reality of human choices and dispositions and that human will must be understood as a determined will, because of the order of cause and effect. This implies that Edwards' theological and philosophical concept of free will does not undermine the neuroscientific approach but includes it. This common general framework makes Edwards a suitable partner from history for this present debate.

Secondly, Jonathan Edwards' concept proves that accepting the deterministic mechanistic world view does not necessarily imply incompatibilism. This confirms the suitability of Edwards as a partner in the current debate, because many critics of neuroscience and its implied view of the human will cannot accept determinism, because they interpret it as being incompatible with human freedom. Because of the coherence of human freedom on the one hand and human morality and responsibility on the other, they deny any determinism and accept libertarianism. In this context Edwards occupies a mediate position offering an alternative position that does not necessarily exclude determinism or free will. In this way, Edwards' concept supports neuroscientific approaches, because he maintains determinism and necessity. On the other hand, Edwards' concept supports thinkers who want to uphold human freedom, morality and responsibility, because Edwards defends freedom as the spontaneity and voluntariness of the will. Against the argument that determinism and necessity would dehumanize human beings and reduce them to machines, Edwards replied that the existence of human understanding and will are good enough reasons for upholding humanity, at the same time clarifying that the reproach attacks the libertarians themselves. According to Edwards, libertarians reduce human beings to less than a machine, because unlike Edwards who states that humans are led by human intelligence, they understand the human will as being led by nothing⁶⁰

⁵⁸ WJE 2:96, 100; 3:375; 4:297; 16:717.

⁵⁹ See M.J. McClymond and G.R. McDermott, The Theology of Jonathan Edwards, 314.

⁶⁰ WJE 1:371.

Thirdly, in Edwards' worldview materialism is transformed into a more dimensional reality and physics are included in a metaphysical worldview. The neuroscientific approach brings us into contact with physicalism, an approach that interprets reality as a closed physical system. The difference between physicalism and metaphysics is the difference between compatibilism and incompatibilism. This difference is of great importance, because it coheres with human self-understanding and identity with respect to understanding human beings as being with or without free will. But what does physicalism mean? The case for reductive-physicalism is not strong; one cannot explain football solely in terms of neurology. This is not the case with non-reductive physicalism, which states that the human mind operates at a higher level of complexity and cannot be directly reduced to physical conditions; it does imply, however, that mental states are a by-product of the physical brain-state and that mental causation is excluded.

Some work has been done to deal with these most difficult questions concerning physicalism. Alva Noë has made a significant contribution, arguing that human consciousness cannot be interpreted as the passive registration of an automatically working machine, but that it involves active interaction between the brain and the world, facilitated by the bodily senses. Keizer agrees with Noë that a human being is not a brain, but has a brain, because a human being cannot be reduced to brain processes. At the same time, he criticizes Noë for the lack of a concept of experience for taste, pain, fear, hunger, joy or nostalgia, because such a concept would clarify the fundamental difference between robots and human beings. Neurons are bearers of feelings, but neurons, in themselves, do not have feelings and cannot be identified with feelings.

Noë paved the way for Steven Horst, whose research takes us another step further against neurodeterminism.⁶⁵ Horst argued that neuroscientific laws cannot be seen as physical laws, because physical laws are related to a small number of influences, while neuroscientific or psychological laws are far more complicated.⁶⁶ Horst reached this view by arguing that human cognitive processes cannot be understood as universal laws which have no exceptions, because our mind is actively

⁶¹ A. Noë, *Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009). According W. Achtner, *Willensfreiheit*, 230-231, Thomas Fuchs understands the human brain as an integrative organ between personality, body, social environment and culture. Human will is not a link in a chain, but part of a network.

⁶² B. Keizer, Waar blijft de ziel?, 118-127.

⁶³ B. Keizer, Waar blijft de ziel?, 132-133, 136-138.

⁶⁴ B. Keizer, Waar blijft de ziel?, 143.

⁶⁵ S. Horst, Laws, Mind and Free Will (Cambridge, MA: MIT press, 2011).

⁶⁶ This way of reasoning is also used by R. Swinburne, *Mind, Brain & Free Will* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2013), 188-204.

involved in the cognitive process. Our cognitive representations of the world are not simply mirror images of the objective reality of the world; our active minds create several models for understanding the world, models which cannot cohere with each other or be reduced to a single super-model of the world. The existence of these several models in the human mind is the reason for its complexity and evidence enough for believing neurodeterminism to be false.

This development appears to break open the closed physical world of brains. In this context, Raymond Tallis and Roger Scruton have defended intentionality, which cannot be explained and understood in causal scientific terms because, in the concept of intentionality, the human being is not only an organism, but is also an active agent. ⁶⁷ This means that human actions are not caused, and could not be caused, in the narrow, atomic linear sense which is implied in the term 'cause.' ⁶⁸ This is a confirmation of freedom as a transcendent notion.

But does this reveal any openness to the concept of the human soul? Keizer closes his book with an implicit plea for the existence of the human soul, but appears to dislike this conclusion, because he cannot accept the Cartesian dualism of soul and body.⁶⁹ Serious criticism has been levied against Cartesian dualism, from both neuroscience and theology, because it cannot explain whether having a damaged brain implies having a damaged mind.⁷⁰ Other objections to this extreme dualism are that dualism cannot be falsified by empirical data, it fails to identify 'mental substance,' and it is not yet clear how a non-material entity acts in the material world.⁷¹ In addition to this problem, there is also the question about whether the influence of the non-material world could be tested empirically.

This proves that a concept of the human soul cannot be developed within Cartesian dualism, but does not indicate that we do not have to think about a concept for the human soul. This research illustrates that we are not to be enclosed in physicalism. Edwards' distinction between metaphysics and physics offers a midway position between physical monism, on the one hand, and Cartesian dualism on the other,⁷² namely, a duality within a coherent reality to guarantee human

⁶⁷ R. Scruton, 'Neurononsense and the Soul', in: J. Wentzel van Huyssteen & E. Wiebe (eds.), *In Search of Self: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Personhood* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012), 338-356; R. Tallis, *Aping Mankind*. See W. Achtner, *Willensfreiheit*, 230, for the denial of intentionality in neuroscience.

⁶⁸ R. Tallis, Aping Mankind, 251.

⁶⁹ For an investigation of the different models of the relationship between body and soul, see H. Goller, *Das Rätsel von Körper und Geist. Eine philosophische Deutung* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2003).

⁷⁰ See K. Augustine, 'Book Review: Whatever Happened to the Soul?' http://infidels.org/library/modern/keith_augustine/no-soul.html, 4 [last accessed 4 July 2012].

⁷¹ See A. J. Gijsbers, 'The Dialogue between Neuroscience and Theology', 7.

⁷² For Edwards' criticism of Descartes, see N. Fiering, 'The Rationalistic Foundations of Jonathan Edwards's Metaphysics,' in: N.O. Hatch and H.S. Stout (eds.), *Jonathan Edwards and the American Ex-*

freedom, responsibility and morality.⁷³

Considerations

Besides revitalizing Edwards' concept of free will for the present context, the arguments in this essay also point to some other considerations which add to the current debate about free will in the context of the meeting of theology and science.

Firstly, one interesting aspect is that theologians, philosophers and neurobiologians are all equally interested in the problem of free will.⁷⁴ Theologians and philosophers have to acknowledge that they need neurobiological facts and understanding, and that universally-held intuitions may not necessarily be true. Neuroscientists can ask theologians difficult questions, such as: Can a non-material entity exert influence on the material brain, without this being identified by empirical tests? These questions should be taken seriously. At the same time, neuroscientists have to recognize that questions about human identity cannot be solved by the knowledge of neuroscience, but that the theological and philosophical wisdom of ages is also necessary if we are to understand human beings. If scientific conclusions go against basic intuitions honored over centuries, science has to be aware of not overestimating itself, especially when its conclusions do not concern the material dimension of this world or human life, but the existential level of human life. Philosophical reflection on the essence and the limitations of science can be helpful in rescuing human liberty from the slavery of science, because science is not the only fountain of knowledge.

Secondly, from the research in this article we have learned that Edwards and neuroscientists use different definitions of free will. This phenomenon is representative of the current debate on free will. Within the context of free will as an anthropological category, different approaches are imaginable. Free will can be understood as an alternative possibility, as voluntariness, as an immediate decision, as a long-term intellectual and moral deliberation, as freedom from compulsion, as responsibility, self-realization or consciousness. Even in the Oxford handbook of free will, one searches in vain for a definition of free will.⁷⁵ This lack

perience (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1988), 73-101, 77-78; A. Zakai, Jonathan Edwards's Philosophy of Nature: The Re-enchantment of the World in the age of Scientific Reasoning (London: T&T Clark, 2010), 27.

⁷³ G.H. Labooy pleads for metaphysics, the interaction between body and mind, and a certain independence of the mind. *Waar geest is, is vrijheid*, 101-138, 262. Meanwhile, there is a new plea for the existence of a human soul: see R. Swinburne, *Mind*, *Brain & Free Will*; C.J. Hazen (ed.), *Neuroscience and the soul*. *Philosophical issues*, a special issue of *Philosophia Christi*, 15, no. 1 (2013).

⁷⁴ W. Achtner, *Willensfreiheit*, 223 pleads for a mutual relationship between neuroscience and theology.

ogy.

75 P. Haggard criticizes common sense understandings of free will, but he does not give an alternative. 'Human volition: towards a neuroscience of will', in: *Nature Reviews Neuroscience*, 9/12 (2008), 934-946.


of clarity about free will clouds the current debate. People can agree or disagree without really understanding each other. This confusion does not help the academic debate move forward. Only by carefully listening to each other can people really discuss issues among themselves and arguments be nuanced and refined so that a deeper understanding of the theme of free will can be achieved.

This leads to the following, and final, remark about Edwards' and the neuroscientists' definition of free will. Neurobiologians use the objective Principle of Alternative Possibilities as an interpretative framework to support their position on free will, but Edwards interprets free will in the subjective anthropological framework of consciousness, responsibility and self-realisation. Edwards' approach can be criticized and nuanced, but it can easily be seen that the difference between Edwards and the neurobiologians is closely related to the difference in the interpretative frameworks of free will that they use, namely the difference between the objective and subjective approach of the concept of free will. Differences in definition do not exclude representatives of both positions from understanding and agreeing with each other. It is thought that neuroscientists can agree with Edwards and that, despite physical determinism, people generally act voluntarily, or at least are able to act voluntarily. The question remains as to whether this aspect of free will, its voluntariness, will enable neuroscientists to enter the discussion, but what is clear, is that it did enable Edwards to uphold responsibility and morality. This reveals one of the themes of the current debate about free will, and indicates that any contemporary debate could be furthered by a better understanding of historical concepts such as Edwards'.

Abstract

The tendency in modern neuroscience is to deny free will, due to a deterministic understanding of reality. The consequence of the denial of free will is also the denial of responsibility, morality and accountability. Jonathan Edwards understood reality also in a deterministic way, but he defended free will. This makes his concept very interesting for the current debate. In the essay about the "Retrieval of Edwards' Concept of Free Will." The relevance for today is investigated as an interdisciplinary attempt between theology, philosophy and neuroscience.

⁷⁶H.G. Frankfurt would agree with Edwards' compatibilism, however he argues in another way. 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility', in: *Journal of Philosophy*, 66 (1969), 829-839. H.G. Frankfurt defends 'volitional necessity' or 'wholeheartedness', *Necessity, Volition and Love* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).



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THEOLOGY IN THE HANDS OF A LITERARY ARTIST: JONATHAN EDWARDS AS PREACHER

Jonathan Edwards learned about preaching from the Calvinist Puritan tradition in which he was raised. Calvin himself said the preacher is a "trumpet of God" who should style his sermons after the nature of Scripture itself. So his sermons were generally expository, direct and brief. Unlike Edwards, Calvin typically did not write his sermons out but preached nearly every day without notes and after studying the text. The most popular Calvinist preaching manuals in Edwards' era were by English Puritan William Perkins, English preacher John Edwards (no relation) and Boston's Cotton Mather. Perkins' Art of Prophesying (1592) urged a "plain style" that opens a text simply without affectations of classical learning (frequently on display in Anglican sermons). John Edwards' The Preacher (1703) recommended intense belief and feeling, and attention to application. Mather's Manuductio ad Ministerium (1726) dismissed rhetoric and logic in favor of "natural reason and a cultivated personal style based upon emulation of the actual practice of admired authors." Edwards also learned from personal role models. His father Timothy was a Harvard graduate who used a large number of subheads and biblical citations in his sermons, yet also was an animated speaker who presided over revivals

¹ Wilson H. Kimnach's "Editor's Introduction," in WJE 10:19. Kimnach's 254-page introduction is the finest guide to Edwards' sermons ever published. See also Kimnach's introduction; John Gerstner, *The Rational Biblical Theology of Jonathan Edwards* (Powhatan, VA: Berea, 1991), 1:481-6; Douglas A. Sweeney, *Jonathan Edwards and the Ministry of the Word* (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2009), 79-80; and Kimnach, "The Sermons: Concept and Execution," in Sang H. Lee, ed., *The Princeton Companion to Jonathan Edwards* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 243-57.

in his East Windsor (CT) parish. Jonathan's grandfather Solomon Stoddard, under whom Edwards served as assistant for twenty-seven months at Northampton, was a powerful revivalist who declared that "when men don't Preach much about the danger of Damnation, there is want of good Preaching." Stoddard enjoyed using rhetorical dialogue in his sermons and urged preachers to "rebuke sharply" those who needed reproof.²

The Sermonic Setting

New England churches in Edwards' day were plain "meetinghouses" with unpainted clapboard on the outside and seating around a pulpit or "desk" near the center on the inside. In reaction against what they considered "graven images" and "Catholic" ostentation in Anglican churches, Puritans eschewed crosses and stained-glass windows, and sang mostly psalms without musical instruments. Ministers preached in academic gowns to demonstrate they were learned and not a sacred priesthood, and also to hide class distinctions that might be apparent in street dress. They delivered two sermons every Sunday—morning and afternoon —and often a weekday lecture. In Northampton, Edwards followed this schedule with sermons of 60-90 minutes each. The principal Sunday service consisted of ten parts: 1) a biblical text as call to worship, 2) corporate "prayer of approach," 3) Old Testament reading, with the minister giving a short "sense of the text," 4) New Testament reading with a sense of the text, 5) singing a psalm metrically, 6) prayer of confession and intercession, 7) a sermon, 8) corporate prayer led by the minister which could last up to 30 minutes, and 9) another psalm and then 10) benediction. Every eight weeks in Northampton Edwards conducted a "sacrament" service (the Lord's Supper) between the two regular Sunday services. Twice a year there were fast days by colonial decree, with special sermons. Thanksgiving days were also held at least once a year, depending on circumstances, and each would feature a sermon. Edwards produced all these sermons for a parish of 1300 people, with usually 700 present on Sundays, while receiving a steady stream of visitors at his home and regularly supervising pastoral interns.³

Three Periods of Preaching

Wilson Kimnach, the unrivalled scholar of Edwards' homiletics, divides Edwards' 37-year preaching career into three periods. The first period, 1722-27, is what Kimnach calls his "apprenticeship," during which he preached in New York City, Bolton (CT), and (after his tutorship at Yale) as an assistant under Stoddard.

² WJE 10:14.

³ Sweeney, 25-26, 57-58, 63; WJE 17:16.

Kimnach says the young preacher's sermons were "as busy in [their] formal structure as the music of Johann Sebastian Bach." Edwards helped his note-taking hearers follow along by announcing new sections as they began. While he avoided strong rhetorical devices such as alliteration and rhythm, he piqued attention by using "the vigor of a vulgar idiom." For example, the apprentice described the unregenerate as one who "spends his days in groveling in the dirt, makes his mind much like a mole or muck worm, feeding on dirt and dung, and seldom lifts his mind any higher than the surface of the earth he treads on."

From 1727 to 1742 Edwards used the sermon "primarily as an instrument of awakening and pastoral leadership." This was the period of "mastery" in which, especially starting in 1729, sermons became more complex. Parts were in outline form. When he offered pastoral guidance, the focus was less on sins of youthful flesh and more on the abuses of commerce. Edwards began to experiment artistically, gradually evolving his form to suit the production of theological treatises. So he preached more sermon series, dividing long discourses into preaching units only after most of the writing was done. Kimnach writes, "The sermon was dissolving under the pressure of long, long thoughts." "Sinners in the hands of an angry God" (1741) was the last sermon with renown that was not also the marker of an important event, such as the Farewell Sermon (1750). Yet while the sermons were developing toward longer productions, Edwards was not indifferent to style. Kimnach notes that when he took his sermons from the pulpit to print, he made sure to build a rising crescendo, saving the best arguments and most important points for last. Interestingly, during this period the maturing preacher worked on several sermons at once, "apparently stor[ing] some of his output in fruitful times against times of dearth."5

The last phase of Edwards' extraordinary sermonic production started in January 1742, when he drew a vertical line down the middle of his sermon booklet on Dan. 5:25, dividing it into double columns—a form he retained for most of his sermons until his death sixteen years later. Kimnach thinks this was the result of watching George Whitefield preach without notes. From there on out, Edwards made even more efforts to use his sermons to help him compose treatises. As he became more of an international intellectual, he turned from his earlier "person-

⁴ Kimnach, "Edwards as Preacher," in Stephen Stein, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Jonathan Edwards* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 104; Kimnach, "Editor's Introduction," WJE 10:99.

⁵ Kimnach, "Edwards as Preacher," 110; "Editor's Introduction," WJE 10. 105, 11-12, 107n9.

⁶ There are approximately 1200 extant sermons, with roughly 200 published in hard print.

 $^{^{7}}$ It also enabled him to conserve paper—hard to come by in his day—since the outlined sermons took up less space.

alist" focus on subjective religious experience to highlighting objective religious phenomena such as the work of redemption through the course of human history. His sermons were almost entirely outlines that grew to be "more and more like bare lists." According to Kimnach, this might have indicated a certain "indifference" to preaching, particularly as his own tenure at Northampton grew more tenuous. At the same time, his growing predilection for treatises and "things to be considered" instead of formal "doctrines" (see below) ironically paralleled the move by Boston's liberal ministers toward what would eventually become Emersonian essays.⁸

At Stockbridge where he had been exiled after his dismissal from Northampton, the discouraged preacher had new audiences, and the Indians there seem to have inspired new enthusiasm. He preached more than one hundred and eighty-seven new sermons, and on another twenty occasions preached from earlier manuscripts. It is clear from the extant manuscripts that Edwards worked hard to adapt his rhetoric to the abilities of his hearers. As Rachel Wheeler has noted, the Stockbridge sermons tell more stories than the Northampton sermons; they are also simpler in presentation and employ more imagery derived from nature. But if he preached more simply to his uneducated Indian audience, the sermons were not simplistic. He did not restrict his aesthetic vision to learned adepts but told the Stockbridge Indians in his very first sermon there that they must have "their eyes opened to see how lovely [Christ] is," and in a communion lecture explained that a good man loves God "above all else for his own beauty." His outlines were less complex and his imagery earthier than in his sermons to the white congregation at Stockbridge, but the vision he tried to evoke was no less sublime.

The goal of spoken and written discourse

Edwards considered preaching of paramount importance for the work of redemption, which was at the center of his ecclesiology and historical vision. ¹⁰ But his conception of the goal of preaching was also his conviction about the art of literature generally—to make what is true become real in the perception of hearers or readers. Edwards had noticed that lack of spiritual experience and frequent repetition of religious maxims can obscure recognition of what is real. When he

⁸ WJE 10:119, 122; WJE 25:45; WJE 10:123; WJE 25:46.

⁹ Rachel Wheeler, "'Friends to Your Souls': The Egalitarian Calvinism of Jonathan Edwards," unpublished paper used by permission, n.41; Wheeler, "'A Heathenish, Barbarous, Brutish Education': Jonathan Edwards and the Stockbridge Indians" (unpub. paper loaned by the author), 6; see also Gerald R. McDermott, "Missions and Native Americans," in Sang Hyun Lee, ed., *The Princeton Companion to Jonathan Edwards* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 264-5.

¹⁰ Helen Westra's *The Minister's Task and Calling in the Sermons of Jonathan Edwards* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1986) is especially helpful on this score.

was only nineteen years old, he preached on the doctrine, "When man dies, he is forever stripped of all earthly enjoyments." He told his hearers that while all the world "knows the *truth* of this doctrine perfectly well" it nevertheless "don't [sic] seem at all *real* to them." Five years later he said two things are required in order for something to seem real to us: "believing the truth of it, and having a sensible idea or apprehension of it." In chapter 24 we explored this Edwardsean notion of a simple idea imparted by a "divine and supernatural light," that makes what was previously a mere notion become a vivid reality by means of something like a sixth sense. In his private notebooks Edwards wrote that this is "a light cast upon the ideas of spiritual things . . . which makes them appear clear and real which before were but faint, obscure representations." What was previously only thought becomes seen, tasted and felt. It takes on a tactile dimension that forever fixes its reality in the apprehension of the believer. Edwards believed this new seeing and tasting of the reality of divine things comes principally, if not exclusively, through preaching.¹¹

Although Edwards said the preacher's sermon must penetrate the affections of his listeners and not simply change their thinking, he was emphatic about the necessity of cognitive content. In a 1739 sermon on "the importance and advantage of a thorough knowledge of divine truth," he taught that Christians must not be content to remain babes in knowledge of divine things, or to be satisfied with spiritual experience alone. They must seek "not only a practical and experimental, but also a doctrinal knowledge of the truths and mysteries of religion." He explained that there are two kinds of knowledge of divine things—the speculative or natural that pertains to the head, and the practical and spiritual that is sensed in the heart. While speculative knowledge without spiritual knowledge is worthless, speculative knowledge nevertheless is "of infinite importance" because "without it we can have no spiritual or practical knowledge." There is no other way that we can benefit from means of grace except by knowledge. "Therefore the preaching of the gospel would be wholly to no purpose, if it conveyed no knowledge to the mind." This assertion was based on Edwards' understanding of the human person: "The heart cannot be set upon an object of which there is no idea in the understanding." He would explicate this at much greater length in the fourth positive sign in his *Religious Affections* seven years later, but here he summarized as follows: "Such is the nature of man, that nothing can come at the heart but through the door of the understanding: and there can be no spiritual knowledge of that of which there is not first a rational knowledge." The upshot

¹¹ WJE 10:405-6, emph. added; WJE 14:201; WJE 13:470.

was that the "sense of the heart" that is at the heart of true religion is normally impossible without doctrinal understanding: "A man cannot see the wonderful excellency and love of Christ in doing such and such things for sinners, unless his understanding be first informed how those things were done. He cannot have a taste of the sweetness and divine excellency of such and such things contained in divinity, unless he first have a notion that there are such and such things." Hence the way to deeper spiritual experience was through greater cognitive understanding of divine things: "The more you have of a rational knowledge of the things of the gospel, the more opportunity will there be, when the Spirit shall be breathed into your heart, to see the excellency of these things, and to taste the sweetness of them." Therefore the Christian preacher is obliged not only to preach but also to teach more and more of the infinite and unsearchable wonders of God and his redemption. 12

Kimnach has observed that although Edwards was a homiletical artist and powerful logician, he nevertheless conceived of the perfect sermon as a vehicle of power more than reason or beauty. He boasted in his preface to the five discourses that were delivered during the Little Awakening of 1734-35 that God had "smiled upon and bless[ed his] very plain, unfashionable way of preaching" even though he was "unable" to preach or write "politely." The important thing was not aesthetic but effect, not prestige but power. Power was never guaranteed, of course, by simply preaching Scripture. It was necessary that the preacher beg God's Spirit to inspire his preparation and enliven his words, and for the minister to preach with pathos and fervency. Prayer was indispensable, and an affective manner, helpful. But the preacher need not display his learning or be especially eloquent. Power came from God's blessing, without which even labored preparation and enthusiastic delivery would produce no lasting results. Preachers should not be surprised if some of their listeners are "stupid and senseless as stones," whispering to their neighbors or sleeping or dreaming during sermons. God is not frustrated because "he will see to it that his word shall not be in vain or without effect." Those who refuse to hear the word will pay attention in the next world and remember "that there ha[d] been a prophet among 'em." Perhaps reflecting his own frustrations with the Northampton congregation he called "sermon-proof," he warned there would be "dark seasons" in the church when preachers would seem to "labor in vain." They would sometimes fish all night, as it were, and bring up their nets empty time after time. But they must not give up or get discouraged, for God is faithful. So whether a sermon becomes a thing of power depends on God. The

¹² WJE 22:84, 87-9, 100: WJE 2:266-91.

minister can only sow the seed of the word, and leave the rest to sun and rain and the influences of heaven. He must wait patiently, like the hard-working farmer, for the harvest. But that means he should not be presumptuous by neglecting diligent study, especially in the Bible, and he must be "much in seeking God." In the end he can only be faithful and "leave the event with God." ¹³

Imagery in Edwards's Sermons

Samuel Hopkins tells us that Edwards took "great pains" to compose his sermons, getting up earlier and studying Scripture more than his contemporaries. But his secret weapon was his unrivalled use of imagery. ¹⁴ Kimnach calls it his "armor-piercing device of sensational imagery." Light was perhaps his favorite image, no doubt influenced in part by his age of Enlightenment. But if it was common among his contemporaries, "no one looked more intensely at the biblical meaning of light for his day than did Edwards." Marsden explains that for him it was "the most powerful image of how God communicated his love to the creation. Regeneration meant to be given eyes to see the light of Christ in hearts that had been hopelessly darkened by sin." The fountain was another favorite. In his 1738 sermon series on love (Charity and Its Fruits) he declared that God is a fountain of love that pours out its "effusions of love" into the bosoms of the saints, whom he likened to "the flowers on the earth in a pleasant spring day" that "open their bosoms to the sun to be filled with his [sic] warmth and light, and to flourish in beauty and fragrancy by his rays." Every saint is a flower in God's garden, and "holy love is the fragrancy and sweet odor" that they all emit. In the same breath he said every saint is "as a note in a concert of music which sweetly harmonizes with every other note . . . and so all helping one another to their utmost to express their love of the whole society to the glorious Father and Head of it, and [to pour back] love into the fountain of love, whence they are supplied and filled with love and with glory." The following spring he interrupted his series on the history of redemption with a sermon devoted entirely to comparing Christ to the sun. To believers his second coming will "be a thousand times more refreshing to them than ever was the sight of the rising sun to them that have wandered in a wilderness, through the longest and darkest night. The sight of [it] will fill their

¹³ Kimnach, "Edwards as Preacher," 105; WJE 19:797; WJE 24:756; WJE 4:386-8; Jonathan Edwards, "Preaching the Gospel," *The Salvation of Souls: Nine Previously Unpublished Semons on the Call of Ministry and the Gospel by Jonathan Edwards*, ed. Richard Bailey and Gregory Willis (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2002), 153; WJE 17:178-9, 181; WJE 19:113; 24:965-6; sermon on Matt 13:3-4(a), WJEO 56.

¹⁴ Kristin Emery Saldine focuses on Edwards' landscape imagery in her "Preaching God Visible: Geo-Rhetoric and the Theological Appropriation of Landscape Imagery in the Sermons of Jonathan Edwards" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton Theological Seminary, 2004).

souls with unspeakable gladness and rejoicing. It will be a bright day to the saints. The beams of that glorious Sun that will then appear will make it bright." But for unbelievers, "every ray of that glory that Christ shall then appear in will be like a stream of scorching fire, and will pierce their hearts with a keener torment than a stream of fierce lightning. . . . That day will burn as an oven indeed. That brightness that the light of Christ's glory shall fill the world with will be more terrible to them than if the world was filled with the fiercest flames." Edwards' words were rarely big and never obscure, but the pictures he painted with them were vivid and memorable. ¹⁵

If his imagery made his sermons memorable, their clear and compelling logic left his auditors "little room to escape his web of arguments." Most New Englanders had "cut their eyeteeth on the logic of carefully-argued sermons," since educated eighteenth-century people were trained in and had great confidence in the power of logic to settle arguments. Edwards was a master of logical argument, and used it to great effect in his sermons. In his golden years of sermon composition the late 1720s through the early 1740s—he carefully assembled arguments and examples "both from Scripture and reason, as even to force the assent of every attentive hearer. . . . His words were so full of ideas, set in such a plain and striking light, that few speakers have been able to command an audience as he." When logical skill was mixed with what Kimnach calls "the intensity of an inchworm," the result was remarkable intellectual focus: "Like an eagle Edwards circled over the context [of the biblical text]," observes Gerstner, "until he found his point and then descended deeply to snatch his homiletic prey and hold it up to the full view of all. For the next hour or more, Jonathan Edwards' only interest was to dissect the text, to analyze it, and to feed his hungry people." Ten-year-old Nehemiah Strong sat in the Northampton pews during his 1739 series on the history of redemption. Years later he told Edwards' grandson Timothy Dwight that he became so entranced by Edwards' sermon on the Second Coming that "he expected without one thought to the contrary the awful scene to be unfolded on that day and in that place," and was "deeply disappointed when the day terminated and left the world in its usual state of tranquility."¹⁶

Three of the Best

We will conclude this paper by looking very briefly at three of Edwards' finest

¹⁵ WJE 10:171; Marsden, *Jonathan Edwards*, 55; WJE 8:386; WJE 22:60.

¹⁶ Marsden, *Jonathan Edwards*, 129, 90-91; Hopkins, *Life*, 51-2; Kimnach, "Jonathan Edwards's Pursuit of Reality," in Nathan Hatch and Harry Stout, eds., *Jonathan Edwards and the American Experience* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 114; Gerstner, 1:486; Timothy Dwight, *Travels in New England and New York*, 4 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969), 4:230-31, quoted in Marsden, *Jonathan Edwards*, 195.

sermons. "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God" is undoubtedly Edwards' most famous sermon. Preached in at the height of the Great Awakening in New England, Harry Stout calls it "arguably America's greatest sermon." In it Edwards tried to compose the "perfect idea" of an awakening sermon by using "rhetorical dynamite" to produce "unprecedented terror." The core idea was "that one could get to life eternal only after first being scared to death." Curiously, Edwards preached it first in Northampton in June 1741, but with no discernible effect. Several weeks later he delivered it at Enfield, Connecticut, where, as Kimnach writes, "the congregation virtually rioted when the preacher had barely begun, so it is impossible to say that they actually heard the sermon." Uncounted scholars and students have studied Edwards' legendary employment of imagery in this sermon. His most striking images—the archer with the drawn bow, the loathsome spider, pent-up waters, unleashed lions—come from Scripture. Some bear repeating: sinners' righteousness would have no more power to keep them from hell "than a spider's web would have to stop a falling rock"; "there are black clouds of God's wrath now hanging directly over your heads, full of the dreadful storm, and big with thunder"; "the wrath of God is like great waters that are damned for the present" but "they increase more and more, and rise higher and higher . . . the waters are continually rising and waxing more and more mighty"; the devils watching for sinners to fall into hell "stand waiting for them, like greedy hungry lions that see their prey, and expect to have it, but are for the present kept back."¹⁷

Marsden has observed that the sometimes-missed logic of the sermon is that "it is the weight of sinners' own sins that is dragging them toward the abyss." Edwards said they stand on slippery ground and need nothing but their "own weight to throw [them] down." Their own "hellish *principles*" would kindle and flame out into hellfire if God permitted them. "Your wickedness," Edwards warned, "makes you as it were heavy as lead." Another oft-missed theme is that *God* is keeping sinners from falling into hell. He "restrains" their wickedness; if not for his restraints, their souls would turn into fiery ovens. The fire pent up in their hearts is struggling to break out, but God's "forbearance" keeps it in check. Only God's "arbitrary will" preserves sinners from hell every moment. Only God's power and pleasure "holds you up"; only his hand keeps "you from falling into the fire every moment" and is the reason "why you han't [sic] gone to hell since you have sat here in the house of God." If these words did not make his hearers feel radically

¹⁷ WJE 22:34, 31; Kimnach, "Edwards as Preacher," 116; Gerstner, *Rational, Biblical Theology*, 1:494; WJE 22:410, 406; Edward J. Gallagher says these images taken together deliver a "recurrent pulsation" that makes the sermon primarily an auditory experience. Gallagher, "'Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God': Some Unfinished Business," *New England Quarterly* 73 (2000), 202-21.

insecure, he had more: they were walking over the pit of hell on a rotten covering with innumerable places that could not bear their weight; there were unseen arrows of death that fly about, even at noonday; no one in hell ever intended to go there, but all flattered themselves they would not wind up there; and there was nothing between them and hell "but the air." "You hang by a slender thread, with the flames of divine wrath flashing about it, and ready every moment to singe it, and burn it asunder." The true issue, as Kimnach writes, was not place but time. It was urgent that sinners not wait any longer. "How awful it is to be left behind at such a day. . . God seems *now* to be hastily gathering in his elect. . . . [P]robably the bigger part of adult persons that ever shall be saved, will be brought in *now* in a little time. . . . The wrath of almighty God is *now* undoubtedly hanging over great part of this congregation." Modern readers may be surprised to learn that the original manuscript version was far more encouraging and mild than the later printed revision. Kimnach says the sermon given at Enfield "preserves a nice balance between the carrot and the stick," unlike the version most Americans have read.18

Edwards' "Farewell Sermon" was one of the few homiletic productions of his last period that were fully written-out. In Kimnach's estimation, it was "as sustained and disciplined" as "Sinners," but "supplant[ed] fire with ice" in eleven pages of doctrine and thirteen pages of application. It was delivered on the first Sunday in July 1750 after his Northampton congregation had voted to eject him from their pulpit. With cool detachment Edwards defended his doctrine, "Ministers and the people that have been under their care, must meet one another, before Christ's tribunal, at the day of judgment." "We live in a world of change," he began, when those who seem most united suddenly become "most disunited." But even if they are removed to places distant from one another, they will meet again in the next world. Then there will be "clear, certain and infallible light" so that all "deceit and delusion shall vanish away." There will be no more debate and disagreement. When ministers meet their people now, and try to instruct and correct them on eternal matters, "all is often in vain." Despite everything their ministers say, many remain "stupid and unawakened." This does not mean that ministers are always right; in fact, they are not infallible in discerning the state of souls, and the "most skillful of them are liable to mistakes." But neither can the people know certainly the state of their minister or one another. "Very often" hypocrites

¹⁸ Marsden, 222; WJE 22:404, 404, 407, original emphasis, 409, 412, 407, 410, 412; Kimnach, "Edwards as Preacher," 116; WJE 22:417-8, emphasis added; WJE 10:114. The notion that God's "arbitrary will" keeps sinners out of hell every moment is underscored by Edwards' occasionalism—his idea that at every moment God recreates the world and wills what is. My thanks to Ken Minkema for this observation.

are mistaken for "eminent saints," and "some of God's jewels" are censured and abused. Therefore it is also "very often" that "great differences and controversies arise between ministers and the people that are under their care." People "are ready to judge and censure one another . . . [and] are greatly mistaken in their judgment, and wrong one another in their censures." But on that future day in eternity when pastors and their people meet again, the secrets of every heart shall be made manifest, and no one will be careless or sleeping or "wandering [in] mind from the great concern of the meeting." The great Judge will "do justice between ministers and their people," and all will see that these affairs of the church were more important "than the temporal concerns of the greatest earthly monarchs, and their kingdoms or empires." "19

In the Application Edwards defended his ministry in Northampton. "I have not spared my feeble strength, but have exerted it for the good of your souls . . . I have spent the prime of my life and strength in labors for your eternal welfare." He said he was never lazy or ambitious for his own financial gain, but "have given myself to the work of the ministry, laboring in it night and day, rising early and applying myself to this great business to which Christ has appointed me." He declared that he had borne "heavy burdens," but God had strengthened him. "Although I have often been troubled on every side, I have not yet been distressed; perplexed, but not in despair; cast down, but not destroyed." Then came a stunning admission of failure: "But now . . . my work is finished . . . You have publicly rejected me." As if to deflect attention from his defeat, he turned again to that future meeting when "our hearts will be turned inside out" and all will see "whether I have been treated with that impartiality, candor and regard which the just Judge esteemed due." He concluded by addressing different groups within the congregation. To those "I leave in a Christless, graceless condition," he feared all his labors had only hardened them and prayed God would grant his Word to be "the fire and hammer that breaketh the rock [of their hearts] in pieces." To those "who are under some awakenings," he told them to "beware of backsliding" and turn to him "who is the infinite fountain of light" so their eyes would be opened and they could meet their minister "in joyful and glorious circumstances." He told the teenagers and twenty-somethings that out of love for themselves they ought not to reject the teaching he had given them. The younger children, he advised, should not imitate those who "cast off fear." "Remember that great day when you must appear before the judgment seat of Christ, and meet your minister there, who has so often counseled and warned you." Parents were admonished not to

¹⁹ WJE 25:457, 463, 468, 469, 471, 473.

be like Eli, who failed to restrain his children. Everyone in the church was told to avoid contention, which was "one of the greatest burdens" he had labored under. He suggested they give themselves to "secret" prayer, and beware of hiring an Arminian for a minister. After asking them to pray for him—even if they disagreed with him—he closed with a final exhortation to keep in mind their future meeting: "And let us all remember, and never forget our future solemn meeting, on that great day of the Lord; the day of infallible decision, and of the everlasting and unalterable sentence, Amen."²⁰

"Heaven Is a World of Love" describes the world he thought believers would enjoy just after the final scene depicted in the Farewell Sermon.. It was the fifteenth and last in his 1738 series on Paul's paean to love in 1 Corinthians 13. In his explication of the text (vv 8-10) he asserts that "other gifts of the Spirit" and "all common fruits of the Spirit" shall cease at the end of the church age, and that only charity or love will remain in heaven. His next eighteen pages in the Yale edition develop seven reasons to support the doctrine ("heaven is a world of love"), followed by eleven pages of application. The reasons start with the declaration that while God is everywhere, he is "more especially" in some places than others—such as his progressively greater presence in Israel, Jerusalem, the temple, the Holy of Holies and then the mercy seat. But heaven is "his dwelling place above all other places in the universe." There sits the infinite fountain of love which is the "mutual holy energy" created by the infinite love of the Father for the Son and the infinite love of the Son for the Father. The Father's love flows to Christ the Head and through him to all his members. The saints are then secondarily subjects of love, just as planets give off reflected light from the sun. All the residents of heaven are perfectly lovely, and harmonize as so many notes "in a concert of music which sweetly [harmonize] with every other note." They are ranked differently according to their capacities for love, but there is no envy in those lower toward those higher because the highest in glory are also highest in holiness and humility and therefore have more love than others. All exist in "an eternal youth" with "perfect tranquility and joy." In heaven there is no fading beauty or decaying love or satiety in our faculty of enjoyment.²¹

In his application Edwards charged his listeners to beware of contention in families, for this especially causes people to "live without much of a comfortable sense of heavenly things, or any lively hope of it." He said saints are happy because they have seen and tasted that heavenly glory. But at the same time they struggle

²⁰ WJE 25:475-77, 480-1, 484, 488.

²¹ WJE 8:369, 386, 383-5.

after holiness, since love always struggles "for liberty" against sin. In his "use" for "awakening to sinners" he told them, "You are in danger. Hell is a world of hatred ... [it] is, as it were, a vast den of poisonous, lusting serpents." Everything that is hateful in this universe "shall be gathered together in hell." Even those who were friends on earth will be enemies there. Everyone will hate one another and "to their utmost torment one another." Misery will not love company there. But "God gives men their choice." If sinners would choose heaven and persevere in well-doing, and love the path which leads to it, "it will certainly lead [them] to heaven at last." They can stay on the path by looking to Jesus, trusting in his mediation and blood—the price of heaven—and intercession for them, and then trusting to his strength to live by his Spirit sent from heaven. Finally, Edwards reassured the saints that to live a life of love to God and neighbor is a way of "inward peace and sweetness." This is the way to have "clear evidences of a title to heaven" because "heavenliness consists in love." So "if ever you arrive at heaven, faith and love must be the wings which must carry you there."

Abstract

This article uncovers the setting of Edwards' sermons, describes three periods in his sermonic career, explicates what he thought to be the goals of preaching, and depicts his incomparable use of imagery. It concludes by discussing three of his best sermons.

²² WJE 8:386, 389-91, 395-6, 391, 395-7.

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JONATHAN EDWARDS — KAZNODZIEJA MISYJNY I PRZEBUDZENIOWY

Jonathan Edwards uznawany jest za jednego z najważniejszych kaznodziejów amerykańskich o wielkim dorobku teologicznym, pastoralnym i misyjnym. Jest on również uznawany za jednego z głównych animatorów wielkiego przebudzenia, które miało miejsce w Nowej Anglii w XVIII wieku. Jego kaznodziejstwo wywarło wielki wpływ na jego pokolenie, ale też przetrwało próbę czasu i po dzień dzisiejszy stanowi inspirację dla wielu. O znaczeniu dorobku Edwardsa może świadczyć szerokie zainteresowanie jego twórczością wśród przedstawicieli różnych dziedzin. Historycy podkreślają jego rolę jako pastora i kaznodziei w ruchu przebudzeniowym i jego wpływ na bieg historii Ameryki; teolodzy cenią jego wyjątkowy wkład w rozumienie historii zbawienia, relacji między Bożą suwerennością a ludzką wolnością, zrozumienie grzechu, zastosowania typologii oraz zrozumienie roli uczuć w chrześcijańskiej duchowości; etycy zwracają uwagę na jego ujęcie moralności w konfrontacji z etyką okresu Oświecenia; filolodzy zafascynowani są pięknem i bogactwem języka, którego używa on by wyrazić swe idee, a filozofowie doceniają jego zacięcie w łączeniu egzystencjalnych wątków teologicznych z filozoficznymi rozważaniami¹.

¹ Zob. Gerald R. McDermott, red., *Understanding Jonathan Edwards*. *An Introduction to America's Theologian* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Stephen J. Stein, red., *The Cambridge Companion to Jonathan Edwards* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Rachel S. Stahle, *The Great Work of Providence. Jonathan Edwards for Life Today* (Eugene: Cascade Books, 2010).

Dużą część zbiorów literackich Jonathana Edwardsa stanowią jego kazania, co też świadczy o wielkim znaczeniu, jakie do nich przykładał. Pozostawił po sobie ponad 1250 kazań, z których duża część została później opublikowana². Jego kazania odzwierciedlają różne etapy życia i służby Edwardsa, ale w szerszym sensie stanowią niezwykły materiał poglądowy dotyczący formacji amerykańskiej myśli religijnej w kontekście dramatycznych zmian społeczno-politycznych zachodzących w tym czasie, ujętych z perspektywy poszukiwania zrozumienia i głębszego doświadczenia duchowych prawd. Był on przede wszystkim kaznodzieją oraz pastorem dbającym o duchowy przekaz prawd, które wyznawał. Jego kaznodziejstwo nacechowane było głębią myśli teologicznej z jednoczesnym naciskiem na wprowadzanie ludzi w te prawdy w odniesieniu do ich życia. W zgodności z reformowaną tradycją głoszone Słowo Boże stanowi najważniejszy element wychowawczy w duchowej edukacji jak i integralną część uwielbienia Boga³. Z całą pewnością taką właśnie postawą nacechowany jest całokształt kaznodziejstwa Edwardsa.

Przyglądając się rozwojowi kunsztu kaznodziejskiego Jonathana Edwardsa z perspektywy chronologicznej można podzielić jego służbę na trzy okresy, w których można zaobserwować jego rozwój i wyodrębnić różne tematy na których się skupiał⁴. Pierwszy etap, który można określić jako odkrywanie roli kazań w ekspresji religijnej miał miejsce po objęciu przez Edwardsa parafii w Nowym Jorku, poprzez pastorat w Bolton, aż do przejęcia przywództwa w zborze w Northampton w 1729 roku. W drugim etapie, który trwa do 1742 i kończy się odejściem z Northampton, widzimy Edwardsa skupiającego się głównie na kaznodziejstwie przebudzeniowym oraz pastoralnym. Ostatni etap datowany od 1743 roku związany jest z intensywniejszym zaangażowaniem akademickim Edwardsa oraz pracą misyjną wśród Indian⁵. Aby przybliżyć postać Jonathana Edwardsa jako kaznodziei misyjnego i przebudzeniowego, krótko przyjrzymy się tym trzem etapom w jego służbie.

Etap I: Odkrywanie mocy kazania w ekspresji religijnej Można powiedzieć, że Jonathan Edwards wyniósł zapał i pierwszy warsz-

² Zob. Wilson Kimnach, Kenneth P. Minkema, Douglas A. Sweeney, red., *The Sermons of Jonathan Edwards. A Reader* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999).

³ Douglas A. Sweeney, *Jonathan Edwards and the Ministry of the Word* (Downers Growe: IVP Academic, 2009), 57–60.

⁴ Podział ten pojawia się w różnych publikacjach dotyczących kaznodziejstwa Edwardsa, m.in. Wilson H. Kimnach, "Edwards as preacher" w: Stephen J. Stein, red., *The Cambridge Companion to Jonathan Edwards* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 106–123.

⁵ Ibid., s. 106.

tat kaznodziejski z domu rodzinnego. Zarówno jego dziadek, wielebny Solomon Stoddart, rozpoznawany lider religijny w okolicach Northampton, jak i ojciec, wielebny Timothy Edwards, wieloletni przywódca kościoła w East Windsor, byli kaznodziejami o rozpoznawalnej reputacji. Długo zanim Edwards przeszedł formalną edukację w Kolegium Yale, miał okazję w domowym zaciszu doświadczać tego, z czym związane jest kształtowanie kunsztu kaznodziejskiego. Kazanie w rozumieniu Edwardsa pojmowane było głównie jako narzędzie mediacji pomiędzy współczesnością a wiecznością, sacrum i profanum, Bogiem i Jego Słowem, a człowiekiem⁶. W zgodności z purytańską tradycją na tak rozumiane kazanie musiały składać się trzy wyraziste elementy. Podstawową składową kazania jest "tekst", czyli rozważany fragment Pisma Świętego połączony z egzegezą wykładającą wieczne prawdy w nim zawarte w określonym kontekście i czasie. Drugim nieodłącznym elementem jest "doktryna" — w oparciu o dany fragment Pisma Świętego wykładana jest doktryna w formie różnych podpunktów związanych z główną tezą kazania. Trzecim elementem jest "zastosowanie" doktryny czyli lista praktycznych wniosków i rad ukierunkowanych na osobisty i społeczny kontekst słuchaczy⁷. Każdy z tych elementów można dostrzec w kaznodziejstwie Edwardsa, który przykładał wielką wagę do treści i struktury merytorycznej wygłaszanych przez siebie kazań.

Od najmłodszych lat swojego życia Edwards został nauczony głębokiego szacunku do Słowa Bożego co jest wyraźnie widoczne w jego nauczaniu. Każde kazanie rozpoczyna się od ekspozycji tekstu biblijnego jako niepodważalnego autorytetu i źródła poznania ostatecznej prawdy — wszelkie wnioski wyrażane w czasie homilii muszą mieć bezpośrednie odniesienie i uzasadnienie w cytowanym tekście. Douglas Sweeney — historyk Kościoła oraz redaktor osobistych notatników Edwardsa, opublikowanych przez Uniwersytet Yale — skrupulatnie dokumentuje odniesienia do tekstu biblijnego w manuskryptach kazań przygotowywanych przez tego wyjątkowego kaznodzieję⁸ Edwards wielokrotnie odnosi się do tekstu biblijnego jako "Słowa Bożego", "słowa Chrystusa" czy też, jak to opisał jeszcze będąc nastolatkiem i pełniąc funkcję pastora w swoim pierwszym kościele, "listem Chrystusa, który napisał do nas"⁹. Głęboko wierzył on i wyznał, że Pismo Święte wyraża zbawienny zamysł Stwórcy wobec stworzenia i jest dosłownie "słowem życia", bez którego nie można doświadczyć mocy odkupienia. Edwards był prze-

 $^{^6}$ Wilson H. Kimnach, Kenneth P. Minkema, Douglas A. Sweeney, "Editors Introduction" w: Wilson H. Kimnach, Kenneth P. Minkema, Douglas A. Sweeney, red., *The Sermons...*, s. xii.

⁷ Ibid., s. xiii.

⁸ Douglas A. Sweeney, "Edwards and the Bible" w: Gerald R. McDermott, red., *Understanding Jonathan Edwards*. *An Introduction to America's Theologian* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 63–77.

⁹ Ibid., 67.

konany, że to właśnie dzięki Słowu Bożemu i duchowemu poznaniu człowiek jest w stanie docenić piękno życia, nabyć prawdziwej mądrości i doświadczyć głębi duchowości, które inaczej byłyby niemożliwe.

W epoce rozwoju biblijnego krytycyzmu, teologicznego sceptycyzmu i religijnego mininimalizmu, Edwards pozostał wierny swoim przekonaniom dotyczącym wiarygodności i autorytetu tekstu biblijnego¹⁰. To nie przeszkadzało mu jednak w tym, by interpretować tekst zarówno w wymiarze historycznym jak i teologicznym. Widać w jego kazaniach staranne i głęboko przemyślane odniesienia do doktryny, jak i umiłowanie do eksponowania symboliki biblijnej, które były ukierunkowane na potrzebę uzasadnienia prawd zawartych w tekście w kontekście szerszej analizy i uchwycenia właściwego ich zrozumienia¹¹. Edwards posiadał wyjątkową zdolność wyrażania skomplikowanych idei filozoficzno-teologicznych w połączeniu z odkrywaniem ich znaczenia w życiu człowieka. Stąd każde jego kazanie zakończone jest zastosowaniem doktryny i odniesieniem do codziennego życia i praktyki pobożności w duchu purytanizmu zakładającego, że kaznodzieja ma po prostu być osobą zwiastującą Chrystusa ukrzyżowanego w taki sposób, aby głoszone słowa trafiały do serc słuchających¹². Ostatecznym celem głoszenia Słowa w rozumieniu reformowanym było więc to, by pogłębić wiarę, nadzieję i miłość słuchaczy, co też wyraźnie można dostrzec w kaznodziejstwie Edwardsa.

Już jako młody kaznodzieja — rozpoczynając pracę w Nowym Jorku — wygłosił Edwards serię płomiennych kazań wyrażających istotę życia chrześcijańskiego, tak jak je postrzegał. Jednym z najbardziej znanych kazań z tego wczesnego okresu jest kazanie wygłoszone w 1722 roku pod znamienitym tytułem: *The Way of Holiness* ("Droga świętości"), w którym na podstawie Księgi Izajasza wykłada istotę przesłania Ewangelii w kontekście świętości Boga i wynikających z tego zastosowań¹³. Edwards już w tym wczesnym okresie rozwoju swojej służby kaznodziejskiej wyraża element fundamentalny dla swojej teologii, a mianowicie potrzebę całkowitego poddania człowieka świętemu Bogu, co też ma znaleźć swój wyraz we wszystkich sferach jego życia. Inny motyw, który często pojawia się w kazaniach z tego okresu takich jak *Dedication to God* ("Oddanie Bogu") czy *The Nakedness of Job* ("Nagość Joba") to nacisk na "autentyczność" i to co definiuje jako

¹⁰ Douglas A. Sweeney , *Jonathan Edwards...*, 85–106.

¹¹ Tibor Fabiny, "Edwards and Biblical Typology" w: Gerald R. McDermott, red., *Understanding Jonathan Edwards*. *An Introduction to America's Theologian* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 91–106.

¹² Douglas A. Sweeney, *Jonathan Edwards and the Ministry of the Word* (Downers Growe: IVP Academic, 2009) 85–89.

¹³ Pełny tekst kazania "The Way of Holiness" w: Wilson H. Kimnach, Kenneth P. Minkema, Douglas A. Sweeney, red. *The Sermons of Jonathan Edwards. A Reader* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999), 1–12.

"rzeczywistość"¹⁴. Znajdujemy tutaj elementy charakterystyczne dla Edwardsa, który przykłada wielkie znaczenie do doktryny i wieloaspektowego jej wyłożenia, z jednoczesnym podkreśleniem, że nie chodzi tutaj jedynie o intelektualną wiarę czy akceptację formy słownej, ale też autentyczność i osobiste wewnętrzne świadectwo wyrażanych w formie doktrynalnej prawd. Choć wielu ludzi w czasach Edwardsa posiada pewną świadomość poznania i wiedzy doktrynalnej, to pozostaje ona często jedynie na poziomie zewnętrznych form religijności mieniąc się jako daleka od codziennej rzeczywistości. W tym właśnie sensie Edwards w swym kaznodziejstwie stara się zwrócić uwagę swych słuchaczy na poznanie rzeczywistości z perspektywy autentycznej duchowości, co też często później określa mianem prawdziwej religii.

Taką postawę wyraźnie widać czytając osobiste refleksje Edwardsa z tego okresu zawarte w słynnej Personal Narrative ("Osobistej opowieści"). Po przeczytaniu słów z Pierwszego Listu św. Pawła do Tymoteusza 1:15 "A królowi wieków, nieśmiertelnemu, niewidzialnemu, jedynemu Bogu, niechaj będzie cześć i chwała na wieki wieków. Amen" Edwards napisał: "Wstąpiło w moją duszę i przeniknęło ją poczucie chwały Boskiej Istoty; nowe odczucie, całkiem odmienne od wszystkiego, czego dotychczas doświadczyłem. Od mniej więcej tego czasu zacząłem mieć nowe myśli o Chrystusie, dziele odkupienia i chwalebnej drodze zbawienia przez niego. A mój umysł bardzo pragnął spędzać czas na czytaniu i rozmyślaniu o Chrystusie, o jego pięknie i doskonałości jego osoby oraz pięknej drodze zbawienia w nim za darmo, z łaski. Odczucie boskich rzeczy, jakie miałem, często nagle rozpalało się w moim sercu jakby słodki płomień; żar serca, którego nie umiem wyrazić"¹⁵. Doświadczenie to pozostało z nim na kolejne lata i stało się podstawą siły przekazu głoszonych przez niego kazań. Szczerość jego duchowych pragnień i doświadczeń została też wyrażona w napisanych w tym okresie Resolutions ("Postanowienia"), gdzie wyraźnie pisze o postanowieniu, by we wszystkim, co robi szukać odzwierciedlenia chwały Bożej, bez względu na cenę, którą przyjdzie mu za to zapłacić¹⁶. Innym znamienitym osiągnięciem we wczesnym kaznodziejstwie Edwardsa jest jego refleksja Christ, the Light of the World ("Chrystus, światłość świata"), gdzie widać rozwój w wykorzystaniu argumentacji teologicznej (w tym przypadku dogłębnego studium tradycyjnej metafory światła) w celu wyrażenia Bożego objawienia w Chrystusie¹⁷. Motyw ten przewija

¹⁴ Wilson H. Kimnach, "Edwards as preacher" w: Stephen J. Stein, red. *The Cambridge Companion to Jonathan Edwards* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 107.

¹⁵ Cyt. za: Colin Whittaker, *Wielkie przebudzenia* (tł. Bożena Olechnowicz, Warszawa: Instytut Wydawniczy "Agape", 1997), 20.

¹⁶ Douglas A. Sweeney, *Jonathan Edwards...*, 45–50.

¹⁷ Wilson H. Kimnach, Edwards..., 107.

się później często w jego nauczaniu wyrażającym ideę "Bożego światła", które stanowi niezbędny element prowadzący do "duchowego poznania". Idea objawienia stanowiącego fundament tego poznania i symbolika światła, które oświeca serce i umysł człowieka ku otwartości na Boga konstytuuje jedno z największych błogosławieństw w relacji pomiędzy Stworzycielem a stworzeniem¹⁸. Edwards w przejrzysty sposób łączy tutaj wątki historyczne, symboliczne i teologiczne w jedną spójną całość.

Etap II: Kaznodziejstwo przebudzeniowe

W roku 1726 Edwards został zaproszony, by wesprzeć w służbie swojego starzejącego się dziadka Solomona Stoddarda w kościele w Northampton, gdzie po roku został oficjalnie ordynowany. Jego dziadek był jednym ze znaczniejszych duchownych swoich czasów i cieszył się wielkim poważaniem w całej Nowej Anglii. Po śmierci dziadka w 1729 roku kazalnica w Northampton pozostała w pełni do jego dyspozycji. Tutaj też rozpoczyna się okres, kiedy Edwards w większym stopniu skupia się na kaznodziejstwie przebudzeniowym. Początkowo jego nauczania skupiały się na zagadnieniach dotyczących społecznej moralności, w szczególności w odpowiedzi na ignorancję religijną młodych ludzi oraz inne problemy w mieście, czego przyczyny Edwards upatrywał w duchowej kondycji człowieka w oddzieleniu od Boga, reprezentując tradycyjną kalwińską interpretację grzechu. Jeśli problem tkwi w duchu i deprawacji grzechu w życiu człowieka, jedynym możliwym rozwiązaniem z perspektywy Edwardsa jest głoszenie doktryny zbawienia w Chrystusie. Należy też zaznaczyć, że nie zgadzał się on z teorią "połowicznego przymierza" z 1662 roku, które w rezultacie przyniosło kompromis, jeśli chodzi o członkostwo w kościele i dlatego wygłosił serię kazań z krytyką założeń teologii liberalnej. Edwards zdecydowanie opowiadał się za tym, że nawrócenie stanowi niezbędny warunek przyjęcia do grona członków kościoła. Wynika to z jego purytańskich przekonań teologicznych, że gdy człowiek "rodzi się na nowo" dokonuje się w nim głęboka duchowa zmiana w wyniku której zaczyna myśleć, czuć i postępować inaczej od ludzi nieodrodzonych. W kazaniu God Glorified in Man's Dependance ("Bóg uwielbiony w zależności człowieka"), Edwards w swej retoryce krytykuje ideę zbawienia przez uczynki podkreślając beznadziejność ludzkiej egzystencji bez Boga i pełną zależność człowieka od Niego z perspektywy wieczności¹⁹. W swym teologicznym myśleniu reprezentował on więc oddanie kalwińskiej doktrynie zbawienia, suwerenności Boga, deprawacji grze-

¹⁸ Douglas A. Sweeney, *Jonathan Edwards...*, 94.

¹⁹ Wilson H. Kimnach, Kenneth P. Minkema, Douglas A. Sweeney, "Editors...", s. xviii.

chu, które stały się fundamentami na których budował swe płomienne, przebudzeniowe kazania²⁰.

Przełomowym w tym okresie stała się seria kazań Justification by Faith Alone ("Usprawiedliwienie jedynie z wiary"), co dało początek przebudzeniu duchowemu na niespotykaną do tej pory w tym miejscu skalę. Sam Edwards opisuje to doświadczenie w następujących słowach: "Wielkie i szczere przejęcie się wielkimi sprawami religii i wiecznego świata stało się powszechne we wszystkich częściach miasta wśród wszystkich klas i ludzi w różnym wieku...Z dnia na dzień przez wiele miesięcy można było oglądać grzeszników wyprowadzanych z ciemności do cudownej światłości. W miarę upływu czasu liczba prawdziwych świętych pomnażała się. W mieście dokonała się tak rychła przemiana, że następnej wiosny i lata (1735) miasto zdawało się być pełne obecności Bożej"²¹. Jako kaznodzieja Edwards wierzył, że owe przebudzenie było rezultatem wierności w głoszeniu prawowitej doktryny reformacyjnej o usprawiedliwieniu tylko przez wiarę²². Stąd w swych kazaniach z tego czasu w bardzo wyrazisty sposób podkreśla znaczenie i konsekwencje grzechu, opisując w obrazowy sposób rzeczywistość piekła, z jednoczesnym naciskiem na ukazanie piękna Bożego objawienia w Chrystusie jako jedynej drogi zbawienia. Jednym z najczęściej kojarzonych z Jonathanem Edwardsem kazań z tego okresu jest słynne Sinners in the hands of an Angry God ("Grzesznicy w rękach rozgniewanego Boga") z 1741 roku, którego głównym tematem był lęk przed wiecznością bez zbawienia oraz zemsta Boga na niewierzących i pewność skazania grzeszników na wieczne cierpienie w piekle²³. Edwards po raz pierwszy wygłosił to kazanie w swoim rodzimym kościele, bez odnotowania jakichkolwiek spektakularnych reakcji. Po kilku tygodniach wygłosił je ponownie w Enfield w dniu 8 listopada 1741 roku, gdzie doprowadziło ono do duchowej rewolucji — słuchacze byli pod tak wielkim wrażeniem, że na głos wyrażali swoje emocje, wołali i krzyczeli z przerażenia, modlili się na głos i nawracali do Boga. W kazaniu tym Edwards w bardzo obrazowy sposób ukazał dynamikę sądu Bożego i strachu przed nim, ze szczególnym podkreśleniem rzeczywistości tego, że może on nadejść w każdej chwili²⁴.

Niezwykle istotnym jest jednak to, by odnotować, że pomimo dużego nacisku na grzech i usprawiedliwienie z wiary oraz doświadczalny aspekt pozna-

²⁰ Zob. E.Brooks Holifield, "Edwards as theologian" w: Stephen J. Stein, red., *The Cambridge Companion to Jonathan Edwards* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 144–159.

²¹ Cyt. za: Colin Whittaker, Wielkie przebudzenia..., 21.

²² Douglas A. Sweeney , *Jonathan Edwards...*, 114–121.

²³ Pehry tekst kazania "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God" w: Wilson H. Kimnach, Kenneth P. Minkema, Douglas A. Sweeney, red., *The Sermons...*, 49–65.

²⁴ Wilson H. Kimnach, "Edwards…", 116.

wania Chrystusa w życiu człowieka, Edwards nie oddzielał tego od głębszego namysłu intelektualnego. W The Importance and Advantage of Thorough Knowledge of Divine Truth ("Znaczenie i korzyść wypływająca z gruntownego poznania Bożej prawdy") z 1739 roku, Edwards napisał: "Nie ma innego sposobu by zgłębić znaczenie łaski, jak tylko poprzez poznanie"²⁵. W czasie pełnego rozkwitu przebudzenia nawracający się doświadczali wielu emocji, a czasami dochodziło nawet do różnych ekscesów, wobec czego Edwards zaczął zastanawiać się nad udziałem uczuć w nawróceniu oraz dalszym życiu człowieka wierzącego i wygłosił serię kazań o rozróżnianiu fałszywych i prawdziwych przeżyć religijnych²⁶. Otóż Edwards argumentuje między innymi to, że nasze uczucia są silne i żywe wcale nie przesądza o tym, iż są one duchowe²⁷. Z drugiej strony ukazuje on listę cech "prawdziwych duchowych uczuć", które powstają w wyniku "duchowego nadprzyrodzonego i boskiego oddziaływania na ludzkie serce", a ich celem jest "umiłowanie spraw duchowych — nie nasza własna korzyść"²⁸. Istotnym owocem prawdziwych duchowych uczuć ma być praktyczne chrześcijaństwo znajdujące swój wyraz w codziennym życiu człowieka wierzącego, w przeciwieństwie do nadmiernego emocjonalizmu skupiającego się bardziej na doznaniach niż posłuszeństwie i uświęceniu²⁹. Stąd niezwykle istotnym elementem nauczania Edwardsa jest też rola Ducha Świętego w procesie uświęcenia i duchowego poznania, które ma prowadzić do zmiany życia w oparciu o rzeczywistość mocy Słowa Bożego. Edwards wyraźnie rozróżnia nominalne chrześcijaństwo czy religię od autentycznej ekspresji wiary w Chrystusa, która jest możliwa dzięki działaniu Ducha Świętego w życiu człowieka, które prowadzi do odnowy duchowej, zachwycenia się Chrystusem i trwałych zmian odzwierciedlających wartości i prawdy objawione w Słowie Bożym³⁰.

Etap III: Kazanodzieja misyjny

Pod koniec lat czterdziestych napięcia w kościele w Northampton doprowadziły ostatecznie do tego, że w 1750 roku rada parafialna wymówiła Edwardowi posadę pastora. Wkrótce po tym został on pastorem w przygranicznym kościele w Stockbridge i misjonarzem w osadzie Indian, co wydawało się być mało atrakcyj-

²⁵ Cyt. za Wilson H. Kimnach, Kenneth P. Minkema, Douglas A. Sweeney, "Editors...", xviii.

²⁶ Skrócona wersja klasycznego dzieła *Treatise concerning religious affections* (Rozprawa o uczuciach religijnych) została wydana w języku polskim pod tytułem *Istotne doznanie* (tł. Joanna Sosulska, Warszawa: Instytut Wydawniczy "Agape", 2002).

²⁷ Ibid., 29–31.

²⁸ Ibid., 58–111.

²⁹ Zob. Walter Eversley, "The Pastor as Revivalist" w: Sang Hyun Lee i Allen C. Guelzo, red., *Edwards in Our Time* (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1999), 114–118.

³⁰ Douglas A. Sweeney, Jonathan Edwards..., 117–121.

nym miejscem dla tak znanego ze swego intelektualnego zacięcia kaznodziei. To właśnie tutaj jednak można zauważyć nowe podejście w kaznodziejstwie Edwardsa, który zaczyna dostrzegać ograniczenia tradycyjnego kazania w kontekście swojej pracy wśród Indian.

Czerpiąc inspirację z życia i misyjnej służby wśród Indian Davida Brainerd'a, którego to wspomnienia Edwards opublikował w 1749 roku, zaczyna on rezygnować ze złożoności swoich dotychczasowych kazań i nie tracąc na przekazie upraszcza znacznie ich formę. Przykładem tego może być jedno z pierwszych kazań misyjnych wygłoszonych w 1751 roku w osadzie indiańskiej *The Things That* Belong to True Religion ("To co stanowi o istocie prawdziwej religii"), które jak zwykle rozpoczyna się od tekstu biblijnego, ale zamiast wyłożenia założeń teologicznych tekstu pojawia się historia nawrócenia Korneliusza. Co ciekawe Edwards utożsamia tutaj Korneliusza z "wojownikiem" tak aby było to zrozumiałe dla jego słuchaczy³¹. Nowym elementem jest też zastąpienie tradycyjnej egzegezy narracją — co stanie się stałym elementem kazań wśród Indian, gdyż jego założeniem było to, iż w ten sposób łatwiej będzie im zapamiętać i przyswoić prezentowane przez niego prawdy. Nie rezygnuje on ze swoich ulubionych koncepcji teologicznych, ale stara się je przekazać w mniej analityczny sposób za pomocą uproszczonych pod względem formy stwierdzeń. Następuje więc tutaj radykalna zmiana od nacisku na analizę do większego wyeksponowania syntezy jako narzędzia ekspozycji Słowa Bożego³².

Zmiana ta nie była jednak powiązana z zaniżeniem jakości intelektualnej czy doktrynalnej prezentowanych przez Edwardsa treści. Niezwykle intrygujące w kazaniach z tego okresu jest jego wyjątkowa ekspozycja zastosowań doktryny. Choć nadal głosi on kalwińską doktrynę zbawienia i bezwarunkowego wybrania, to podkreśla także, że Chrystus umarł za przedstawicieli wszystkich narodów i warstw społecznych. Dzieło zbawienia jest więc takie samo dla Indian, jak i białych, ponieważ przebaczenie w Chrystusie jest przeznaczone dla wszystkich narodów, bez względu na rasę czy status społeczny³³. Kiedy więc nauczał na temat doktryny grzechu podkreślał, że dla Boga nie ma rozróżnienia w tej kwestii między Indianami a Anglikami. Szerzej i w bardziej usystematyzowany sposób Edwards omawia problematykę związaną z grzechem i wolną wolą dziele *Freedom of the Will* ("Wolność woli"), które ukazało się w 1754 roku i miało wielki wpływ na całe pokolenie pastorów, misjonarzy i teologów czego rezultatem był

³¹ Wilson H. Kimnach, "Edwards...", 120.

³² Ibid., 121

³³ Rachel M. Wheeler, "Edwards as missionary", w: Stephen J. Stein, red., *The Cambridge Companion to Jonathan Edwards* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 205.

rozwój światowego ruchu misyjnego³⁴. Było to szczególnie istotne dla wielu angielskich kalwinistów, którzy zmagali się z tym jak zintegrować swoje teologiczne przekonania dotyczące predestynacji z tekstami biblijnymi wskazującymi na to, że Bóg chce aby Ewangelia była głoszona wszystkim ludziom (np. Jn. 3,16–17; 1 Tm 2,3–4). Argumentacja Edwardsa dotycząca wolności w głoszeniu Ewangelii w połączeniu z naciskiem na suwerenność Boga, stała się inspiracją dla wielu reformowanych wyznawców kalwinizmu do szerszego zaangażowania w dzieło ewangelizacji międzykulturowej³⁵. Podczas gdy wielu reformowanych myślicieli ograniczało misję do epoki apostolskiej, Edwards jawnie się przeciwstawiał temu redukcjonizmowi propagując wagę ewangelizacji międzykulturowej w oparciu o biblijny autorytet.

Należy też zwrócić uwagę na to, że kazania Edwardsa z tego okresu nacechowane są również sporą dawką zachęty i wsparcia dla często znajdujących się w trudnym położeniu Indian. Ostrzega on ich też przed tym, że dostęp do Ewangelii związany jest z nowymi zobowiązaniami i podkreśla potrzebę edukacji oraz przemiany życia. Podobnie jak inni propagatorzy misji w tych czasach Edwards wierzył, że "cywilizacja" i chrześcijaństwo są nierozłącznie powiązane i w związku z tym oprócz słuchania Ewangelii rezydenci misji byli regularnie nauczani podstaw czytania, pisania, arytmetyki, choć szybko uznał, że tradycyjne metody nauczania nie działają i zastosował innowacyjne metody edukacji wśród Indian³⁶. Należy też podkreślić postawę samego Edwardsa wobec swych indiańskich odbiorców — wielokrotnie wyrażał się o nich z wielkim szacunkiem, solidaryzował się z nimi, a nawet stwierdził, że Anglicy mogą też się czegoś od nich nauczyć na temat religii, co było rewolucyjnym jak na te czasy stwierdzeniem³⁷. Homilie Edwardsa skierowane do Indian w Stockbridge doświadczających wiele cierpień były bardzo praktyczne i nacechowane zachętą by poddawać swoje życie Chrystusowi bez względu na okoliczności i odkrywać w Nim swego obrońcę, pocieszyciela i przyjaciela. Jedno z takich kazań wygłoszonych w sierpniu 1756 roku w czasie wojny między Francuzami a Indianami w wyrazisty sposób podkreśla ofertę skierowaną do wszystkich grzeszników: "Wy, którzy jesteście biedni i pozbawieni przyjaciół w tym świecie (...) jeśli ktoś z was jest zmęczony ciężarem grzechu i przyglądaniu się złu tego świata (...) to niech nie stąpa drogą ciemności, lecz wybierze niebo jako swój dom (...) Zaufaj Chrystusowi"³⁸.

³⁴ Douglas A. Sweeney, *Jonathan Edwards...*, 170.

³⁵ Ibid., 153.

³⁶ Rachel M. Wheeler, "Edwards as...", 203.

³⁷ Douglas A. Sweeney, Jonathan Edwards..., 180.

³⁸ Cyt. za Rachel M. Wheeler, "Edwards as...", 206.

Ostatnie lata życia Edwardsa są więc w dużym stopniu poświęcone służbie misyjnej, która ma zupełnie inny charakter niż w okresie przebudzeniowym w kościele w Northampton. Tutaj nie kładzie już tak wielkiego nacisku na podkreślanie strachu i potępienia, choć do końca pozostaje wierny swoim kalwińskim przekonaniom. Kiedy naucza na temat deprawacji grzechu podkreśla jednak jego uniwersalność, poprzez co wyraża, że nie dotyczy ona tylko Indian, ale całej ludzkości. To co jest charakterystyczne dla tego ostatniego okresu to przełamanie wcześniejszych paradygmatów związanych z głoszeniem kazań, a pod względem doktrynalnym dostosowanie formy do grupy odbiorców. Edwards mieni się więc jako kaznodzieja, który wychodzi ponad swoje ograniczenia i potrafi dostosować się do potrzeb prezentowanych przez kontekst pola misyjnego.

W czasie tego kilkuletniego okresu w roli pastora-misjonarza wśród Indian w Stockbridge Edwards odegrał ważną rolę nie tylko jako duchowy lider, ale przede wszystkim człowiek przełamujący reformowane stereotypy dotyczące ewangelizacji międzykulturowej wywierając trwały wpływ na rozwój światowego ruchu misyjnego. Dla Edwardsa misja stanowiła narzędzie poprzez które Bóg może i chce realizować swoje cele w historii³⁹. Edwards — kaznodzieja przebudzeniowy i misyjny na długo jeszcze pozostanie inspiracją dla wielu swych następców.

Abstract

Jonathan Edwards is regarded as one of America's greatest preachers, whose legacy includes a wealth of theological, pastoral and missionary works. His sermons comprise a large portion of the Edwards archives, a witness to the effort he expended in writing them and how highly he regarded the task of preaching. He left behind over 1250 written sermons, the majority of which have only recently been published. This article analyzes selected sermons that reflect his development as a preacher, beginning with the early days of his first pastorate, followed by the period of revivals, and finally reaching his missionary sermons in Stockbridge.

 $^{^{39}}$ Gerald R. McDermott, "Conclusion: Edward's Relevance Today" w: Gerald R. McDermott, red., *Understanding...*, 206.

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A COGNITIVE APPROACH TO THE HERMENEUTICS OF JONATHAN EDWARDS'S SERMONS

Jonathan Edwards was one of the most eminent and versatile thinkers in early American history; any label one might try to put on him—preacher, scientist, philosopher, theologian, missionary or minister—will not give full justice to the intellectual complexity of his thought. Edwards' texts demand all the scholarly attention they can get, and thus encourage interdisciplinary research. It seems that only by conjoining the hermeneutic tools offered by different methods of looking into language and culture can one hope to construct an investigative apparatus apt for the analysis of Edwards' oeuvre. In this article I wish to demonstrate how cognitive poetics, a cognitive linguistics-based method of enquiry, may help us in explaining the complex hermeneutic processes accompanying the reception of his sermons, and how it may aid their more comprehensive study.

In the first part of the article I employ cognitive poetics to demonstrate how, in a few selected passages from the sermon *Future Punishment of the Wicked Unavoidable and Intolerable*, Edwards constructed sensual and physical images to appeal to his listeners. In the second part of the paper, I focus on Edwards' most famous text, *Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God*, and argue that a part of the powerful rhetorical effect of the sermon on the Enfield audience may be attributed to the mechanism of a cognitive "deictic shift."

Jonathan Edwards's Sermons

As the author of the most famous American sermon, *Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God*, Edwards has often been ranked among the "fire and brimstone" preachers. This label, however, sadly simplifies the richness and diversity of his sermonic output, in which dense and vivid hellfire preaching played an important, but not major role. Ralph Turnbull observes, "that his preaching was mingled with terror and mimesis is beyond question, but that Edwards should be judged as a preacher of that particular kind of sermon and nothing else is unfair and unkind." Especially in the later part of his life, after the eclipse of the Great Awakening and his removal from Northampton, Edwards adopted a less fiery and more reflexive tone, visible especially in his missionary sermons to Stockbridge Indians.

Unlike his friend George Whitefield, the most famous preacher of the Great Awakening, Edwards did not rely on impressive delivery in the pulpit. His voice was a "little languid, with a tone of pathos" and, as observed by Samuel Hopkins, "too low for a large assembly, but very distinct and strangely arresting." Edwards followed the code of preaching of his father Timothy Edwards, and his grandfather Solomon Stoddard, two towering figures of the "Connecticut River Valley School of Preaching." Especially the latter's strong views on the necessity of terrorizing imagery seems to have impacted Edwards. Still, unlike his grandfather, until the 1740s he would write texts of his sermons in full, and only after the Great Awakening did he occasionally turn to sketchy notes. As Edwards exhibited the "homiletical gift of structure," his sermons visibly bear the mark of his analytical thinking: "always there is symmetry, orderliness, design."

Edwards' sermons are exceptional also because of their aesthetical qualities. By the standards of their times they are impressive, textual works of art. Interestingly, in the Preface to *Discourses on Various Subjects* (1738), Edwards himself assumed that his writings lacked necessary "politeness" and "modishness of style." (Kimnach observes that Edwards rejected "style" (understood as wit and embellished *impromptu* rhetoric), not realizing that in some of his works he actually studies and practices it: the "efficacious verbal expressions for which he constantly strove" constituted what he seemed to distance himself from. Like his father and his grandfather, Edwards considered the sermon to be a "vehicle of power rather

¹ Ralph Turnbull, Jonathan Edwards, the Preacher (Michigan: Baker Book House, 1958), 138.

² Ola Winslow, *Jonathan Edwards* (New York: Macmillan, 1940), 129.

³ Ibid., 129.

⁴ Turnbull, Jonathan Edwards, the Preacher, 107.

⁵ Winslow, Jonathan Edwards, 136.

⁶ WJE 10:24.

than of reason or beauty";⁷ elocution was not a means of aesthetic pleasure (rhetorical *delectare*), but of reaching to the audience, impacting their minds and hearts and reforming them.

The imagery of Edwards' sermons is impressively appealing. His oratorical skill allowed him to breach the boundary between images and concepts; he was a philosopher working with abstract notions of theology, but at the same time, he was a rhetorician and a man of words. Edwards' verbal images are an invitation to his complex and uncompromising theology, but they also play an important communicative role: he believed them to be critical in "awakening" the audiences. In his early sermon, The Warnings of Future Punishment Don't Seem Real to the Wicked, Edwards observed that one of the hindrances for the advancement of religion was that people who believed in hell did not actually regard it as something real. Thus, "developing one of the most characteristics of principles in all his preaching, he distinguished between believing something theoretically and having a true sense of it as a personal reality,"8 and decided that to preach successfully he needed to provide his hearers with a "verbal picture of hell painted for them so that they could, in effect, hear the 'shrieks and cries of the damned'."9 This might be one of the greatest assets of Edwards' preaching style—the ability to negotiate the relationship between the tangible and the intangible, the real and the abstract, to craft verbal images vivid and appealing enough to render the intangible idea of hell, suffering and damnation immediate and sensually comprehensible.

The analysis of sermons as rhetorically complex as those authored by Edwards poses certain methodological problems; after all, they are discourses that were intended to be delivered to people from the pulpit of a meetinghouse. Thus, treating them as static texts is unconstructive—they require an approach that will, on the one hand, look into their dynamic language patterns and, on the other hand, that will highlight the communicative context in which they came into existence. The method proposed in this paper allows the interpreter to achieve both of these goals and offers a fresh look at the dynamic functioning of language in sermons; consequently, the cognitive approach seem to be particularly apt for the analysis of Edwards' rhetoric.

Jonathan Edwards's Corporal Imagery

The application of cognitive poetics for the analysis of Edwards' sermons seems

⁷ Wilson H. Kimnach, "Edwards as preacher," in Stephen. J. Stein, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Jonathan Edwards* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 103-125.

⁸ George Marsden, *Jonathan Edwards*: A Life (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2003), 120.

⁹ Ibid., 121.


a fitting idea when one considers one of the key features of his sermonic style, i.e., the physicality of the imagery. Three years ago my own students gave a unique testimony to this quality of Edwards' manner of writing. I was teaching a seminar on rhetorical analysis and I decided to include in the reading list a few passages from *Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God*. When my students uniformly declared that Edwards was an inspiring "painter of words," I encouraged the whole group to try to select one metaphorical image from the sermon, study it carefully and prepare a painting or a drawing on the basis of the selected description. The outcome of this intersemiotic experiment surprised me greatly. The students meticulously underlined all the words which denoted physical relationships between objects, all the verbs that denoted movement, and all prepositions that suggested spatial arrangement, then they drew a series of sermon-inspired images.



Anna Capińska



Nina Łągiewka



Karolina Dulemba

The three drawings prepared by my students present three markedly different interpretations of the sermon's metonymic hand of God. The drawing by Anna Capińska recalls the famous image of a spider held by the hand of God over the pit of hell: "The God that holds you over the pit of hell, much as one holds a spider, or some detestable insect, over the fire, detests you, and is dreadfully provoked." To her, the human being hangs over hell by a slender thread—the immediacy of the peril and human helplessness are given emphasis. Nina Łągiewka focused on the kinesthetic relationship between the hand of God and the hand of a sinner: "If God should let you go, you would immediately sink and swiftly descend and plunge into the bottomless gulf, and your healthy constitution, and your own care and prudence, and best contrivance, and all your righteousness, would have no more influence to uphold you and keep you out of hell, than a spider's web would have to stop a falling rock." To her, God upholds the sinner and applies his strength to draw him out of hellfire—the bond between the Almighty and the sinner relies upon the former's countering of the latter's natural tendency to literally fall into damnation. Finally, Karolina Dulemba's drawing may be viewed as a critical representation of the complete control God has over the sinner.

The three images show different perspectives, different arrangements and different physical relationships between the hand of the Almighty and the damned. As genuine outcomes of my students' rhetorical hermeneutic process, they give testimony to an important quality of the preacher's sermonic craft: the ability to mediate between the physical and the metaphysical. Edwards was successful in

creating corporeal, sensual images and in utilizing them persuasively to bring the finite minds of the hearers closer to the celestial infinite.

This feature of Edwards' imagery is hardly surprising in the context of how his philosophy was influenced by the thought of John Locke. The idea that the primary source of human knowledge is not rationality, but rather experience was not unknown to Edwards. Locke's empirical epistemology assumed that we gather up ideas and develop intellectually through sensual experiences: hearing, seeing, smelling, touching and tasting the reality around us. In this respect, Edwards' sermons give testimony to his philosophical views: they are full of representations of the natural phenomena that are described in "physical" terms. The preacher crafts images full of references to the sensual experiences in order to introduce his hearers to the experience of the terrible reality of hell and to recreate our process of sensual reception of the world. Thus, a methodology that dedicates attention to the notion of imagery and postulates images to be physical and sensual is of great use for the analysis of Edwards' sermons.

Cognitive Poetics

The framework of cognitive poetics (CP) lies in cognitive linguistics and cognitive psychology. One of the key principles of these approaches is the belief that all forms of expression and perception are connected with our biological and physical circumstances. In consequence, "our minds are embodied not just literally but also, figuratively, finally clearing away the mind-body distinction of much philosophy, most famously expressed by Descartes." The proponents of CP propose that embodiment moulds every level of language and the communication of our experiences, thoughts, and beliefs takes place through patterns of language that take root in our material existence. Thus, a substantial portion of the focus of cognitive stylistics concerns the matters of spatial metaphorical imagery, conceptual structures, issues of reference and iconic effects in language. This stylistic methodology allows one to find the impact of the working of the "embodied" mind in the text and explicate its diverse aspects.

CP allows us to rationalise and explain how the addressees reach their interpretation of a given text. What is more, it also increases our awareness of certain language patterns and mechanisms that otherwise could remain unnoticed. As a method, it does not focus solely on the effects of the language message, nor does it put all emphasis on the investigation of the language structure of the work of literature; as pointed out by Tsur, cognitive linguistic theories "systematically account

¹⁰ Peter Stockwell, Cognitive Poetics (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 4.

for the relationship between the structure of literary texts and their perceived effects. $^{\prime\prime11}$

CP proposes that the use of language in a complex poem, casual conversation and a sermon is essentially similar, and that traditionally "artistic" language employs means that had been evolved particularly for non-artistic purposes. The cognitive pursuit of the workings of the "embodied mind" does not focus solely on the study of the structures of literary or everyday language—it also dedicates some attention to the communicative context as well as the interpretative outcome of the employment of particular patterns of language. Thus, a CP approach to Edwards' sermons, texts of overwhelming rhetorical complexity, allows for the application of a wide array of tools, normally associated with non-literary study of language. CP draws attention to the notion of imagery and the image schemes triggered not only by the use of "literary" embellishment, but also simple grammatical categories, like prepositions, which signify, for instance, shifts in perspectives assumed in the discourse.

Modern literary criticism sees imagery as anything from "vivid and particularized descriptive passages in poetry, 12" through figures of speech—synecdoche, metonymy, simile, metaphor, personification, allegory and symbol 13—to the "sense of mental picture of an object" combined with a "picture evoked in words." This last definition seems to resonate well both with Edwards' philosophy of preaching as well as with CP. The former assumes that picturesque and sensual images are crucial for the sermon to be emotionally appealing, the latter proposes that when we communicate we rely greatly on *mental schemas*, that is, generalised mental representations of concepts. Undoubtedly, Edwards' evocative imagery is not merely an ornament but a means of communication and of generating desired concepts in the hearers' minds.

An important distinction in the cognitive imagery concerns the difference between the figure and the background. This division stems out of cognitive insight into the role of perspective and emphasis in imagery. The figure is a self-contained, dynamic and visible element of the imagery, while the background serves as its static framework. It is the figure that is given communicative promi-

¹¹ Reuven Tsur, "Aspects of Cognitive Poetics," in Cognitive Stylistics: Language and Cognition in Text Analysis, ed. Elena Semino & Jonathan Cupeper (Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2002), 279-318.

¹² Meyer Howard Abrams, *A Glossary of Literary Terms* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), 43.

¹³ Alex Preminger and Terry Broganm, *The New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 560.

¹⁴ Katie Walles, A Dictionary of Stylistics. (London: New York Longman 1989), 235.

¹⁵ Stockwell, Cognitive Poetics, 15.

nence, partly because it so strongly stands out from the background and is responsible for attracting and maintaining the attention of the addressees. This distinction is of particular importance for the cognitive study of metaphor.

Metaphor seems to play the critical role in the framework of CP, which looks at it as something far more significant than a mere means of stylistic embellishment. It is a critical indicator of the workings of our mind and the patterns that govern our thoughts. Thus, the cognitive approach focuses more on the conceptual metaphor—that is, the understanding of one concept (called the target) through another (called the source). By mapping the attributes of the latter onto the former, we essentially do not merely associate one concept with another; rather, we begin to think about one concept through the perspective of another. This merging of ideas is a natural process which allows us to comprehend more abstract concepts through the notions grounded in human experience. Interestingly, the principle of invariance suggests that the process of cognitive mapping does not work in reverse, thus the concept of the target cannot restructure the source. The only exceptions are metaphors so defamiliarising and salient that they have the potency to effect the interanimation of the source and the target domains. Such seem to be the metaphors of the sermon analysed below.

The Future Punishment of the Wicked Unavoidable and Intolerable

The Future Punishment of the Wicked Unavoidable and Intolerable was delivered at the height of the Great Awakening, in April 1741. The sermon is a masterpiece of hellfire preaching; as observed by White, "in its strategies of argument, style-composition, and disposition, [Edwards'] Future Punishment is meticulously and superbly designed to evoke maximum emotional response." Consequently, it offers excellent material for the cognitive stylistics analysis.

The image of God that opens the sermon is anthropomorphic and highly dynamic. The Almighty manifests his great displeasure with sinners: "Behold, I have smitten my hands at thy dishonest gain which thou hast made, and at thy blood which hath been in the midst of thee." The semi-dialogic quotation of the words of God renders the passage vibrant, and the use of physical images of a "hand" and "blood" focuses the hearers' attention on corporality.

Edwards points out that the Almighty's behaviour is similar to the reaction of a human being, who when "seeing or hearing of some horrid offence [. . .] which very often stirs their spirits and animates them with high resentment [. . .], will rise up in wrath and smite their hands together, as an expression of the heat of

¹⁶ Eugine White, *Puritan Rhetoric: The Issue of Emotion in Religion* (London & Amsterdam: Southern Illinois University Press, 1972), 178.

their indignation." The words of the Almighty are reinforced by repetition (e.g., "smitten") and his portrayal is further rendered more dynamic by the use of verbs associated with rapid and decisive movement, e.g., "rise up." Edwards also combines the image with an emotional appeal, as almost all the epithets he uses bear strong negative connotations (e.g., "heinous crimes" or "horrid offence").

The verb "rise up" projects a particular spatial perspective: the one that rises "up" assumes the physical position suitable for confrontation, as he or she towers over other elements of the background. Also, CP stresses that human emotions are often metaphorically perceived through the source domain of heat, as well as the source domain of upward movement—thus, such expressions as "to boil with anger" or "to blow up (with anger)" are common in a number of languages. In consequence, cognitively, the dynamics of the action of "rising up" implicates, through the employment of a universal conceptual metaphor, decisive and provoked movements of angry God, who towers over everyone and everything else.

The Almighty and his power are given physical and dynamic figurative form in the climactic series of images in the sermon: "what will it signify for a worm, which is about to be pressed under the weight of some great rock, to be let fall with its whole weight upon it, to collect its strength, to [...] preserve itself from being crushed by it?" Sinners are dehumanized and depicted as base creatures, whereas God's wrath is presented as something physical, a rock which is about to "crush" the wicked—it is a force physically destructive and violent (as it is suggested by the semantics of the word "crush," but also by its cacophonic qualities). The obvious, almost antithetical helplessness of the worm against the overwhelming weight of the rock is quickly projected onto the direct relationship between the sinners and God: "Much more in vain will it be for a poor damned soul, to endeavour to support itself under the weight of the wrath of Almighty God." The key word for this juxtaposition, the preposition "under," allows one to map the relationship between a worm and a rock onto the relationship between a sinner and God, with the hierarchical perspective and the ultimate difference in strength and potency retained.

This conceptual spatial framework serves as the scaffolding for a great many figurative images of the sermon and goes beyond the classical rhetorical *taxis* and *lexis*. The persuasive emphasis on God's might and superiority is an important part of the message of the sermon. Edwards explicates it by stressing the spatial arrangement of the imagery which draws on two common conceptual metaphors: GOOD IS UP and BAD IS DOWN. Their universal character explains why all instances of downward movement evoke pejorative connotations (visible in expres-

sions such as "down in the dumps" or "look down on somebody") and every object that towers over others is viewed to occupy a positive, superior position (visible in expressions such as "be up and about" or "look up to somebody"). The arrangement of the metaphorical space in the sermon becomes more important because, on the one hand, Edwards employs it consistently as a cohesive device, reinforcing the message of the discourse; on the other hand, it becomes the figurative expression of Edwards' hierarchy and theology.

In the next passage Edwards continues the exploration of the corporeal imagery, but takes it in a slightly different direction: "yet as soon as [sinners] begin to feel that wrath, their hearts will melt and become as water. However they may seem to harden their hearts [...] yet the first moment they feel it, their hearts will become like wax before the furnace." The hearts of the sinners undergo a physical transformation, and the verbs employed by the preacher suggest the change in their state of matter ("harden" and "melt"), and point to purely corporeal experiences. At the same time, since wax melts in high temperatures, by the logical implication, the Almighty's anger becomes associated with fire, which in turn triggers the set of associations through which we connote violent emotions with increased temperature. From the perspective of traditional stylistics, the phrase "their hearts will become like wax before the furnace" constitutes the figure of simile, not a metaphor, yet CP argues that the mapping behind this phrase is in fact universal and common for all sorts of metaphorical expressions as well as similes—it exemplifies the way we conceptualise human emotionality.

A number of other examples of "physical" images can be found in the "Application," a standard element of a Puritan sermon outline, in which the preacher tries to present the audience with how the doctrine of the sermon may influence their lives. In his address to the sinners there, Edwards describes God's power in the following manner:

He can fill thy poor soul with an ocean of wrath, a deluge of fire and brimstone; or he can make it ten thousand times fuller of torment than ever an oven was full of fire; and at the same time, can fill it with despair of ever seeing an end to its torment, or any rest from its misery: and then where will be thy strength? What will become of thy courage then? What will signify thine attempts to bear?

The cognitive perspective allows one to make a number of interesting observations about this passage. Firstly, one notices that God is presented as a figure of the discourse: he is the dynamic element of the image and other elements are dependent on his actions—thus, he gathers all the attention of the hearers and

becomes the focal point of the discourse. Also, in the image, the body of the sinner is conceptualised as a container that God can fill up with hyperbolic oceans and deluges of wrath and fire. The action of pouring liquid into the container, the source for the metaphor, refers to a universal, physical activity performed daily; the trope takes as its source the experience grounded in our physical circumstances. Finally, the metaphor also points to the implied relationship between the sinner and God. The Almighty metaphorically fills the container of the human's body, thus he is implicitly presented as an active party who has full access to the sinner's intimate interior and who is in control of him, both emotionally and physically. The series of rhetorical questions which close the image constitutes a rhetorical stratagem which engages the hearers, as they try to answer the posed questions in their minds, thus involving them more strongly in thinking about the ideas the preacher advocated through the "physical" imagery of the sermon.

Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God

Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God is arguably the most extensively researched and analysed sermon in the history of America. Numerous stylistic, rhetorical and philosophical aspects of the sermon have already been described by many generations of commentators, and the famous essay by Edwin Cady marked the beginning of a new, more modern phase of analysis.¹⁷ Some commentators have looked into the communicative significance of the consolation at the end of the sermon,¹⁸ others have pondered its sensual imagery,¹⁹ its logical structure,²⁰ the effect of "immediacy"²¹ or the eighteenth-century Newtonian insights into gravity, through which the sermon constitutes the "immediately apprehensive effect of God voluntarily exercising his infinite and divine influence."²² Yet, still the questions asked by Cady more than half a century ago have not been answered in full: "Why, then, was Sinners so successful in its mission of reducing previously blasé Enfield, Connecticut, to shuddering terror? [...] what made the sermon so

¹⁷ Edwin Cady, "The Artistry of Jonathan Edwards:" New England Quarterly 22 (1949): 61–72.

¹⁸ Robert Lee Stuart, "'And Oh the Cheerfulness and Pleasantness': Jonathan Edwards at Enfield," *American Literature* 48 (1976): 46–59.

¹⁹ Thomas J. Steel & Eugene R. Delay, "Vertigo in History: The Threatening Tactility of *Sinners in the Hands," Early American Literature* 18 (1983): 242–256.

²⁰ Rosemary Hearn, "Form as Argument in *Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God," College Language Association Journal* 28 (1985): 452–59.

²¹ Leo Lemay, "Rhetorical Strategies in *Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God* and *Narrative of the Late Massacres in Lancaster Country,*" in *Benjamin Franklin, Jonathan Edwards, and the Representation of American Culture*, ed. Barbara Oberg & Harry Stout (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 186–204.

²² Christopher Lukasik, "Feeling the Force of Certainty: The Divine Science, Newtonianism, and Jonathan Edwards's *Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God*," *The New England Quarterly* 73 (2000): 222–45.

very effective? Where lies the spring of its success?"²³ In my opinion, the study of cognitive deixis in the sermon may provide at least a partial answer for Cady's enquiries.

Deictic expressions gramaticalise the contextual (spatial, temporal or social) relationships within the deictic centre (also known as *origo*), i.e., the author's ("I"), spatial position ("here") and temporal position ("now"), with other elements of the reality. In consequence, deixis is an important notion for cognitive poetics and linguistic pragmatics—that is, for such methods of investigating language which pay considerable attention to the notion of context. If the addresser intends to make a reference to an object and the surrounding environment he necessarily has to anchor his perspective in a certain spatial-temporal point, and only after that can he or she employ the mechanism of deictic projection—that is, confront his or her deictic perspective with the deictic perspective of addressees.

Edwin Segal comments on the importance of deixis in narration and representation of fiction. ²⁴ He observes that usually the deictic centre of the reader is transferred from the non-fictional reality onto the narrated reality through a number of stylistic processes; in other words, the addressee of the discourse imagines himself or herself in the environment of fiction. The deictic shift in *Sinners* is of a more complex nature. Edwards does not only make the members of the audience imagine hell—which would not be a surprising reaction to the density of the imagery he is presenting the audience—but also forces them to make the mental leap of conjoining the reality of hell and the reality of Enfield, and thus, to experience hell sensually. In other words, through a complex amalgam of diverse rhetorical strategies and constant shifts of perspectives, the speaker makes the members of the audience feel, for a moment, as if they were a part of the furniture of hell and as if the vivid and terrifying representations of damnation were their immediate reality.

The basic rhetorical structure of *Sinners* is a sermon constructed around the principle of intensification of tension. The gradual increase in the density of oratory takes place in every section of the sermon as Edwards methodically endows the vivid metaphorical images with rhetorical figures (e.g., anaphors, alliterations and assonances) and expands on the images used in the previous sections. The figurative, forceful depiction of hell foregrounds the deictic shift. Only by pushing the rhetoric to the very edge can the preacher hope to reach to his hearers directly

²³ Cady, "The artistry of Jonathan Edwards," 62.

²⁴ Edwin Segal, "Narrative Comprehension and the Role of Deictic Shift Theory" in *Deixis in Narrative: A Cognitive Science Perspective*, ed. J. F. Duchan, G. A. Bruder, and L. Hewitt (Hillsdale: Erlbaum), 3-17.

and allow them to sensually experience the damnation and torments of hell in their heads. At the same time, the preacher relentlessly reminds the hearers about the immediacy of God's judgment and their death, as well as about the helplessness of their situation.

The hand of God is the central element of the imagery of the sermon; it becomes a vivid metonymy, representing associatively the interventionist power of the Almighty. The hand is the operative figure in the imagery of the sermon, the focal element of the discourse, a cohesive rhetorical device resonating in almost all the images, and the means of maintaining the attention of the audience and of overcoming the inhibition of return, the loss of attention to static and unchanging elements.

The background for this primary figure of hand is also of critical importance for the sermon. Most of the figurative images in the sermon are drawn directly from the text of the Scripture selected by Edwards: Deuteronomy 32:35, "Their foot shall slide in due time." As observed by Lukasik, 25 the idea of one's foot "sliding" succinctly conjoins the "biblical certainty of natural man's depravity and the scientific certainty of universal gravitation to explicate God's absolute sovereignty in all things." One might also add that the idea of "sliding" down to hell, i.e., of a descending movement, from the sermon's onset introduces the notion of vertical orientation of the imagery, which reaches its primacy with the central image of the sinners held over hell by the hand of God. This vertical hierarchy has, obviously, an axiological framework, as it draws upon one of the aforementioned, common conceptual metaphors: GOOD IS UP and DOWN IS BAD. The sinners move downwards, thus they fall to hell not only spatially in terms of the figurative space, but also conceptually and morally. Interestingly, the power of the Almighty is represented by the most salient element of the image: the metonymic hand, which only temporarily counters the natural downward pull of sinfulness. One could hardly think of a better figurative illustration of the doctrine of man's absolute and unquestionable dependence on God.

Through the recurrent and emphatic use of prepositions "under," "in" and "above" the preacher builds upon the initial vertical spatial arrangement implied by the imagery from the beginning of the sermon. This physical, vertical space, with God occupying the supervising, highest position, helpless sinners hanging somewhere below him, and the pit of hell and suffering located even lower, allows him to organize the imagery. The hearers do not refer themselves to the landscape of hell just yet, and they are not encouraged to locate themselves there mentally.

 $^{^{25}}$ Christopher Lukasik, "Feeling the Force of Certainty," 236.

The initial stage of the preacher's strategy seems to rely on detailed and systematic visualisation of hell by the hearers, as well as persistent emphasis on their hopelessness and helplessness.

At this point, Edwards employs an interesting stylistic technique to stress the immediacy of their damnation by rhetorically "freezing" the image of inferno. The listing of parallel sentences and the use of the present tense creates the impression that all the means of divine retribution are set in an impatient wait for sinners: "The wrath of God burns against them, their damnation don't slumber, the pit is prepared, the fire is made ready, the furnace is now hot, ready to receive them, the flames do now rage and glow. The glittering sword is whet, and held over them, and the pit hath opened her mouth under them."

Word by word, the preacher imposes on the audience an even more emphatic series of images. Edwards stresses that the demons of hell are impatiently expecting sinners: "The devils watch them; they are ever by them, at their right hand; they stand waiting for them, like greedy hungry lions that see their prey, and expect to have it, but are for the present kept back." The preacher creates a vivid picture of what is in store for the sinners in hell; his discourse is like a cognitive verbal camera, an introspective view into hell, registering all the elements of the inferno. The background imagery is static, "suspended" in its anticipation of the figure that will enter the landscape of hell. In the next parts of the sermon, the listeners become the "dynamic" element, the figure of imagery, which completes the figurative representation of hell.

In the application of the sermon, Edwards begins to push his discourse in the direction of the "deictic shift," and, at the same time, he further intensifies the imagery of the sermon. The very first sentence suggests a change in the focus of the preacher's rhetoric: "The *Use* may be of *Awakening* to unconverted persons in this congregation." The deictic pronoun "this" points to the extra-linguistic element of the speaker's immediate communicative context: the group of his addressees. Edwards rearranges the pragmatic functioning of his sermon, and begins to anchor it directly in the communicative environment of the Enfield meetinghouse, using the background he prepared in the initial parts of the sermon, through the intensification of the imagery and its systematic exposition.

Obviously, one might argue that applying abstract ideas to the hearers' reality is exactly the rhetorical function of the application in a sermon, and the speaker could hardly do anything else. However, Edwards' oratorical talent allows him to move beyond what is dictated by the conventional scheme of the sermon. In the consecutive sections of his discourse, Edwards begins to mix the images from

the previous part of the sermon, which he so strenuously constructed, with the reality of the Enfield meetinghouse: "That world of misery, that lake of burning brimstone is extended abroad under you. *There* is the dreadful pit of the glowing flames of the wrath of God; there is hell's wide gaping mouth open; and you have nothing to stand upon." The semantic difference in the proximity between the two deixis "this" and "there" gradually begins to vanish, as the figurative hell and the reality of the Enfield meetinghouse become merged. The deixis of time, rooted in the grammatical present tense ("is"), the personal deixis ("you"), and the spatial deixis ("this," "there") become rhetorically transformed. It is not only that "natural men" of finite minds gain a glimpse of the infinite, but for the moment of the delivery of this part of the discourse, the congregation, gathered to listen to the preacher, actually become in their minds the sinners in the hands of an angry God.

Conclusions

The analysis presented above is by no means complete. Both *Future Punishment* and *Sinners* are sermons so complex and diverse that they provide material sufficient for a number of articles, and any attempt to offer a comprehensive insight into them in just one text can hardly be successful. Still, it was not my goal to conduct a definitive analysis of the two sermons. Instead, I intended to demonstrate how such a method of enquiry as Cognitive Poetics can help in explaining the phenomenon of Edwards' rhetoric.

The cognitive approach offers metalanguage which is particularly suitable for the description of preaching rhetoric, as, on the one hand, it dedicates focused attention to the nuances of language use, such as figures, and, on the other hand, seeks to explicate these nuances as natural products of the working of the human mind and pays considerable amount of attention to their contextualisation. Consequently, by naming different phenomena of language and rhetoric in a new way, CP allows for a fresh look at the language of sermons; and by placing the focus of analysis on the dynamic aspects of the discourse and its cognitive functioning, CP can easily account for the mental processes accompanying the reception of sermons by the audience. Thus, it seems a fit tool that can enhance the theological, philosophical or rhetorical reading of the sermons and contribute to a more comprehensive study of Jonathan Edwards' works.

Abstrakt

W artykule została podjęta próba zastosowania poetyki kognitywnej do opisu języka kazań Jonathana Edwardsa. Metodologia kognitywna wydaje się szczególnie użyteczna przy analizie retoryki homiletycznej Edwardsa ponieważ z jednej strony kładzie nacisk na zastosowane w kazaniach mechanizmy językowe, a z drugiej podkreśla rolę kontekstu, tym samym pomaga w zrozumieniu procesów ich recepcji. Zawarte w artykule przykładowe analizy kognitywne przeprowadzone zostały na dwóch kazaniach Edwardsa: *Future Punishment of the Wicked* oraz *Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God* — w przypadku pierwszego tekstu zwrócono uwagę na obrazy użyte w kazaniu, a w przypadku drugiego analiza skupia się na obecnym w nim mechanizmie przesunięcia deiktycznego.

Abstract

In the article I employ cognitive poetics for the analysis of Jonathan Edwards' sermons. This methodology seems particularly effective for the investigation of his preaching; on the one hand, it puts emphasis on language patterns and mechanisms employed in sermons; on the other hand, it highlights their communicative context, thus helping to explicate their reception process. The analysis featured in the article was conducted on two of Edwards' sermons: Future Punishment of the Wicked and Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God; in case of the former I focus on the imagery and in case of the latter on the mechanism of 'deictic shift'.

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JONATHAN EDWARDS ON TYPOLOGY AS LANGUAGE

To discuss typology seems anachronistic. The heyday of academic interest in the discipline of typology seems to have passed, certainly in American Studies and Literature. Here and there an article appears but the topic does not attract nearly as much scholarly interest as in the 1970's. Regarding Jonathan Edwards' typology much work has been done and several basics have been established: that Edwards' typological understanding of the Old and the New Testament is quite traditional and orthodox, that his extension of the typological principle to the natural world opens the way to the symbolism of the Transcendentalists and in its implications subverts Edwards' theological convictions (in one interpretation), or that it is an admirable broadening of the understanding of divine communication and the believer's participation in the dynamic system of relationships between God and all created beings (in another interpretation). Beyond these, however, some recent scholarship has brought Edwards' typology into new contexts and examined it from different perspectives and it seems that the topic is still worth discussing. There have been a few ventures into a consideration of Edwards' thought and

¹ For literary scholarship in particular, Ken Minkema observes that it does not by far match the intensity of theological and historical approaches to Edwards. See Kenneth P. Minkema, "Jonathan Edwards in the Twentieth Century," *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society* 47.4 (2004), ¡http://www.etsjets.org/files/JETS-PDFs/47/47-4/47-4-pp659-687_JETS.pdf;, 677 [accessed 23 January 2012].

writings from the perspective of contemporary literary and critical theory,² but generally the combination of critical theory and early American texts is a rare one.³

This paper joins the dwindling ranks of those arguments for a combination of Edwards and literary theory and attempts to make a case for the relevance of such a combination in the general contours of Edwards' understanding of typology as language. To that end, some well-known typological texts are first examined closely and reconsidered for themes which might be implied, and these are finally connected to some of the fundamental issues regarding language and representation as interpreted by Jacques Derrida. There are other literary theoretical approaches, which could yield profitable readings of Edwards; reading Edwards through a deconstructive lens is certainly not the only perspective that can be chosen among the more recent literary theoretical trends, and it has its limits. On the other hand, it highlights certain important aspects of Edwards' texts and places them in new contexts, making Edwards relevant to contemporary critical debates.

Edwards regards typology as an important principle of Scriptural exegesis, and in notebooks such as "Harmony of Old and New Testaments" or in "Types of the Messiah," he finds Old Testament prefigurations of the events of the New Testaments and of the Christian era, or spiritual meaning of various ceremonies and ordinances described in the Bible. However, he finds that the same interpretative principle is to be applied also to the created world, to objects and events in nature and general human experience. He argues: "as the system of nature and the system of revelation are both divine works, so both are in different senses a divine word. Both are the voice of God to intelligent creatures, a manifestation and declaration of himself to mankind." Of course he believes that "the Book of Scripture is the interpreter of the Book of Nature." The Book of Nature is "writ-

² Richard C. De Prospo, *Theism in the Discourse of Jonathan Edwards* (Newark: University of Delaware Press; London, Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1985); Stephen Daniel, *The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); Wayne Lesser, "Jonathan Edwards: Textuality and the Language of Man," *Critical Essays on Jonathan Edwards*, ed. William J. Scheick (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1980) 287-304; Jennifer L. Leader, "'In Love with the Image': Transitive Being and Typological Desire in Jonathan Edwards," *Early American Literature* 41.2 (2006): 153-181, *Academic Search Complete*, http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=fc7b4826-0871-4d20-832b-4c8ced05018%40sessionmgr11&vid=12 &hid=104, [accessed 2 July 2012].

³ This is not surprising—not only because Early Americanists mostly do not tend to be favorably inclined toward continental philosophy of the last decades, but also because postmodern literary interpretations are typically associated with late eighteenth-, nineteenth- and twentieth-century texts. Literary critics quoted here, Paul de Man and J. Hillis Miller, focus mostly on 19th and 20th literature. On the other hand, Edwards as an Early Modern thinker and a Christian Philosopher is part and parcel of the Western metaphysical tradition which Derrida analyzes. Paul de Man's interest in Rousseau, Edwards' contemporary, for example, also suggests that such combination is not impossible. A more thorough methodological reflection cannot be presented here; I have attempted it elsewhere.

⁴ "Miscellanies," no. 1340, WJE 13:374.

⁵ "Images," no. 156, WJE 11:106.

ten" in the "language" of types: "Types are a certain sort of language, as it were, in which God is wont to speak to us." 6

In itself, this is not new. The understanding of nature as a book was commonplace and has a long tradition in Christianity. Puritan typology developed in connection with other traditions, such as emblematics and meditations on the creatures, in which the notion of a spiritual meaning of the created world was prominent. There was also the Puritan penchant for discovering divine providences in the world and in the events of life and examples of deliberate "spiritualizing" of nature, in other words, drawing spiritual lessons from the course of nature and human activities. Edwards, writing down arguments for his natural typology, is perfectly convinced that such endeavor has a biblical mandate, that it is theologically sound and rationally justifiable, and yet he senses that his convictions will be met with suspicion, as if he was advocating some unusual practices. Edwards' defense of his theory against the anticipated criticism, as he lays it down in the "Types" notebook, reveals some of the issues, which are at stake in natural typology. In one perspective, the main difficulty is epistemological, in another perspective, it has to do with representation in language.

The passages in which Edwards explains his typological theory are interesting and deserve to be considered closely. Edwards believes that the Scripture and the created world are full of types which point to their spiritual fulfillment, to spiritual truths which the believer might discover through them. In fact, it is the believer's task to understand the types which are given in Scripture and to search for more types both in the Bible and in nature. This is the key argument of the "Types" notebook, and it is also mentioned in the "Types of the Messiah." In "Types" Edwards writes:

When we are sufficiently instructed that all these things [in the Old Testament] were typical and had their spiritual signification, it would be on some accounts as unreasonable to say that we must interpret no more of them than the Scripture has interpreted for us, and than we are told the meaning of in the New Testament, as it would be to say that we must interpret prophecy, or prophetical visions and types, no further than the Scripture has interpreted it to our hand.⁸

⁶ "Types", WJE 11:151.

⁷ Barbara Kiefer Lewalski, *Protestant Poetics and the Seventeenth-Century Religious Lyric* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Mason I. Lowance, *The Language of Canaan: Metaphor and Symbol in New England from the Puritans to the Transcendentalists* (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 1980), 26.

⁸ WJE 11:146-147.

Note that this implies that the believer needs to interpret and make decisions regarding the meaning of types and their status.

Secondly, the believer must also search for types in the natural world. Throughout his life Edwards kept adding entries to his list of natural types in the notebook "Images of Divine Things": the silkworm is a type of Christ because it gives men clothes just as Christ clothes the believers with his righteousness, the snake lurking to devour its prey represents the devil lurking for the sinner, the invention of the telescope is a type of the approaching millennium. In the accompanying notebook on the "Types," Edwards declares jubilantly:

I believe that the whole universe, heaven and earth, air and seas, and the divine constitution and history of the holy Scriptures, be full of images of divine things, as full as a language is of words; and that the multitude of those things that I have mentioned are but a very small part of what is really intended to be signified and typified by these things: but that there is room for persons to be learning more and more of this language and seeing more of that which is declared in it to the end of the world without discovering all.⁹

The metaphor of natural typology as language seems to have been particularly felicitous in Edwards' view for he pursues its implications as he explains the rules which should make typology a sound discipline and guard it from turning into an exercise of human fancy. In this important passage, Edwards writes:

Types are a certain sort of language, as it were, in which God is wont to speak to us. And there is, as it were, a certain idiom in that language which is to be learnt the same that the idiom of any language is, viz. by good acquaintance with the language, either by being naturally trained up in it, learning it by education (but that is not the way in which corrupt mankind learned divine language), or by much use and acquaintance together with a good taste or judgment, by comparing one thing with another and having our senses as it were exercised to discern it (which is the way that adult persons must come to speak any language, and in its true idiom, that is not their native tongue).

Great care should be used, and we should endeavor to be well and thoroughly acquainted, or we shall never understand [or] have a right notion of the idiom of the language. If we go to interpret divine types

⁹ WJE 11:152.

without this, we shall be just like one that pretends to speak any language that han't thoroughly learnt it. We shall use many barbarous expressions that fail entirely of the proper beauty of the language, that are very harsh in the ears of those that are well versed in the language.

God han't expressly explained all the types of Scriptures, but has done so much as is sufficient to teach us the language. ¹⁰

Edwards intends this passage as a defense of his typological beliefs; he wishes to show prudence and caution to make clear that he is no enthusiast dangerously mistaking his imaginations for divine revelation, as he clearly seems to expect (the previous entry from "Types" quoted here begins: "I expect by very ridicule and contempt to be called a man of a very fruitful brain and copious fancy, but they are welcome to it." 11).

Upon closer examination, however, Edwards' defense raises more questions than it answers. Some of the weak points become apparent immediately. First of all, Edwards' phrasing is rather vague. What precisely are those "barbarous expressions" or who determines the criteria of "a good taste"? Edwards offers no hint of an explanation. Secondly, although true spiritual understanding of types is available only to the regenerate, apparently even their perception of the divine in nature can be wrong, if their typological skills need to be trained and exercised. These points tend to increase the difficulties which modern readers have with Edwards' theory and which Edwards himself anticipated among his contemporaries, i.e. that the boundary between true typological discernment and mere human fancy is dangerously insecure, or in other words, that the distinction between good use of the language of typology and "barbarous expressions" rests, ultimately, solely on the believer's personal decision. 12

Importantly, such difficulties of Edwards' typological theory are not diminished by the paradigm of language which he employs to explain it. It will be now useful to look at Edwards' understanding of language elsewhere in his writings because it contains some interesting tensions which, when considered alongside his typology, complicate his typological theory even more. When Edwards explains that typology is a kind of language, what views on language are implied? On the one hand, Edwards is confident of the communicative role of language

¹⁰ "Types," WJE 11:151.

¹¹ Ibid., 152.

¹² This article pursues the implications of Edwards' metaphor of typology as a language and consequently the problem of subjectivity in typology is not discussed here in greater detail. Nevertheless, the reader will find it implicitly present throughout this text. Subjectivity is a persistent theme in considerations of Edwards' typology and I have explored it elsewhere.

and its referential and epistemological accuracy. He is convinced that language follows certain structures of the human mind. First, Edwards claims that there is a direct connection between language and sensation in the case of simple ideas:

Sensation. Self-evidence. Things that we know by immediate sensation, we know intuitively, and they are properly self-evident truths: as, grass is green, the sun shines, honey is sweet. When we say that grass is green, all that we can be supposed to mean by it is, that in constant course, when we see grass, the idea of green is excited with it; and this we know self-evidently.¹³

Further, Edwards claims that "many of our universal ideas are not arbitrary. The tying of ideas together in genera and species is not merely the calling of them by the same name, but such a union of them that the consideration of one shall naturally excite the idea of others." This natural association of ideas is even reflected in the structure of language in the names of mixed modes, as Edwards writes in the following argument:

As there is great foundation in nature for those abstract ideas which we call universals, so there is great foundation in the common circumstances and necessities of mankind and the constant method of things proceeding, for such a tying of simple modes together to the constituting such mixed modes. This appears from the agreement of languages, for language is very much made up of the names of mixed modes, and we find that almost all those names in one language have names that answer to them in other languages. The same mixed mode has a name given to it by most nations; whence it appears that most of the inhabitants of the earth have agreed upon putting together the same simple modes into mixed ones, and in the same manner. The learned and polished have indeed many more than others, and herein chiefly it is that languages do not answer one to another.¹⁵

The type has for Edwards, according to some interpreters, precisely this quality: the connection between the type and its antitype is thought to be direct and straightforward, as in the case of names of mixed modes or simple ideas. Perry Miller, for example, writes that "the beauty of a type was exactly that, if it existed

¹³ "The Mind," no. 19, WJE 6:346.

¹⁴ "The Mind," no. 43, WJE 6:361.

¹⁵ "The Mind," no. 41, WJE 6:359-360.

at all, it needed only to be seen, not argued,"¹⁶ in other words its effect would be the same as that of the name of a simple idea. And Wilson Kimnach expresses a similar thought in a different context: the type "could be both true (according to the analogy of the world) and real (according to the evidence of the senses)."¹⁷ To regenerate perception, at least, the natural type would provide a similar certainty as a simple idea.

On the other hand, Edwards shares Locke's wariness toward an overly simplistic understanding of language. Similarly to the *Essay on Human Understanding*, Edwards argues that the connection between words and ideas is arbitrary and the way in which words are linked together does not necessarily reflect the way ideas themselves are linked:

Words. We are used to apply the same words a hundred different ways; and ideas being so much tied and associated with the words, they lead us into a thousand real mistakes. For where we find that the words may be connected, the ideas being by custom tied with them, we think that the ideas may be connected likewise, and applied everywhere and in every way as the words.¹⁹

This particularly jeopardizes the communicative function of language and its epistemological reliability. In such context, Edwards' attempt to use language as a model of typology runs into difficulties.

Any time discourse relates to spiritual matters the case is even more problematic. There is an interesting tension in Edwards' writings between the human and the divine element in language. On the one hand, Edwards reasons that language originated from man's necessity to refer to material things and that reference to spiritual subjects was derived from its primary use:

The reason why the names of spiritual things are all, or most of them, derived from the names of sensible or corporeal ones, as "imagination," "conception," "apprehend," etc., is because there was no other way of making others readily understand men's meaning when they first signified things by sounds, than by giving of them the names of

¹⁶ Perry Miller, "Introduction," *Images or Shadows of Divine Things* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), 26.

¹⁷ Wilson Kimnach, "Editor's Introduction", Sermons and Discourses 1720-1723, WJE 10:230.

¹⁸ It is not my intention to repeat Miller's overly Lockean reading of Edwards which has long been counterbalanced by scholars who have pointed out idealist and other aspects of Edwards' thought. In this particular point, however, the connection to Locke's *Essay* is unmistakable.

¹⁹ "The Mind," no. 18, WJE 6:345-346.

things sensible to which they had an analogy. They could thus point it out with the finger, and so explain themselves as in sensible things.²⁰

At the same time, Edwards holds that God himself has condescended to communicate to mankind in this indirect way: "And it was the manner in those ancient times to deliver divine instructions in general in symbols and emblems, and in their speeches and discourses to make use of types and figures and enigmatical speeches, into which holy men were led by the Spirit of God. This manner of delivering wisdom was originally divine." Implied in these two passages is an argument for an essentially figurative nature of metaphysical language, both as direct divine communication and as human reference to transcendental matters. This highlights a couple more paradoxical views in Edwards' theory.

On the one hand, Edwards argues that the purpose of typology is to communicate spiritual knowledge; indeed, this is the highest purpose of all communication: "No speech can be any means of grace, but by conveying knowledge. Otherwise the speech is as much lost as if there had been no man there, and he that spoke, had spoken only into the air." On the other hand, Edwards seems to believe that divine communication must necessarily be—to a degree—incomprehensible. Hence his argument on the "enigmatical speeches" as "originally divine." The following statement in the "Types of Messiah" brings the understanding of divine communication into an interesting context:

Thus when future things were made known in visions, the things that were seen were not the future things themselves, but some other things that were made use of as shadows, symbols or types of the things . . . the prophecies are given forth in allegories, and the things foretold spoken of not under the proper names of the things them[selves], but under the names of other things that are made use of in the prophecy as symbols or types of the things foretold.²³

And even more clearly when Edwards elaborates on the metaphor of type as shadow in his "Notes on Scripture," no. 288:

Hebrews 10:1. "The law having a shadow of good things to come, and not the very image of the things." Here a shadow is distinguished from images or pictures, as being a more imperfect representation of the

²⁰ "The Mind," no. 23, WJE 6:349.

²¹ "Types of the Messiah", WJE 11:193.

²² The Importance and Advantage of a Thorough Knowledge of Divine Truth, WJE 22:88.

²³ WJE 11:192,193.

things represented by it. The types of the Old Testament are compared to this kind of representations of things, not only here, but *Hebrews* 8:5 and *Colossians* 2:17, which fitly resemble them on several accounts.

The shadow of a thing is an exceeding imperfect representation of it, and yet has such a resemblance that it has a most evident relation to the thing, of which it is the shadow. Again, shadows are dark resemblances; though there be a resemblance, yet the image is accompanied with darkness, or hiding of the light. The light is beyond the substance, so that it is hid. So was it with the types of the Old Testament; they were obscure and dark. The light was beyond the substance; the light that was plainly to reveal gospel things came after Christ, the substance of all ancient types. The shadow was accompanied with darkness and obscurity; gospel things were then hid under a veil.²⁴

Conceived as shadow, the function of the type is to *hide* the substance. (It must be recalled that Edwards' first title of his typological notebook was "Shadows of Divine Things." This stands in direct contrast to the previous arguments on the importance of communicating knowledge. There is thus a certain tension in Edwards' understanding of the human and the divine element in language: on the one hand, reference to spiritual things in language is a sort of second-order language, derived by analogy, on the other hand, this manner of communicating spiritual mysteries is originally divine.

Edwards' reflections on language must be understood not only in the context of his engagement with Locke's *Essay* but also in the context of Puritan attitudes to rhetoric and figurative use of language and their struggle to distinguish typological exegesis from allegorical interpretation. ²⁶ While typology was believed to be part of God's revelation in Scripture, allegorical interpretation was treated with great caution and reservation. Barbara Kiefer Lewalski's summary of the position of Samuel Mather is illustrative: "types differ from arbitrary similes and comparisons (such as the comparison of the union of Christ and the Church to marriage) by reason of their divine institution to foreshadow Christ and his benefits, and from parables and allegories by reason of their historical reality." From a different angle, the Puritan attitude toward type and allegory belongs also to the wider context of their understanding of rhetoric and its connection to homiletics.

²⁴ WJE 15:247-248.

²⁵ See WJE:11:51 n. 5.

 $^{^{26}}$ See Kimnach, "Introduction", 3-41 and 180-258 for a discussion of rhetorical and homiletic influences on Edwards.

²⁷ Lewalski, Poetics, 124.

The Reformed tradition, with its emphasis on the literal text, meant that tropes were understood "as God's chosen formulation of his revealed truth which man must strive to understand rightly." Clearly, the difficulty that the Puritan tradition had with rhetoric lay in distinguishing properly between the uses of language and employing rhetorical devices only within the limits felt to be appropriate, using rhetoric as a tool in the service of homiletic goals. For this reason, too, it was so important to distinguish between types and human allegories and to define how types could be correctly discovered and interpreted so that God's Word would not be thwarted by human invention.

There are elements in Edwards' understanding of language and of typology which reveal affinity to the tradition of Puritan reflections on of rhetoric and typology. ²⁹ He is convinced that types cannot be reduced to, or mistaken for, mere human invention: he articulates his typological ideas in contrast to the expected objection that he is "a man of a very fruitful brain and copious fancy." He warns that "persons are deceived by the use of figurative and metaphorical expressions" when they mistake what is "only an idea in the imagination" for true knowledge and experience of spiritual things. ³⁰ He wishes, again in a rather Lockean moment, to "extricate all questions from the least confusion or ambiguity of words, so that the ideas shall be left naked." ³¹

However, to take these points as an outline of Edwards' attitude toward language and its rhetorical uses would be misleading. Such arguments are perhaps inevitable and necessary and certainly the basic assumption that underlies these efforts—that it is possible to determine when a meaning of an expression is to be understood literally and when it is metaphoric, and in what way it is metaphoric and how it can be interpreted—is inevitable and at the core of perhaps all human thinking about language in general. What is at stake here is, of course, the issue of representation, and that is why it also makes sense for Edwards to explain typology as a language. Naturally Edwards is assuming that it is possible to make a distinction between those instances of language when meaning is communicated directly and when it is figurative. In another perspective: he is assuming that the

²⁸ Lewalski, *Poetics*, 77.

²⁹ This is not meant to imply that the Puritan tradition is the sole context for interpreting Edwards' typological thought. Edwards was engaged in issues which were most pressing in his own times, responding to deist claims and to moral sense philosophy, for example. The purpose of this article is not to discuss Edwards' intellectual environment in its complexity; in a discussion of Edwards' typology, however, it is necessary to note that his typological theory shares some presuppositions with the Puritan tradition.

³⁰ Sermon on II Corinthians 13: 5; quoted in Miller, "Introduction", 31-32. At this point this 1735 sermon has not been edited by the Jonathan Edwards Center. The transcript can be found in *Sermons, Series II*, 1735, WJEO 50, listed as 368. Sermon on II Cor. 13:5 (1735).

³¹ "Cover-Leaf Memoranda," no. 7, WJE 6:193.

language of theology can demarcate those instances in which language is rhetorical, figurative and does not represent "correctly," to designate them as such and separate them from the non-rhetorical; in other words that it is possible, to distinguish between the type and the trope, that perennial issue of historical typology and exegesis. But rather than a solution, Edwards' thought and writings contain a dynamic tension between the possibility for a determined meaning in language and the ever recurring realization that language does not simply transport meaning but also resists users' efforts to determine meaning, to determine even the context in which meaning could be determined.

This last is Jacques Derrida's argument regarding the iterability of the linguistic mark. To highlight a point of connection between the implications of Edwards' typological theory and the concerns of postmodern approaches to language, it is necessary to introduce a brief excursus into some basic ideas of at least one representative of the latter. Derrida has argued that the conception of language in Western thought has developed within a particular historico-metaphysical epoch which he terms "logocentrism," 32 based on the "determination of the meaning of being in general as *presence*"33 and, ultimately, also on the identity of language and meaning.³⁴ He argues that inherent in the epoch of logocentrism is a conception of language as primarily spoken language. Writing is consequently considered secondary: "The epoch of the logos thus debases writing considered as mediation of mediation and as a fall into the exteriority of meaning" while in the phonocentric conception (language as speech), the "signified has at any rate an immediate relationship with logos in general."35 Writing has two main predicates: absence (it functions in the absence of the sender and of the receiver) and iterability (both repetition and difference, "the possibility of every mark to be repeated and still to function as a meaningful mark in new contexts that are cut off entirely from

³² "The totality of the great epoch covered by the history of metaphysics, and in a more explicit and more systematically articulated way to the narrower epoch of Christian creationism and infinitism when these appropriate the resources of Greek conceptuality" (Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Baltimore, London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 13.

³³ Of Grammatology, 12.

³⁴ Consequently, Derrida argues regarding the Saussurian concept of the sign that "the semiological or, more specifically, linguistic 'science' cannot therefore hold on to the difference between signifier and signified—the very idea of the sign—without the difference between sensible and intelligible, certainly, but also not without retaining, more profoundly and more implicitly, and by the same token the reference to a signified able to 'take place' in its intelligibility, before its 'fall,' before any expulsion into the exteriority of the sensible here below. As the face of pure intelligibility, it refers to an absolute logos to which it is immediately united. This absolute logos was an infinite creative subjectivity in medieval theology: the intelligible face of the sign remains turned toward the word and the face of God" (Of Grammatology, 13).

³⁵ Ibid., 13, 15.

the original context, the 'intention to communicate' of the original maker of the mark," in the words of Hillis Miller³⁶). In opposition to the logocentric view of language, Derrida holds that these two traits of the classical concept of writing apply to all language and that consequently language should be primarily understood as writing.³⁷ In a critique of J. L. Austin's theory of speech acts in *How to Do Things* with Words, Derrida argues that writing cannot be subsumed under communication and that iterability, as one of its essential characteristics, carries with itself the impossibility of determining context. When Austin thus excludes figurative language, literature and jokes, from "normal" use of language (and from his theory) and calls them "parasitic" (in a move not unlike Locke's, it might be added), Derrida shows how Austin's own theory of speech acts subverts this distinction and depends, in fact, on the principle of iterability—and thus consequently reintroduces the very ambiguities which Austin wishes to bracket from his theory. For Derrida, the conditions for such "parasitic" aspects of language are a possibility always inherent in all language and they cannot therefore be "excluded" from consideration.³⁸

Connected to Derrida's understanding of language as writing is his questioning of the borders between philosophy and literature or metaphorics in general. In "White Mythology" where he discusses metaphor in philosophical text, Derrida argues that the originary sense becomes metaphor only when philosophy puts it in circulation. Metaphor in philosophical discourse then dissipates itself through the wearing down of individual metaphors. Having passed from the physical to the metaphysical, the originary sense is forgotten; philosophy thus performs double erasure: the originary sense is forgotten and the first shift from the originary sense to the metaphysical sense is also forgotten. Though forgotten, the originary stage nonetheless remains active. But if philosophy wishes to classify its metaphors, to define philosophical metaphor, it becomes apparent that it cannot control philosophical metaphorics from the outside by any philosophical concept of metaphor, for

metaphor has been issued from a network of philosophemes which themselves correspond to tropes or to figures, and these philosophemes are contemporaneous to or in systematic solidarity with these tropes or figures. This . . . layer of 'primary' philosophemes . . . cannot be dominated. It cannot dominate itself, cannot be dominated by

³⁶ Hillis J. Miller, Speech Acts in Literature (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 78.

³⁷ Jacques Derrida, *Limited Inc.*, trans. Samuel Weber, Jeffrey Mehlman, Alan Bass (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 10.

³⁸ Derrida, Limited, 57.

what it itself has engendered, has made to grow on its own soil, supported on its own base. . . . If one wished to conceive and to class all the metaphorical possibilities of philosophy, one metaphor, at least, always would remain excluded, outside the system: the metaphor, at the very least, without which the concept of metaphor could not be constructed . . . the metaphor of metaphor.³⁹

Locke's critique of the dangers of rhetoric in his *Essay* might be said to attempt precisely this, which Derrida holds impossible, to demarcate metaphor in the discourse of philosophy, to control it, even to get rid of it. But his condemnation of rhetoric is itself, as is well known, full of figures of speech; moreover as Paul de Man argues, "when Locke then develops his own theory of words and language, what he constructs turns out to be in fact a theory of tropes." It has been suggested that there are some points in Edwards' theory where Edwards, too, seems to rely on a possibility of determining the difference between the language of theology and philosophy and between a figurative, rhetorical uses of language, where he seems to assume that the discourse of philosophy can control its tropes and metaphors. But perhaps in Edwards these points are secondary when compared to the many ambiguities he creates and the open ends for which he does not account.

The vagueness of Edwards' rules for learning the language of typology is not the core of the issue; it is merely symptomatic of a deeper problem. If the language of typology is to be learned by use and practice, it implies that there is a possibility for a situation when the self, even the believing self, "speaks" a type and does not yet know whether he or she has discovered a genuine type or if it is a false type, a mere product of the believer's human imagination. It is certainly a passing moment, and the more the believer is trained in the language of typology, the surer he or she becomes in typological interpretation; nevertheless, the possibility is there and can be understood as a fundamental insecurity of the typological project, a destabilizing dimension which might not be always realized but can never be removed. To link this to Derrida's terminology, it could be said that this moment of indeterminacy is a manifestation, even if merely in a glimpse, of language as writing, when the language of typology is not quite connected to the purpose of communication. Edwards' definition of typology as a language turns out to be a Trojan horse: instead of aiding explanation of his project, it undermines its very intention.

³⁹ Jacques Derrida, "White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy," *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 219-220.


⁴⁰ Paul de Man, "The Epistemology of Metaphor," Critical Inquiry 5.1 (Fall 1978), 16.

The difficulties which have been noted and discussed here might serve, on the one hand, as a criticism of the shortcomings of Edwards' typological theory. Not only does Edwards' defense of his conception of natural typology as language fail to answer the issues raised by the problem of subjectivity, it creates even more difficulties for the project. Most importantly, Edwards' general understanding of language as a problematic medium of communication which can mislead men in thinking casts doubt on the very idea of typology conceived as language and undermines the promise of its alleged communicative and epistemological reliability.

On the other hand, perhaps, Edwards' failure to entirely convince posterity of the validity of his typological beliefs might be as much a recommendation of his thought as a criticism and make him newly interesting for the context of contemporary critical reflection. One might make it a criticism that he claimed that typology could possibly have objective rules and be safely kept apart from subjective allegorizing and failed. But one might also credit him for that failure, for in the process he has highlighted some deeper problems of language. Steeped in the many metaphors of his Christian metaphysics, Edwards made the arguments of his typological theory significantly ambiguous; his involvement with language was complex enough to prevent him, albeit in a rather paradoxical way, from a "thousand real mistakes" he might have made in mistaking the connections of words for the connections of ideas.

Abstract

Explaining his theory of typological understanding of nature, Edwards develops a metaphorical definition of typology as a language which the believer must carefully learn to speak. The metaphor of language turns out to be an interesting choice when it is placed in the context of his reflections on language, for Edwards' understanding is that it is in the very nature of language, even language regarding spiritual things, to sometimes thwart its goal, the communication of meaning. Such definition of typology complicates Edwards' project but also highlights issues which resonate with certain concerns of postmodern critical theory, such as Jacques Derrida's analysis of language, and so might help to make Edwards interesting for contemporary literary theoretical considerations.



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THE AFFECTIONS AND THE HUMAN PERSON: EDWARDS ON RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

Yale philosopher John E. Smith once observed that all of Jonathan Edwards' thought can be considered "one magnificent answer" to the question: What is true religion? We would add that Edwards' answer to that question invariably involved what he called the "affections," since they lay at the heart of his theological anthropology. The human person for Edwards was a bundle of affections that determine nearly everything that person feels, thinks and does. Therefore no treatment of his theology can escape the question of what he meant by the affections, and the role that the affections play in religious experience. This paper will explore first the importance of the affections for Edwards, then his conception of their relation to the human person and true religion, and finally his estimation of how to evaluate them.

Importance and Nature of the Affections

Near the beginning of *Religious Affections* Edwards portrays the affections as "springs of motion" for all forms of human activity:

Such is man's nature, that he is very inactive, any otherwise than he is influenced by some affection, either love or hatred, desire, hope, fear or

¹ John E. Smith, "Editor's Introduction," WJE 2:2.

some other. These affections we see to be the springs that set men agoing, in *all* the affairs of life, and engage them in *all* their pursuits . . . take away all love and hatred, all hope and fear, all anger, zeal and affectionate desire, and the world would be, in a great measure, motionless and dead, there would be no such thing as activity amongst mankind, or any earnest pursuit whatsoever. 'Tis affection that engages the covetous man . . . 'tis the affections also that actuate the voluptuous man . . . so in religious matters, the *spring of their actions* are very much religious affections: he that has doctrinal knowledge and speculation only, without affection, never is a engaged in the business of religion.²

Several things are worth noting here. Human society is a bustling affair, brimming with aspiration and endeavor. As on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange, everyone is going somewhere. Yet just below the surface are the affections that motivate these movements. Affections are both good and bad, non-religious and religious. Religious affections do not function differently from non-religious affections, but have different objects. So while everyday affections such as the desires for wealth and sensual pleasure have money and sensory gratification as their objects, religious affections seek God and spiritual things.

Furthermore, Edwards argues that genuine religion is always a matter of the affections. Mere "doctrinal knowledge and speculation" are not deep and strong enough to constitute affections and therefore genuine religion. They are "mere actings of the will and inclination of the soul." Only if they are "vigorous and lively" in their exercise do they rise to the level of "religious affections." There are "many actings of the will and inclination, that are not so commonly called affections" since they are merely weak preferences—such as preferring blueberry to strawberry jam. Such preferences raise "us little above a state of indifference." But religious affections involve "a fervent, vigorous engagement of the heart in religion" that display themselves in love for God with all the heart and soul. He compared "the business of religion," which is moved by affections, to "running, wrestling or agonizing for a great prize or crown, and fighting with strong enemies that seek our lives, and warring as those that by violence take a city or kingdom." Thus Edwards defined affections as "the more vigorous and sensible exercises of the inclination and will of the soul."

By "soul" Edwards meant the confluence of two faculties—the "understanding" that perceives and judges, and the "inclination or will" that moves the human

² WJE 2:101; emph. added.

³ WJE 2:101, 97, 99-100, 96.

self toward or away from things in liking and disliking, loving and hating, approving and rejecting. This brief definition of the affections rooted in the faculties of the soul is often misunderstood in two related ways: commentators either ignore the intellectual component or reduce the affections to "emotions," thus missing Edwards' insistence on the unity of the human person. Let us treat these problems one by one.

First, note the intellectual component. For Edwards the affections move the soul, which means they move the mind as well as the will. In the affections of true religion, the mind is "enlightened, rightly and spiritually, to understand or apprehend divine things." True religion will always have "knowledge of the loveliness of divine things."⁴ Holy affections, he noted, "are not heat without light,"⁵ for they arise from affections that are a unity of mind and inclination in the soul. If the soul is warmed toward God, it will be drawn to certain understandings of God. All inclination already involves perception of the mind because of the unity of the soul and self. Edwards rejected all dichotomies that set the mind against the heart—even while such dichotomies were common during the Great Awakening debates. Opponents of the Awakening, such as Charles Chauncy, argued that revival preachers had merely stirred up "passions," and that true religion brought the self under the control of reason rather than emotion. Radical revivalists, such as James Davenport, reveled in intense emotions and derogated the intellect.⁶ But Edwards' position refused the dichotomies of either side, insisting on a soul whose affections shape not only feelings and choices but also the mind. By his lights, an idea is not only intellectual but also has affective content. Say the word "fire," and while for some it suggests a delightful fireside encounter with a loved one, for others it painfully recalls the loss of a home. Conversely, all affections or inclinations are united to intellectual conceptions: "The heart cannot be set upon an object of which there is no idea in the understanding."⁷ This union of the intellect with the heart was missed by most in the revival debates. Many pro-revivalists assumed that religion was all about feelings and had nothing to do with the mind. "Old Lights" claimed to be in favor of reason and against emotion and revival, while "New Lights" often criticized reason while championing emotion and revival. Few grasped the subtlety of Edwards' position.

Both sides then, and many scholars since, have wrongly assumed that Edwards' affections were the same thing as "emotions." But emotions for Edwards

⁴ WJE 2:266, 271; emph. added.

⁵ WJE 2:266.

⁶ WJE 4:60. See also WJE 4:51-52, 60-65, 79-83.

⁷ WJE 2:266, 271 (emph. added); WJE 22:88.

were only one dimension of human experience shaped by affections, along with thinking and choosing. Edwards argued that true religious affections sometimes choose *against* emotional feeling, such as when Jesus chose not to yield to his feelings of fear in the Garden of Gethsemane. When "passions" overwhelm one's better judgment, such as in a fit of rage, emotions are in fact opposed to true religious affections. Furthermore, Edwards always linked affections to an object, while emotions may or may not have an object. In current English usage, the statement "I am emotional" need not imply an object of emotion. But the assertion "I am affectionate" raises the question, toward what or whom?

At the center of all Edwards' thinking about affections and religious experience was his conviction of the unity of the human person. He rejected the threefold distinction of mind, will and emotions that was common in nineteenth- and twentieth-century discussions of human psychology and in outline went back to Plato. Edwards declared that the will and affections "are not two faculties," but different expressions of the inclination that already has intellectual judgment contained within it.⁸ As we just saw, he recognized that there are times when one expression seems to conflict with the other, as when the mind must choose against the feelings. Critics then and since have proposed the will as a mediator between the two (mind and emotions). Edwards replied to his contemporaries that such a mediating will is a self-determining power that is logically incoherent and selfcontradictory, as he argued in Freedom of the Will. The will, he noted, cannot determine itself. A person has a will, but one's will itself does not have a will. Ultimately all faculties cohere with one another within the unity of the human self. It must be conceded, however, that although Edwards lists the understanding as the first in the faculties of the soul, he says little concerning its nature or function. This could be because he thought its status less problematic than that of the other faculties. It is also apparent that his preoccupation with the mind, will and affections indeed, his authorship of volumes like Freedom of the Will, Religious Affections, and Original Sin—situates him in an Augustinian-voluntarist tradition that characterized the human self more in terms of its desires and choices than its thoughts and concepts.

Even the two-fold distinction of understanding and inclination tends to break down in the course of Edwards' discussion in *Religious Affections*. What one calls mind or understanding is the human self in one mode of operation, while inclination is another mode. Because both understanding and inclination are expressions of the total human self, the distinction between them is more analytical than

⁸ WJE 2:97.

actual. They are not parts of the soul or self, as is commonly imagined. The inclination's affections include an intellectual dimension, while the mind's thoughts include an affective dimension. In this way the two faculties are interlocking in their operations. It is therefore a basic mistake to interpret Edwards in terms of any dichotomy of intellect versus affect, or head versus heart—although some interpreters have wanted to claim him for one side or the other.

If the human self was basically unitary for Edwards, so were the affections in one sense. That is, the godly affections were all rooted in the basic affection of love. To be sure, Edwards singled out for discussion in *Religious Affections* a variety of affections including fear, hope, love, hatred, desire, joy, sorrow, compassion and zeal. But the affection that overshadows the rest is love, also called charity. In *Charity and Its Fruits* love is "the sum of all virtue," and is opposed to envy, pride, selfishness, and censoriousness. But love is not only the root of the virtues for Edwards; it is also, in some sense, the root of all godly affections and actions. One recalls Augustine's statement in *City of God* that each person's love is the "gravity" that determines whether a person rises or falls. For Edwards, the opposite of love is not hatred but indifference. A "hard heart," he wrote, is an "unaffected heart." He interpreted affections in all their diversity as so many modifications of love arising from diverse circumstances in which love is expressed:

From love arises hatred of those things which are contrary to what we love, or which oppose and thwart us in those things that we delight in: and from the various exercises of love and hatred, according to the circumstances of the objects of those affections, as present or absent, certain or uncertain, probable or improbable, arise all those other affections of desire, hope, fear, joy, grief, gratitude, anger, etc.¹⁰

Edwards spoke of a "counterfeit love" which produces "other false affections" —an idea reminiscent of Augustine's distinction between charity and concupiscence, two "loves" with different destinations, one driving some toward the City of Man and the other propelling others toward the City of God. ¹¹

Scrutinizing the Affections

Edwards did not merely delineate the affections and explain how they function in the human person. As Smith has put it, he proceeded to subject Protestantism's sacred domain—the inner life—to public tests. Edwards believed piety needed to

⁹ WJE 2:102-08; WJE 8:129, 218-92; Augustine, City of God 11.23; WJE 2:117.

¹⁰ WJE 2:108.

¹¹ WIE 2:150.

be evaluated by a kind of rational scrutiny. This was for the purpose of discriminating true religion from hypocrisy and self-deception. He recognized that this is a difficult task, even for a pastor obligated to make decisions regarding other persons' spiritual condition. Only God, said Edwards, can fathom a human soul. Thus he writes that "it was never God's design to give us any rules by which we may certainly know, who of our fellow professors are his, and to make a full and clear separation between sheep and goats: but that on the contrary, it was God's design to reserve this to himself, as his prerogative." A recently-published text, "Directions for Judging of Persons' Experiences," shows Edwards searching for principles to evaluate members of his flock: "See to it: That the operation be much upon the will or heart, not on the imagination. . . . That the trouble of mind be reasonable. . . . That they have not only pretended convictions of sin; but a proper mourning for sin. 12 During his later years, Edwards became skeptical about definitive judgments on one's own or others' spiritual condition. Hypocrites mimicked saints, and saints resembled hypocrites. The heart was deceptive, both to others and to itself.

In *Religious Affections* the overriding sign of genuine religion is "holy practice," which lies in the realm of action rather than perception or sensibility. The only set of affections that produces the habit of holy practice is the cluster collectively titled the "new sense of the heart." This is the "disposition" or habit which the Spirit "infuses" to enable saints to see God's infinite beauty and glory. It is a "sweet idea," the "joy of joys," a sweet and ravishing "view of the moral excellency of divine things." This sight alone makes all the other divine attributes glorious and lovely. It is a taste that is diverse from all other sensations, as different as the taste of honey is from the mere intellectual idea of it. It is an "intuitive knowledge" of the supreme beauty and sweetness of the holiness and moral perfection of divine things. This beauty of holiness, Edwards proclaimed, is the most important thing in the world, the divinity of divinity, without which God would be an infinite evil, and apart from which it would be better if we had not been born and there had been no being at all. These were the extravagant claims made by Edwards for what has been called the most original idea in all of his theology. 13

This "sense of the heart" is treated at greater length in *The Theology of Jonathan Edwards* (Oxford UP, Sept. 2011, chs. 10, 24), but it is important here to note the scholarly debate over the relationship of this "sense" to everyday perceptions. One the one side are those like Paul Helm who highlight the discontinuity between the

¹² WJE 2:43, 193; WJE 21:522-24.

¹³ WJE 2:242, 253, 257, 260, 206, 259, 272-73, 298; John E. Smith, "Editor's Introduction," in WJE 2:30.

new sense and all other human experiences. 14 Since Edwards compares the new sense to Locke's "new simple idea"—an idea, like heat or wetness, that cannot be understood without a corresponding experience—these scholars maintain that the new sense has no connection to ordinary sense perception and implies a kind of sixth sense. 15 On the other side are those such as Perry Miller who note that Edwards denied that the new sense set aside the functioning of the natural senses. They interpret the "new sense" not as a sixth sense or vision of another world but as a deeper vision of the present world. 16 Our position is that Edwards' new sense involved an interplay of natural and gracious experience. Pace Miller, the experience of conversion is foundational to Edwards' religious epistemology. Believers are able to perceive a holy beauty in God that is invisible to nonbelievers, and in this sense believers and nonbelievers live in two different universes. Subsequent to regeneration, the believer comes to appreciate even the beauties of the natural world in new ways. While Emerson and Schleiermacher held that a deeper vision was accessible to all human beings, Edwards made this vision dependent on a prior operation of divine grace. Pace Helm, however, the mental breakthrough of grace, or "divine and supernatural light," operates in and through the natural sense faculties, and so grace does not destroy or bypass nature but perfects it. The "new sense" is not an epistemological quirk, detached from the rest of human life. Those who undergo regeneration find that this one experience unlocks the meaning of all human experience, and sheds light on all of life. Thus Edwards' "new sense" is a creative synthesis of Puritan and Enlightenment ideas, melding the discontinuities of grace with the continuities of human nature. Moreover the "new sense" became a basis for Edwards to judge between gracious and natural experiences in the midst of the eighteenth-century religious awakenings.

The argument of *Religious Affections* suggests that individuals can examine themselves to see if they delight in this divine beauty for its own sake. It may be a hard test, but for Edwards it was this vision, issuing in a disposition given to Christian practice (by which he meant things such as humility, forgiveness, mercy, fear of God, balance among the virtues, and hunger for more of God), that yields decisive evidence of grace. *Religious Affections* also outlines a set of phenomena that are unreliable as signs of grace. Some persons, for example, become convinced of God's favor because verses of Scripture or other words related to Jesus

¹⁴ Paul Helm, "John Locke and Jonathan Edwards: A Reconsideration," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 7 (1969), 51-61.

¹⁵ WIE 2:205.

¹⁶ Perry Miller, "Jonathan Edwards and the Sense of the Heart," *Harvard Theological Review* 41 (1948), 123-45.

Christ suddenly come to mind. Another unreliable or "no certain" sign is the presence of "very great" or "raised high" affections. Edwards points to the Israelites at the Red Sea who sang God's praises but then "tested the Lord" by forgetting his work for them and crying out to go back to Egypt. ¹⁷ Other uncertain signs are great effects on the body, fluency in talking about religious things, spiritual phenomena arising without effort, the appearance of love, many different kinds of affections, a certain order in the affections, spending much time in religious duties, mouths full of praises, assurance of salvation, and good impressions among the godly about the spiritual state of a person. All of these are common among hypocrites, who also exhibit excessive confidence in themselves, a prideful and superior spirit, censorious or judgmental attitudes toward others, and a tendency toward self-satisfaction. ¹⁸

The Role of the Imagination

Edwards also discussed the role of the human imagination in religious experience. Early in his career he thought God sometimes used the human imagination—for example, when people had visions and sensed God speaking to them. In Distinguishing Marks-a Yale commencement address in 1741—he argued that these phenomena are not antithetical to true religion: "That persons have many impressions on their imaginations, don't prove that they have nothing else." When the Holy Spirit stirs the human mind and heart, the imagination is liable to be influenced, and "such is our nature that we can't think of things invisible, without a degree of imagination." He stressed the positive functions of imagination: "It appears to manifest in many instances I have been acquainted with, that God has really made use of this faculty [of imagination] to truly divine purposes; especially in some that are more ignorant." He concluded that the "holy frame and sense" of these people at these times were from God, but "the imaginations that attend it are but accidental" and therefore often mixed with confusion and falsehood. 19 Five years later in Religious Affections Edwards was more jaded. All "imaginary sights of God and Christ and heaven, all supposed witnessing of the Spirit, and testimonies of the love of God by immediate inward suggestion; and all impressions of future events, and immediate revelations of any secret facts whatsoever . . . all interpretations of the mystical meaning of Scripture, by supposed immediate revelation" are simply "impressions in the head" and evidence of "false religion." These "impressions on the imagination" are symptoms of the false religion seen in

¹⁷ WJE 2:127-30.

¹⁸ WJE 2:142-45, 220, 127-90.

¹⁹ WIE 4:235-38.

heretical groups such as the Gnostics, Montanists, Antinomians, "the followers of [Anne] Hutchinson in New England" [and] the later French prophets."²⁰ Edwards was not denouncing all uses of the imagination at this point, but ruling out the validity of any that claimed "immediate revelation." Yet this 1746 association of voices and visions with immediate revelation, which he had always rejected from his earliest writings, suggests he regarded the imagination with more wariness than before.

If Edwards was ambivalent on the role of the imagination in religious experience, he was surprisingly open to biological and psychological factors in the operation of the affections. In a state of affection, he allowed, "the motion of the blood and animal spirits begins to be sensibly altered; whence oftentimes arises some bodily sensation."²¹ He said little on the metaphysical question of how soul and body interact—other than that it is a mystery—but implied that changes in either soul or body would affect the other.²² When discussing temptation, he suggested that Satan cannot directly implant ideas into the human mind, as God can, but must stir up the "animal spirits" and so excite the "imagination or phantasy." This was one reason Edwards was skeptical toward those claiming to have had visions of God. Diabolical influence or emotional arousal could counterfeit divine inspiration. Several years after the Affections, when he edited The Life of David Brainerd, Edwards indicated that depression or "melancholy" was a "disease" that can produce "dark thoughts" of "spiritual desertion," the impression that God has deserted the soul. He also commented that those with "a very gay and sanguine natural temper" are "much more exposed to enthusiasm" than those with other mental temperaments. Edwards thus regarded "enthusiasm"—which he defined as "imaginary sights of God and Christ" and "immediate inward impressions" of divine voices—as influenced by variations in psychological temperament.²³ Although Edwards' comments on these matters are sketchy and incomplete, it is clear that he considered biological, social and psychological factors as co-determinants of religious experience.

We can conclude with two observations. First, one of Edwards' foundational ideas was not to judge spiritual phenomena by *a priori* assumptions, but to look more deeply at underlying dynamics and more broadly at extensive connections for clues to religious validity. He warned that spiritual phenomena could not be taken at face value, that hypocrites deceive the righteous, and the devil counter-

²⁰ WJE 2:285-87.

²¹ WJE 2:96-97.

²² WJE 23:166-6. He said the same about the mutual effects of body and mind: WJE 6:339.

²³ WJE 2:88-89; WJE 7:91-94; WJE 2:285.

feits true religion. His project of spiritual discernment was among the most penetrating and subtle in Christian history.

Second, Edwards probed the affections and religious experience with an intensity unique to the eighteenth century and perhaps the centuries since. The enlightened thinkers of his century thought it beneath their dignity to philosophize concerning religious experience, especially the affections. Even less did they consider it their life's work to categorize and analyze subjective states of religious sensibility. One of Edwards' gifts to modern intellectual history was the way he made it possible, for both religious and secular investigators, to view religious affections as phenomena worth study.

Abstract

The human person for Edwards is a bundle of affections that determine nearly everything that person feels, thinks and does. Therefore no treatment of his theology can escape the question of what he meant by the affections, and the role that the affections play in religious experience. This paper explores first the importance of the affections for Edwards, then his conception of their relation to the human person and true religion, and finally his estimation of how to evaluate them.

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"TALK OF EXPERIENCE": JONATHAN EDWARDS ON RELIGIOUS SPEECH

For a person who left behind him millions of words, Edwards had more than his share of reservations about the limits of language. Several factors in his inherited thought and in his experience contributed to this awareness. First, he was born into New England's intramural ecclesiastical experiment to found and sustain pure churches, which included a requirement for potential members to describe their spiritual experiences before the congregation. Compounding this feature were the innovations for church membership that Edwards' grandfather, Solomon Stoddard, introduced at Northampton and that Edwards had to negotiate. Second, the religious revivals at mid-century, in which Edwards played so important a role, highlighted preaching, religious self-disclosure, and other forms of expression that led to a diversity of speakers, forms, and contents. These two discursive sites—one ecclesial, the other largely extra-ecclesial—both posed increasing challenges for Edwards, who in his revival tracts and in subsequent essays and sermons came to examine the use and abuse of religious "talk of experience."

The New England Conversion Narrative

The first trajectory to trace here is the church model of New England Congregationalism in which Edwards was raised. The covenanted, primitivist model formulated by the New England puritans beginning in the 1630s had, as its core, the individual seeking grace through a process or morphology of stages of spiritual

awareness, a method called "preparationism." These stages could be many and complex, but at their simplest they included: conviction, or being alerted to one's miserable condition on account of sin; humiliation, or an awareness of God's justice in their condemnation; and "discoveries," or that comfort in realizing God's mercy accompanied by earnest longings after God and Christ. The individual was guided through these stages by using "the means of grace," including worship, hearing sermons, prayer, reading, and the like.¹

But the individual was part of a faith community, in which each individual's striving to live a godly life contributed to the commonweal, and in which neighbors supported and interacted with each other spiritually and physically in all the spheres of human activity. This collective expression of sanctified living had its embodiment in the local congregation, which was voluntary and self-ruling. Polity was an important extension of the Reformational impulse, but it was also a function of the puritans' efforts to resolve the identification of the invisible church within the visible. Recognizing that there would always be a "mixed multitude" of true and only nominal believers within the visible church, New England Congregationalists nonetheless instituted a polity to insure, as much as possible, that full members were of the elect, or the invisible church. They did this through a graduated membership system, as codified in the Cambridge Platform of 1648. Baptism was the first level of membership, under which a person was brought into church watch and education; beginning in the 1660s, baptismal membership was extended under what became known as the Half-Way Covenant. Full membership was the second and final level, in which the individual was entitled to partake of the sacrament, have children baptized, vote in church meetings, and hold church and civic offices.²

To achieve full membership could be, to varying degrees depending on the congregation, an onerous process: one had to present oneself and be questioned by the minister, by the elders or deacons, and finally by the assembled congregation after giving a "particular" or extended oral description of one's spiritual experience. And there was no guarantee of success. We have scores of these written autobiographies, "relations," or "conversion narratives," as they are variously

¹ On preparationism and devotional practices, see Norman Pettit, *The Heart Prepared: Grace and Conversion in Puritan Spiritual Life* (Yale Univ. Press, 1966); Charles Cohen, *God's Caress: The Psychology of Puritan Religious Experience* (Oxford Univ. Press, 1986); and Charles Hambrick-Stowe, *The Practice of Piety: Puritan Devotional Disciplines in Seventeenth-Century New England* (Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1982).

² On the colonial New England church polity and practices, see Edmund S. Morgan, *Visible Saints: The History of a Puritan Idea* (New York Univ. Press, 1963); Harry S. Stout, *The New England Soul: Preaching and Religious Culture in Colonial New England* (Oxford Univ. Press, 1986); and James F. Cooper, Jr., *Tenacious of Their Liberties: The Congregationalists in Colonial Massachusetts* (Oxford Univ. Press, 1999).

called, from the early $17^{\rm th}$ to the early $19^{\rm th}$ century, from men and women, old and young, native, black and white—an incredibly rich resource. Many were printed, or circulated in manuscript, read and re-read, so that the forms and cadences of the genre were absorbed, repeated, revised, and embodied, "turning texts into life even as they turn[ed] life into texts."

Growing up, Edwards would have read or heard a good number of lay relations, such as in his father's church at East Windsor, Connecticut.⁴ A typical relation, though very brief to serve our purposes here, was that given by a Samuel Grant around the year 1710, which Edwards as a boy may well have heard orated in the meetinghouse:

I hope I may truly say that God has enabled me to see my sinfulness by nature, and that I was shapened in iniquity and conceived in sin, and by the fall of our first parents I am altogether become filthy, vile and sinful, and that I cannot make any satisfaction by the works of the law: and this I know, that my sins have lain as a heavy burden upon me, and although I have [been] kept from many great enormities or sins, yet have thought myself to be the most vilest creature in the world, and nothing but as it were a sink of sin: and in the midst of my distresses I hope I may truly say that God has discovered his grace to me in pardoning my sins, and enabled me to trust in him for my life and eternal salvation, and made me heartily to loath and hate all sin, as it [is] against God, and to trust in ye Lord Jesus Christ. And I desire to live a holy life here for Christ's sake, as well as in happiness with him hereafter, [in his] ordinances, [and] that I may have [my] faith and love still increasing towards them.⁵

Though the religious culture of American Puritanism endured, forming gen-

³ For examples of early New England relations, see *Thomas Shepard's 'Confessions,'* ed. George Selement and Bruce Woolley, Colonial Society of Massachusetts Collections 58 (1981); "The Notebook of the Reverend John Fiske, 1644-1675," ed. Robert G. Pope, Colonial Society of Massachusetts Collections 47 (1974), 6-10, 29-30, 33-34, 61, 100-101, 146-51; *The Diary of Michael Wigglesworth, 1653-1657*, ed. Edmund S. Morgan (Harper, 1946). The quote is from Nancy Bradley Warren, *The Embodied Word: Female Spiritualities, Contested Orthodoxies, and English Religious Cultures, 1350-1700* (Univ. of Notre Dame, 2011), 16.

⁴ For relations from this church, see "The East Windsor Conversion Relations, 1700-1725," ed. Kenneth P. Minkema, *Connecticut Historical Society Bulletin* 51 (1986); Minkema, "The Relation of Samuel Belcher," *William and Mary Quarterly*; and Timothy Edwards, MS, Sermon on II Cor. 2:16 and five relations, 1720-25, transcript, Jonathan Edwards Center, New Haven, Conn. JE also referred to "a book of Relations" in his "Catalogue" of Reading, no. [34], WJE 26:125.

⁵ Edwards Papers, Trask Library, Andover Newton Theological School, Newton Centre, Mass. The emphases are mine, in order to draw attention to the parallels in the relation quoted at the end of the essay.

erations to come, by the time Edwards began his ministry, puritanism as a political experiment had ended, and requirements for entering the churches had shifted. This was the case in particular in Solomon Stoddard's church of Northampton, Massachusetts, where extended narratives before the congregation were not required but only consent to a form. This is the form, as recorded by Stoddard in the church records in 1672:

I doe here publickly take hold of the covenant of the Lord, giving up my selfe unto him, to be one of his, subjecting my selfe to the teaching & gov't of Jesus Christ in this Church, & engage according to my place & power to promote the welfare thereof.⁶

This, as well shall see, became problematic for Edwards. But Stoddard points to the second trajectory for us to trace: the development of a revival culture, in which emphasis was placed on dramatic, identifiable experiences of conversion. Stoddard was widely known as a very successful conversionist preacher, overseeing no less than five awakenings during his six decades at Northampton, and Edwards' own father saw at least that number of "stirs" among his own congregation. More generally, New England churches had seen occasional awakenings, with accompanying additions to the church membership roles, during times of natural disasters and wars, but Edwards was instrumental in the emergence of revivals as an integral feature of church life, on the local, regional, and international levels.⁷

The Connecticut Valley Revival

The story of the rise, nature, and decline of the Connecticut Valley revival of 1734-35, beginning at Northampton, is well known thanks to Edwards' *Faithful Narrative of a Surprising Work of God*, published in London by Isaac Watts in 1737. Interestingly, the spiritual "flexibleness" began with "the relation of a young woman that had been one of the greatest company-keepers in the whole town, in whom there appeared evident a glorious work of God's infinite power and sovereign grace." Reaching its height in the early months of 1735, by the spring it had spent itself, quashed in part by the tragic suicide of Edwards' uncle Joseph Hawley.

⁶ "Northampton Church Records, Book I," First Churches of Northampton, Mass.

⁷ On awakenings under Stoddard's and Timothy Edwards' ministries, see Thomas S. Kidd, *The Great Awakening: The Roots of Evangelical Christianity in Colonial America* (Yale Univ. Press, 2007), 6-9. On revivals sparked by natural events and war, see George Harper, *A People So Favored of God: Boston's Congregational Churches and Their Pastors*, 1710-1760 (Univ. Press of America, 2004), chs. 3-4.

⁸ Edwards, Faithful Narrative, WJE 4:116.

During the Connecticut Valley Revival, Edwards endorsed and even extended the traditional reliance on the relation. He had privately received persons into his study to hear their descriptions of their spiritual experiences, much as scores of pastors over the generations since the early seventeenth century had. The difference here was in number and time: for Edwards met with literally hundreds of persons in the space of only several months, which is more than a typical New England pastor would have heard in his entire career. Also, following the pietist model, he had instituted religious "conferences" in town, for mixed groups and for young men and women, for the purpose of religious edification and exchange, which came to feature individuals giving accounts of the work of the Spirit on their souls. And in the Faithful Narrative he had given a new cast to the genre in his accounts of Abigail Hutchinson and the child Phebe Bartlett. But Edwards also had collapsed those many accounts he heard in private into a generic type, recognizing that while there was "variety" there was also an "analogy" or similarity to their experiences. His profile of the typical conversion was couched in the scientific mode, which made it widely applicable, but it basically described the three traditional preparationist phases—the difference being that he downplayed the means or order and focused on the end or result. Northampton had become the people of the Faithful Narrative, and—ironically for a congregation that had come of age under Stoddard repudiating the need for relations-they apparently sought to live up to that reputation by excelling in the art of talking about their experiences.

Aftermath

If Edwards still had trusted in the efficacy of talking of experiences during the hectic months of the Connecticut Valley revival, in the months and years immediately following he came to a sad realization: many of the claims to conversion and true grace were phony. All too quickly, with the waning of the revival and the temporary fad for religion, people were turning back to their old ways. Privately, Edwards contemplated this rapid and pervasive shift back to "viciousness." In his "Directions for Judging of Persons' Experiences," a series of notes to himself about hearing people's relations, he cautioned himself to:

See to it . . . Whether, when they tell of their experiences, it is not with such an air that you as it were feel that they expect to be admired and applauded, and won't be disappointed if they fail of discerning in you

something of that nature; and shocked and displeased if they discover the contrary.⁹

Instead of appreciation for his efforts to point out his people's faults, all he was meeting with was increasing resentment.

His private sentiments became public soon enough. Discoursing in February 1736, for instance, Edwards in a "contribution" lecture on Ps. 116:12 connected religious speech with the duty of charity—essentially telling his people to put their money where their mouths were. Praising God with our mouths was important, he pointed out, but so was service to others. Those who expressed the conviction or hope that they were converted must not only talk of the things they have supposedly experienced, or of how they have been "overcome" by them, or of how they have been affected by the "dying love" of Christ. "[M]any of you," Edwards commented laconically, "have expressed those things to me." What was needed was "a behavior answering such talk." ¹⁰

In his sermons, Edwards pursued this balance of profession and practice. A few months later, in May 1736, preaching on James 2:18, regarding the importance of religious *behavior*—this a full decade before the Twelfth Sign of *Religious Affections*—he proclaimed that "such manifestations of godliness are better Ground of Charity to others than anything that men say about their own godliness. 'Tis a much better way of showing our faith than professing that we have faith, and telling anything about our own faith." He went on, rehearsing the common elements of conversion relations:

[Behavior is] a better ground of charity than persons telling a very fair story of their experiences, if they seem to give an account of a clear work of conversion . . .

Tis a better ground of charity than if men appear very forward to talk of those things of religion. Being forward to talk of things of religion is a thing that looks well, if it be done without any appearance of ostentation, but yet all that are forward to talk are not true saints.¹¹

'Tis a better ground of charity than talk, though men seem to talk very experimentally and feelingly, though their talk seems to come from the heart, and though, as far as we can see, they seem to know what they

⁹ Edwards, "Directions for Judging of Persons' Experiences," WJE 21:525.

¹⁰ Edwards, MS Sermon on Ps. 119:12 (no. 378), Feb. 1736, WJEO 51.

¹¹ Note Edwards' lack of any qualifier here.

say, and to have much of an acquaintance with the life of religious talk, and yet be a hypocrite.¹²

Edwards' concern was "counterfeit humiliation," in which, paradoxically, converts were proud of their humility. From Edwards' perspective, they relied too much on a presumed day of grace, or a locatable conversion experience; now that they felt they had "gone through" conversion, individuals rested secure in their state, even became smug about it, and engaged in rhetorical one-upmanship. Small wonder then that during this period, as Ava Chamberlain points out, Edwards began committing entry upon entry in his notebooks treating spiritual pride and self-righteousness, over against the evidences of persevering behavior. ¹³

In a sermon from February 1737, Edwards extended the theme, painfully aware, even as he was preaching, that *A Faithful Narrative* was about to be published in London, while the people of whom he wrote so glowingly could do little more than exhibit, through their high speeches, what he saw as their own hypocrisy.

Many that are looked upon as saints, and pass for such amongst their neighbors, are accepted as such in the visible church of Christ., . . . yet are those that God's soul hates. . . .

Tis so with respect to the profession and shows that many persons make of religion in words. Many make a very splendid profession of religion, and men have a great esteem of it; ... Many are forward for religious discourse, and in this way make great shows of piety among men. And others admire their talk ... feelingly, and like men of experience. 14

In response, Edwards in this between-awakenings period developed distinctions between true and false Christians to an extent and depth he had not before. The most ambitious exploration of this theme to date was his sermon series on the parable of the wise and foolish virgins, preached in late 1737 and early 1738. The text, while full of categories for distinguishing the two sorts, focuses on hypocritical religious talk of experiences.

A false Christian may make profession of special experience of a work of grace in their hearts, as well as true Christians. He may not only make such a profession of Christianity as visible Christians in general do, in professing their assent to the fundamental doctrine of the

 $^{^{\}rm 12}$ Edwards, MS Sermon on James 2:18, no. 393 (May 1736), WJEO 51.

 $^{^{13}}$ "Editor's Introduction," WJE 18:18-24.

¹⁴ Edwards, MS Sermon on Luke 16:15, no. 421 (Feb. 37), WJEO 52.

gospel, and in either explicitly or implicitly owning their baptismal covenant; but they may pretend that they have had experience of a special work of God's Spirit in their hearts.¹⁵

With all of the suspicion Edwards was casting on "professions of special experiences," it is worthwhile to point to his own "Personal Narrative," written in late 1740—not coincidentally, hard on the heels of George Whitefield's first emotional visit to Northampton, when high-flown talk of experiences abounded. In drafting his own "relation" Edwards combined the traditional elements—childhood and youthful experiments, near-death experiences, cycles of dullness and reviving, significant moments of enlightening—with a retrospective model that included key teachings in which he took delight and benefit. The "Personal Narrative" at once looks backwards and forwards as a form of self-writing, which others would then emulate. 16

Still, he was not yet willing to broadcast beyond his own pulpit his reservations about religious talk. In the *Distinguishing Marks*, preached at Yale College commencement and published in 1741, he inveighed against the increasing amount of censuring that was going on, as well as judging the spiritual state of others. In a remarkable admission for someone who was intently exploring the marks and signs of true versus false faith, he states, "I once did not imagine that the heart of man had been so unsearchable as I find it is. I am less charitable, and less uncharitable than once I was. . . . The longer I live, the less I wonder that God challenges it as his prerogative to try the hearts of the children of men, and has directed that this business should be let alone till the harvest" here being the final judgment.

Rhetorical Hyperbole in the Great Awakening

However much the Great Awakening was beheld by many as a work of God's Spirit, its critics characterized it as an exercise in excess, pointing to interruptions of worship services by moaning, crying out, fainting, trances, and bodily contortions; exhortation by women and people of color; claims to visions and revelations; censuring and judging others as unconverted, accompanied by separatism, schism, and contention—not to mention a detrimental flood of printed polemics. While there was a broad range of controversial behavior, speech was a

¹⁵ Edwards, Sermon on Matt. 25:1-12, no. 454 (Jan. 1738), published in *Sermons by Jonathan Edwards* on the Matthean Parables, Volume I: True and False Christians (On the Parable of the Wise and Foolish Virgins), ed. Kenneth P. Minkema, Adriaan C. Neele, and Bryan McCarthy (Wipf & Stock, 2012), 76.

¹⁶ Printed in WJE 16:790-806.

¹⁷ Edwards Some Thoughts, WJE 4:285.

key and perhaps the most highly contested sphere in terms of who could speak, how, when, and to whom. For his part, Edwards ramped up his efforts to contain "evil speaking" and "corrupt communication," especially among young people, as epitomized in the "Bad Book" case of 1744. He also continued to criticize religious rhetorical inflation amongst converts and proponents of the revivals. Descriptions of ever more dramatic religious experiences became something of a linguistic marker among converts, while radical New Light leaders claimed an ability to discern true grace in others.

As a moderate New Light, Edwards tried to pull his more enthusiastic counterparts back from what he saw as their extremism. In a "Miscellanies" entry from the early 1740s, devoted entirely to "Talk of Experience," he wrote:

The profession that persons make of the divine gifts they have received from God, and their declaring their experiences abroad, is like the wind that accompanies a cloud. . . . So if professors place religion very much in religious discourse, and abound very much in talking of their own experiences, it is a wonder if their religion don't spend itself that way, so that [there] should be but little fruit in good works. 18

So persistent and widespread had the problem with talk of experiences become that Edwards finally went into print with his observations. The issue was, as he saw it in *Some Thoughts Concerning the Revival*, published in early 1743, that the sheer frequency of such windy professions made sincere ones not only the source of doubt but of "prejudice," which would all the more constrain the spread of true religion. "Spiritual pride disposes to speak of other persons' sins" instead of one's own, or to "speak of almost everything that they see amiss in others, in the most harsh, severe and terrible language." In the end, those claiming to be the most zealous Christians, proclaiming the virtue of speaking truth to sin in others in the most plain-spoken way, all the more easily condemned any that they saw as less righteous than themselves. Certainly Christians are to watch over one another, Edwards allowed, but "it don't thence follow that dear brethren in the family of God, in rebuking one another, should use worse language than Michael the archangel durst use in rebuking the devil himself." ¹⁹

By the time Edwards wrote *Religious Affections*, his views on the efficacy of relations and "forwardness" to religious talk as party badges and as means of condemning others were fully formed. Hypocrites "make a great show of their

¹⁸ "Miscellanies," no. 951, WJE 20:210.

¹⁹ Edwards, Some Thoughts, WJE 4:418-20.

humility in speech; but they commonly make a bungling work of it," if not apparent to them, then to observers. Plucking phrases used from relations for decades, Edwards in the Sixth Sign actually parodies the genre:

And therefore they have no other way, many of them, but only to be much in . . . telling how they were humbled to the dust at such and such times, and abounding in very bad expressions which they use about themselves; such as: "I am the least of all saints, I am a poor vile creature, I am not worthy of the least mercy, or that God should look upon me! Oh, I have a dreadful wicked heart! my heart is worse than the devil! Oh, this cursed heart of mine," etc. Such expressions are very often used, not with a heart that is broken, . . . But with a light air, with smiles in the countenance, or with a pharisaical affectation: and we must believe that they are thus humble, and see themselves so vile, upon the credit of their say so; for there is nothing appears in 'em of any savor of humility, in the manner of their deportment and deeds that they do.²⁰

Applying Religious Affections

In the late 1740s, following the publication of Religious Affections, Edwards widely applied his views of "religious talk" in his preaching. One significant example was the sermon on II Kings 23:24, delivered in September 1747, with the doctrine, "Tis a very amiable thing when persons that profess religion, are lively and active in religion." Critiquing those who could talk convincingly about their religious experiences, Edwards observed, "A becoming, external liveliness in religion, consists in liveliness in the practice or business of religion, more than in the profession of it."²¹ Being able to talk at great length about personal experiences was not necessarily a good thing. As historian of sound Richard Rath writes, in the early modern period, when words were believed to have power, "Talk that did not come from an indwelling spiritual experience devalued true speeches." Edwards' criticisms, leveled against lay exhorters among the radical New Lights and Separatists coming out of the revivals and also against people in his own church and community, placed their utterances close to or within the category of what Rath calls "heated" speech, or speech that is "foolish, irrational, morally questionable and, not least of all, dangerous."22 For Edwards' part, he declared that if he lived

²⁰ Edwards, Religious Affections, WJE 2:316-17.

²¹ Edwards, MS Sermon on II Kgs. 23:24, no. 875 (Sept. 1747), WJEO 65.

²² Richard C. Rath, How Early America Sounded (Cornell Univ. Press, 2003), 134, 136.

to see another outpouring of the Spirit, he hoped it would come with more prudence and caution about talk of experience; less talk, and more act, would make what talk there was more effective.

Sounds without Meaning

When in 1748 Edwards announced that he would no longer go along with the profession of faith established under Stoddard, insisting that applicants for full membership no longer simply assent to the old form but instead give a testimony that was more personally relevant. In her recent study of *The Science of* the Soul in Colonial New England, Sarah Rivett describes Edwards' efforts to revive the testimony of faith as a reinvestment in the empirical search for data about God's essence and activity drawn from individual, anomalous testimonies—to preserve "epistemic certainty" in a religious culture in which embodied manifestations of grace were becoming the standard. Rivett argues that Edwards, despite his claims to the contrary, was trying to establish an "exact and certain distinction between saints and hypocrites," and that this was his undoing and indeed the end of "soul science" as it had been pursued since the early 17th century. To nuance Rivett's point, I would say that Edwards wanted to breath new relevance into the genre by making it more circumspect. While he wanted to minimize hypocrisy and self-deception, he also saw these as nearly insoluble challenges among the churched, made more problematic by the unstable nature of language. His solution was not to insist on sure and certain self-knowledge, and to make one's "talk" or self-signification reflect that.

Edwards' decision was a resolution of his reevaluation of the efficacy of profession generally, and to cut short the "multitude of words" coming from talkers of experience and pretended spiritual authorities. Unlike Separatists, who reinstated the earlier requirement of a "particular" relation of grace, Edwards was not concerned so much with length (the examples he gave are no more than a paragraph long) as with accuracy. He felt that words such as "humbled," "convicted," and "awakening" had, through time and overuse, been drained of their meaning. As historian Christopher Grasso writes, in Edwards' view, "scripture words and phrases had been applied like rhetorical tags to a variety of circumstances."²³

What had happened in Northampton, and in many churches that went on similar membership principles, was, Edwards believed, that the profession for joining

²³ Christopher Grasso, "Misrepresentations Corrected: JE and the Regulation of Religious Discourse," in JE's Writings: Text, Context, Interpretation, ed. Stephen J. Stein (Univ. of Indiana, 1996), 22; see also Grasso, *A Speaking Aristocracy: Transforming Public Discourse in Eighteenth-Century Connecticut* (Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1999), ch. 2.

the church had become pro forma, so that not only merely nominal believers were admitted to full membership, but people who were truly ignorant of their state. In early 1750, he delivered a lecture series attempting to convince his people about his way of thinking, declaring,

If it should be allowed that 'tis lawful and a duty for a natural man that knows he do not accept of Christ nor give himself up to God, openly and solemnly to dissemble and willfully to lie in his owning and sealing the covenant, and declare before the church that he does: . . . if this be known to be the principle proceeded in, his words cease to be of the nature of a profession of the covenant . . . If he says he gives himself up to God, the principle is, that 'tis lawful for him to lie, and that is the principle that he goes upon, and that the church understands him to go upon; so that he don't intend to mean what he says, nor do the church understand him to mean any such thing.²⁴

This lecture series, followed by the printed *Humble Inquiry*, did not succeed in convincing his people to reform their misuse of language in the way he wanted, and this, among other factors, led to his dismissal.²⁵

Nevertheless, Edwards continued to pursue his insistence that words must have a consensual, specific meaning. In *Misrepresentations Corrected*, written as a response to a response to *An Humble Inquiry*, Edwards pointed out that "Words declare or profess nothing any otherwise than by their signification: for to declare or profess something by words, is to *signify* something by words—and therefore if nothing is signified by words of a pretended profession, nothing is really professed."²⁶ If this were the case, human communication became nothing more than "sounds without meaning."

Since the beginning of his pastorate, Edwards had wrestled with the problem of having a congregation that had grown up under the gospel, in "a land of light," and had the benefit of means, ordinances, and powerful preaching, but became indifferent to divine truths, because hearing the same truths over and over made them incapable of attaching personal relevance to what they heard and were

²⁴ Lectures on the Qualifications for Full Communion in the Church of Christ, WJE 25:435.

²⁵ He explained himself further to the audience beyond Northampton in the preface to *Farewell Sermon* (WJE 25:490): "The great thing which I have scrupled in the established method of this church's proceeding, and which I dare no longer go on in, is their publicly assenting to the form of words rehearsed on occasion of their admission to the communion,... it being, at the same time that the words are used, their known and established principle, which they openly profess and proceed upon, that men may and ought to use these words, and mean no such thing, but something else of a nature far inferior; which I think they have no distinct determinate notion of."

²⁶ Misrepresentations Corrected, WJE 12:389.

taught. Their professions arose not from personal conviction, or any evidence to their minds or hearts, but as a sort of ritual that confirmed their place in the community. That is one reason why Edwards struggled with defining and presenting the idea of the "new sense" in an affective idiom.

In the end, he achieved a resolution by calling for a balance between self-description based on individual experience and on exhibiting "universal persevering obedience," or Christian practice. He enunciated this synthesis in *Religious Affections*, but achieved it—at least as much as he was able—in the unlikeliest of places: among the Mahicans and Mohawks of the Stockbridge mission post. His sacrament sermons to the natives contained a renewed emphasis on self-examination that was an extension of his new views on covenantal qualifications. And he brought back "particular" relations, not with any view to turning Separatist or turning back the clock to the early 17th century, but in a new key in tune with what he felt were the church's challenges in defining individual sainthood and the nature of the body of Christ as a whole. We have a couple of examples of relations, in Edwards' hand, signed by Stockbridge Indians. These relations are characterized not by claims of full assurance of salvation, or name-dropping of the names of prominent evangelists such as Whitefield, but are full of reticence and carefully qualified estimations of motive and desire:

And I now profess, that so far as I know my own heart, I have from my heart consented to the covenant of grace, proposing salvation through free grace in Christ alone; and so I hope I have consented to that which my parents did in giving me up to God, Father, Son and Holy Ghost, in my baptism, making this my own act, by giving myself up to God, choosing God for my Father and portion, and Christ as my Lord and Savior, and the sanctification of the Spirit as my happiness; promising to walk in a way of obedience to all the commandments of God as long as I live, and to be subject to the government of this church during my abode here.²⁷

"So far as I know my own heart" . . . "I hope" . . . "promising." These are nearly the very phrases Samuel Grant used a half century earlier. There is a lack of finality, a conditionality, a sense that the professor's life has yet to manifest all that he or she has professed, yet an owning and application of eternal truths that, for Edwards, brought the directives of scripture, personal experience, and the spoken word into harmony.

²⁷ My italics. Edwards, "Drafts of Professions of Faith," WJEO 39.

Abstract

In his involvement with religious revivals in mid-eighteenth century New England, Jonathan Edwards became concerned with how converts described their religious experiences, sometimes profusely and to the exclusion of all else. Drawing upon his inherited ecclesiology and conversionist culture, Edwards embarked on a critique of his congregation and then of participants in the revivals who dwelt on "talk of experiences" rather than on practice or behavior.

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SORTING OUT THE GENUINE FROM THE COUNTERFEIT: JONATHAN EDWARDS ON TESTING THE SPIRITS

Jonathan Edwards (1703-58) was one of the five or so greatest theologians in the history of the Christian church. Like Luther, he was a master of the Bible, and determined to make Scripture his final rule for faith and practice. But unlike Luther, he promoted the work of the Holy Spirit through revival. In fact, he believed that the key to secular history is the history of revival. For example, the revival of the early church eventually converted the Roman Empire. The revival of the Reformation, he pointed out, helped form what became modern Europe.

Edwards was himself a theologian of revival. When liberals said true religion is essentially a matter of belief, and enthusiasts said true religion is basically a matter of the emotions, Edwards said No, true religion is a matter of the affections, that deepest source of the self which we used to call the soul, that inspires not only the thoughts of the mind but also the feelings and choices of the heart. Revival is needed, he said, to revive the soul's affections, so that people see the beauty of God and have their minds and wills and emotions transformed.

Edwards wrote several treatises defending the Great Awakening, a massive series of revivals that swept up and down the American colonies in 1740-41, brought a new unity to what had been divided colonies, and led indirectly to the American Revolution thirty years later.

The Great Awakening saw both heaven and hell come to earth. Edwards said that when the Holy Spirit sends revival, the first one to get revived is the devil. So while there were spirits of light from God that brought new life and truth and beauty to thousands, there were also spirits of darkness that sowed division, confusion and craziness at the same time.

Therefore, a few years after the Awakening had passed, Edwards wrote a book on how to test the spirits, the *Religious Affections* (1746). It was a work of spiritual discernment. Some have said it was the most comprehensive and penetrating work of spiritual discernment ever written in the history of Christian thought.

Edwards presented two series of twelve—twelve unreliable signs of true faith, and twelve reliable signs of true faith.

The first set of twelve signs were those that Christians often use to determine whether the Spirit is present in a person or movement. But Edwards said every one is unreliable. None is supported by Scripture as a reliable sign that the Spirit has truly come with his indwelling presence.

Let me go through these unreliable signs very briefly.

- 1. <u>Intense religious affections</u>. Edwards said the Galatians would have been willing to pluck out their eyes for Paul, but Paul said he feared he may have labored in vain over them. Those who saw Lazarus wept and rejoiced over his resuscitation, but then only days later joined the crowds crying, "Crucify him! Crucify him!"
- 2. <u>Much fervent talk about religion</u>. Edwards said false religious affections are more likely to talk all the time about their spiritual experiences than are true affections. Peter and Jude both told their readers to beware of false teachers who are full of talk but empty of life.
- 3. Many religious affections at the same time. Edwards said the stony ground hearers in the sower and the seed parable had faith and joy at first but later revealed they did not have true faith.
- 4. A certain sequence or order in the affections, such as going from terror before God to comfort after learning of the gospel promise. Edwards pointed out that Cornelius had no grief over his sin but came to true faith. We are told by Jesus to discern by looking to the nature of the fruit, not the Spirit's method or order when bringing a person to faith.
- 5. Spiritual experiences not produced by the self. It is true that most conversions in the NT were dramatic and not self-generated, but there are other powers that can counterfeit true religion such as Satan, angels of light and the human psyche itself. Both Balaam and Judas were used by the Spirit in dramatic ways, but

neither had the indwelling Spirit; both were wicked men.

- 6. Scriptures coming miraculously to mind. Satan can do the same, as he showed in the desert with Jesus.
- 7. Physical manifestations. True faith will manifest itself physically from time to time, but the mere presence of bodily effects does not guarantee the presence of the Holy Spirit. King Saul was slain in the Spirit twice but proved to be a wicked man.
- 8. Frequent and passionate praise for God. At the Red Sea the Israelites sang to and praised God, but shortly after worshipped the Golden Calf.
- 9. The appearance of love. All good things, especially love, are counterfeited. Even love for Jesus, as John shows in his letter to the church at Ephesus, saying they lost their first love. Jesus said that in the coming times of trial, the love of many would grow cold.
- 10. Zealous or time-consuming devotion to religious activities. Jesus talked at the end of the Sermon on the Mount about those who prophesied, cast out demons, and performed miracles, but of whom he said, "I never knew you."
- 11. Being convinced one is saved. Edwards pointed out that our hearts are easily self-deceived, as were the Pharisees about their own salvation.
- 12. Others being convinced that someone is saved. Jesus said the weeds and wheat look alike until harvest time, and that, as Scripture reminds us, man looks at the outward appearance, but God looks at the heart.

So if none of these oft-used criteria are reliable, which criteria are? The answer is Edwards' twelve positive signs. These, he said, usually all hang together, and when taken as an interconnected chain of characteristics, point reliably to the presence of the indwelling Spirit.

- 1. A divine and supernatural source. This is the presence of the indwelling Spirit of God, who lives in the saint (which means any true Christian) on a permanent basis. Edwards said the Spirit can move through a natural man (one who has not been regenerated), or use him in some way, but will not give him a new principle of action from the inside. Balaam is a good example: the Spirit spoke through him truly of the future of Israel, but he remained a wicked man whom the NT condemned as the author of idolatry and immorality. In the true saint, the Spirit remakes the person from the inside out, imparting a new power, a new spiritual sense, and a gradual increase of holiness.
- 2. Attraction to God and his ways for their own sake. Edwards argued that a true saint will be attracted to God primarily because of what she sees in God, not primarily for the benefits God confers. When Satan told God that Job's worship

was based on love for self rather than love for God, God conceded the point. He allowed Satan to take away all that Job had, in the hope of proving that Job's faith was *not* based simply on self-interest. This is why, Edwards charged, saints rejoice in God and His beauty, while the merely presumptuous rejoice in themselves and their own spiritual experiences.

- 3. Seeing the beauty of holiness. The scriptures often describe the knowing of the regenerate as a kind of seeing. John writes, "No one who abides in him sins; no one who sins has seen him or knows him," and "the one who does evil has not seen God" (1 John 3.6; 3 John 11). Jesus said, "I have come into this world so that those who do not see may see" (John 9.39). But what do the saints see? The answer is the glory or beauty of divine things—which the Bible calls "the beauty of holiness" (Ps 29.2; 96.9). According to Edwards, this is the beauty that makes the person of Jesus so ravishingly beautiful, that has drawn the hearts of billions to Himself for thousands of years. The devil and the damned, he added, see the holiness of God, but they do not see the beauty of that holiness. How can that be? When I was in high school a teacher took me to an art museum. While he gazed with love and delight at one painting after another, I looked at my watch. I saw the same paintings my teacher saw, but I did not see their beauty. I could not "see" because my heart and mind did not have the capacity to see and enjoy the art. Seeing the beauty of Jesus Christ and the glory of redemption is similar. People without the Spirit don't see the glory of God and Christ because they are not able to. Their eyes have not been opened to divine beauty, so they cannot see it or enjoy it.
- 4. This means <u>a new knowing</u>. It is not merely knowledge of doctrine, or conviction of conscience. Nor is it knowledge of the mystical meaning of a biblical passage, for Paul said that I can have the gift of prophecy and understand all mysteries, but without love I am nothing (1 Cor. 13.2). Neither is it hearing a voice or seeing a vision, for the unregenerate can experience both of these things. Instead, it is a "sense of the heart" that sees that the wounds of Christ on the cross are not ugly but beautiful and is now able to see that Christ and his redemption are the inner meaning of all the Scriptures.
- 5. Deep-seated conviction. True faith is not just an intellectual conclusion but also a gift given by revelation: "No one knows who the Father is but him to whom the Son has revealed it" (Lk 10.21).
- 6. <u>Humility</u>. True saints are truly humble. They do not seek position and prestige, and are willing both to confess their sins and to clean toilets. They know that God resists the proud but gives grace to the humble (James 4.6).
 - 7. Change of nature. The Bible describes conversion as being born again, be-

coming a new creature, rising from the dead, being renewed in the spirit of your mind, dying to sin and living to Christ, being partakers of the divine nature. Therefore those who claim faith but are not being gradually "transformed by the renewal of their minds" (Rom 12.2) must examine themselves to see if they be in the faith (2 Cor 13.5).

- 8. A Christ-like spirit. Jesus said his disciples were to be like children—which means not to be immature but to be willing to admit publicly when they are wrong, to be teachable, and to realize they deserve and need discipline. Children also forgive more easily than adults, and so disciples must imitate Christ who forgave even his enemies.
- 9. <u>Fear of God</u>. This is the "beginning of wisdom." It is not servile terror, but the desire to please and not offend a loving Father. It remembers that even the angels cover their faces before God's throne (Isaiah 6), and that God looks for those who tremble at his word (Is 66.2).
- 10. <u>Balance</u>. True saints, said Edwards show godly "proportion" and a beautiful "symmetry" in their lives. By this he meant a balance between fear of God and assurance of salvation, between joy in God and mourning for sin, between love for God and love for neighbor, between love for friends and love for strangers, between love for neighbor and love for family, between caring for others' material needs as well as their souls, between trusting for God for salvation and trusting God to provide for our other needs, between following Jesus in good times and following in bad, between public worship and secret prayer.
- 11. <u>Hunger for God</u>. True saints do not rest on their laurels, contenting themselves with knowing that they have been saved, but forget what lies behind and strain forward to what lies ahead (Phil. 3.13-14). They are not complacent, but hunger and thirst for righteousness (Matt 5.6).
- 12. Christian practice. This, for Edwards, is the most important sign of grace. Jesus said it is the only way we can pick out false prophets, and James said it is the way we can show that we have faith. It means, among other things, crucifying our favorite sin—the total surrender of which Mother Teresa spoke—and perseverance until the end of life. We will stumble and fall, and even backslide, but saints pick themselves up off the ground, ask forgiveness, and plead for grace to continue walking. For Paul tells us that Messiah Jesus has reconciled us in his body of flesh by his death "provided that you continue in the faith, stable and steadfast, not shifting from the hope of the gospel that you heard" (Col. 1.28).

Edwards warned that these reliable signs of grace are not meant for us to become spiritual detectives, denouncing others for not showing the fruit of the Spirit

and therefore damned to hell. For God alone knows the hearts of men and women. But they are important to pastors, to warn them not to give assurance of salvation on the basis of spiritual experience alone, rather than the whole constellation of signs of grace here described. They also help us to discern in ourselves, and in our own ministries, the difference between genuine works of the Spirit and works or experiences coming from other spirits altogether.

What I have just outlined is merely the jacket, as it were, of Edwards' *Religious Affections*. I trust that you can see the body under the jacket is a powerful source of spiritual discernment that will be immensely useful for the global Christianity that is now emerging in this new century.

Abstract

A few years after the Awakening had passed, Edwards wrote a book on how to test the spirits, the *Religious Affections* (1746). It was a work of spiritual discernment. Some have said it was the most comprehensive and penetrating work of spiritual discernment ever written in the history of Christian thought. In this work, Edwards presented two series of twelve—twelve unreliable signs of true faith, and twelve reliable signs of true faith.

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"SINGLY, PARTICULARLY, CLOSELY": EDWARDS AS MENTOR

It is now a commonplace to assume Jonathan Edwards' pastoral ineptitude in the period after the revivals. His bungling in the Bad Book Affair of 1744 sees him naming and shaming the *witnesses* along with the alleged *perpetrators* of the scurrilous use of a midwifery manual. He baulks at pastoral visitation of members of his parish, and instead spends long hours each day in his study reading and writing. He finds himself in the middle of pamphlet warfare in the late 1740s when he tries to justify his actions in limiting the qualifications for communion, though it appears no one is listening, or at least no one is reading his defence. He is portrayed in this crisis as mounting a rear-guard action to squash lay rights by asserting his patrician, Puritan, and clerical authority over the congregation, despite the fact that he released new energy amongst the laity through his preaching during the revivals. He is ultimately dismissed in 1750 after twenty-three years ministry in Northampton. He has become known as a poor shepherd of the flock, even if a preeminent philosopher and theologian.

There is of course substantial evidence to build this case. Samuel Hopkins, a close confidante and responsible for Edwards' first biography, acknowledges that Edwards was not prone to home visitation given his aversion to small talk.¹

¹ Samuel Hopkins, *The Life and Character of the late Reverend, Learned, and Pious Mr. Jonathan Edwards, President of the College at New-Jersey, together with Extracts from his Private Writings and Diary* (2nd ed., Northampton: Andrew Wright, 1804), 54, 72. Edwards was nevertheless happy for others with the gift of pastoral conversation to exercise this ministry.

Edwards, in his own and others' estimation, recognised that his own gifting was essentially as a writer, and not as a speaker: "his tongue was as the pen." He at first resists the call to take on the position as President of the College of New Jersey because it would take him away from writing and burden him with a large load of speaking engagements. He could be absent-minded in the minutiae of daily life, not knowing how his milk reached the table, although he did make it his own chore to chop wood for the fire. His determination to hold on to his responsibilities at Northampton when all seemed lost does suggest a man wilfully out of touch with reality, exercising forlorn hope for continuation of ministerial leadership.

Despite these shortcomings, it is the purpose of this essay to reframe the pastoral labours of Edwards, to review his context and to highlight his competencies. As a significant category of pastoral theology, it will be my contention that Edwards was actually a very skilled mentor and expert trainer of leaders for the church. While his ministry of mentoring may not have been unique in his day, he nonetheless acquitted himself well in this pastoral practice, especially in the relationship he developed with Samuel Hopkins and Joseph Bellamy as will be explored here. At one level his personality might have worked against congregational cooperation, creating pastoral tensions. At another level, however, his character, spiritual discernment, and openness to sharing his life and to new models of communication, were transformative, and created a significant legacy through those whom he mentored. Though Hopkins points out some of Edwards' weaknesses, he undertakes this task as one having been empowered by, and having benefited from, Edwards' mentoring ministry. Hopkins is also quick to point out that while bashful in some settings, Edwards was actually more sociable and affa-

² Hopkins, *Life*, 49, 81.

³ Jonathan Edwards, "To the Trustees of the College of New Jersey," in *Letters and Personal Writings*, WJE 16:726, 729.

⁴ Hopkins, Life, 54.

⁵ It is worth pointing out that Edwards' dismissal from pastoral responsibilities was not unique, but was a relatively common occurrence in eighteenth century New England, signalling issues that were bigger than the disagreements between Edwards and his congregation. Edwards Jnr, and Hopkins, for example, faced similar pastoral separation.

⁶ A revived appreciation for the movement spawned by Edwards, mediated through his closest adherents, is attested in recent publications concerning the "New Divinity," and Edwards' legacy. See *The New England Theology: From Jonathan Edwards to Edwards Amasa Park*, ed. Douglas A. Sweeney and Allen C. Guelzo (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006); *The Legacy of Jonathan Edwards: American Religion and the Evangelical Tradition*, ed. Darryl G. Hart, Sean M. Lucas and Stephen J. Nichols (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003); *Jonathan Edwards and the American Experience*, ed. Nathan O. Hatch and Harry S. Stout (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); and Douglas A. Sweeney, *The American Evangelical Story: A History of the Movement* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005), 59-61.

ble than was commonly assumed.⁷ Hopkins makes clear that Edwards was a skilful guide in spiritual matters, who addressed the soul issues of his family, friends and students "singly and particularly." Edwards himself, in outlining the educational needs of Indian children in his care at Stockbridge, outlines his concern to treat them "singly, particularly and closely." The unexplored theme of mentoring in Edwards' ministry, and the urgent need for contemporary churches to better exercise leadership development, prompt the writing of this article.

Schools of the Prophets: Edwards's Context for Mentoring

Recent ethical inquiry has again seen the need to draw attention to human moral formation in order to complement the categories of deontological or duty-based ethical deliberation, and consequentialist or utilitarian positions, which have been particularly suited to Enlightenment foundations. 10 Virtue theory is making a comeback, for without giving an account of the moral life or the character of an agent facing moral dilemmas, discussion of liminal ethical case studies can be interpreted as reductionist and dissatisfying. 11 Edwards himself devoted prodigious energies to provide a teleological account of the nature of virtue in a world that was abandoning theistic assumptions. 12 His own ethical theory of consent to being, evident throughout his writings, was an essentially dynamic and relational strategy in which goodness and beauty were related within a theistic worldview to maximise the growth towards human happiness or flourishing. 13 Edwards is passionately concerned about moral formation, within which his own attempts at mentoring are to be located. More concretely, mentoring can be defined as that intentional activity between two people which seeks to empower for spiritual development, often with the result of enhancing skills and attitudes for leadership. It most often occurs through face-to-face encounters, and is supported through other strategies, like letter writing, discussion of decision-making, and sharing resources. Smither, is his book Augustine as Mentor, helpfully suggests that "mentoring in essence means that a master, expert, or someone with significant experience is imparting knowledge and skill to a novice in an atmosphere of discipline,

⁷ Hopkins, *Life*, 44, 46.

⁸ Ibid., 47, 54, 55.

⁹ Edwards to Sir William Pepperrell, WJE 16: 412.

¹⁰ See Alaisdair McIntyre, *After Virtue? A Study in Moral Theology* (3rd ed., Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007).

¹¹ Phil C. Zylla, *Virtue as Consent to Being: A Pastoral-Theological Perspective on Jonathan Edwards's Construct of Virtue* (McMaster Ministry Studies Series; Eugene: Pickwick, 2011), 2.

¹² Jonathan Edwards, "Dissertation II: The Nature of True Virtue," WJE 8:537-628.

¹³ Zylla, Virtue as Consent, 47, 54, 74.

commitment, and accountability."¹⁴ Edwards, both theoretically and practically, espoused a ministry of mentoring.

Indeed, it is quite remarkable that though the word 'mentor' itself was first used in modern literature by Fénelon at the end of the seventeenth century in the book *Les aventures de Télémaque*, and its first known appearance in English occurs in 1750 in the writing of Lord Chesterfield, the word appears in correspondence between Edwards' two most significant disciples, Samuel Hopkins (1721-1803) and Joseph Bellamy (1719-1790), as early as 1758, to refer to Edwards himself:

I have enclos'd to you the Answer to J. G. partly because agreed to take it, and get it printed, but forgot it. but especially, because Mentor has lately been here, and advises by all Means to have it published ... MENTOR has heard it and commends it, and offerd to be the first Subscriber.¹⁵

The writings of Fénelon circulated widely in colonial America; references to *Télémaque* appear in Edwards' own "Catalogue" some time between February 18, 1744 and July 15, 1746, so it may not be surprising that this vocabulary circulated amongst the coterie of his closest friends just a few years later. ¹⁶ Indeed, Hopkins was himself greatly influenced by the ethical theory of disinterested benevolence which was espoused by Fénelon and his interlocutor Madame de Guyon in late seventeenth century France. ¹⁷ Furthermore, the fact that the word 'mentor' in the above quotation is capitalised, in the first instance initially and on the second occurrence in its entirety, may be evidence that it functions as a proper noun and refers to the lead character of that name in Fénelon's book. This matrix of mentoring associations from literature further supports Edwards' involvement in a ministry of mentoring.

More significant still than the use of certain words or literary models is the

¹⁴ Edward L. Smither, *Augustine as Mentor: A Model for Preparing Spiritual Leaders* (Nashville: B&H Academic, 2008), 4. I want, however, to take issue with Smither's presentation, in as far as he seems to suggest that any patterns of influence whatsoever can be denoted as mentoring. Augustine's *individual letters* may have served the purpose of deliberate Christian formation, but it is much harder to see this being the case when Augustine gives a *speech in a synod*. Providing resources for instruction can be mentoring when these books target spiritual or ministerial lacunae, but the publication of discourses or treatises does not constitute mentoring *tout court*. For example, see Smither, *Augustine as Mentor*, 185-186.

¹⁵ Samuel Hopkins to Joseph Bellamy, 19 Jan. 1758, WJEO 32, Letter C141a. Mentor was appointed as tutor to Télémaque while his father was absent undertaking his odyssey, and had the responsibility to teach his pupil how to rule wisely and to live simply.

¹⁶ Edwards, "Catalogue" of Reading, entry no. 462, WJE 26:230.

¹⁷ Peter J. Thuesen, "Editor's Introduction," in WJE 26:65; see also Stephen Post, "Disinterested Benevolence: An American Debate over the Nature of Christian Love," *Journal of Religious Ethics* 14 (1986): 356-368.

mentoring tradition from which Edwards drew. This was an ancient practice despite its new literary shape. Monastic foundations, for example, had made faith transmission an essential part of their reason for being since the fourth century. Leaders of such communities were entitled abbot, appealing etymologically to their role as "father" or "abba" of the house, from whom the individual monks received spiritual direction. Augustine is particularly deliberate in forming his clergy through their common commitment to a monastic rule, ¹⁸ though the Puritan movement disavowed the contemplative features of monastic mentoring, preferring the active model of universities which made passing on the faith a critical indicator of their success. John Preston exemplified such a Puritan mindset of multiplication in espousing the strategic potential of the Colleges of Cambridge: "a preacher in the University doth generare patres, beget begetters." Even when local parishes during the reigns of Elizabeth or James I refused to offer the living to a Puritan preacher, such leaders could be accommodated within the life of the church through appointment as a lecturer, or self-supported teacher, who was neither responsible for regular Sunday services nor answerable to the patron of the parish. Itinerants of a sort, they resembled members of medieval mendicant orders in modern Protestant guise.²⁰

Edwards' mentoring ministry was further shaped by the relatively common practice amongst disenfranchised English Puritans of building a local community of like-minded believers for training in preaching and godly living. A framework for collaborative learning outside of the formal structures of ecclesiastical preparation became the fall-back position for those like Richard Greenham of Dry Dayton, five miles north-west of Cambridge in England, who encouraged young men to take up residence in his parsonage, to create an environment in which mutual correction and encouragement might be practised, and thereby to prepare men for Puritan ministry.²¹ These "schools of the prophets," drawing their inspiration from communities of prophesying leaders described in 1 Samuel 19, or 2 Kings 2, where disciples were trained to handle the law, became a common and effective strategy for faith transmission in the seventeenth century. Not bound by church regulations or episcopal rule, these colleges of learning were united more radically by 'bonds of affection,' and generated great loyalty and common vision.²² Such

¹⁸ Smither, Augustine as Mentor, 148-55.

¹⁹ As quoted in William Haller, *The Rise of Puritanism: Or, The Way to the New Jerusalem as set forth in Pulpit and Press from Thomas Cartwright to John Lilburne and John Milton, 1570-1643* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957), 73.

²⁰ Haller, The Rise of Puritanism, 29-30.

²¹ Ibid., 26-29.

²² For example, Bellamy's school was characterised by its "spiritual fraternalism." Mark Valeri, *Law*

spiritual disposition is highlighted in the work of William Haller, who is inclined to see this contribution as constitutive of the Puritan movement as a whole.²³ In the New World, such informal training strategies were integral to the stability of the church. Local home seminaries not only received the graduates of Harvard or Yale College to prepare them for a learned ministry,²⁴ but they even prepared boys for enrolment in university before the Great Awakening.²⁵

However, such an educational model did gain new dynamism in the course of the New England revivals. While Harvard and Yale had themselves been conceived as "schools of the prophets," their rationale as training institutes for clergy was being undermined. Opposition to the revivals from the standing order of New England church leadership had caused doubts in some minds as to whether those leaders, trained at the recognised universities and critical of the revivals, were actually converted. George Whitefield, during his New England itinerations, accused the ecclesiastical cadre of being unregenerate, the model of a "reverse jeremiad" in which many amongst the laity were encouraged to speak critically of the ministerial caste, and to appeal for their penitent response. Such was the animus, that there developed in New Jersey a new training institute, nicknamed the Log College, in which the apprenticeship model of ministerial training was situated within an atmosphere of revivalist sensitivities. Not surprisingly, Whitefield himself was especially enamoured of the project when he visited in November 1739:

The place wherein the young men study now is, in contempt, called *the College*. It is a log-house, about twenty feet long, and nearly as many broad; and, to me, it seemed to resemble the school of the old prophets

and Providence in Joseph Bellamy's New England: The Origins of the New Divinity in Revolutionary America (Religion in America Series; New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 20.

²³ Perry Miller accentuated the rationalist stream in Puritan consciousness, contra William Haller. Janice Knight draws on both sets of insights to argue for a more heterogeneous movement, though she argues that New England Puritanism was dominated by the school of the "spiritual brethren," as highlighted by Haller, rather than the "intellectual fathers" as Miller denoted those following Ames rather than Sibbes. See Janice Knight, *Orthodoxies in Massachusetts: Rereading American Puritanism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 10, 34. Their preaching style is a significant marker of distinction, with the "fathers" stressing logic and doctrine, and the "brethren" stressing rhetoric and the power of the affections. Haller, *The Rise of Puritanism*, 15, 19, 20, 48, 53, 54.

²⁴ Richard Warch, *School of the Prophets: Yale College*, 1701-40 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1973), 192, 268.

²⁵ Joseph Conforti, Samuel Hopkins and the New Divinity Movement: Calvinism, the Congregational Ministry, and Reform in New England between the Great Awakenings (Grand Rapids: Christian University Press, 1981), 21-22. An elementary school was located in East Windsor in Timothy Edwards' manse: see ..(....)...Kenneth P. Minkema, "Jonathan Edwards on Education and His Educational Legacy," in After Edwards: The Courses of the New England Theology, ed. D. A. Sweeney and O. D. Crisp (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 31-49, especially 31-32. Warch, School of the Prophets, 188, 189.

²⁶ Ibid., 33.

... From this despised place, seven or eight worthy ministers of Jesus have lately been sent forth; more are almost ready to be sent; and a foundation is now being laid for the instruction of many others . . . Carnal ministers oppose them strongly \dots^{27}

While Schnittjer has shown that such a learning community was not indigenous to America, this college was nevertheless the first of its type in Pennsylvania. Tennent combined divinity and piety as twin goals of learning, but did so in the context of family life, farming, common worship, practical ministry exposure, and generous personal investment in the next generation of leadership, enabling a mentoring dynamic of significant pedagogical value. ²⁹

Schools of the prophets were on the ascendancy in New England as well. Revivalist aspirations in Connecticut, for example, were especially at home amongst the middling sort of youth, who saw personal regeneration as the best kind of credential for church leadership, rejecting social standing alone as a qualification for ministry. Such ministerial inclinations also promoted mobility, for the New Lights from Yale refused to return to the village or town where they had grown up, if this meant being apprenticed to an unregenerate pastor. Initiative for mentoring received new energy *from below*, as the recent college graduate had to choose with whom his ministerial traineeship would be served. Rural men, without significant financial means, would appreciate not just cheap tuition, but would be able to contribute their own skills and labour to the life of the training community. Edwards received many such ministry aspirants, two of the most notable being Dr Joseph Bellamy and Dr Samuel Hopkins who each later established a school

²⁷ George Whitefield, *Journals: A New Edition Containing Fuller Material than any Hitherto Published* (Guildford and London: Banner of Truth Trust, 1960), 354-55.

²⁸ Schnittjer makes the case that it was not so much its institutional novelty that made this College famous, as much as the educational experience focused in mentoring which William Tennent, Sr. practised there. It should be added that much of the mentoring experience of its students, probably no more than twenty in number, was not intentional. Tennent drew on traditional academic categories, but necessity created new opportunities for shared experiences of farming or discussion of revival vicissitudes. See Gary E. Schnittjer, "The Ingredients of Effective Mentoring: The Log College as a Model for Mentorship," *Christian Education Journal* 15/1 (1994): 86-100. Despite meagre beginnings, it is estimated that its graduates went on to spawn some sixty institutions of higher learning, Princeton amongst them.

²⁹ Schnittjer, "Ingredients of Effective Mentoring," 94-95. Schnittjer's paper provides a useful outline of Tennent's mentoring ministry, though it does not expound the particulars of those mentoring dynamics.

³⁰ Conforti, Samuel Hopkins and the New Divinity Movement, 24. As well as ministry training in churches, such students may well have attended Yale too, as the College drew in a significant number of sons of farmers and artisans, opening up educational possibilities for them. See Warch, School of the Prophets, 153, 252.

³¹ Conforti, Samuel Hopkins and the New Divinity Movement, 39.

of the prophets to great effect.³² Bellamy was of a different stamp from Edwards: a pugnacious preacher,³³ from a different social background,³⁴ and known for a kind of vulgarity,³⁵ but was regarded as Edwards' most intimate friend.³⁶ Hopkins was not as accomplished a preacher as Edwards or Bellamy, had no family ties to the clergy, and needed entrée into a new social matrix, but turned out to be the executor of Edwards' literary remains.³⁷ Cumulatively, their efforts generated a distinctive Calvinist school, referred to at first by detractors, and then more widely, as the New Divinity.³⁸ Such was the constructive power of a mentoring mindset.

Edwards' home was a magnet for those looking to be trained. Hopkins had originally intended to move away from New England and his home in Waterbury in western Connecticut to study under Tennent in Pennsylvania, but decided in the end to complete his training in Northampton, after hearing Edwards preach on the validity of the revival at the Yale commencement of 1741.³⁹ Hopkins used Edwards' library, filled the pulpit in his absence, and fortuitously benefited greatly from the stimulating spiritual conversation of Sarah Edwards.⁴⁰ Joseph Bellamy resided in Edwards' home too, where he enjoyed the stability of family life, which he himself had missed growing up.⁴¹ Bellamy was arguably the most significant mentor in the nascent movement for revival, establishing the first private ministry training institute in New England in Bethlehem, Connecticut, and shaping some twenty-five ministers of the Gospel, including Jonathan Edwards, Jr.⁴² It had been of course an asset to Edwards that he had a happy marriage and eight daughters amongst his eleven children, which made a ministry apprenticeship in his home that much more attractive.⁴³ He made potential suitors most welcome:

³² Bellamy ministered in Bethlehem from 1740 to 1790, and was recognised as running the most successful ministry training school in Connecticut: Conforti, *Samuel Hopkins and the New Divinity Movement*, 35. Samuel Hopkins ministered at Housatonic (later called Great Barrington), Massachusetts from 1743 to 1769, then at Newport, Rhode Island, from 1770 until his death in 1803.

³³ Valeri, Law and Providence, 18.

³⁴ Ibid., 10, 13.

³⁵ Edwards, "The Preface to *True Religion* by Joseph Bellamy," in WJE 4:572.

³⁶ Valeri, Law and Providence, 14.

³⁷ Conforti, Samuel Hopkins and the New Divinity Movement, 13.

³⁸ Ibid., 1-7.

³⁹ This sermon was later revised to become the tract, *Distinguishing Marks*, WJE 4:213-88.

⁴⁰ Conforti, *Samuel Hopkins and the New Divinity Movement*, 31. Bellamy had so valued the encouragement that Edwards provided, that when a position in Stockbridge became available, he entreated Edwards to take up the opportunity, so that Hopkins in nearby Housatonic might benefit from Edwards' closer input.

 $^{^{41}}$ Valeri, *Law and Providence*, 11, 173. See also Bellamy's MS student notebook of 1736, which he used while a student with Edwards, in Yale University Divinity School, Special Collections.

⁴² Ibid., 56, 87, 157; Conforti, Samuel Hopkins and the New Divinity Movement, 38.

⁴³ It was not just Edwards' home that attracted suitors for his daughters. Phineas Fiske prepared

If any gentleman desired acquaintance with his daughters, after handsomely introducing himself, by properly consulting the parents, he was allowed all opportunity for it, and a room and fire, if needed: but must not intrude on the proper hours of rest and sleep, nor the religion and order of the family.⁴⁴

A later long-term guest in the Edwards parsonage was the consumptive David Brainerd, for whom both Edwards and his daughter Jerusha had much affection.

Closeness of family ties abound throughout Edwards' own school of the prophets and its heirs, creating a tight movement. Awareness of common social background outside of the traditional New England standing order, and commitment to the peer group with whom one was formed, was further encouraged through the Saybrook Platform in Connecticut, which since 1707 had valorised a pseudo-Presbyterian ecclesiology. 45 Interestingly, these schools of the prophets quite deliberately played down the types of competencies which were traditional in ministerial formation, for example home visitation, or broader social engagement. The minister as revivalist-preacher, and as local theologian, were rather the models set before those being trained. 46 The task of the teacher in the later movement was to ensure that apologetic arguments could be mounted to defend the theology of the revivals, even if this made the approach to learning more deductive and logical than Edwards would himself have espoused.⁴⁷ The influence of these schools in shaping followers needs to be set against Edwards' deliberate but perhaps disingenuous disavowal of belonging to a school named after Calvin.⁴⁸ While there can be no doubt that Edwards' theological trajectory can be named Reformed, his refusal to follow slavishly any one thinker was both true, given the breadth and liberality of his reading, and wise, as a strategy for training up the next generation of leaders, who would have to stand on their own two feet, and not just parrot him. Hopkins, perhaps with a hint of self-justifying independence, makes this clear in his biography:

He [Edwards] took his religious principles from the Bible, and not from any human system or body of divinity. Though his principles

pupils for College, and trained them afterwards in his own parsonage: "In this last role he may have had mixed motives, however, for he managed to marry his three daughters to three Yale graduates who came to study divinity with him." Warch, School of the Prophets, 270-71.

⁴⁴ Hopkins, Life, 48.

⁴⁵ Conforti, Samuel Hopkins and the New Divinity Movement, 57.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 35-36.

⁴⁷ Melvin B. Endy, Jr., "Theology and Learning in Early America," in *Schools of Thought in the Christian Tradition*, ed. P. Henry (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), 130, 133-134, 144.

⁴⁸ Edwards, Freedom of the Will, WJE 1:131.

were *Calvinistic*, yet he called no man father. He thought and judged for himself, and was truly very much of an original.⁴⁹

Edwards' mentoring was not born out of a therapeutic modernism, which sought to promote self-expression or self-realisation, nor did he want others to ape him. Independence of mind does not necessarily require narcissistic individualism. He was part of a more substantial Christian narrative of faith transmission and ministerial formation, mediated to him through the urgency and intimacy of Puritan preaching schools, and sustained in the social and theological structures of the New Divinity. The mentor-protégé relationship was not unique to Edwards, but nevertheless proved to be a significant and pastorally effective feature of his ministry.

Familiar Discourse: Edwards's Practice of Mentoring

Edwards' intense pulpit persona may blind us to the tenderness of his friendships and his desire for sociability. He had many close friends in Northampton,⁵⁰ who wanted him to stay and establish a new church in their town after his dismissal.⁵¹ Many friends went out of their way to visit him on the frontier in Stockbridge.⁵² He called together a small council after he had been selected for the presidency of the College of New Jersey in 1757, to seek their advice for his future. When they confirmed to him the wisdom of the invitation, he burst into tears, "which was very unusual for him in the presence of others." Perhaps this was not so unusual under more private circumstances. He may have been cautious in making friends,⁵⁴ but his capacity for spiritual discernment could render those friendships very rich nevertheless. It surely ought not to be surprising that Edwards' extraordinary achievement in isolating and analysing religious affections in a treatise could have some practical significance in personal relationships as well, even if during the dismissal the complexity of pastoral dynamics blunted his relational capacity. In his biography, Hopkins makes much of Edwards' discernment, and reiterates that this was in evidence from a young age; he was more insightful than many an elder in the church.⁵⁵ Such discerning insights into hu-

⁴⁹ Hopkins, *Life*, 44. Emphasis original.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 68.

⁵¹ Ibid., 71.

⁵² Ibid., 79.

⁵³ Ibid., 84.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 48.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 22, 23, 51. It ought not to be forgotten that Hopkins himself first came to Edwards not merely to learn homiletics but to find some level of resolution concerning his anxious seeking after assurance of salvation. Sarah Edwards was an important mentoring influence at this time too. See Conforti, Samuel Hopkins and the New Divinity Movement, 29-32.

man personality came to concrete expression in Edwards' *pedagogy* and were refracted through his adoption of *modern epistolary conventions*. Both arts served his mentoring agenda.

Edwards was an accomplished preacher, but his enjoyment of dialogue and commitment to Socratic method were no less significant features of his ministry. He wrote to the Trustees of Princeton describing his commitment to dialogical learning if he were to be appointed as President, and when he arrived there he encouraged his students to prepare an answer for class which could be discussed when they came together. Frequently he would debate with ministry aspirants while walking or riding. Evidently, the reason why he gave to Hopkins or Bellamy copies of his own recently composed discourses was to give them opportunity to learn while giving feedback. Such an attitude in Edwards stood in stark relief to the later reputation of those in the New Divinity, who, it was said, developed quite hierarchical conceptions of master and learner, in which refusal to accept the received wisdom of the theological system was met with disapproval. He lacked defensiveness in debate, and had an awareness of developmental psychology, which may surprise:

Among such whose candour and friendship he had experienced he threw off the reserve, and was most open and free; quite patient of contradiction, while the utmost opposition was made to his sentiments, that could be by any plausible arguments or objections. And, indeed, he was, on all occasions, quite sociable and free with all who had any special business with him ... ⁶¹

In preaching, Edwards made room to address particular groups within the auditory: the children were addressed as well as the youth or adults in his *Farewell Sermon* of 1750.62 In his own family, he acknowledged the age and stage of those being taught:

As he rose very early himself, he was wont to have his family up in season in the morning; after which, before the family entered on the

⁵⁶ George S. Claghorn, "Introduction," in WJE 16:22. Minkema points out that Edwards advises the use of Baxter's *Matho; sive, Cosmotheoria puerilis* of 1738 for education in the natural sciences, a book constructed around dialogical investigations:Minkema, "Edwards on Education," 39-40.

⁵⁷ Edwards to the Trustees, WJE 16:729.

⁵⁸ Hopkins, *Life*, 84-85.

⁵⁹ Conforti, Samuel Hopkins and the New Divinity Movement, 55.

⁶⁰ Endy, "Theology and Learning in Early America," 131.

⁶¹ Hopkins, Life, 46.

⁶² Edwards, A Farewell Sermon Preached at the First Precinct in Northampton, after the People's Public Rejection of their Minister ... on June 22, 1750," WJE 25:483.

business of the day, he attended on family prayers; when a chapter in the Bible was read, commonly by candle-light in the winter; upon which he asked his children questions according to their age and capacity \dots^{63}

Edwards' openness to new methods of engagement in teaching is in particular evidence when he takes over responsibility for the mission schools in Stockbridge. In a letter to Sir William Pepperrell, advocate for the mission and a hero of the Louisbourg campaign of 1745, he draws attention to the value of a teacher who 'should enter into conversation with the child,' and desires that "the child should be encouraged, and drawn on, to speak freely, and in his turn also to ask questions, for the resolution of his own doubts." Such reciprocity helps pupils not just to understand words but also to comprehend ideas. Music could also be a pedagogical strategy, to join hearts and minds in "a relish for objects of a superior character." On another occasion, Edwards gave advice about how to resist Satan, which evidenced a nuanced case-by-case pastoral strategy. His attention to detail in interactions with those for whom he was responsible is important to note.

Alongside such particular instances of concern for individual growth in Edwards' letters, it is most helpful to investigate as well their form and role in Edwards' mentoring relationships. Letters are one of the most concrete ways for us to access his verbal contribution to mentoring dynamics, and to experience the modulations of pastoral address, which are evident there. Indeed, study of developing epistolary conventions in the eighteenth century, particularly the style known as the "familiar letter," both locates Edwards in his literary world and functions as a counter-weight to flat readings of his pastoral capacity. In general, letters can function as a means of social ordering when their phrasing acknowledges due deference or when meetings or visits are organised. Letters can function as means of social transgression when they represent or manipulate power dynamics, in which two parties, sometimes more, are involved. Konstantin Dierks builds the case that the "ideology of agency" was distinctively new in enlightened epistolary circles in colonial America and beyond, with the oft repeated phrase "in my power" functioning metonymically for the individual's recently renegotiated relationship with the opportunities and restraints of emergent capitalism, social mobility, and impe-

 $^{^{63}}$ Edwards can also speak of some Indian boys who "were now past their forming age." See Edwards to the Reverend Thomas Prince, WJE 16:638.

⁶⁴ Edwards to Sir William Pepperrell, WJE 16:408.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 411.

⁶⁶ Edwards to the Reverend Thomas Gillespie, WJE 16:229.

rial centralisation.⁶⁷ The *physical* agency or potency of one's hand has its parallel in *emotional* or *spiritual* agency or potency in one's hand, another term for one's script or letter-writing. Edwards is found to use this phrase nine times in his writing, five times in his extant letters, giving some purchase to Dierk's thesis and to Edwards' location in the eighteenth century republic of letters.

The familiar letter, in contrast with the more traditional polite letter, was that variety of correspondence which was "meant to foster emotional intimacy rather than business efficiency or aristocratic formality,"68 and so was well suited to evangelical priorities and spiritual direction.⁶⁹ Letters had been used to provide communications in war, to invoice purchases, or to negotiate politics, but the origins of these modes predated the eighteenth century. To Indeed, the new literary genre of the novel, presupposing adequate education and leisure to read and sufficient funds to publish and purchase, grew out of the compilation of letters, which itself brought to expression the "personal voice" in communication, a sense of immediacy, and the "carefully modulated acknowledgement of the reader." Samuel Richardson's runaway success Pamela (1740) or Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's equally influential Die Leiden des jungen Werthers (The Sufferings of the young Werther) in 1774 are notable examples of the epistolary novel. Amazingly, despite its sometimes morally confronting story-line, Edwards read Richardson's novel, and twice, once in 1754 and once in 1755, lent it to his disciple Samuel Hopkins for his edification.⁷³ Reading more popular journals, alongside more serious novels, Ed-

⁶⁷ Konstantin Dierks, *In My Power: Letter Writing and Communications in Early America* (Early American Studies; Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 1-8.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 144.

⁶⁹ Bruce Hindmarsh, *John Newton and the English Evangelical Tradition: Between the Conversions of Wesley and Wilberforce* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 245.

⁷⁰ Anderson and Ehrenpreis argue that the eighteenth century was the "great age of the personal letter," due to the rapid development of roads and therefore a postal network, the rediscovery of Latin epistolary models and growth in appreciation of French style, and a reaction to the fripperies of life and art before the Glorious Revolution. See Howard Anderson and Irvin Ehrenpreis, "The Familiar Letter in the Eighteenth Century; Some Generalizations," in *The Familiar Letter in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. H. Anderson, P.B. Daghlian and I. Ehrenpreis (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1966), 269, 270-72.

⁷¹ Claghorn, "Introduction," WJE 16:4-5.

⁷² See Samuel Richardson, *Pamela*; *Or, Virtue Rewarded* (Penguin Classics; London: Penguin, 2003). This novel, tracking the victory of virtue, is built around a series of letters from Pamela to her distant parents, describing her work for a noble lady, and later the ruses and devices of that noblewoman's son to win Pamela for himself in marriage. Letter-writing constitutes not only the strategy of communication, but it also provides much content to provoke events in the book. Pamela's attempts to secure paper, ink and couriers for her letters, and her designs to hide her correspondence from the intrusive Mr B. or Mrs Jewkes, are both instructive and comical. Pamela also uses the phrase "in my power" in relation to her growing sense of personal agency. Intriguingly, the parson, Mr Williams, is met on a country road reading Fénelon's *Télémaque* (p. 318)!

⁷³ Edwards, "Catalogue" of Reading, entry no. 593, WJE 26:271-272; Edwards, "Account Book," entries on Richardson, WJE 26:343-345. Wilson Kimnach suggests that Edwards was a "kindred spirit" with Richardson in terms of their "pietistic sensibility" and their commitment to "close observations of

wards was exposed to modern familiar epistolary models and absorbed notable features. The "motif of the letter" was omnipresent in colonial culture. 74

The familiar letter was conceived not to interact with polite concerns but instead with the minutiae of everyday life. 75 Note the contents of a letter to Bellamy dated 21 January 1742: Edwards notes receiving a previous letter from him on January 11, relates some recent awakening in New Hampshire, sends an apology for not being able to attend a meeting arranged by Bellamy at Guildford, organises the exchange of books with a colleague in Goshen, and sends a copy of Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God. He concludes with intimate sentiment: "I am, dear Sir, your affectionate and unworthy |Brother and fellow-labourer, |Jonathan Edwards."⁷⁶ In a subsequent letter to Bellamy dated 15 January 1747, he takes up a repeated theme in his correspondence concerning "the affair of the sheep," which details their purchase, shearing, and the family's requirements of wool for the remainder of the winter. He abruptly changes the topic to speak of post-Reformation dogmatics, namely the writings of van Mastricht and Turretin, then relates ongoing organisation of the transatlantic Concert of Prayer, concluding with a plea that Bellamy come to visit him and his family in February or March, for "we have so many affairs to confer upon that concern us both."⁷⁷ Switching between topics jarringly, and acknowledging interruptions during writing, strengthened the claim in Edwards' correspondence to immediacy, something prized in this style of letter. 78 "The hallmark of candor was taken to be spontaneity." 79 Edwards as mentor is sharing his life and its concerns with Bellamy; he desires yet closer interaction through shared company. Dierks comments on this genre of conclusion to a letter:

To stop visiting one's friends could be excusable, but to stop writing letters was ungracious. Personal visits and face-to-face conversation remained the ideal mode of social interaction, but heavy workloads and busy schedules often made letter writing the only realistic alternative ... Writing letters helped men in the elusive process of trying to reconcile desire and reality—agency and constraint—into a self-image that reaffirmed their own personal adequacy, and also into a social im-

the workings of the human heart." See Wilson H. Kimnach, "The Literary Life of Jonathan Edwards," in *Understanding Jonathan Edwards: An Introduction to America's Theologian*, ed. G. R. McDermott (Oxford: University Press, 2009), 138.

⁷⁴ Dierks, In My Power, 144.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 148

⁷⁶ Edwards to the Reverend Joseph Bellamy, WJE 16:98-100.

⁷⁷ Edwards to the Reverend Joseph Bellamy, WJE 16:216-218.

⁷⁸ Dierks, In My Power, 120.

⁷⁹ Anderson and Ehrenpreis, "The Familiar Letter," 272.

age that earned them a reputation for duty or affection.⁸⁰

Though stiff and formulaically deferential for twenty-first century readers, Edwards' letters can unselfconsciously point out ways in which his own social status had frequently counted for little in the business of letter-writing, so drawing attention to a surprising powerlessness. His dependence on unreliable intermediaries, like couriers or ships, or his exposure to unpredictable events, for example the weather or hard-to-locate friends, could be for Edwards exasperating. While in the main correspondence was still in the eighteenth century the preserve of a male elite, within this social sphere letters and their delivery could function to equalise relationships. As a postscript to his last known letter to Bellamy, written from Stockbridge on 1 December 1757, he writes:

P.S. December 5

Sir,

The opportunity for conveyance of my letters to ministers chosen to be of the council your way, not being very good, I here send other letters, desiring you to take the care of conveying them with all possible care and speed.⁸³

Edwards' need of assistance confirmed Bellamy's place in his mentor's inner circle, and the frequent functional inadequacy of Edwards' authority despite his wearing a wig. On the other hand, it may just be the *appearance* of loss of power or authority: by reifying what would otherwise have been local and ephemeral speech, Edwards' correspondence can gain value and influence and potentially longevity.⁸⁴

Ward argues that spiritual correspondence is one of the great achievements of the eighteenth-century revivals.⁸⁵ Bruce Hindmarsh, in commenting upon the letter-writing ministry of John Newton, brings the nature of eighteenth-century letter-writing to a theological head, when he astutely observes that it functions in a new space of spiritual solidarity, acknowledging its position "between the subjectivity of the confessional diary and the objectivity of the literary essay," combining "spontaneous expression with the treatment of a substantial subject."⁸⁶ It permits

⁸⁰ Dierks, In My Power, 163-164.

⁸¹ Ibid., 107

⁸² Michael Warner, The Letters of the Republic: Publication and the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 17, 39.

⁸³ Edwards to the Reverend Joseph Bellamy, WJE 16:736.

⁸⁴ Warner, Letters of the Republic, 17.

⁸⁵ W. Reginald Ward, The Protestant Evangelical Awakening (Cambridge: University Press, 1992), 2.

⁸⁶ Hindmarsh, John Newton and the English Evangelical Tradition, 32.

of predictable patterns of piety alongside enthusiastic excess, or social convention studded with relational innovation.⁸⁷ It is both constrained and free.⁸⁸ Edwards' ministry of *mentoring through correspondence* is extraordinarily well suited to the mediating position he has taken in the course of the revivals in any number of other areas, allowing for revivalist sentiment to nest within more traditional structures of order. He might prefer conversation face-to-face, but the substance of mentoring relationships can be expressed satisfactorily by mail as well, discussing a litany of theological comments, personal concerns, or administrative instructions. In fact, Edwards admirably cultivates this particular species of pastoral care in his correspondence. It is my contention that Edwards is particularly successful in mentoring, because in this forum of pastoral care he can renegotiate relationships, identity and clerical agency in ways which suit his temper and his times.

"This is the Way: Walk in It"—Edwards's Enduring Example

In composing Edwards' biography, Hopkins builds the structure of his narrative around the value of Edwards' example to those who would follow. Both the beginning and the end of the work remind its reader that "This is the way; walk in it."89 Hopkins provides an unedited list of Edwards' youthful resolutions to remind young readers of what can be accomplished spiritually even at any early age. Hopkins frequently resorts to language of sight and experience to bring vitality to his account, drawing his readers into the excitement of the story. 90 Naturally, he cannot give details about Edwards' secret devotional life, but obliquely makes comment about it by describing Edwards' outward generosity, a recollection which is permissible now that the subject, having died, can in no way become proud in the retelling.⁹¹ The point is this: Hopkins has not only benefited from Edwards' intentional pastoral investment, but he wants to pass on something of those riches for others who care to learn. 92 Providing an historical model cannot be described as mentoring narrowly defined, but some lessons for ministry can nevertheless be gleaned. How might Edwards serve the cause of the development of pastoral leadership, or mentoring, today?

⁸⁷ Dierks, referring to social conditions broader than ecclesiastical concerns alone, shows how letters might hold together disinterestedness and advantage, convention and improvisation, authority and agency, service and obligation, and deference and sincerity: Dierks, *In My Power*, 58, 84, 98, 148, 151.

⁸⁸ Hindmarsh, John Newton and the English Evangelical Tradition, 246-47.

⁸⁹ Hopkins, Life, vi, 57.

⁹⁰ Ibid., iii, v.

⁹¹ Ibid., 50.

⁹² Ibid., 58, 69, 86.

To Share Not Only the Gospel of God, But Also Our Own Selves (1 Thess. 2:8)

In our day, ministry has been professionalised. We adopt a model of church life from the corporate sector, we create distinct spheres of work, family and leisure, and we create a cadre of leadership distant from the congregation. Our leaders are visionaries and public speakers, perhaps imitating stand-up comedians or talkshow hosts, with lives opaque to pastoral accountability. Edwards may well have maintained some of the social decorum attributed to his ministerial responsibilities in a deferential world, but alongside this he gave himself generously to those whom he was training. He wrote to Bellamy disclosing details of the settlement of his salary, 93 speaks of Bellamy as being "one of the most intimate friends that I have in the world,"94 and frequently invites him to come and stay at their home.95 In observing Edwards' life, his mentorees learnt not only the art of theological discourse, but self-sacrifice and self-denial as well, in contrast to the "complacency and worldliness" of many other clergy of their day. 6 In making reference to 1 Thessalonians 2, Edwards describes the church as "our mother." He comments that "[t]his is also a lively image of the care that the church, especially the ministers of the gospel, should have of the interest of Christ committed to their care."97 Edwards broadens our expectation of pastoral leadership, and encourages us to share our lives with those we train.

Do the Work of an Evangelist, Carry Out Your Ministry Fully (2 Tim. 4:5)

A danger in any pastoral ministry is that we serve the interests of the people paying our living, yet neglect the interests of the broader mission of the church. It might be that we as leaders neglect our own evangelistic opportunities, or such neglect might come to expression when we fail to energise, encourage and train others more gifted in that area. The routines of pastoral ministry are much safer than the crises of revivalist zeal. Edwards and his adherents erred on the other side of the divide, espousing revivalist commitments even when local responsibilities seemed to be overlooked. Edwards could play down traditional pastoral practices and warned against "secular concerns interfering with the work of the ministry" to highlight more positively the mandate to do the work of the evangelist. ⁹⁸ Edwards majored on the skills of homiletics in his parsonage-seminary, ⁹⁹ even when

⁹³ Edwards to the Reverend Joseph Bellamy, WJE 16:374-375.

⁹⁴ Edwards to the Reverend John Erskine, July 5, 1750, WJE 16:348.

⁹⁵ Edwards to the Reverend Joseph Bellamy, WJE 16:218.

⁹⁶ Conforti, Samuel Hopkins and the New Divinity Movement, 47.

⁹⁷ Edwards, Notes on Scripture, entry no. 314, WJE 15:47.

⁹⁸ Conforti, Samuel Hopkins and the New Divinity Movement, 47.

⁹⁹ Hopkins, Life, 53.

his disciples were not of his capacity. ¹⁰⁰ It is not that Edwards never provided pastoral care. Indeed, Deborah Hathaway, a young convert in the nearby parish of Suffield, had written to Edwards seeking his spiritual counsel given that her own church was without a minister. He provides her with a serious yet not heavily theological response, outlining some fundamental disciplines of the Christian life. ¹⁰¹ Edwards also received many parishioners into his study for *soul conversation*, but his mentoring reminds us of the importance of recruiting the next generation of gifted evangelists and defending a place for energies devoted to outreach and cultivation of a mission mindset. Nested within a pastoral framework, Edwards sets before us the challenge of doing the work of an evangelist.

What You Have Heard From Me ... Entrust to Others (2 Tim. 2:2)

Developing long-term perspective on our ministry is difficult in an occupation where pastors are often faced with challenging situations requiring quick responses. It is easier to be reactive than proactive, and easier to receive or do ministry than to generate it amongst others. Edwards is aware of the need to provide for faith transmission, and invests a significant amount of time in those whom he is training. It is interesting that he does not use 2 Timothy 2:2 to validate a generic mentoring ministry, amplifying the sequence of links between any teacher and any learner as is common today in expounding that text. He does however use this verse to defend the propriety of ordination, which was in his own day, alongside family devotions, central to faith transmission between generations: "And what is intended [in this verse] don't seem to be only hearing the doctrines of the gospel preached and taught as ordinary Christians do, but some committing of these doctrines to teachers in a way peculiar to them ... the Apostle speaks of another committing."102 It is in the observation of fine distinctions that Edwards excels, and he shows here that he recognises the value of ministerial formation, even if we extend the application of this verse.

In explaining his ministry to the Indians of Stockbridge, for example, he insists that passing on the faith was integral to the ministry of Jesus and his followers: "When Christ lived in the earth, he chose twelve men to go along with him wherever he went, that he might teach 'em and instruct 'em, and fit 'em to be ministers to preach the gospel." ¹⁰³ He later summarises "true religion" and makes his vow

¹⁰⁰ Bellamy was a "son of thunder," though Hopkins was less able as a preacher, whose style was more didactic and whose interests were often geared towards social reform. See Conforti, *Samuel Hopkins and the New Divinity Movement*, 176-77, 180.

 $^{^{101}}$ Edwards to Deborah Hathaway, WJE 16:91-95. Outside of his immediate family, such correspondence with a woman was unusual. See Dierks, *In My Power*, 158.

¹⁰² Edwards, *The "Blank Bible,"* entry on II Tim. 1:13, WJE 24:1132.

¹⁰³ Edwards, The Things that Belong to True Religion, WJE 25:570.

that "[t]his is the religion that I will teach you while I stay in this place." ¹⁰⁴ Edwards draws attention to the nature of Christ's mentoring as an intentional programme of *training* individuals for the ministry, which Edwards as clergy from time to time fulfils, and the importance of *discipling*, teaching believers the necessary attitudes and skills to learn from and follow Christ, which he exemplifies. He achieves both, given that Edwards' mentorees excelled in their ability to sustain both organisationally and pastorally the movement which he began. ¹⁰⁵ His strategic foresight is set before us as a noble aspiration.

Think Over What I Say, For The Lord Will Give You Understanding (2 Tim. 2:7)

It ought to be acknowledged, however, that Edwards' disciples did not replicate his ministry without modification. They had been taught to think critically and creatively, through discussion, reading and writing, and now they continued to think fresh thoughts, sometimes reneging on ideas which Edwards had so passionately held. Bellamy and Hopkins were confident to modify the Edwardsean deposit, in large part to make their prized Reformed worldview relevant to revolutionary politics, nation-building and discussions of social ethics, in particular slavery, of the late eighteenth/early nineteenth century. 106 At heart, Hopkins extends the nature of divine sovereignty to include a positive divine will for sin, an assertion of God's hatred for those presumptuous enough to seek salvation, and an encouragement of disinterested benevolence, or being "willing to be damned for the glory of God and the good of mankind." 107 Bellamy was more inclined then Edwards to preach terror, as Solomon Stoddard had practised it. I contend therefore that Edwards had been a successful mentor in *teaching* his adherents, not indoctrinating them, even when those same followers in defending their mentor's cause modified his arguments. Of course, Edwards himself had negotiated new intellectual worlds as part of his own philosophical development, though perhaps his native intelligence made of his discoveries a more subtle reconciliation with Biblical truth. There is always a moment of anxiety and vulnerability when, during the relay race, the baton is passed from one runner to the next. This mentoring moment in the ministry of Edwards is no less worthy of attention and excitement, as the Lord gives new understanding to his representatives. Mentoring as contribution and not control is here witnessed.

¹⁰⁵ The foundation of seminaries like Andover was one such institutional achievement of the New Divinity movement. Conforti, *Samuel Hopkins and the New Divinity Movement*, 82.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 574.

¹⁰⁶ Conforti, Samuel Hopkins and the New Divinity Movement, 123, 125.

¹⁰⁷ Hopkins was also uncomfortable with the place of aesthetics in Edwards' schema, interpreting it as needlessly speculative. Conforti, *Samuel Hopkins and the New Divinity Movement*, 61, 110, 115.

So What is it with the Sheep and Mentoring?

In all of Edwards' correspondence, nothing amuses or intrigues quite like his repeated references in letters to Bellamy over a period of seven years to sheep and their value. He makes arrangements for Bellamy to purchase some if the opportunity arises. ¹⁰⁸ He writes to revise these arrangements given the urgent need of wool for the winter, being prepared to send more money for their procurement. ¹⁰⁹ Apparently a middleman has been organised to deliver wool in June 1747, which Edwards is keen to confirm. ¹¹⁰ A polite reminder to Bellamy about securing the wool is penned in July 1749. ¹¹¹ In perhaps Edwards' most concise letter to Bellamy in November 1750, consisting of just a few mundane sentences, Edwards alludes to the disagreements in his marriage arising from the question whether their own sheep should be sold or hired out! His impending move from Northampton connects the question of raising sheep to his own personal needs and situation. ¹¹² Settled in Stockbridge, he appears to have bought some more, and sends men to secure their delivery, reassuring Bellamy that outstanding dues will be supplied. ¹¹³ Sheep function as a significant theme in the extant letters to Bellamy.

While no doubt important to Edwards' family's prosperity, for our purposes these references to sheep provide another window into the dynamics of Edwards' ministry. He is part of a growing money economy, where economic interdependence is a *sine qua non* of social life. 114 Even his mentoring reflects this reality. The fact that Edwards is using letters to secure his financial arrangements is further testimony to their place in the growing capitalist economy, both for contracting and for invoicing. Epistolary conventions are shaped by the economic capacity to trade and to have the resources to write and to post. 115 He demonstrates extraordinary trust in his friend to negotiate the purchase of the sheep, sharing his financial arrangements, and thereby inviting Bellamy, not just into his spiritual world, but into his pecuniary and marital world too. Edwards is sharing his whole life with his intimate friend. Bellamy is a communications hub, confidante, financial adviser, wholesaler, marriage counsellor, and events manager. Here we see a picture of Edwards as the spiritual guide, whose sheep (metaphorically) knows and trusts his voice. His pastoral relationships may have been damaged in Northampton, but his pastoral instincts in the saga of the sheep (literally) are quite plain to see.

¹⁰⁸ Edwards to the Reverend Jospeh Bellamy, WJE 16: 210-211.

¹⁰⁹ Edwards to the Reverend Joseph Bellamy, WJE 16: 216-217.

¹¹⁰ Edwards to the Reverend Joseph Bellamy, WJE 16: 223.

¹¹¹ Edwards to the Reverend Jospeh Bellamy, WJE 16: 288.

¹¹² Edwards to the Reverend Joseph Bellamy, WJE 16: 362-363.

¹¹³ Edwards to the Reverend Joseph Bellamy, WJE 16: 600.

¹¹⁴ Valeri, Law and Providence, 78.

 $^{^{115}}$ Anderson and Ehrenpreis, "The Familiar Letter," 276; Dierks, In My Power, 3.

Abstract

Appreciation of Jonathan Edwards' labours as a pastor has grown in recent years with the publication of many formerly unknown sermons. It is the intention of this paper to show the ways in which some of his own significant mentoring relationships contributed to his achievements in pastoral ministry. By examining Puritan assumptions of faith transmission, early biographies of Edwards, and his letters, we open a window into the world of ministry training and educational philosophy, which guided his intentional investment in the next generation of clerical leadership. Developments in the art and rationale of letter writing serve as a focus to understand Edwards' own epistolary output, and function as a way of locating the distinctives of nascent evangelicalism. The paper concludes with reflection on Biblical themes in Edwards' ministry, which encourage contemporary mentoring ministry.

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JONATHAN EDWARDS MEETS DIETRICH BONHOEFFER. TRUE RELIGION OR NON-RELIGIOUS CHRISTIANITY

To be, or not to be ... religious

At first glance, it would be difficult to find more diverse approaches to Christianity than those represented by Jonathan Edwards and Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Gerald McDermott, in his article in this volume discussing Edwards' views on religious experience, begins by citing John Smith's observation that "all of Jonathan Edwards's thought can be considered "one magnificent answer" to the question: What is true religion? Bonhoeffer in turn declared in his prison letters to Eberhard Bethge that, "people as they are now simply cannot be religious anymore", and went on to articulate a critique of religion and sketch the outlines of non-religious Christianity. Clearly, it would seem, these two seminal thinkers stand on opposite ends of the spectrum when it comes to religion.

Yet perhaps there is another side to the story. In *Seeing God: Jonathan Edwards and Spiritual Discernment*, McDermott cites Bonhoeffer fourteen times, not to critique Edwards but as a resource to develop and illustrate Edwards' 'unreliable'

 $^{^1}$ Gerald McDermott, "The Affections and the Human Person: Edwards on Religious Experience", in *Wratislaviensia* 7 (2012), 175.

² John E. Smith, "Editor's Introduction," in *Religious Affections*, volume 2 (revised) of The Works of Jonathan Edwards (hereafter WJE 2), (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), WJE 2:2.

³ Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers from Prison*, volume 8 of the *Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works*, (English edition; hereafter, DBWE), (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2010), DBWE 8:362.

and 'reliable' signs of religious affections. Could a meeting between Edwards and Bonhoeffer take the form of a constructive conversation rather than a critical confrontation?

Before we jump too quickly to label an encounter between Edwards and Bonhoeffer a dialogue rather than a dispute, we should note that McDermott's citations in *Seeing God* all come from Bonhoeffer's two most 'religious' works, *Life Together* and *Discipleship*⁴, which were written during his involvement in the Church Struggle against Hitler's Third Reich.⁵ References are absent to his early academic theses and lectures, and more importantly to his later works, especially the unfinished *Ethics*, which took shape during Bonhoeffer's involvement in the conspiracy against Hitler, and *Letters and Papers from Prison*, written following his arrest and imprisonment. How might Edwards' view of true religion fare when submitted to Bonhoeffer's critique of religion? How does it compare to Bonhoeffer's proposal for non-religious Christianity? These questions are addressed below; as we begin, a quote from Clifford Green suggests the possibility to reframe our protagonists' arguments for and against religion in a more positive way. As Green writes,

Discipleship is primarily "ecclesial theology" (though not isolated from its historical and political context), while *Ethics* is primarily public theology—or 'worldly theology'—and so are the reflections of the *Letters* and *Papers from Prison*.

What do I mean by calling *Ethics* 'public theology'? If *Discipleship* is primarily exegetical, interpreting the Sermon on the Mount and Pauline letters for the Christian community, *Ethics* is concerned with that same Christianity in the public world.⁶

If Green is right (and I believe he is), then perhaps an attempt to compare Bonhoeffer's *public theology* to Edwards' *ecclesial theology* is not doomed to failure from the outset.

Yet comparing Edwards and Bonhoeffer is neither easy nor straightforward. They lived in different intellectual eras (Enlightenment versus Modernism), grew up in different cultures ($18^{\rm th}$ century Colonial America versus early $20^{\rm th}$ century German upper-class *burgertum*), and represented diverse ecclesial and theological

 $^{^4}$ Five references are to *Life Together*, and nine to *Discipleship*.

⁵ When I asked Gerry about this, he explained that at the time he wrote that book he was more familiar with *Discipleship* and *Life Together* than the other books in the Bonhoeffer corpus.

⁶ Clifford Green, "Bonhoeffer's Quest for Authentic Christianity: Beyond Fundamentalism, Nationalism. Religion and Secularism", in *Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Theology for Today*, (Gutersloher Verlaghaus, 2009), 348.

traditions (Puritan/Reformed-Congregationalist-Pietist versus Lutheran). Philosophically, Edwards was an idealist and occasionalist, whom Wallace Anderson, editor of the Scientific and Philosophical Writings in the JE Edition, called a "phenomenological idealist" and an immaterialist⁷; Bonhoeffer in turn, operating out of what Clifford Green has called "post-critical realism"⁸, offered a sharp critique of idealism and "metaphysics".

The differences in Edwards' and Bonhoeffer's backgrounds and perspective were partially offset by other factors. Both made it their task to keep abreast of the latest developments in science, philosophy, culture, and world events, and they shared an appreciation for beauty, art, literature and music. Although Bonhoeffer often criticized pietism, growing up. his nanny was a Pietist. He himself read daily from the Losungen (Daily Watchwords) published by the Moravian Brethren, and encouraged his seminary students at the Preachers' College in Finkenwalde to do the same. Bonhoeffer was Lutheran, yet he was influenced by Karl Barth's reformed theology, and his own Union Church of Prussia included both Lutheran and Reformed parishes. Both men had a high regard for Scripture, and they read and studied the Bible devotionally, exegetically, and theologically. While Bonhoeffer did not match Edwards' prodigious output of sermons, he believed in the special efficacy of the ministry of the Word and preached regularly. The lives and work of both men are characterized by a living faith in Christ and a consistent Christological center.

During the 2011 International Jonathan Edwards Conference held in Wrocław, our discussion of Edwards' views on religion was kicked off by McDermott's paper on Edwards' views of religious experience⁹, and wrapped up by his talk on the reliable and unreliable signs of true religion. ¹⁰ This article grew out of that discussion, and draws on both those papers at several points during its summary of Edwards' understanding of religious affections and his description of the "unreliable" and "reliable" signs of true religion. After discussing the nature of Bonhoeffer's critique of religion, and what he meant when he proposed his vision of "non-religious Christianity", an initial comparison of their respective positions is made. A more in-depth analysis is planned for the future; the goal of this paper is to define terms, identify the issues at stake, highlight key questions to answer, and to suggest some initial answers.

⁷ For immateralism, cf. Wallace E. Anderson, "Immaterialism in Jonathan Edwards' Early Philosophical Notes," Journal of the History of Ideas XXV, no. 2 (April-June 1964), 181. For phenomenological idealism, cf. Wallace E. Anderson, "Editor's Introduction," WJE 6:112.

⁸ Green, "Bonhoeffer's Quest", 339.

 ⁹ Gerald McDermott, "The Affections...", 175-184.
 ¹⁰ Gerald McDermott, "Sorting out the genuine from the counterfeit: Jonathan Edwards on testing the Spirits", in Wratislaviensia 7 (2012), 199-204.

Edwards' understanding of religious affections

If all Edwards' thought is an answer to the question, "What is true religion?", his most sustained effort in this area is found in *Religious Affections* (hereafter, *RA*). He begins *RA* by clarifying what he understands religious affections to be, and why he considers them so important. As John Smith explains, "before Edwards could lay down criteria for distinguishing true affections from false he had first to establish their connection with genuine religion¹¹." Edwards' thesis is as bold as it is direct: "True religion, in great part, consists in holy affections."¹²

Edwards defines the affections as "... the more vigorous and sensible exercises of the inclination and will of the soul." The soul in turn is characterized by two faculties; (1) *understanding* (i.e. perception, discernment, judgment), and (2) *inclination* (which in its various activities is called the will, the mind, and the heart). Inclinations, which are either towards what is approved or pleasing, or against what is disapproved or displeasing, may be weak or strong; it is the latter, which move the soul to act "vigorously and sensibly", which Edwards calls *affections*. 15

In Edwards' view, understanding and inclination are closely intertwined; neither functions independently, rather they are conjoined in the holistic activity and actions of the soul, which in turn is subject to "the laws of the union which the Creator has fixed between soul and body." Harking back to Plato, the trichotomic understanding of human nature prevalent in Edwards' day divided human beings into body, soul and spirit, with yet further distinctions made between mind, will, emotions, etc. In contrast, Edwards argues for a non-dualistic, holistic view of human nature; soul and body are an integrated union, and the fervent activities of the soul, which involve the actions of the mind and the will (inclination), are what we commonly refer to as the heart. As McDermott writes, "Edwards' position refused the dichotomies of either side, insisting on a soul whose affections shape not only feelings and choices but also the mind."

McDermott has elsewhere provided a helpful comparison of "affections" with "emotions", and "beliefs". ¹⁸ Affections, are "long-lasting, deep, consistent with beliefs"; they "always result in action, and involve mind, will and feelings". *Emotions*, on the other hand, are described as "fleeting, superficial, sometimes overpower-

¹¹ John Smith, WJE 2:7-8.

¹² Jonathan Edwards, WJE 2:95.

¹³ Ibid., 96.

¹⁴ Ibid., 96.

¹⁵ Ibid., 96-97.

¹⁶ Ibid., 96.

¹⁷ McDermott, "The Affections", 177.

¹⁸ Gerald McDermott, Seeing God: Jonathan Edwards and Spiritual Experience, (Vancouver, Canada: Regent College, 2000).

ing", they "often fail to produce action", and consist of "feelings, which are often disconnected from the mind and will." Furthermore, affections "always influence behavior, influence feelings" and are characterized as "strong", whereas beliefs "do not always influence behavior", are often "disconnected from feelings" and "weak". ²⁰

Edwards defined *religious* affections as those that seek God and spiritual things, and claimed that there is no such thing as genuine religion without them.²¹ All godly affections, along with the actions that ensue from them, "are rooted in the basic affection of love."²² But during the turbulent events of the Great Awakening's revivals, which excited some and disturbed others, "hypocrites mimicked saints, and saints resembled hypocrites", which led Edwards to conclude that "counterfeit love" produces "false affections".²³ As Smith writes, it was Edwards "acknowledgement of counterfeit piety that forced him to find criteria for distinguishing false from true religion²⁴. In contrasting holy and unholy affections, McDermott once again emphasizes Edwards' holistic understanding of human nature: *holy affections* "always inspire feeling, thinking and doing"; *unholy affections* may be "all feeling with no thinking', "all thinking with no feeling", or "mere doing with no thinking or feeling".²⁵

Edwards' "unreliable" and "reliable signs" of religious affections

Having defined affections in general, and established the nature of religious affections, Edwards goes on in Parts II and III of *RA* to describe twelve unreliable signs and twelve reliable signs of true religion. McDermott discusses these at some length in *Seeing God*, where he helpfully groups Edwards' 'unreliable signs' into three categories i.e. those concerning religious experience, religious behavior and assurance of salvation. The first group of unreliable signs, which concerns religious *experience*, includes: (1) Intense religious affections; (2) Many religious affections at the same time; (3) A certain sequence in the affections; (4) Spiritual experiences not produced by the self; (5) Scriptures come miraculously to mind; (6) Physical manifestations of the affections.²⁶ Next come the unreliable signs involving religious *behavior*: (7) Much fervent talk about religion; (8) Fre-

¹⁹ Ibid., 40.

²⁰ Ibid., 41.

²¹ McDermott, "The Affections", 176.

²² Ibid., 179.

²³ Ibid., 179.

²⁴ John Smith, WJE 2:11.

²⁵ McDermott, Seeing God, 41.

²⁶ Ibid., 45-55.

quent and passionate praise for God; (9) The appearance of love; (10) Zealous or time-consuming devotion to religious activities.²⁷ Finally, there are the unreliable signs involving *assurance of salvation*: (11) Being convinced one is saved; (12) Others being convinced that someone is saved.²⁸

As Smith notes, for Edwards the accidental nature of the unreliable signs resides "in the fact that they can be present without the Spirit's presence." Indeed, "Edwards argues that they are to be found where there is no genuine piety and that they may be absent where genuine piety exists." Smith makes two key points concerning these signs. Contrary to views common in his day, which Edwards believed were false and misleading: (1) "The Holy Spirit is not bound to a definite order of operation"; (2) "nothing can be inferred about affections from the fact that they come to be accepted by other people as signs of saintliness." Edwards thus both denies "the validity of many Puritan descriptions of salvation as involving a sequential process", and rejects "the attempt to use 'the approval of the godly' as a criterion for judging the affections."

In Part III of *RA*, Edwards' lists twelve reliable signs ("distinguishing marks") of true religion. As paraphrased by McDermott, they are: (1) A divine and supernatural source; (2) Attraction to God and his ways for their own sake; (3) Seeing the beauty of holiness; (4) A new knowing; (5) Deep-seated conviction; (6) Humility; (7) Change of nature; (8) A Christ-like spirit; (9) Fear of God; (10) Balance; (11) Hunger for God; (12) Christian practice.³³

As Smith writes, positive signs are those marks "through which the presence of the divine Spirit can be known." Edwards distinguishes between "the Spirit as operating *on* the self ... and as *dwelling in* the self"; only the latter constitutes saving grace. It is this distinction, argues Smith, which enabled Edwards to both support the revivals and to argue against the "abuses and delusions" that accompanied them. What is needed is regeneration, a change of nature "in the self as a whole"; "a change in the heart", which is then "manifested in every aspect of the self. In the self.

²⁷ Ibid., 56-65.

²⁸ Ibid., 66-77.

²⁹ Smith, WJE 2:18.

³⁰ Ibid., 19

³¹ Ibid., 19

³² Ibid., 21.

³³ McDermott, "Sorting out the genuine", 201-203.

³⁴ Smith, WJE:23.

³⁵ Ibid., 24.

³⁶ Ibid., 27.

³⁷ Ibid., 27.

On the one hand, regeneration brings with it a "new sense of the heart", an intuitive knowledge and vision of divine things that results from new birth, yet "operates in and through natural sense faculties", thus allowing individuals to "examine themselves to see if they delight in this divine beauty for its own sake."³⁸ Yet for Edwards, new birth also leads inexorably to the twelfth and final sign of true religion, holy practice. McDermott summarizes the link Edwards makes between new birth and holy practice.

In *Religious Affections* the overriding sign of genuine religion is 'holy practice', which lies in the realm of action rather than perception or sensibility. The only set of affections that produces the habit of holy practice is the cluster collectively titled the 'new sense of the heart' ... which the Spirit 'infuses' to enable saints to see God's infinite beauty and glory.³⁹

This is the heart of Edwards' position: religious affections result from regeneration and lead to holy practice. Each link in the chain is essential; if one is missing the others are too. Smith argues that Puritanism, in making religion a matter of the interior life, went even further than Classical Protestantism's emphasis on faith and the inner working of the Spirit. Edwards carried this trend forward, but at the same time deepened a strain present in most streams of Puritanism, which said that practice is the best test of faith.

As a principle of life, the Spirit shows itself in the true believer as a vital power; the form most appropriate to its nature is that of holy practice. What this means is that a man's conduct is something more than the moral consequence of the religious relationship; it means that practice takes on a religious dimension. It may take its place as the chief among the signs of gracious affections because it is the Holy Spirit revealing itself as life in the world. ⁴¹

Where Edwards modified the Puritan emphasis on the inner life, was in declaring outward practice a better, more faithful and reliable sign of true religion than the most remarkable religious experiences. ⁴² Practice is the natural result of the new life imparted to believers at conversion by the Holy Spirit; holy actions become the "vital power" of the indwelling "Holy Spirit revealing itself as life in the

³⁸ McDermott, "The Affections", 181.

³⁹ Ibid., 180.

⁴⁰ Smith, WJE 2:43.

⁴¹ Ibid., 2:42.

⁴² Ibid., 2:42.

world."⁴³ Edwards left his mark on religion in America, Smith declares, by "taking a long look at Protestantism's sacred domain—the inner life—and demanding that it be subjected to a public test."⁴⁴, left his mark on religion in America. Since his day, "American Protestantism has had no place for quietism; its robust strain of activity in the world can be traced to the strain of Puritan piety and not least to the interpretation of that piety by Jonathan Edwards."⁴⁵

Bonhoeffer's critique of religion and proposal for non-religious Christianity $^{46}\,$

On the surface at least, many parallels between Edwards's *Religious Affections* and Bonhoeffer's "ecclesial theology", represented by *Life Together* and *Disciple-ship*, come readily to mind. To name just one example, how many pious believers (religious or no), impressed and impacted by the legacy of both men, could avoid the perhaps all-too-ready temptation to compare Edwards' unreliable signs of true religion with what Bonhoeffer termed "cheap grace", or his reliable signs with Bonhoeffer's "costly grace"? Should they try? When we come to *Ethics* and *Letters and Papers from Prison* however, the path ahead becomes more difficult. Could it be that the "religion" Bonhoeffer was critiquing corresponds in large measure with Edwards' unreliable signs? What does Edwards' vision of true religion have in common with Bonhoeffer's non-religious Christianity? Before we attempt to provide even a preliminary answer to such questions, we must first have clearly in mind what Bonhoeffer meant.

In Tegel Prison, Bonhoeffer wrote an "Outline for a Book", which he never got the opportunity to finish. In it we read:

Faith is participating in this being of Jesus. (Becoming human, cross, resurrection.) Our relationship to God is no "religious" relationship to some highest, most powerful, and best being imaginable—that is no genuine transcendence. Instead, our relationship to God is a new life in "being there for others," through participation in the being of Jesus. The transcendent is not the infinite, unattainable tasks, but the neighbor within reach in any given situation. God in human form! Not . . . in the conceptual forms of the absolute, the metaphysical, the infi-

⁴³ Ibid., 2:42.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 2:43.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 2:43.

⁴⁶ Portions of this section draw on a lecture entitled "Duchowość Bonhoeffera dla nas dziś" ("Bonhoeffer's Spirituality for us Today"), which the author delivered during the 2013 Bonhoeffer Days conference held in Szczecin.

nite, and so on, . . . (b)ut rather "the human being for others"! therefore the Crucified One. The human being living out of the transcendent⁴⁷

In this passage, Bonhoeffer's proposal for non-religious Christianity is clearly linked to his critique of religion. Yet at the same time it grows out of his spirituality ("faith", "our relationship to God"), which expresses itself as a "new life in 'being there for others', through participation in the being of Jesus." In his letter to Bethge (April 30, 1944), he writes:

What keeps gnawing at me is the question, what is Christianity, or who is Christ actually for us today? The age when we could tell people that with words—whether with theological or with pious words—is past, as is the age of inwardness and of conscience, and that means the age of religion altogether. We are approaching a completely religionless age; people as they are now simply cannot be religious anymore. ⁴⁸

The questions to be answered would be: What does a church, a congregation, a sermon, a liturgy, a Christian life, mean in a religionless world? How do we talk about God—without religion, that is, without the temporally conditioned presuppositions of metaphysics, the inner life, and so on? How do we speak (or perhaps we can no longer even "speak" the way we used to) in a "worldly" way about "God"? How do we go about being "religionless-worldly" Christians, how can we be $\dot{\epsilon}x$ - $\lambda\eta\sigma(\alpha)$, those who are called out, without understanding ourselves religiously as privileged, but instead seeing ourselves as belonging wholly to the world? Christ would then no longer be the object of religion, but something else entirely, truly lord of the world. But what does that mean? In a religionless situation, what do ritual [Kultus] and prayer mean? Is this where the "arcane discipline" [Arkandisziplin], or the difference (which you've heard about from me before) between the penultimate and the ultimate, have new significance?⁴⁹

Bonhoeffer, declaring that the "age of religion" is past, asks some far-reaching questions: "What is Christianity, or who is Christ actually for us today?" "How do we speak ... in a worldly way about 'God'." "How do we go about being 'religionless-worldly Christians'?" "In a religionless situation, what do ritual and prayer

⁴⁷ Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers from Prison*, volume 8 of the *Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works*, (English edition; hereafter, DBWE), (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2010), DBWE 8:501.

⁴⁸ Bonhoeffer, DBWE 8:362.

⁴⁹ Bonhoeffer, DBWE 8:364.

mean?" Several days later (May 5, 1944), in another letter to Bethge, he explains what he means by "interpreting religiously"; "What then does it mean to 'interpret religiously'? It means, in my opinion, to speak metaphysically, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, individualistically. Neither way is appropriate, either for the biblical message or for people today." ⁵⁰ In these short texts we can find the key elements of Bonhoeffer's critique of religion, which Ralf Wüstenberg summarizes well in his book, *Theology of Life*.

The concepts "metaphysics" and "inwardness/individualism"—primary features of Bonhoeffer's late criticism of religion—are now interpreted from different perspectives: metaphysics under the aspects of "deus ex machina," "stopgap," and "working hypothesis 'God'"; "inwardness/individualism" under the aspects of "something partial," "religiously privileged," and guardianship of "God". 51

We have space for only a brief sketch of how Bonhoeffer understood these terms, and what he proposed in their place. Instead of a metaphysical idea of God, who is far away and high above us, Bonhoeffer stressed the nearness and presence of God in the world, among us. We meet Christ in what we do, and above all in those whom we meet. As he wrote in "Outline for a Book", "our relationship to God is a new life in "being there for others," through participation in the being of Jesus. The transcendent becomes "the neighbor within reach in any given situation." For Bonhoeffer, our relationship to God leads us to people; our union with Christ is worked out in participation in the being of Jesus, i.e. "being-for-others". Spirituality therefore need not chose between being in Christ and being for others; rather than isolating our relationship with God from our relationship with others, it encompasses and incorporates both.

Instead of religious "inwardness" and "individualism", Bonhoeffer proposes life with others, both in the Church community and society at-large, for "the church is church only when it is there for others." God's sovereignty does not release us from responsibility for ourselves and for others, instead the living God calls us to freedom and responsibility, and invites us to participate in His presence and work in the world. In the place of the *deus ex machina* God, whose main purpose for existence (it would appear) is to rescue us—His dependent, helpless

⁵⁰ Bonhoeffer, DBWE 8:372.

 $^{^{51}} Ralf$ Wüstenberg, A Theology of Life: Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Religionless Christianity, (Grand Rapids MI: Eerdmans, 1998), 22.

⁵² Bonhoeffer, DBWE 8:501.

⁵³ Bonhoeffer, DBWE 8:503.

children!—from suffering and oppression, we find a God who encourages us to maturity and interdependence. Partiality is exchanged for solidarity with God and others, which often takes the form of participating in the suffering of God and in suffering with others. Bonhoeffer fights religious entitlement with the theology of the cross; being in Christ means humility and not pride, service and not privileges. As he writes, "The church must participate in the worldly tasks of life in the community—not dominating but helping and serving.⁵⁴

As Wüstenberg shows, Bonhoeffer's critique of religion was not a consistent, well-defined program; he could speak positively and not just negatively about religion. Furthermore, as tempting as it is to force his comments into a clear, chronological order (i.e. early positive statements about religion, a middle period where he adopts the critical approach of Karl Barth, and finally his prison theology from 1944 on, where he postulates religionlessness), 55 "positive statements, critical statements, and comments about religionlessness not only follow developmentally one upon the other, but also occur systematically juxtaposed." The reason for this, Wüstenberg argues, is that Bonhoeffer never offered (nor undertook) a programmatic critique of religion, and never provided a consistent definition of "religion"; rather than "integrating *religion* into his own theological thinking . . . 'religion' becomes the formal, negative foil against which other important ideas are substantively explicated."

In a similar vein, Green insists that Bonhoeffer really meant what he said when he used phrases like "religionless Christianity" and "non-religious interpretation of biblical and theological concepts". ⁵⁸ Bonhoeffer shared Barth's "critical judgment that religion was a 'human path to God'." But unlike Barth, "Bonhoeffer never had a doctrine of 'true religion'. Authentic Christianity? Yes. True Religion? No." ⁵⁹ The reason for this is that Bonhoeffer's theory of religion—in contrast to Barth's "formal or phenomenological definition", was "quite historical, particular, and above all functional, or behavioral. Religion as turning to the power-God in human personal crisis and intellectual problems, religion as born of human weakness, suffering, and ignorance, religion as devoted to a *deus ex machina* theology—this is what Bonhoeffer rejected."

All of this suggests that while there is a relationship between Bonhoeffer's critique of religion and his postulate of non-religious Christianity, the source of the

⁵⁴ Bonhoeffer, DBWE 8:503.

⁵⁵ Wüstenberg, A Theology of Life, 26.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 27.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 27.

⁵⁸ Green, "Bonhoeffer's Quest", 349.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 349.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 349.

latter lies elsewhere. Wüstenberg discerns the source of Bonhoeffer's admittedly sketchy outline of non-religious Christianity, not in religion or its critique, but rather in Dilthey's philosophy of life.

[Bonhoeffer] adopts Dilthey's concept of life and interprets it christologically: life with Christ. The nonreligious interpretation is thus a Christological interpretation taking its reference point in life; what one might call a "life-christological" interpretation.⁶¹

Rather than separating life in this world from faith, Bonhoeffer seeks the proper relationship between them. In the May 5th, 1944 letter, it is clear that he does not intend to leave the Church. In an autonomous world-come-of-age, the reestablishment of an "arcane" or secret discipline within the church community turns out to be as important and essential for non-religious Christians as the practice of non-religious interpretation in the world.⁶² In the April 30, 1944 letter, he does not leave "Church, congregation, a sermon, a liturgy, a Christian life" behind, but rather asks about their place in a religionless world.⁶³ Similarly, in "Thoughts on the Day of Baptism", he writes to his godson Dietrich Wilhelm Rüdiger Bethge, that "we can be Christians today in only two ways, through prayer and in doing justice among human beings."⁶⁴ In words that recall Green's distinction between Bonhoeffer's ecclesial theology and his public theology, Wüstenberg explains,

The glorification of the mystery of Christ's person in prayer and worship corresponds externally to the responsible act, so that arcane discipline finds its "dialectical counterpart" in the nonreligious interpretation. In the words of the *Letters and Papers from Prison*, arcane discipline and religionless are related like *the prayer and actions of the righteous*. Or to use a formulation from the *Ethics*, arcane discipline and nonreligious interpretation are related as the ultimate and the penultimate.⁶⁵

But what does this non-religious Christianity really look like? There are perhaps twenty interesting and useful books on my shelves alone, which seek to tell us how we might life out Bonhoeffer's vision today. Why so many, and why do the answers vary so much? Once again, we turn to Wüstenberg for the answer.

⁶¹ Ralf Wüstenberg, A Theology of Life, 156.

⁶² Bonhoeffer, DBWE 8:373.

⁶³ Ibid., 8:364.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 8:389.

⁶⁵ Wüstenberg, Ibid., 29.

And thus we arrive at the question of how this life for others really looks. [...] In his fragmentary Tegel theology, Bonhoeffer equipped us with the guiding questions regarding the correct relationship between life come of age and Christian faith—this was his theme, and was the essence of the questions of nonreligious interpretation. Both the church and theology will have to struggle ever anew to find the appropriate answer.⁶⁶

In the end, or perhaps the beginning, Bonhoeffer has left us much. We have the testimony of his life and death, his texts on following Christ and living in community, his ethics, and last but not least his "fragmentary" prison theology. It is left to us, however, to take up our cross and follow Jesus, to live with and for others, both in the community and in the world. And we ourselves must "struggle ever anew", to answer the questions about the "correct relationship between life come of age and Christian faith."

True religion or non-religious Christianity?

Much more could be written about Edwards' and Bonhoeffer's views on "religion"—and already has. However, our purpose here is to compare their views regarding true religion and non-religious Christianity. Are they speaking of the same thing, or two different things? Do they complement or contradict each other? Can they help us understand religion in post-Christian Europe? How can a meeting between them be arranged, what form might it take, and where would it lead?

The path of least resistance is to look for parallels between *Religious Affections* (RA) on the one side, and *Life Together* (LT) and *Discipleship* (D) on the other. Following that line, but breaking RA down into the reliable and unreliable signs, one could compare LT and D to the unreliable signs, and *Ethics* (E) and *Letters and Papers from Prison* (LPP) to the reliable signs. Or perhaps within Bonhoeffer's resistance ethics and prison theology (E and LPP), we can distinguish between his critique of religion (which we compare to Edwards' unreliable signs), and his proposal for non-religious Christianity (which we compare to Edwards' reliable signs). The possibilities seem endless. Whichever path we chose, the full journey must wait for another trip.

In the space remaining, I would like to first suggest a shopping list of topics to explore, containing just a few of the many issues that could and should be raised in a meeting between Edwards and Bonhoeffer. I will then bring this initial conversation to a close by addressing four questions: (1) Edwards' and Bonhoeffer's

⁶⁶ Ibid., 146.

public and private theology. (2) Edwards' emphasis on regeneration and Bonhoeffer's focus on "God's righteousness and kingdom on earth". (3) Edwards' true religion and Bonhoeffer's non-religious Christianity. (3) Edwards "holy practice" and Bonhoeffer's "prayer and righteous action". The comments below are all too brief, a fault that I hope to correct in the future.

Edwards meets Bonhoeffer: some topics to explore

- Both critique religious experience: To what extent is Bonhoeffer's critique of "pietism", inwardness, partiality etc. similar or parallel to Edwards' critique of the religious experiences/excesses of the Great Awakening?
- Both are consistently non-dualistic (e.g. no division of body/soul, sacred and secular).
- Edwards speaks of a new knowing or spiritual sight, of seeing the beauty of Christ and the gospel; Bonhoeffer writes of "understanding the world better than it knows itself", of seeing reality, i.e. the world as reconciled to God in Christ). The terminology and traditions are different, are the concepts nevertheless parallel?
- Both taught and practiced self-examination without falling into introspection. Edwards stressed that the signs are not for the purpose of judging others but rather to examine one's self. Did he avoid morbid introspection? Probably. Bonhoeffer spoke against inwardness, and declared that Christ wants to meet us in our strength and not just in our weakness. Yet he introduced private confession among the students at the Preachers' seminary in Finkenwalde.
- How significant are their philosophical differences (phenomenological idealism versus post-critical realism)? Do their differences here undermine views and positions that might otherwise seem compatible?
- Following Luther, there is a strong element in Bonhoeffer of apophatic or negative theology—which leads to recognizing God in Christ, and to the theology of the cross. This is where we meet, see, and know God. How does this compare to Edwards' more kataphatic or positive theology, to his epistemology?
- Edwards was obsessed with salvation history, saw revivals as God's plan for furthering His Kingdom, and laid the foundation of a grand meta-history of redemption. How does this compare to Bonhoeffer's understated (though real) eschatology, to his "dialogical view" of God's sovereignty?
- Edwards' vision of the beauty of God drove all of his theology. How does this compare e.g. to Bonhoeffer's idea of Christ as the *cantus firmus*?
- For Edwards, true religion is to love Jesus, not just have correct doctrine about him. He was captured by the beauty of Christ and the gospel. Bonhoeffer's Christological center is well known; in his next to last letter to Bethge he wrote (Aug.

- 21, 1944): "We must immerse ourselves again and again, for a long time and quite calmly, in Jesus's life, his sayings, actions, suffering, and dying in order to recognize what God promises and fulfills." Christ is at the center of both men's theology; what are their differences, similarities?
- Both saw Christ as Lord of the whole world, not just the church. However, by Bonhoeffer's day, the church had become not just assailed or embattled, but—at least in much of Europe, which is the context Bonhoeffer spoke of when referring to "the world come of age"—the church had become a marginalized ghetto, largely irrelevant. How does this change of perspective impact their respective views?

Public versus ecclesial theology

The first question I want to comment on stems from Green's distinction, raised above, between Bonhoeffer's ecclesial (LT, D) and public (E, LPP) theology. The relationship between LT and D, written during the period of Bonhoeffer's active involvement in the Church Struggle against the all-inclusive claims of the Nazi state, and E and LPP, written during his involvement in the conspiracy and following his arrest in 1942, has long been debated by Bonhoeffer scholars. A few have claimed that nothing really changed, others that nearly everything changed; most observers today recognize a basic trajectory of Bonhoeffer's thought throughout his life (continuity characterized by natural growth and development), together with the appearance of new ideas or concepts that move in original and striking directions. By focusing attention on the context and audience, Green's distinction between Bonhoeffer's ecclesial versus public theology provides a helpful approach, which reduces the tension within the Bonhoeffer corpus without removing it altogether. Does adopting the ecclesial versus public theology distinction indicate that we should stick with comparing RA with LT/D? Or rather that we should incorporate E/LPP into the discussion, since differences between Bonhoeffer's earlier and later works are—to some degree at least—a matter of differences in terminology, resulting from the shift in context (church struggle versus conspiracy) and audience (church community versus society at large)?

Our answer to those questions is complicated by the fact that Edwards also had a robust public theology, which as McDermott has pointed out, stems "from his philosophy of being and his theology of love." In *The Nature of True Virtue*, Edwards' "described the structure of being as a vast network of interrelations

⁶⁷ Gerald McDermott, "Public Theology, Society, and America", chapter 32 in Michael McClymond and Gerald McDermott, *The Theology of Jonathan Edwards*, (Oxford University Press, 2012), 513. For a fuller treatment, cf. Gerald McDermott, *One Holy and Happy Society: The public Theology of Jonathan Edwards*, (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1992).

wherein every entity is related to every other."⁶⁸ Edwards believed that God, the "Being of beings" was the source and goal of beings, and the Being in and through whom all other beings are related. Nevertheless, in *True Virtue* he never cites the Bible, arguing instead from conscience, moral benevolence, and aesthetic perception, which he believed are common to all human beings, to lay the foundation for a "common moral philosophy", which in turn would function as a framework for "cooperation of Christians and non-Christians in social projects with moral ends."⁶⁹ So, we may conclude, although the public and ecclesial theology distinction works for approaching both Edwards and Bonhoeffer, and offers much promise in comparing the two, at this stage of our enquiry it raises as many questions as it answers, and points to the need for more in-depth research and analysis.

Regeneration versus "God's righteousness and kingdom on earth"

We saw above the importance Edwards placed on regeneration (new birth), by virtue of which believers receive that collective set of religious affections or "new sense of the heart" which the Holy Spirit "'infuses' to enable saints to see God's infinite beauty and glory"⁷⁰, and which in turn issues in holy practice. For Edwards, regeneration, religious affections, and holy practice are interrelated and inseparable, and they lie at the very heart of "true religion". What then is their place or role in Bonhoeffer's vision of non-religious Christianity? As he wrote from prison, there are "more important things to talk about than … saving our souls".

Hasn't the individualistic question of saving our personal souls almost faded away for most of us? Isn't it our impression that there are really more important things than this question (—perhaps not more important than this *matter*, but certainly more important than the *question*!?)? I know it sounds outrageous to say that, but after all, isn't it fundamentally biblical? Does the question of saving one's soul even come up in the Old Testament? Isn't God's righteousness and kingdom on earth the center of everything? And isn't Rom. 3:24ff. the culmination of the view that God alone is righteous, rather than an individualistic doctrine of salvation? What matters is not the beyond but this world, how it is created and preserved, [10] is given laws, reconciled, and renewed. What is beyond this world is meant, in the gospel, to be there *for* this world—not in the anthropocentric sense of liberal, mystical, pietistic, ethical theology, but in the biblical sense of the creation and the incar-

⁶⁸ Ibid., 513.

⁶⁹ Bd.,. 514-515.

⁷⁰ McDermott, "The Affections", 180.

nation, crucifixion, and resurrection of Jesus Christ.⁷¹

Is Bonhoeffer here denying the need for regeneration (rebirth)? If so, then regardless of whatever other similarities we might discover between them, the two men would appear to have quite different things in mind when they speak of "true religion" and "non-religious Christianity". Once again, however, we must make the effort required to understand what Bonhoeffer was trying to say, not least from the perspective of his death-row prison cell in the Third Reich. He qualifies his declaration, first by saying that there are more important things to talk about than the *question* of salvation, not the *matter* of salvation itself. Furthermore, it is the "individualistic question of saving our personal souls." And he goes on from there to talk about the Old Testament theme of God's righteousness and His Kingdom on earth, to speak (in a very Lutheran manner) about God's righteousness, and to paraphrase in a brief sentence or two, both the heart of his vision of "this-worldly" Christianity and the critique of the "religious" views—"the beyond" (i.e. "metaphysics" and "otherworldliness"), "liberal, mystical, pietistic, ethical theology"—it replaces. Once again, the differences in culture, tradition, historical-intellectual-political context, as well as terminology, make the conversation more nuanced than it seems at first. In one sense we moved ahead, in another we find ourselves back where we started, with the question of true religion or non-religious Christianity still before us.

True religion and non-religious Christianity

As Green declared above, "Bonhoeffer never had a doctrine of 'true religion'. Authentic Christianity? Yes. True Religion? No." Nevertheless, we may still ask whether "true religion" and "non-religious", "this-worldly", *authentic* Christianity have much in common. The answer, I believe is yes, but as we work this out, we must keep our heads—and our terminology—clear. We discussed above what Bonhoeffer was rejecting in his critique of religion. Green goes on to add:

. . . if somebody wants to operate with a different definition of religion . . . that would be a whole different discussion. And for certain purposes we do need different definitions. But there is no way, I insist, to theologically rehabilitate and legitimate the sort of religion Bonhoeffer described, nor impute to him a second positive concept of religion. ⁷³

⁷¹ Bonhoeffer, DBWE 8:372-373.

⁷² Ibid., 349.

⁷³ Green, "Bonhoeffer's Quest", 351.

Three observations come to mind: (1) It is legitimate to ask what Edwards meant by (true) religion; (2) In comparing Bonhoeffer to Edwards we must not rehabilitate the "religion" he rejected—or if we insist on so doing, at least avoid calling it *Bonhoeffer's* view of religion; (3) It is not correct to call anything *Bonhoeffer's* view of true religion.

Bonhoeffer and Edwards are speaking of two different things when they speak of religion. Edwards speaks of true religion in his "reliable signs"; Bonhoeffer not only rejected what he considered the false religions of his day, but went on to argue that religion, as a historical phenomenon, had run its course. The world, he declared has "come-of-age", and "we are approaching a completely religionless age; people as they are now simply cannot be religious anymore." Without a theory of religion, Bonhoeffer could speak of non-religious, this-worldly or as Green suggests "authentic" Christianity, but not of "true religion", which makes comparing him with Edwards at once more difficult and more intriguing.

It is important to note that Bonhoeffer was not claiming that—from here on out—the "age of religion" is past for all people, everywhere; rather he was describing the European context of his day. It may be argued that his comments retain much of their validity in today's post-Christian Europe; we may debate their relevance in other contexts. It is another matter entirely to ask how they do (or do not) apply to religious phenomena in Edwards' day, in the two-thirds world, etc. Yes, we may employ Bonhoeffer's critique of religion to evaluate Edward's "true religion", we may compare non-religious Christianity with Edwards positive marks of true religion, etc. We may also turn the tables and critique Bonhoeffer's this-worldly Christianity from the perspective of Edwards' reliable and unreliable signs of true religion. But the meeting we arrange between Bonhoeffer and Edwards must not take place in a theoretical, ahistorical vacuum. We must keep their historical-cultural, intellectual-philosophical, geo-political, and ecclesial-theological contexts clearly in mind, along with our own. Only then may we properly and profitably ask what they have to teach us about following Christ in our individual lives, our community and our society today.

"Holy practice" versus "prayer and doing justice among human beings"

Our last question concerns the relationship between Edwards' twelfth sign or "holy practice" on one hand, and on the other hand the classic opening to Bonhoeffer's *Discipleship*, (where he contrasts "cheap" and "costly" grace), together with Bonhoeffer's declaration from Tegel prison that in post-Third-Reich Europe "we can be Christians in only two ways, through prayer and in doing justice among

⁷⁴ Bonhoeffer, DBWE 8:362.

human beings." Edwards declares that there is no more reliable way to recognize true religion than by observing the nature of its fruit. Accordingly, Christians should talk less and do more, should serve others rather than defend their own privileges. Bonhoeffer in turn declares that the church, by defending its own freedom and privilege rather than defending the innocent and helpless, has lost the authority—or at least the credibility—to speak. What remains, for now, is the practice of "secret discipline" within the community, and righteous action without. Wherever they start (and the consensus on both men is that they start with Christ), they seem to end up in roughly the same place. There certainly seems to be common ground to explore here.

Conclusion

Great people tend to rise above their era, to overcome and surpass the limitations of their tradition and worldview. Thus in the history of the Church, we find time and again that great theologians and pastors—despite their very real differences—are often closer to the heart of God, and hence to each other, than many who claim to be their followers. This indeed appears to be the case with Edwards and Bonhoeffer. May the conversation continue; for now I close with a quote from Bonhoeffer, in words which Edwards himself could have written.

It is not for us to predict the day—but the day will come—when people will once more be called to speak the word of God in such a way that the world is changed and renewed. It will be in a new language, perhaps quite nonreligious language, but liberating and redeeming like Jesus's language, so that people will be alarmed and yet overcome by its power-the language of a new righteousness and truth, a language proclaiming that God makes peace with humankind and that God's kingdom is drawing near. "They shall fear and tremble because of all the good and all the prosperity I provide for them" (Jer. 33:9). Until then the Christian cause will be a quiet and hidden one, but there will be people who pray and do justice and wait for God's own time. May you be one of them, and may it be said of you one day: "The path of the righteous is like the light of dawn, which shines brighter and brighter until full day" (Prov. 4:18).⁷⁵

⁷⁵ Bonhoeffer, DBWE 8:390.

Abstract

It seems that Jonathan Edwards and Dietrich Bonhoeffer are on opposite ends of the religious spectrum. But is that really the case? This article explores how Edwards' Religious Affections might fare when subjected to a Bonhoefferian critique of religion, and compares his views on true religion to Bonhoeffer's proposal for non-religious Christianity. Are they speaking of the same thing, or two different things? Do they complement or contradict each other? Can they help us understand religion in post-Christian Europe? How can a meeting between them be arranged, what form might it take, and where would it lead?



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Professor Gerald McDemott of Roanake College delivers the keynote address at the 2011 International Jonathan Edwards Conference, organized in Wrocław by EWST and the Jonathan Edwards Center-Poland.



Students and scholars from fifteen universities, six international Jonathan Edwards Centers and four continents participated in the 2011 Conference.



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Dr. Joel Burnell, Prof. Wojciech Szczerba (President of the Evangelical School of Theology), Prof. Adriaan Neele of Yale, and Prof. Kenneth Minkema sign the Agreement between Yale University and EWST establishing the Jonathan Edwards Center-Poland. (May 30, 2009)